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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Chapter 57
COURT COSTS
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CHAPTER 57
CHAPTER 57
COURT COSTS
57.021 Costs; taxing.
57.031 Costs; record.
57.041 Costs; recovery from losing party.
57.051 Costs; prohibition against unlawful exaction.
57.061 Costs; recovery of illegally exacted; procedure.
57.071 Costs; what taxable.
57.081 Costs; right to proceed where prepayment of costs and payment of filing fees waived.
57.082 Determination of civil indigent status.
57.085 Deferral of prepayment of court costs and fees for indigent prisoners.
57.104 Computation of attorney fees.
57.105 Attorney’s fee; sanctions for raising unsupported claims or defenses; exceptions; service of motions; damages for delay of litigation.
57.111 Civil actions and administrative proceedings initiated by state agencies; attorneys’ fees and costs.
57.112 Attorney fees and costs and damages; arbitrary, unreasonable, or expressly preempted local ordinances.
57.115 Execution on judgments; attorney’s fees and costs.
57.021 Costs; taxing.The clerk or the judge shall tax the costs accruing in each action when it is determined and shall keep a duplicate of the costs bill on file among the original papers in the action. Each item of costs shall be enumerated in the bill.
History.ss. 5, 6, ch. 78, 1847; RS 1302; GS 1734; RGS 2949; CGL 4673; s. 13, ch. 67-254.
Note.Former s. 58.02.
57.031 Costs; record.All officers who are allowed to charge fees and costs shall keep a book in which they shall record an itemized account of all the costs and fees which they charge against parties having business with them. The book shall be open at all times for inspection of parties wishing to examine the costs charged for any service rendered by the officers.
History.ss. 1, 2, ch. 3252, 1881; RS 1303; GS 1735; RGS 2950; CGL 4674; s. 13, ch. 67-254.
Note.Former s. 58.03.
57.041 Costs; recovery from losing party.
(1) The party recovering judgment shall recover all his or her legal costs and charges which shall be included in the judgment; but this section does not apply to executors or administrators in actions when they are not liable for costs.
(2) Costs may be collected by execution on the judgment or order assessing costs.
History.s. 71, Nov. 23, 1828; s. 7, ch. 73, 1847; RS 1304; GS 1736; RGS 2951; CGL 4675; s. 13, ch. 67-254; s. 311, ch. 95-147.
Note.Former s. 58.04.
57.051 Costs; prohibition against unlawful exaction.
(1) PROHIBITION.No officer shall make two charges for the same official act or service, nor charge for any constructive service. No fee shall be charged for any official service performed or claimed to be performed by any officer unless the fee is specifically authorized and its amount is specified by law.
(2) PENALTY.When any officer willfully charges or levies more than he or she is entitled to, the officer shall forfeit and pay to the party injured 4 times the amount unjustly claimed which may be recovered on motion in the court where the services were rendered.
History.ss. 2, 8, ch. 73, 1847; ss. 3, 4, ch. 1535, 1866; RS 1305; GS 1737; RGS 2952; CGL 4676; s. 13, ch. 67-254; s. 312, ch. 95-147.
Note.Former s. 58.05.
57.061 Costs; recovery of illegally exacted; procedure.
(1) SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.Any person aggrieved by any charge for costs by any officer may have its correctness determined by a court and jury by giving 5 days’ notice to the officer making the charge, stating in the notice the time and place of trial. The judge shall enter the action for trial on the day specified in the notice unless he or she extends the time.
(2) VERDICT AND JUDGMENT.If the jury finds for plaintiff, it shall find the amount which has been improperly collected and the court shall enter judgment for 4 times the amount on which execution shall issue.
History.ss. 4, 5, 6, Mar. 10, 1843; s. 2, ch. 73, 1847; RS 1305; GS 1737; RGS 2952; CGL 4676; s. 13, ch. 67-254; s. 313, ch. 95-147.
Note.Former s. 58.06.
57.071 Costs; what taxable.
(1) If costs are awarded to any party, the following shall also be allowed:
(a) The reasonable premiums or expenses paid on all bonds or other security furnished by such party.
(b) The expense of the court reporter for per diem, transcribing proceedings and depositions, including opening statements and arguments by counsel.
(c) Any sales or use tax due on legal services provided to such party, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary.
(2) Expert witness fees may not be awarded as taxable costs unless the party retaining the expert witness furnishes each opposing party with a written report signed by the expert witness which summarizes the expert witness’s opinions and the factual basis of the opinions, including documentary evidence and the authorities relied upon in reaching the opinions. Such report shall be filed at least 5 days prior to the deposition of the expert or at least 20 days prior to discovery cutoff, whichever is sooner, or as otherwise determined by the court. This subsection does not apply to any action proceeding under the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.
History.s. 1, ch. 16246, 1933; CGL 1936 Supp. 4680(1); s. 13, ch. 67-254; s. 42, ch. 87-6; s. 5, ch. 99-225.
Note.Former s. 58.08.
57.081 Costs; right to proceed where prepayment of costs and payment of filing fees waived.
(1) Any indigent person, except a prisoner as defined in s. 57.085, who is a party or intervenor in any judicial or administrative agency proceeding or who initiates such proceeding shall receive the services of the courts, sheriffs, and clerks, with respect to such proceedings, despite his or her present inability to pay for these services. Such services are limited to filing fees; service of process; certified copies of orders or final judgments; a single photocopy of any court pleading, record, or instrument filed with the clerk; examining fees; mediation services and fees; private court-appointed counsel fees; subpoena fees and services; service charges for collecting and disbursing funds; and any other cost or service arising out of pending litigation. In any appeal from an administrative agency decision, for which the clerk is responsible for preparing the transcript, the clerk shall record the cost of preparing the transcripts and the cost for copies of any exhibits in the record. A party who has obtained a certification of indigence pursuant to s. 27.52 or s. 57.082 with respect to a proceeding is not required to prepay costs to a court, clerk, or sheriff and is not required to pay filing fees or charges for issuance of a summons.
(2) Any sheriff who, in complying with the terms of this section, expends personal funds for automotive fuel or ordinary carfare in serving the process of those qualifying under this section may requisition the board of county commissioners of the county for the actual expense, and on the submission to the board of county commissioners of appropriate proof of any such expenditure, the board of county commissioners shall pay the amount of the actual expense from the general fund of the county to the requisitioning officer.
(3) If an applicant prevails in an action, costs shall be taxed in his or her favor as provided by law and, when collected, shall be applied to pay filing fees or costs that have not been paid.
History.ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 17883, 1937; CGL 1940 Supp. 4680(2); s. 15, ch. 29615, 1955; s. 1, ch. 57-251; s. 13, ch. 67-254; s. 14, ch. 73-334; s. 1, ch. 80-348; s. 18, ch. 94-348; s. 1362, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 96-106; s. 9, ch. 97-107; s. 71, ch. 2003-402; s. 34, ch. 2005-236; s. 8, ch. 2009-61; s. 12, ch. 2012-100.
Note.Former s. 58.09.
57.082 Determination of civil indigent status.
(1) APPLICATION TO THE CLERK.A person seeking appointment of an attorney in a civil case eligible for court-appointed counsel, or seeking relief from payment of filing fees and prepayment of costs under s. 57.081, based upon an inability to pay must apply to the clerk of the court for a determination of civil indigent status using an application form developed by the Florida Clerks of Court Operations Corporation with final approval by the Supreme Court.
(a) The application must include, at a minimum, the following financial information:
1. Net income, consisting of total salary and wages, minus deductions required by law, including court-ordered support payments.
2. Other income, including, but not limited to, social security benefits, union funds, veterans’ benefits, workers’ compensation, other regular support from absent family members, public or private employee pensions, reemployment assistance or unemployment compensation, dividends, interest, rent, trusts, and gifts.
3. Assets, including, but not limited to, cash, savings accounts, bank accounts, stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, equity in real estate, and equity in a boat or a motor vehicle or in other tangible property.
4. All liabilities and debts.

