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Florida Statute 56.17 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 56.17 Case Law from Google Scholar
Statute is currently reporting as:
Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 56.17

The 2023 Florida Statutes

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Chapter 56
FINAL PROCESS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 56.17
56.17 Executions; duty of officer on claim of third person being filed.—On receipt of the bond and affidavit the officer shall deliver the property to the claimant and desist from any further proceedings under the execution until the right of property is tried. The officer shall return the execution to the court from which it issued with the affidavit and bond.
History.—ss. 9, 10, Feb. 17, 1833; RS 1198; GS 1627; RGS 2831; CGL 4518; s. 11, ch. 67-254; s. 303, ch. 95-147.
Note.—Former s. 55.40.

F.S. 56.17 on Google Scholar

F.S. 56.17 on Casetext

Amendments to 56.17


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 56.17
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 56.17.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All

  1. The Highland Consulting Grp. v. Soule

    9:19-cv-81636-RLR (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2023)
    Fla. Stat. Ann. § 56.16. Under this statute, a third party claiming a right to seized property can file an affidavit with the seizing agency asserting the claim and also including a bond. Once these requirements are met, “the officer shall deliver the property to the claimant and desist from any further proceedings under the execution until the right of property is tried.” Fla. Stat. §56.17.
    PAGE 7

  2. Caballero v. de Colombia

    1:18-cv-25337-KMM/Becerra (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2022)
    Plaintiff argues that the Interested Parties are precluded from seeking relief because they failed to provide a bond and an affidavit, as required by Chapter 56 of the Florida Statutes. ECF No. [192] at 3. Plaintiff references four sections of Chapter 56, Sections 56.12, 56.15, 56.16, and 56.17. See ECF No. [192] at 2. Although the applicability of each varies based on whether the interested parties are considered judgment debtors or non-judgment debtors, the bond and affidavit requirements are the same. Plaintiff contends the Interested Parties were required to post a bond in the amount of $155,775,586.44, equal to double the value of the properties at issue. Id.; ECF No. [192-1] at 3. Such a requirement, Plaintiff asserts, is not waivable and precludes any challenge to the sale. See ECF No. [192] at 2.
    PAGE 35

  3. Clampitt v. Marie Wick, Co.

    320 So. 3d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times
    (Emphasis added.) Under its plain language, section 56.16 provides a process for a person who "claims any property levied on" to "obtain possession of the property." Id. That person must execute an affidavit and furnish a bond. Id. "On receipt of the bond and affidavit the officer shall deliver the property to the claimant and desist from any further proceedings under the execution until the right of property is tried." § 56.17.
    PAGE 830

  4. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Res. Rep. Inc.

    662 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2011)   Cited 637 times
    [i]n applying the basic principles [governing summary judgment,] the factor of access to proof must ... be seriously considered in ruling on a defendant's motion for summary judgment, particularly ... where plaintiff's proof must come mainly from sources largely within the control of the defendants and from the mouths of the alleged wrongdoers. Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., Inc. v. Am. Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 609 (5th Cir.1979) (quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 56.17( 60) at 56–1065 (1976 ed.)).1 Consequently, “[s]ummary judgment should not ... ordinarily be granted before discovery has been completed.” Id. In the present case, discovery has not been completed because of the destruction of the most relevant evidence necessary for Josendis to establish his case and because the district court improperly constricted the scope of discovery. Thus, to cite one example, the district judge denied Josendis's request to discover “[a]ll of the income reporting documents submitted by [Wall to Wall] to the Internal Revenue Service regarding the Plaintiff for [three calendar years prior to the filing of Josendis's original complaint on July 25, 2008 (the ‘relevant…

  5. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc. v. Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n

