The 2023 Florida Statutes
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The relevant Florida statute, § 57.115 provides:Upon consideration, Judgment Debtor's arguments in opposition to fees do not really address entitlement, but rather concern any amount ultimately to be awarded. See D'Agostino, 251 So.3d at 192 (whether the debtor attempted to avoid or evade paying the judgment “is a consideration for the court as to the amount of fees and costs-not entitlement” under § 57.115). And although Judgment Debtor ultimately paid the foreign judgment in full, the docket reflects that he opposed Judgment Creditor's efforts to collect on the judgment prior to that payment. See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 10-11. Under these circumstances, I will recommend that the Court exercise its discretion to find Judgment Creditor entitled to fees and costs under Fla. Stat. § 57.115 for her post-judgment collection efforts rendered in direct connection to execution of the judgment. See Flava Works, Inc., 2018 WL 1863638, at *6, report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1859322 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2018) (awarding fees under § 57.115); D'Agostino, 2019 WL 5209638, at *4, report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 11505325 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2019) (same). See also D'Agostino, 251 So.3d 188 (affirming… The law of the state where a court is located governs the procedures applied to the execution of a money judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a). Under Florida law, the Court may award a judgment creditor reasonable costs and fees she incurred in trying to execute a judgment. See Fla. Stat. § 57.115(1). When determining the amount of fees, if any, to award, the Court considers whether the debtor sought to avoid paying the judgment and the quality of the creditor's efforts, such as “the value of the services provided or the necessity for incurring costs in connection with the execution.” Fla. Stat. § 57.115(2).Defendants' second request concerns the amount of attorneys' fees which should be awarded following the Court's determination that Defendants were entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to Sections 57.115 and 56.29(8), Florida Statutes.(c) Award [Judgment Creditor] its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for these proceedings pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 56.29(11) and § 57.115, and4. Defendants A4A Reseau, Inc., A4A Network, Inc., and Marc Parent shall have and receive from Defendant Flava Works, Inc. attorneys' fees and costs (with interest) incurred in connection with executing on their Final Judgment pursuant to Sections 57.115 and 59.29(8), Florida Statutes, in an amount yet to be determined;The Undersigned, as I have done in the previous report and recommendations [ECF No. 148], is going to reach the merits of Defendants' request via, in part, Florida Statute Section 57.115, which states, in relevant part: “The Court may award against a judgment debtor reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred thereafter by a judgment creditor in connection with execution on a judgment.” Fla. Stat. § 57.115(1).The parties' marriage was dissolved in 2015 and, as a part of those proceedings, Former Husband obtained a money judgment against Former Wife. Former Husband subsequently filed a Motion for Continuing Writ of Garnishment and requested that the trial court order that Former Wife pay his attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.115, Florida Statutes (2019). Former Wife filed a Claim of Exemption based on her status as head of household. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the writ of garnishment, finding that Former Wife failed to meet her burden of proving that she is the head of household such that the statutory exemption applies. The order also required that Former Wife pay Former Husband's attorney's fees. The trial court's finding that Former Wife failed to meet her burden of proving the statutory exemption is supported by competent, substantial evidence. We, therefore, affirm the portion of the order entering the writ of garnishment. However, as Former Husband concedes, the trial court erred in ordering that Former Wife pay attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.115. See Paz v. Hernandez, 654 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA… The Bank also points to various rules of statutory construction, noting that the dictionary definition shows "may" is permissive; that elsewhere in the same statute, the legislature uses the mandatory word, "shall;" that the legislature did not change "may" to "shall" when making other amendments to the same statute; that statutes awarding attorney's fees are to be strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law rule; and that in the context of other Chapter 57 fee award statutes, the word "may" is deemed to afford discretion. See Appellee's Brief (Doc. 10) at 11-14 (citing, inter alia, Black's Law Dictionary, 1379 (7th ed. 1999) (definition of "may"); Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) ("[A]ll parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.") (citation omitted); Willis Shaw Exp., Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003) (holding language of statute must be strictly construed where it is in derogation of common law rule that each party pays its own fees); In re Vulpetti, 182 B.R. 923, 926 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding fee award under § 57.115 (which provides that… Although the Tierra Holdings decision is not directly on point, its decision provides direction. Here, the issue before this Court is whether a party can be awarded attorney's fees under a lease agreement provision and section 768.79 simultaneously. As in Tierra Holdings , the contract language in the attorney's fee provision of the lease does not explicitly waive any attorney's fees which may be available per statute. Further, the plain language of section 768.79 does not simply make attorney's fees permissible, but mandatory if all requirements set forth are met and the offer was made in good faith. See TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak , 663 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1995). Thus, because section 768.79 imposes a penalty, the fact that an attorney's fee award is mandatory under the statute if all requirements are met, and this Court's ruling in Tierra Holdings , we find a party may be awarded fees pursuant to terms in a contract and section 768.79 simultaneously. See Land & Sea Petroleum, Inc. v. Bus. Specialists, Inc. , 53 So.3d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (holding seller was entitled to attorney's fees based on a provision in the contract as well as under 768.79); Fed. Auto Ins., Inc. v. Bus… . . . . 4th DCA 2003) (holding party entitled to attorney's fees under both contract language and section 57.115 . . .