The application must include a signature by the applicant which attests to the truthfulness of the information provided. The application form developed by the corporation must include notice that the applicant may seek court review of a clerk’s determination that the applicant is not indigent, as provided in this section.

(b) The clerk shall assist a person who appears before the clerk and requests assistance in completing the application, and the clerk shall notify the court if a person is unable to complete the application after the clerk has provided assistance.
(c) The clerk shall accept an application that is signed by the applicant and submitted on his or her behalf by a private attorney who is representing the applicant in the applicable matter.
(d) A person who seeks appointment of an attorney in a proceeding under chapter 39, at shelter hearings or during the adjudicatory process, during the judicial review process, upon the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights, or upon the filing of any appeal, or if the person seeks appointment of an attorney in a reopened proceeding, for which an indigent person is eligible for court-appointed representation must pay a $50 application fee to the clerk for each application filed. A person is not required to pay more than one application fee per case. However, an appeal or the reopening of a proceeding shall be deemed to be a distinct case. The applicant must pay the fee within 7 days after submitting the application. If the applicant has not paid the fee within 7 days, the court shall enter an order requiring payment, and the clerk shall pursue collection under s. 28.246. The clerk shall transfer monthly all application fees collected under this paragraph to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the Indigent Civil Defense Trust Fund, to be used as appropriated by the Legislature. The clerk may retain 10 percent of application fees collected monthly for administrative costs prior to remitting the remainder to the Department of Revenue. If the person cannot pay the application fee, the clerk shall enroll the person in a payment plan pursuant to s. 28.246.
(2) DETERMINATION BY THE CLERK.The clerk of the court shall determine whether an applicant seeking such designation is indigent based upon the information provided in the application and the criteria prescribed in this subsection.
(a)1. An applicant, including an applicant who is a minor or an adult tax-dependent person, is indigent if the applicant’s income is equal to or below 200 percent of the then-current federal poverty guidelines prescribed for the size of the household of the applicant by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.
2. There is a presumption that the applicant is not indigent if the applicant owns, or has equity in, any intangible or tangible personal property or real property or the expectancy of an interest in any such property having a net equity value of $2,500 or more, excluding the value of the person’s homestead and one vehicle having a net value not exceeding $5,000.
3. Notwithstanding the information provided by the applicant, the clerk may conduct a review of the property records for the county in which the applicant resides and the motor vehicle title records of this state to identify any property interests of the applicant under this paragraph. The clerk may evaluate and consider the results of the review in making a determination under this subsection. If a review is conducted, the clerk must maintain the results of the review in a file with the application and provide the file to the court if an applicant seeks review under subsection (4) of the clerk’s determination of indigent status.
(b) Based upon its review, the clerk shall make one of the following determinations:
1. The applicant is not indigent.
2. The applicant is indigent.
(c) If the clerk determines that the applicant is indigent, the clerk shall immediately file the determination in the case record.
(d) The duty of the clerk in determining whether an applicant is indigent is limited to receiving the application, conducting a review of records under subparagraph (a)3., and comparing the information provided in the application and identified in the review of records to the criteria prescribed in this subsection. The determination of indigent status is a ministerial act of the clerk and not a decision based on further investigation or the exercise of independent judgment by the clerk. The clerk may contract with third parties to perform functions assigned to the clerk under this section.
(e) The applicant may seek review of the clerk’s determination that the applicant is not indigent in the court having jurisdiction over the matter by filing a petition to review the clerk’s determination of nonindigent status, for which a filing fee may not be charged. If the applicant seeks review of the clerk’s determination of indigent status, the court shall make a final determination as provided in subsection (4).
(3) APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ON AN INTERIM BASIS.If the clerk of the court has not made a determination of indigent status at the time a person requests appointment of an attorney in a civil case eligible for court-appointed counsel, the court shall make a preliminary determination of indigent status, pending further review by the clerk, and may, by court order, appoint counsel on an interim basis.
(4) REVIEW OF THE CLERK’S DETERMINATION.
(a) If the clerk of the court determines that the applicant is not indigent and the applicant seeks review of the clerk’s determination, the court shall make a final determination of indigent status by reviewing the information provided in the application against the criteria prescribed in subsection (2) and by considering the following additional factors:
1. Whether paying for private counsel or other fees and costs creates a substantial hardship for the applicant or the applicant’s family.
2. Whether the applicant is proceeding pro se or is represented by a private attorney for a fee or on a pro bono basis.
3. When the applicant retained private counsel.
4. The amount of any attorney’s fees and who is paying the fees.
5. Any other relevant financial circumstances of the applicant or the applicant’s family.
(b) Based upon its review, the court shall make one of the following determinations and shall, if appropriate, appoint counsel:
1. The applicant is not indigent.
2. The applicant is indigent.
(5) APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL.In appointing counsel after a determination that a person is indigent under this section, the court shall first appoint the office of criminal conflict and civil regional counsel, as provided in s. 27.511, unless specific provision is made in law for the appointment of the public defender in the particular civil proceeding. The court shall also order the person to pay the application fee under subsection (1), or enroll in a payment plan if he or she is unable to pay the fee, if the fee remains unpaid or if the person has not enrolled in a payment plan at the time the court appoints counsel. However, a person who is found to be indigent may not be refused counsel.
(6) PROCESSING CHARGE; PAYMENT PLANS.A person who the clerk or the court determines is indigent for civil proceedings under this section shall be enrolled in a payment plan under s. 28.246 and shall be charged a one-time administrative processing charge under s. 28.24(27)(c). A monthly payment amount, calculated based upon all fees and all anticipated costs, is presumed to correspond to the person’s ability to pay if it does not exceed 2 percent of the person’s annual net income, as defined in subsection (1), divided by 12. The person may seek review of the clerk’s decisions regarding a payment plan established under s. 28.246 in the court having jurisdiction over the matter. A case may not be impeded in any way, delayed in filing, or delayed in its progress, including the final hearing and order, due to nonpayment of any fees or costs by an indigent person. Filing fees waived from payment under s. 57.081 may not be included in the calculation related to a payment plan established under this section.
(7) FINANCIAL DISCREPANCIES; FRAUD; FALSE INFORMATION.