    881 F.2d 983 (11th Cir. 1989)   Cited 10 times
    Section 605(a) of the Federal Communications Act prohibits the unauthorized third party reception of satellite transmissions intended for fee-paying subscribers. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Corinth Motel, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Miss. 1986); American Television and Communications Corp. v. Floken, Ltd., supra; Entertainment and Sports Programming Network, Inc. v. Edinburg Community Hotel, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.Tex. 1985); National Football League and Miami Dolphins, Inc. v. The Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6 (S.D.Fla. 1983). Section 605(e)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. 1989) empowers the district court to "grant . . . final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain violations of subsection (a)." On appeal from a permanent injunction granted on a motion for summary judgment, the critical issue is "whether [the plaintiff], as the moving party here, clearly established the absence of any genuine issue of fact material to the granting of the injunction." Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Murphy, supra, 626 F.2d at 655; see 6 Moore's Federal Practice para. 56.17[30] (1988).
    PAGE 988

  6. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. F.T.C

    849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988)   Cited 115 times   4 Legal Analyses
    108 F.T.C. at 359-60 (citing 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[11] at 56-785 (1987)) (quoting ALJ's Initial Decision, reprinted in 108 F.T.C. 263, 312 (1986)) (footnotes omitted). Because the Commission properly rejected the suggestion that Orkin's proffered extrinsic evidence could make the contracts ambiguous, it could not have erred in its review of this evidence.
    PAGE 1363

  7. Bingham, Ltd. v. United States

    724 F.2d 921 (11th Cir. 1984)   Cited 81 times
    Disposition of a summary judgment motion in a declaratory judgment action is governed by the same basic principles that generally rule the grant or denial of such a motion. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 56.17[19]. Before rendering summary judgment, the district court must determine "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c); Shahid v. Gulf Power Co., 291 F.2d 422, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1961), rehearing denied, 298 F.2d 793 (1962). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 93 S.Ct. 2469, 37 L.Ed.2d 207 (1973). The district court must view the inferences to be drawn from materials submitted in support of that motion, however, in a light "most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176, 177 (1962). Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655, 656 (11th Cir. 1983).
    PAGE 924

  8. In re Yarn Processing Pat. Validity Lit.

    462 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Fla. 1978)   Cited 2 times

    long has been the hallmark of `even handed justice.'" See also 6 Pt. 2, J. Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.17[11] (2d ed. 1976). The question of whether ARCT, INC., MACFIELD TEXTURING, INC., and AVTEX, INC.,

  9. BUDGET LANDSCAPE v. McMILLIN INV

    343 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 2 times
    The appropriate method for appellee to protect any interest it might have in the property on which the execution was levied is provided for by statute. Section 56.16, Florida Statutes (1976), provides that a third party claimant (such as appellee) to property levied on may obtain possession of the property by filing an affidavit that the property belongs to him and by posting a bond in favor of the judgment creditor. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 56.17, Florida Statutes (1976), the officer delivers the property to the claimant, desists from proceeding under the execution, and returns the execution to the court from which it issued with the affidavit and bond. Section 56.18, Florida Statutes (1976), provides that as soon as possible after the return, a trial shall be held on the issue of ownership obviously in the court from which the execution emanated. 13 Fla.Jur., Execution, § 97. Accordingly, it appears to me that, rather than seeking an injunction in the Circuit Court of Indian River County, the appellee should have followed the statutory remedy set forth in Chapter 56, Florida Statutes (1976).

  10. Revitz v. County of Dade

    291 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
    Affirmed. McClosky v. Martin, Fla. 1951, 56 So.2d 916; Pan American Metal Products Co. v. Healy, Fla.App. 1962, 138 So.2d 96; §§ 30.30, 56.16, 56.17, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.

    Cases from cite.case.law:

    HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, v. NORTHERN BUILDING COMPANY, 751 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2014)

    . . . Dickey, 827 F.2d 90, 100 n. 8 (7th Cir.1987) (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[18] (2d ed.1986 . . .

    HANCOCK COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, v. RUHR, v. v. L. J. v. v. v. v. v. v. v., 487 F. App'x 189 (5th Cir. 2012)

    . . . deviation percentages for the nine counties are the following: Adams, 39.46%; Amite, 49.05%; Claiborne, 56.17% . . .