. . . fees and costs in the trial court, asserting three grounds for recovery: (1) the note; (2) section 57.115 . . . the judgment for attorney's fees and costs, the trustee attacks the trial court's reliance on section 57.115 . . . Section 57.115(1) provides: "The court may award against a judgment debtor reasonable costs and attorney's . . . See § 57.115(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . We therefore affirm the award of attorney's fees and costs based upon the note and section 57.115(1), . . .
. . . support and subject to the court’s full contempt power and seeking attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.115 . . .
. . . attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor in a garnishment proceeding, which were awarded under section 57.115 . . . garnishment was not simply another type of execution for which attorney’s fees could be awarded under section 57.115 . . .
. . . judgment for supplemental attorney’s fees and was awarded $20,793 in attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.115 . . .
. . . the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to § 56.29(11), Florida Statutes and § 57.115 . . . OKALOOSA costs and attorneys’ fees for these proceedings under § 56.29(11), Florida Statutes and § 57.115 . . .
. . . . § 57.115; Paz v. Hernandez, 654 So.2d 1243 (Fla.3d D.C.A.1995). . . .
. . . Id. at 1151; § 57.115, Fla. Stat. (2007); § 57.041, Fla. Stat. (2007); § 59.46, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . Section 57.115 states that: “[t]he court may award against a judgment debtor reasonable costs and attorney . . . ’s fees incurred thereafter by a judgment creditor in connection with execution on a judgment.” § 57.115 . . .
. . . . § 57.115, which provides that “[t]he Court may award against a judgment debtor reasonable costs and . . . Grande’s legal entitlement to recover fees and costs, arguing that: (1) the language of Fla.Stat. § 57.115 . . . Florida Statutes § 57.115 Section 57.115 of the Florida Statutes provides as follows: (1) The court may . . . recover postpetition attorneys fees, Grande would have to establish that its claim under Fla.Stat. § 57.115 . . . relatively narrow category of fees incurred in connection with “execution” on a judgment for which § 57.115 . . .
. . . Thereafter, Hernandez filed a motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to sections 57.105 and 57.115, Florida . . . court denied attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 57.105 but awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 57.115 . . . need only address the issue regarding Hernandez’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 57.115 . . . Section 57.115(1) provides for an award of reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees against a judgment debtor . . . garnishment is merely another form of execution and therefore he is entitled to attorneys’ fees under section 57.115 . . .
. . . with prejudice and the Bank sought an award of attorney’s fees in accordance with sections 57.105 and 57.115 . . .
. . . Section 57.115(1), Florida Statutes (1991) permits the award of attorney’s fees against a judgment debtor . . .
. . . We affirm the denial of attorney’s fees under section 57.115, Florida Statutes (1991). . . .
. . . ANB responded by arguing that section 57.115 was applicable, and by pointing out that the guaranty provision . . . The judgment did not state whether the award was based upon section 57.115 or upon the terms of the note . . . the award of attorney’s fees was based upon provisions in the note and was not pursuant to section 57.115 . . .
. . . 57.114 In August 1986 ERM-Southwest performed outcrop reconnaissance mapping both on and off-site. 57.115 . . .
. . . Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the analogous Oregon statutes, O.R.S. 57.115 . . . Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 10(b), Rule 10b-5 claims and analogous claims under O.R.S. 57.115 . . .