(a) If the court learns of discrepancies between the application and the actual financial status of the person found to be indigent, the court shall determine whether the status and any relief provided as a result of that status shall be revoked. The person may be heard regarding the information learned by the court. If the court, based on the information, determines that the person is not indigent, the court shall revoke the provision of any relief under this section.
(b) If the court has reason to believe that any applicant, through fraud or misrepresentation, was improperly determined to be indigent, the matter shall be referred to the state attorney. Twenty-five percent of any amount recovered by the state attorney as reasonable value of the services rendered, including fees, charges, and costs paid by the state on the person’s behalf, shall be remitted to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the Grants and Donations Trust Fund within the Justice Administrative Commission. Seventy-five percent of any amount recovered shall be remitted to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund.
(c) A person who knowingly provides false information to the clerk or the court in seeking a determination of indigent status under this section commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
History.s. 35, ch. 2005-236; s. 24, ch. 2007-62; s. 27, ch. 2008-111; s. 9, ch. 2009-61; s. 21, ch. 2010-162; s. 35, ch. 2012-30; s. 19, ch. 2021-116; s. 4, ch. 2022-201.
57.085 Deferral of prepayment of court costs and fees for indigent prisoners.
(1) For the purposes of this section, the term “prisoner” means a person who has been convicted of a crime and is incarcerated for that crime or who is being held in custody pending extradition or sentencing.
(2) When a prisoner who is intervening in or initiating a judicial proceeding seeks to defer the prepayment of court costs and fees because of indigence, the prisoner must file an affidavit of indigence with the appropriate clerk of the court. The affidavit must contain complete information about the prisoner’s identity; the nature and amount of the prisoner’s income; all real property owned by the prisoner; all tangible and intangible property worth more than $100 which is owned by the prisoner; the amount of cash held by the prisoner; the balance of any checking, savings, or money market account held by the prisoner; the prisoner’s dependents, including their names and ages; the prisoner’s debts, including the name of each creditor and the amount owed to each creditor; and the prisoner’s monthly expenses. The prisoner must certify in the affidavit whether the prisoner has been adjudicated indigent under this section, certified indigent under s. 57.081, or authorized to proceed as an indigent under 28 U.S.C. s. 1915 by a federal court. The prisoner must attach to the affidavit a photocopy of the prisoner’s trust account records for the preceding 6 months or for the length of the prisoner’s incarceration, whichever period is shorter. The affidavit must contain the following statements: “I am presently unable to pay court costs and fees. Under penalty of perjury, I swear or affirm that all statements in this affidavit are true and complete.”
(3) Before a prisoner may receive a deferral of prepayment of any court costs and fees for an action brought under this section, the clerk of court must review the affidavit and determine the prisoner to be indigent.
(4) When the clerk has found the prisoner to be indigent but concludes the prisoner is able to pay part of the court costs and fees required by law, the court shall order the prisoner to make, prior to service of process, an initial partial payment of those court costs and fees. The initial partial payment must total at least 20 percent of the average monthly balance of the prisoner’s trust account for the preceding 6 months or for the length of the prisoner’s incarceration, whichever period is shorter.
(5) When the clerk has found the prisoner to be indigent, the court shall order the prisoner to make monthly payments of no less than 20 percent of the balance of the prisoner’s trust account as payment of court costs and fees. When a court orders such payment, the Department of Corrections or the local detention facility shall place a lien on the inmate’s trust account for the full amount of the court costs and fees, and shall withdraw money maintained in that trust account and forward the money, when the balance exceeds $10, to the appropriate clerk of the court until the prisoner’s court costs and fees are paid in full.
(6) Before an indigent prisoner may intervene in or initiate any judicial proceeding, the court must review the prisoner’s claim to determine whether it is legally sufficient to state a cause of action for which the court has jurisdiction and may grant relief. The court shall dismiss all or part of an indigent prisoner’s claim which:
(a) Fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted;
(b) Seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief;
(c) Seeks relief for mental or emotional injury where there has been no related allegation of a physical injury; or
(d) Is frivolous, malicious, or reasonably appears to be intended to harass one or more named defendants.
(7) A prisoner who has twice in the preceding 3 years been adjudicated indigent under this section, certified indigent under s. 57.081, or authorized to proceed as an indigent under 28 U.S.C. s. 1915 by a federal court may not be adjudicated indigent to pursue a new suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal without first obtaining leave of court. In a request for leave of court, the prisoner must provide a complete listing of each suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal brought by the prisoner or intervened in by the prisoner in any court or other adjudicatory forum in the preceding 5 years. The prisoner must attach to a request for leave of court a copy of each complaint, petition, or other document purporting to commence a lawsuit and a record of disposition of the proceeding.
(8) In any judicial proceeding in which a certificate of indigence has been issued to a prisoner, the court may at any time dismiss the prisoner’s action, in whole or in part, upon a finding that:
(a) The prisoner’s claim of indigence is false or misleading;
(b) The prisoner provided false or misleading information regarding another judicial or administrative proceeding in which the prisoner was a party;
(c) The prisoner failed to pay court costs and fees under this section despite having the ability to pay; or
(d) The prisoner’s action or a portion of the action is frivolous or malicious.
(9) In determining whether an action is frivolous or malicious, the court may consider whether:
(a) The prisoner’s claim has no arguable basis in law or fact;
(b) The prisoner’s claim reasonably appears intended solely to harass a party filed against;
(c) The prisoner’s claim is substantially similar to a previous claim in that it involves the same parties or arises from the same operative facts as a previous claim;
(d) The prisoner’s claim has little likelihood of success on its merits; or
(e) The allegations of fact in the prisoner’s claim are fanciful or not credible.
(10) This section does not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding.
History.s. 2, ch. 96-106; s. 6, ch. 2003-1; s. 72, ch. 2003-402; s. 49, ch. 2004-265.
157.104 Computation of attorney fees.
(1) In any action in which attorney fees are to be determined or awarded by the court, the court shall consider, among other things, time and labor of any legal assistants who contributed nonclerical, meaningful legal support to the matter involved and who are working under the supervision of an attorney. For purposes of this section, “legal assistant” means a person who, under the supervision and direction of a licensed attorney, engages in legal research, and case development or planning in relation to modifications or initial proceedings, services, processes, or applications; or who prepares or interprets legal documents or selects, compiles, and uses technical information from references such as digests, encyclopedias, or practice manuals and analyzes and follows procedural problems that involve independent decisions.
(2) In any action in which attorney fees are determined or awarded by the court, there is a strong presumption that a lodestar fee is sufficient and reasonable. This presumption may be overcome only in a rare and exceptional circumstance with evidence that competent counsel could not otherwise be retained.
History.s. 1, ch. 87-260; s. 1, ch. 2023-15.
1Note.