    JOSENDIS, v. WALL TO WALL RESIDENCE REPAIRS, INC. a, 662 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2011)

    . . . Co., 606 F.2d 602, 609 (5th Cir.1979) (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice P 56.17(60) at 56-1065 (1976 . . .

    In R. FIGARD, J. R. J. v. PHH f k a d b a Mo., 382 B.R. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008)

    . . . Underwriting Findings did increase the total monthly payment of the Figards to $765.21 which was a $56.17 . . .

    SIERRA CLUB, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION USDOT FHWA FHWA FHWA, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Nev. 2004)

    . . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[3], at 2472 (1965)); Buckingham Township v. . . .

    SFERRA, v. M. MATHEW,, 103 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)

    . . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[58] at 606) (citing DeLuca v. . . .

    CAPITAL DISTRICT PHYSICIAN S HEALTH PLAN, v. O HIGGINS, d b a O Co., 951 F. Supp. 352 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)

    . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17[4] (2d ed. 1996). . . .

    In PENNSYLVANIA FOOTWEAR CORPORATION, PENNSYLVANIA FOOTWEAR CORPORATION, P. v. MIDLANTIC BANK, N. A., 199 B.R. 534 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996)

    . . . MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶56.17[58], at 56-606 (2d ed. 1995-96), the text further cautions that, “when . . .

    In JOSHUA HILL, INC. JOSHUA HILL, INC. A. v. WHITEMARSH TOWNSHIP AUTHORITY J. K. M. K. R. S., 199 B.R. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1996)

    . . . MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 56.17[58], at 56-606 (2d ed. 1995-96), the text further cautions that, “when . . .

    JAMES MADISON LIMITED, F. HECHT, Sr. v. A. LUDWIG,, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

    . . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[3], 56-362 (1988). . . .

    PENOBSCOT INDIAN NATION, v. KEY BANK OF MAINE,, 906 F. Supp. 13 (D. Me. 1995)

    . . . defendant where “there was nothing to support a finding of negligence”); see Moore’s Federal Practice, § 56.17 . . .

    KROLL, v. DISNEY STORE, INC., 899 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1995)

    . . . Moore’s Federal Practice, 2nd Ed., Rule 56, paragraph 56.15[1] and 56.17[20-1]. . . .

    ULISSEY, v. SHVARTSMAN,, 61 F.3d 805 (10th Cir. 1995)

    . . . Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶56.17[42] (2d ed. 1995). . . .

    T. OGLESBY, II, M. D. v. PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 877 F. Supp. 872 (D. Del. 1994)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.17[43], at 56-544 (2d ed. 1988). . . .

    BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. W. R. GRACE CO. CONN., 918 F. Supp. 533 (D. Conn. 1994)

    . . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[58] at 606. This has been long recognized in the Second Circuit. . . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[4] at 381. . . .

    ELKHART BRASS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. v. TASK FORCE TIPS, INC., 867 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ill. 1994)

    . . . fact or whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.17 . . .

    In BEST REFRIGERATED EXPRESS, INC. HOARTY, v. C. H. ROBINSON COMPANY,, 168 B.R. 969 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1994)

    . . . fact and only a question of law, summary judgment is appropriate. 6-Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.17 . . .

    E. HARTIG, v. SAFELITE GLASS CORP., 819 F. Supp. 1523 (D. Kan. 1993)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[41-1] (1993). . . .

    FARR, v. DESIGNER PHOSPHATE AND PREMIX INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. FARR,, 804 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Neb. 1992)

    . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17[58] (2d ed. 1982)). . . .

    PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC. v. GANTT, Co- Co- T. WARING, v. GANTT, Co- Co- M., 796 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

    . . . District % Afr-Amer % Hispanic % White CD 7 57.90 13.53 (8.73) 24.65 CD 15 57.27 18.95 (16.7) 21.48 CD 8 56.17 . . .

    A. C. AUKERMAN COMPANY, v. R. L. CHAIDES CONSTRUCTION CO., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992)

    . . . See 6 Moore’s, supra, ¶ 56.17[38] (2d ed. 1990). . . .