A. Section 29, ch. 2023-15, provides that “[t]his act shall not be construed to impair any right under an insurance contract in effect on or before [March 24, 2023]. To the extent that this act affects a right under an insurance contract, this act applies to an insurance contract issued or renewed after [March 24, 2023].”

B. Section 30, ch. 2023-15, provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this act, this act shall apply to causes of action filed after [March 24, 2023].”

57.105 Attorney’s fee; sanctions for raising unsupported claims or defenses; exceptions; service of motions; damages for delay of litigation.
(1) Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee, including prejudgment interest, to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially presented to the court or at any time before trial:
(a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense; or
(b) Would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.
(2) At any time in any civil proceeding or action in which the moving party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that any action taken by the opposing party, including, but not limited to, the filing of any pleading or part thereof, the assertion of or response to any discovery demand, the assertion of any claim or defense, or the response to any request by any other party, was taken primarily for the purpose of unreasonable delay, the court shall award damages to the moving party for its reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, which may include attorney’s fees, and other loss resulting from the improper delay.
(3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), monetary sanctions may not be awarded:
(a) Under paragraph (1)(b) if the court determines that the claim or defense was initially presented to the court as a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable expectation of success.
(b) Under paragraph (1)(a) or paragraph (1)(b) against the losing party’s attorney if he or she has acted in good faith, based on the representations of his or her client as to the existence of those material facts.
(c) Under paragraph (1)(b) against a represented party.
(d) On the court’s initiative under subsections (1) and (2) unless sanctions are awarded before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(4) A motion by a party seeking sanctions under this section must be served but may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.
(5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party’s attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection.
(6) The provisions of this section are supplemental to other sanctions or remedies available under law or under court rules.
(7) If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract. This subsection applies to any contract entered into on or after October 1, 1988.
(8) Attorney fees may not be awarded under this section in proceedings for an injunction for protection pursuant to s. 741.30, s. 784.046, or s. 784.0485, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner knowingly made a false statement or allegation in the petition or that the respondent knowingly made a false statement or allegation in an asserted defense, with regard to a material matter as defined in s. 837.011(3).
History.s. 1, ch. 78-275; s. 61, ch. 86-160; ss. 1, 2, ch. 88-160; s. 1, ch. 90-300; s. 316, ch. 95-147; s. 4, ch. 99-225; s. 1, ch. 2002-77; s. 9, ch. 2003-94; s. 1, ch. 2010-129; s. 4, ch. 2019-167.
57.111 Civil actions and administrative proceedings initiated by state agencies; attorneys’ fees and costs.
(1) This section may be cited as the “Florida Equal Access to Justice Act.”
(2) The Legislature finds that certain persons may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense of civil actions and administrative proceedings. Because of the greater resources of the state, the standard for an award of attorney’s fees and costs against the state should be different from the standard for an award against a private litigant. The purpose of this section is to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action by providing in certain situations an award of attorney’s fees and costs against the state.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) The term “attorney’s fees and costs” means the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs incurred for all preparations, motions, hearings, trials, and appeals in a proceeding.
(b) The term “initiated by a state agency” means that the state agency:
1. Filed the first pleading in any state or federal court in this state;
2. Filed a request for an administrative hearing pursuant to chapter 120; or
3. Was required by law or rule to advise a small business party of a clear point of entry after some recognizable event in the investigatory or other free-form proceeding of the agency.
(c) A small business party is a “prevailing small business party” when:
1. A final judgment or order has been entered in favor of the small business party and such judgment or order has not been reversed on appeal or the time for seeking judicial review of the judgment or order has expired;
2. A settlement has been obtained by the small business party which is favorable to the small business party on the majority of issues which such party raised during the course of the proceeding; or
3. The state agency has sought a voluntary dismissal of its complaint.
(d) The term “small business party” means:
1.a. A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time the action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments;
b. A partnership or corporation, including a professional practice, which has its principal office in this state and has at the time the action is initiated by a state agency not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million; or
c. An individual whose net worth did not exceed $2 million at the time the action is initiated by a state agency when the action is brought against that individual’s license to engage in the practice or operation of a business, profession, or trade; or
2. Any small business party as defined in subparagraph 1., without regard to the number of its employees or its net worth, in any action under s. 72.011 or in any administrative proceeding under that section to contest the legality of any assessment of tax imposed for the sale or use of services as provided in chapter 212, or interest thereon, or penalty therefor.
(e) A proceeding is “substantially justified” if it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a state agency.