    D. PATTERSON, v. A. COUGHLIN, III P. J. N., 905 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1990)

    . . . Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 33-34 (2d Cir.1986); 6 Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice ¶1 56.17 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. NEW CASTLE COUNTY, C. ICI NEW CASTLE COUNTY, ICI v. AVON PRODUCTS, INC. NVF E. I. Co. FMC, 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989)

    . . . Authority, Etc., 500 F.Supp. 559, 563-64 (D.Del.1980); see also 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17[10 . . .

    XEROX CORPORATION, As A v. GENMOORA CORP. J. E. W., 888 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1989)

    . . . Id., citing 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 56.17[60] at 56-1065 (1976 ed.): In applying the basic principles . . .

    G. WAHL, E. A. On v. CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS,, 725 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Kan. 1989)

    . . . event be disfavored as an appropriate issue for summary judgment. 6 — Pt. 2 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.17 . . .

    SHOWTIME THE MOVIE CHANNEL, INC. ESPN, v. COVERED BRIDGE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., 881 F.2d 983 (11th Cir. 1989)

    . . . Murphy, supra, 626 F.2d at 655; see 6 Moore’s Federal Practice para. 56.17[30] (1988). . . .

    L. BANKS, v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, a a a, 870 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989)

    . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.17[41.-1] (2d ed. 1988); see, e.g., Sankovich v. Life Ins. . . .

    A. HORWITZ, v. AGS COLUMBIA ASSOCIATES,, 700 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[41.2] (2d ed. 1988) (“Summary judgment is generally inappropriate . . .

    CHESAPEAKE UTILITIES CORPORATION, v. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY,, 704 F. Supp. 551 (D. Del. 1989)

    . . . Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[43], at 56-544 (2d ed. 1988). .The functional equivalent of . . .

    VALLEY CITIZENS FOR A SAFE ENVIRONMENT, v. C. ALDRIDGE, F., 695 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass. 1988)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[3] (2d ed. 1985). . . .

    SPEARMAN v. UNITED STATES, 690 F. Supp. 1435 (E.D. Pa. 1988)

    . . . Moore, Federal Practice Par. 56.17[1], at 2464 (2d ed. 1974). . . .

    ORKIN EXTERMINATING COMPANY, INC. v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988)

    . . . provide ... for a fixed annual renewal fee.” 108 F.T.C. at 359-60 (citing 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 11 56.17 . . .

    STREET, v. VITTI,, 685 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[43] (2d ed. 1987). . 97 A.D.2d 151, 468 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1983). . . .

    GARZA, v. MARINE TRANSPORT LINES, INC. v. NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING DRYDOCK CORPORATION,, 680 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)

    . . . Moore 11 56.17[43]. . . . Moore, at If 56.17[43]. . . .

    SAHAGIAN, v. DICKEY,, 827 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1987)

    . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[18] (2d ed. 1986) (footnotes omitted). . . .

    In CANDOR DIAMOND CORP. McCOLLEY, v. ROSENBERG, RY Co., 76 B.R. 342 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice II 56.17[27] at 56-869-70 (2d ed.1987); see, e.g., Murray v. . . .

    STEINBERG, v. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC. RCA Co. RCA CPT RCA RCA Co. A. H. A. S. Co. STEINBERG, v. COLUMBIA- DELPHI PRODUCTIONS, II, II,, 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)

    . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice 11118.28, 56.02[2], 56.17[4] (2d ed. 1986). . . .

    CARTER, v. CITY OF BRISTOL, VIRGINIA,, 662 F. Supp. 114 (W.D. Va. 1987)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17(42) (2d ed. 1985). . . .

    T. S. I. INC. v. BERMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., 115 F.R.D. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)

    . . . judgment on these contract claims since no material facts remain for adjudication. 6 Moore’s Fed.Prac. fl 56.17 . . .

    McGINNISS, v. EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION,, 648 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)

    . . . Co. of Newark, 707 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.1983); 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[31] (2d ed. 1985) . . .