(f) The term “state agency” has the meaning described in s. 120.52(1).
(4)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, an award of attorney’s fees and costs shall be made to a prevailing small business party in any adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding pursuant to chapter 120 initiated by a state agency, unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust.
(b)1. To apply for an award under this section, the attorney for the prevailing small business party must submit an itemized affidavit to the court which first conducted the adversarial proceeding in the underlying action, or by electronic means through the division’s website to the Division of Administrative Hearings which shall assign an administrative law judge, in the case of a proceeding pursuant to chapter 120, which affidavit shall reveal the nature and extent of the services rendered by the attorney as well as the costs incurred in preparations, motions, hearings, and appeals in the proceeding.
2. The application for an award of attorney’s fees must be made within 60 days after the date that the small business party becomes a prevailing small business party.
(c) The state agency may oppose the application for the award of attorney’s fees and costs by affidavit.
(d) The court, or the administrative law judge in the case of a proceeding under chapter 120, shall promptly conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application for an award of attorney’s fees and shall issue a judgment, or a final order in the case of an administrative law judge. The final order of an administrative law judge is reviewable in accordance with the provisions of s. 120.68. If the court affirms the award of attorney’s fees and costs in whole or in part, it may, in its discretion, award additional attorney’s fees and costs for the appeal.
1. No award of attorney’s fees and costs shall be made in any case in which the state agency was a nominal party.
2. No award of attorney’s fees and costs for an action initiated by a state agency shall exceed $50,000.
(5) If the state agency fails to tender payment of the award of attorney’s fees and costs within 30 days after the date that the order or judgment becomes final, the prevailing small business party may petition the circuit court where the subject matter of the underlying action arose for enforcement of the award by writ of mandamus, including additional attorney’s fees and costs incurred for issuance of the writ.
(6) This section does not apply to any proceeding involving the establishment of a rate or rule or to any action sounding in tort.
History.ss. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ch. 84-78; s. 43, ch. 87-6; s. 7, ch. 87-224; s. 21, ch. 92-315; s. 8, ch. 95-196; s. 6, ch. 96-410; s. 8, ch. 99-353; s. 6, ch. 2000-336; s. 10, ch. 2003-94; s. 2, ch. 2006-82; s. 9, ch. 2011-208.
57.112 Attorney fees and costs and damages; arbitrary, unreasonable, or expressly preempted local ordinances.
(1) As used in this section, the term “attorney fees and costs” means the reasonable and necessary attorney fees and costs incurred for all preparations, motions, hearings, trials, and appeals in a proceeding.
(2) If a civil action is filed against a local government to challenge the adoption or enforcement of a local ordinance on the grounds that it is expressly preempted by the State Constitution or by state law, the court shall assess and award reasonable attorney fees and costs and damages to the prevailing party.
(3) If a civil action is filed against a local government to challenge the adoption of a local ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable, the court may assess and award reasonable attorney fees and costs and damages to a prevailing plaintiff. An award of reasonable attorney fees or costs and damages pursuant to this subsection may not exceed $50,000. In addition, a prevailing plaintiff may not recover any attorney fees or costs directly incurred by or associated with litigation to determine an award of reasonable attorney fees or costs.
(4) Attorney fees and costs and damages may not be awarded pursuant to this section if:
(a) The governing body of a local governmental entity receives written notice that an ordinance that has been publicly noticed or adopted is expressly preempted by the State Constitution or state law or is arbitrary or unreasonable; and
(b) The governing body of the local governmental entity withdraws the proposed ordinance within 30 days; or, in the case of an adopted ordinance, the governing body of a local government notices an intent to repeal the ordinance within 30 days after receipt of the notice and repeals the ordinance within 30 days thereafter.
(5) The provisions in this section are supplemental to all other sanctions or remedies available under law or court rule. However, this section may not be construed to authorize double recovery if an affected person prevails on a claim brought against a local government pursuant to other applicable law involving the same ordinance, operative acts, or transactions.
(6) This section does not apply to local ordinances adopted pursuant to part II of chapter 163, s. 553.73, or s. 633.202.
(7)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), this section is intended to be prospective in nature and applies only to cases commenced on or after July 1, 2019.
(b) The amendments to this section effective October 1, 2023, are prospective in nature and apply only to ordinances adopted on or after October 1, 2023.
(c) An amendment to an ordinance enacted after October 1, 2023, gives rise to a claim under this section only to the extent that the application of the amendatory language is the cause of the claim apart from the ordinance being amended.
History.s. 1, ch. 2019-151; s. 1, ch. 2023-309.
57.115 Execution on judgments; attorney’s fees and costs.
(1) The court may award against a judgment debtor reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred thereafter by a judgment creditor in connection with execution on a judgment.
(2) In determining the amount of costs, including attorney’s fees, if any, to be awarded under this section, the court shall consider:
(a) Whether the judgment debtor had attempted to avoid or evade the payment of the judgment; and
(b) Other factors as may be appropriate in determining the value of the services provided or the necessity for incurring costs in connection with the execution.
History.s. 13, ch. 87-145.