    S. PANTZER, v. SHIELDS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,, 660 F. Supp. 56 (D. Del. 1986)

    . . . Id., § 56.02[2], at 56-27; id., § 56.17[4], at 56-737. . . .

    R. PRESLEY, v. HEALY TIBBITS CONSTRUCTION CO., 646 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1986)

    . . . Law of Workmen’s Compensation section 90.22 at 16-377; see also 6 Moore, Federal Practice, paragraph 56.17 . . .

    BARTLETT V. v. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION,, 642 F. Supp. 954 (W.D.N.C. 1986)

    . . . defense, at least where no prejudice results to the plaintiff. 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 56.17 . . .

    SCHWARTZ, v. PIERUCCI,, 60 B.R. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1986)

    . . . See also 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.17[58] (2d ed. 1985). . . .

    KANGAROOS U. S. A. INC. v. CALDOR, INC., 778 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.17[27] (2d ed. 1985). . . .

    UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, v. C. E. LIGHT, a k a E. Jr., 766 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1985)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice, $ 56.17[11] (2d ed. 1982). . . .

    UNITED STATES v. VEN- FUEL, INC., 758 F.2d 741 (1st Cir. 1985)

    . . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17[21] (2d ed. 1982). . . .

    J. FORAND, Jr. v. O BRIEN, Jr., 602 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Mass. 1985)

    . . . Wilker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[42], Therefore, defendants Renaud and City of Taunton’s motions . . .

    UNITED STATES v. ATHLONE INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, H. R. B. M. UNITED STATES, 746 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1984)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice 1Í 56.17 (2d ed. 1982). . . .

    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, v. BARRERA,, 595 F. Supp. 894 (D.P.R. 1984)

    . . . Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 56.17(58). . . .

    In INDEPENDENT CLEARING HOUSE COMPANY, a In UNIVERSAL CLEARING HOUSE COMPANY, a a In ACCOUNTING SERVICES COMPANY, a D. MERRILL, v. ABBOTT,, 41 B.R. 985 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984)

    . . . Moore, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.17[41.-1], at 56-930 (1982); Jackson v. . . .

    ELECTRO- CATHETER CORPORATION, v. SURGICAL SPECIALTIES INSTRUMENT COMPANY, INC., 587 F. Supp. 1446 (D.N.J. 1984)

    . . . . ¶ 56.17[15] at 813 (“practical administration dictates that [the court] should settle what issues are . . .

    OVERMAN, v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. a, 605 F. Supp. 350 (C.D. Cal. 1984)

    . . . Munsingwear, Inc., 622 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.1980); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17(14) n. 5. . . .

    RIVERA, v. ANAYA,, 726 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1984)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.17[4], at 56-737 (2d ed. 1982). . . .

    BINGHAM, LTD. v. UNITED STATES, 724 F.2d 921 (11th Cir. 1984)

    . . . See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17[19]. . . .

    AMF INCORPORATED, v. COMPUTER AUTOMATION, INC., 573 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Ohio 1983)

    . . . inappropriate” in complex fraud suits, such as the instant action. 6, pt. 2, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    SNYDER, v. UNITED STATES, 717 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1983)

    . . . judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations should be denied. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. H. THOMAS, D. H., 709 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1983)

    . . . Under these circumstances summary judgment may be utilized. 6 Part 2, Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.17 . . .

    TELEPROMPTER OF ERIE, INC. a v. CITY OF ERIE, a a D. a a, 567 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1983)

    . . . intent, and other subjective feelings and reactions are material.” 6J Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    In MORGA STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. MORGA, O, 31 B.R. 356 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1983)

    . . . Oroville-Wyandotte Irrigation District, 411 F.Supp. 361 (D.C.Ca 1975); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17 . . .

    M V AMERICAN QUEEN, a a v. SAN DIEGO MARINE CONSTRUCTION CORP., 708 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1983)

    . . . absence of the parol evidence rule it would not be. 611 F.2d at 264 (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    LIBERTY NATIONAL BANK, v. AETNA LIFE CASUALTY COMPANY,, 568 F. Supp. 860 (D.N.J. 1983)

    . . . clearly crucial here, are normally inappropriate for summary disposition. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    ACOUSTIFLEX CORPORATION, v. OWENS- CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION,, 572 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1983)

    . . . fact or whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    HAYDEN PUBLISHING CO. INC. v. COX BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 566 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)

    . . . seemingly be impervious to Rule 56 application, see generally Moore’s Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 56.17 . . .

    KERR, Ad v. KOEMM, C. KOEMM v. KERR, 557 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)

    . . . Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2729; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[42]. . . .

    TWENTIETH CENTURY- FOX FILM CORPORATION, v. MCA, INC., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17[14] at 56-800 to 802 (3d ed. 1982). . . .

    FIDLER, v. EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY,, 555 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1982)

    . . . See also 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[58], at 56-1058 to 1059 (2d ed. 1982) (statute of limitation . . .

    CITY OF WARRENSBURG, v. RCA CORPORATION, CIT, 550 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Mo. 1982)

    . . . We also quoted ¶ 56.17[28], which deals specifically with defenses of alleged illegality in its entirety . . . See Federal Practice and Procedure ¶¶ 56.17[1], .17[5], Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure . . .

    HOFING GMC TRUCK, INC. v. KAY WHEEL SALES COMPANY, INC. v. METROPOLITAN BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INC. W. H., 543 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1982)

    . . . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[31] (2d ed. 1982). . . .

    HEALY TIBBITTS CONSTRUCTION CO. a v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, a, 679 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982)

    . . . defense, at least where no prejudice results to the plaintiff. 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 56.17 . . .

    J. S. v., 78 T.C. 822 (T.C. 1982)

    . . . Pike and Cerritos then entered into a lease of the Vega for 36 months at $56.17 per month, or $674.04 . . . However, Pike paid only $56.17 per month and Mukai paid only $93.93 per month in car rentals. . . .

    DICKENSON, v. PETIT,, 536 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Me. 1982)

    . . . She had work-related expenses of $56.17 and child-care expenses of $173.32. . . .

    BA MORTGAGE AND INTERNATIONAL REALTY CORPORATION, v. LaSALLE NATIONAL BANK No. BA MORTGAGE AND INTERNATIONAL REALTY CORPORATION, v. LaSALLE NATIONAL BANK BA MORTGAGE AND INTERNATIONAL REALTY CORPORATION, v. LaSALLE NATIONAL BANK, No., 535 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1982)

    . . . McDonald’s Corp., 48 F.R.D. 370, 373-74 (N.D.Ill.1970); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 (2d ed. 1966 . . .

    C. CLYDE v. THORNBURGH,, 533 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1982)

    . . . United States Steel Corp., supra; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[38] at 56-918 [2d ed. 1980], The . . .

    M. SLUSHER, v. HERCULES, INCORPORATED,, 532 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. Va. 1982)

    . . . that the Rules prescribe most liberally for the amendment of pleadings.” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    In ATLAS CONCRETE PIPE, INC. ATLAS CONCRETE PIPE, INC. v. ROGER J. AU SON, INC., 668 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1982)

    . . . Co., 473 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1973); 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 56.17 [41.-1], Because we remand . . .

    In ATLAS CONCRETE PIPE, INC. ATLAS CONCRETE PIPE, INC. v. ROGER J. AU SON, INC., 668 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1982)

    . . . Co., 473 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1973); 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 56.17 [41.-1]. . . .

    PAVONE, INC. E. Sr. E. Jr. v. SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 547 F. Supp. 230 (D. Conn. 1982)

    . . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[41.-1]. . . .

    O BRIEN, C. v. ELI LILLY COMPANY E. R., 668 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981)

    . . . material fact exists, as in this “close ease,” summary judgment should be denied. 6 Moore’s, Vol. 2, ¶ 56.17 . . .