F.S. 57 on Google Scholar

F.S. 57 on Casetext

Amendments to 57


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 57
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S57.082 6c - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - RENUMBERED. SEE REC #6271 - M: F
S57.082 7c - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - FALSE INFO TO DETERMINE CIVIL INDIGENCY - M: F
S320.57 1 - NONMOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - VIOL OF MOTOR VEH LIC REG NOT SPECIFIED - M: S
S322.57 2 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - FAIL TO HAVE REQ ENDORSEMENT ON DRIVERS LIC - M: S
S322.57 3 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - NO CDL ENDORSEMENT BY NON RESIDENT - M: S
S322.57 4a - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9130 - M: F
S322.57 5a - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DRIVE WO VALID COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSE - M: F
S372.57 - CONSERVATION-LICENSE-STAMP - REMOVED - I: N
S372.57 - CONSERVATION-LICENSE-STAMP - REMOVED - I: N
S372.57 16 - CONSERVATION-LICENSE-STAMP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 6701 - F: T
S372.57 17 - CONSERVATION-LICENSE-STAMP - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 6702 - M: F
S520.57 - FRAUD - OPER SALES FINANCE CO WO LIC - M: F
S648.57 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - REMOVED - M: S


Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S57
R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

S322.57 (2) No PROPER ENDORSEMENT on DL (Motorcycle, School Bus) - Points on Drivers License: 0
S322.57 (3)(a) No proper endorsement on CDL (non-resident) - Points on Drivers License: 0
S322.57 (4)(a) Expired CDL (more than 30 days)/no proper endorsement. Must be in a CMV, if in a personal vehicle use Expired DL 322.065 or 322.03(5) - Points on Drivers License: 0
S322.57 (4)(b) Expired CDL (30 days or less) Must be in a CMV, if in a personal vehicle use Expired DL 322.065 - Points on Drivers License: 0


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

J. TRUMP, v. R. VANCE, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 2412 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Belmont , 301 U.S. 324, 330-331, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937). . . . Belmont , 301 U.S. 324, 332, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937). . . . Maryland , 254 U.S. 51, 57, 41 S.Ct. 16, 65 L.Ed. 126 (1920) (concluding that federal postal officials . . .

B. CHIAFALO, v. WASHINGTON, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (U.S. 2020)

. . . A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 57 (2d ed. 1829). . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Acts & Resolves no. 57, §§ 1, 3, pp. 64-66; 1848 Va. Acts, Tit. . . .

SEILA LAW LLC, v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 50-53; Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-62. . . .

KANSAS v. C. BOETTGER v., 140 S. Ct. 1956 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Laws § 57, p. 108; see also Colo. Rev. Stat., ch. 22, § 112 (1868); 1864 Mont. . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . State Bd. of Ed. , 249 Cal.App.2d 58, 62-64, 57 Cal.Rptr. 69, 72-73 (1967) (upholding revocation of secondary . . . Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). . . . Preventive Health and Health Services Block Grants; Nondiscrimination Provisions) • 42 U.S.C. § 300x-57 . . .

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, v. COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION LLC, v., 140 S. Ct. 1837 (U.S. 2020)

. . . The proposed route traverses 21 miles of national forests and requires crossing 57 rivers, streams, and . . .

L. BAXTER v. BRACEY,, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) ). . . . Rev. 45, 57 (2018) ; Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. . . .

ANDRUS v. TEXAS, 140 S. Ct. 1875 (U.S. 2020)

. . . guilt phase by stressing that he intended to train his efforts on the case in mitigation. 3 Habeas Tr. 57 . . . habeas hearing that she thought "it was impossible" that Andrus had committed the offense, 8 Habeas Tr. 57 . . .

J. THOLE, v. U. S. BANK N. A, 140 S. Ct. 1615 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Commissioner , 300 U.S. 5, 13, 57 S.Ct. 330, 81 L.Ed. 465 (1937). . . . See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) ; App. 60; see also n. 2, supra ; Blair , 300 U.S. at 13, 57 S.Ct. 330 ; Bogert . . . Id. , at 56-57. . . .

GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS, CORP. SAS, v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS USA, LLC,, 140 S. Ct. 1637 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Lord, Williston on Contracts § 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed. 2001) ). . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 301 U.S. 308, 323, 57 S.Ct. 764, 81 L.Ed. 1122 (1937) (territorial legislators may exercise . . . United States , 301 U.S. 308, 322-323, 57 S.Ct. 764, 81 L.Ed. 1122 (1937). . . . United States , 301 U.S. 308, 319, 57 S.Ct. 764, 81 L.Ed. 1122 (1937) (recognizing that a statute preparing . . .

GEORGIA, v. PUBLIC. RESOURCE. ORG, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (U.S. 2020)

. . . West Publishing Co. , 27 F. 50, 57 (CC Minn. 1886) (citing English cases and treatises and concluding . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Scott , 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) ; Craig v. . . . Parrish , 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937). . . . Bakke , 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) ); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. . . . Dist., Oct. 11, 2018), App. 56-57; see also Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 Vand. L. . . .

KANSAS, v. GLOVER, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See, e.g. , Heien , 574 U.S. at 57, 135 S.Ct. 530 (officer thought that motorist was " 'very stiff and . . .

COMCAST CORPORATION, v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN- OWNED MEDIA,, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Waters , 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) ; Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate . . .

L. ALLEN, v. A. COOPER, III,, 140 S. Ct. 994 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See Plaintiffs' Response, Doc. 57, p. 7. . . .

RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See also 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶5.09, pp. 5-55 to 5-57 (16th ed. 2019). . . .

R. ISOM v. ARKANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 342 (U.S. 2019)

. . . S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1906 (quoting Withrow , 421 U.S. at 57, 95 S.Ct. 1456 ). . . .

DEWEES, v. UNITED STATES., 140 S. Ct. 48 (U.S. 2019)

. . . No. 19-57 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT, v. BARR,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO RESTORE NATIONWIDE SCOPE OF INJUNCTION Re: ECF No. 57 JON S. . . . ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 4. . . . ECF No. 57-2 ¶ 17. . . . ECF No. 57-4 ¶ 5. . . . -2, 57-3, 57-4, 57-5, 57-6 with ECF Nos. 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, they have provided additional . . .

ELHADY, v. H. KABLE,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 562 (E.D. Va. 2019)

. . . MSJ Ex. 6 at 57, Khan, Pls.' MSJ Ex. 18 at 93, Shahir Anwar, Pls.' MSJ Ex. 16 at 66, Amri, Pls.' . . . Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd , 333 F.3d 156, 163-64 (D.C. . . .

ALLERGAN SALES, LLC, v. SANDOZ, INC., 935 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . ."); Appellee's Br. 56-57; Appellant's Reply Br. 35-36 ("Both the public interest and the balance of . . .

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 935 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. , 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978). . . . Hill , 437 U.S. 153, 193, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) ("[A] federal judge ... is not mechanically . . .

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR, v., 935 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) ("[T]he Warrant Clause ... surely . . .

G. STEPHENS v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a, 935 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Skyline Corp. , 97 Idaho 408, 546 P.2d 54, 57-58 (1975) (relying on the Second Restatement to limit liability . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . n.5, 122 S.Ct. 2242 ; see Hooks, 689 F.3d at 1168 n.7 (noting petitioners IQ scores of: 80, 70, 61, 57 . . .

BELLITTO, v. SNIPES,, 935 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . GARNER, READING LAW 57 (2012). . . .

SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL- DENVER, INC. v. M. AZAR II, U. S., 391 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . S1-AR at 639; S2-AR at 456; H-AR at 555-57, 565-67. . . . H-AR at 555-57, 565-67; H-Answer ¶¶ 6. . . . See S1-AR at 677-742; S2-AR at 6249, 6309, 6323; H-AR at 541-43, 555-57, 1087-89. . . . Intermediaries did not apply the must-bill policy to the plaintiffs prior to 2007, see S1-AR at 256-57 . . . Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 656-57, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam); Anderson v. . . .

ARTHREX, INC. v. SMITH NEPHEW, INC., 935 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at col. 5 ll. 41-42, 51-57. . . . FTC , 407 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ); see also 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3). . . . Though Arthrex cites dictionaries that may support a narrower interpretation, see Appellant's Br. 57, . . .

J. MURRAY, M. D. a v. MAYO CLINIC, a M. D. M. D. M. D. M. D. M. D. M. D. M. D. a, 934 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Barnette , 923 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1991) )). . . .