    J. HEHEMAN, v. E. W. SCRIPPS COMPANY, A, 661 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1981)

    . . . language, however, and as explicitly noted by commentators, see 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice II 56.17 . . .

    L. ONNEN, v. UNITED STATES, 524 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Neb. 1981)

    . . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.17[3], pp. 56-692 to 56-695 (1980). . . .

    BLODGETT v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ,, 553 F. Supp. 1090 (N.D. Cal. 1981)

    . . . See 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17(10). . . .

    C S FUEL, INCORPORATED, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY,, 524 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Ky. 1981)

    . . . adjudication, ... but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.” 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    AMERICAN RE- INSURANCE COMPANY, v. INSURANCE COMMISSION OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Dr., 527 F. Supp. 444 (C.D. Cal. 1981)

    . . . See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[33], at 56-906 to 07 (2d ed. 1980). . . .

    BARKER, v. NORMAN, 651 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1981)

    . . . Moore, Federal Practice 56.17[4], at 56-736 to -741 (2d ed. 1980); but cf. . . .

    HARVESTALL INDUSTRIES, INC. B. v. HOCHSTETLER,, 656 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1981)

    . . . See also Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.17[44] (1980). . . . .

    DAVIS, v. H. FENDLER,, 650 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1981)

    . . . Moore Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[15]. CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court must be affirmed. . . .

    In SAPOLIN PAINTS, INC. In WOOLSEY MARINE INDUSTRIES, INC. UNITED CAPITAL CORP. v. SAPOLIN PAINTS, INC., 11 B.R. 930 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981)

    . . . Whirlpool Corp., 325 F.2d 779, 781 (2d Cir. 1963); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[43] (2d ed. 1980 . . .

    A. ENGBLOM E. v. L. CAREY, D. C. J. M., 522 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

    . . . 641 F.2d 1044, at 1047 (2d Cir. 1981) (Tenney, J. concurring), quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    SPORT SHOE OF NEWARK, INC. a v. RALPH LIBONATI CO. INC. a a M. t a, 512 F. Supp. 921 (D. Del. 1981)

    . . . See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[5] (2d ed. 1948). . . .

    B. STANLEY, v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY U. S., 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981)

    . . . United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1976); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.17 . . .

    HERALD COMPANY, a Co. v. McNEAL, J. Jr. T. Jr. W. H. St., 511 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1981)

    . . . See generally 6 (Part 2) Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.17[10] at 56-772 (1980). . . .

    KEELER v. W. JOY, GENUARD, J. v. W. JOY,, 641 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1981)

    . . . constitutional question presented and there is no genuine issue of material fact.” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .

    INTERSIMONE, v. CARLSON, 512 F. Supp. 526 (M.D. Pa. 1980)

    . . . See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.17[10], Therefore, we will proceed to rule on the parties’ motions . . .

    WILLIAMS, v. BORDEN, INC., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1980)

    . . . .); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[58] at 56-1062-63 & n.10. . . .

    AUTOMOTIVE WHOLESALERS OF ILLINOIS, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA., 501 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1980)

    . . . McDonald’s Corp., 48 F.R.D. 370, 373-74 (N.D.Ill.1970); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 (2d ed. 1966 . . .

    PETTINARO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. G. v. DELAWARE AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSIT, a W. H. Sr. W. T. a, 500 F. Supp. 559 (D. Del. 1980)

    . . . See 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17(10) at 772 (1979). . . .

    E. DORMAN, v. R. HARRIS,, 633 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1980)

    . . . Harris, 616 F.2d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 1980); see also 6 Moore’s Federal Practice f 56.17[3] at 56-694 & . . .

    SANCHEZ, De v. LOFFLAND BROTHERS COMPANY, 626 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1980)

    . . . Childs, 507 F.2d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 1975). . 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17[21], at 56-854 . . .

    McKENNA v. PEEKSKILL HOUSING AUTHORITY, M. a A. E., 497 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)

    . . . large public import should not be decided on an inadequate factual basis,” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.17 . . .