J. GENZER, v. JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY,, 934 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . King , 57 Okla. 528, 157 P. 763, 767 (1915), overruled on other grounds by Bryant v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. ADAMS,, 934 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Watts , 535 F.3d 650, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2008), citing United States v. . . .

RAWA, A. W. Jr. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, v., 934 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . May 14, 2018), ECF No. 57. . . .

ANDERSON, AS TRUSTEE FOR NEXT- OF- KIN OF ANDERSON v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS Dr. M. D. HCMC D. J. A. F. HCMC M. D. s J. L. L. T. D. M. T., 934 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Failing to find a heartbeat, the fire department defendants pronounced him dead at 8:57 a.m. . . .

SCRIMO, v. LEE,, 935 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Schriver, 255 F.3d at 57 (quoting Jones, 229 F.3d at 120 ). . . . Beam, 57 N.Y.2d 241, 251, 455 N.Y.S.2d 575, 441 N.E.2d 1093 (1982). . . .

SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v. BRISTOL EXCAVATING, INC., 935 F.3d 122 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . ."); Oral Arg. at 25:57-26:10 ( [Counsel for Department of Labor]: "[I]f they have left it completely . . .

STONE, v. TROY CONSTRUCTION, LLC, 935 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Burr , 551 U.S. 47, 57, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007), we noted that, "where 'willfulness' . . . McLaughlin , 486 U.S. at 132-33, 108 S.Ct. 1677, to characterize the willfulness standard. 551 U.S. at 57 . . .

WOLFINGTON, v. RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES II PC, a k a, 935 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . JA 57 n.12. 496 U.S. 384, 398, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). 889 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 1989 . . .

COLE v. CARSON, v., 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . officers sued under Section 1983 should enjoy qualified immunity accorded at common law. 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 . . .

BURKE, v. REGALADO, v., 935 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bay County , 854 F.2d 454, 456-57 (11th Cir. 1988). . . . Id. at 4356-57. . . . Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 54, 57, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (holding that contract prison physician . . . Br. at 57-58. The Sheriffs rely in their brief on cases that are inapposite to this one. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CUEVAS- LOPEZ,, 934 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . C, amend. 802, at 155-57 (Nov. 1, 2016). . . .

UNITED STATES v. STAHLMAN,, 934 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Camargo-Vergara, 57 F.3d 993, 998 (11th Cir. 1995). . . .

BOWLES, v. DESANTIS,, 934 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855-57, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (holding that the right to appointed . . .

SINGLETON, v. ARKANSAS HOUSING AUTHORITIES PROPERTY CASUALTY SELF- INSURED FUND, INC. BRK, 934 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ("The movant has the burden of showing that there . . .

UNITED STATES v. E. JONES,, 934 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Santiago , 268 F.3d 151, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2001). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. . . .

CONILLE v. COUNCIL AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 935 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Unit 57, 901 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting that, following a bench trial, this court reviews findings . . .

BENTLEY, v. AUTOZONERS, LLC, LLC,, 935 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Mangia 57, Inc. , 787 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2015) ; and negligence if a co-worker who is not a supervisor . . .

UNITED STATES v. CANO,, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Arizona , 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (citation omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. MERRITT,, 934 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2016) and an advisory Guidelines range of 46 to 57 . . .

AMAZON. COM, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,, 934 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Amazon.Com , 148 T.C. at 156-57. . . . See 57 Fed. Reg. 3571, 3579 (Jan. 30, 1992). . . . See 57 Fed. Reg. at 3579. . . .

IN RE SWEARINGEN,, 935 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cockrell , 303 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2002) ; see also Raby , 925 F.3d at 756-57. . . .

NEW YORK STATE CITIZENS COALITION FOR CHILDREN, v. J. POOLE,, 935 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 798 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1986). . . . Taylor , 752 F.3d 254, 255-57 (2d Cir. 2014) (Cabranes, J ., dissenting from order denying rehearing . . .

LEWIS, v. CITY OF UNION CITY, GEORGIA,, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Waters , 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) ("[W]e know from our experience that . . .

A. CARVELLI, v. OCWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, M. R. Jr., 934 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cigna Corp ., 918 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2019), "generalized statements about [a company's] transparency . . .

FLORES, v. P. BARR, K. U. S. U. S. U. S., 934 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . the phrase "safe and sanitary" is so vague that either it cannot be enforced, see Oral Argument at 33:57 . . .

MENAKER, v. HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY,, 935 F.3d 20 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Columbia , 831 F.3d at 56-57. Id. at 59. Id. at 57. Id. (emphasis added). . . . Columbia, 831 F.3d at 57. Id. App. 105, 106 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 39). Id. at 104 (Am. . . .

UNITED STATES v. NORMAN,, 935 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . application of the controlled substance offense enhancement raised Norman's Guidelines range from 46-57 . . .

UNITED STATES v. GLENN,, 935 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). . . . See Youngblood , 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333. . . . Youngblood , 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333 (emphasis added). . . . Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 155-65, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. G. WAGUESPACK,, 935 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), as May 5 was listed instead of March 29 . . .

WAL- MART STORES, INCORPORATED L. L. C. s v. TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, 935 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Maryland , 437 U.S. 117, 125, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978) (rejecting claims of disparate treatment . . .

ZEHENTBAUER FAMILY LAND, LP LP v. CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, L. L. C. L. L. C. E P USA,, 935 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . S.Ct. 1426 (quoting ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Proving Antitrust Damages: Legal and Economic Issues 57 . . .

UNITED STATES v. CLARK,, 935 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). . . . Peck , 317 F.3d 754, 756-57 (7th Cir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was . . .

UNITED STATES v. SCANZANI,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 210 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). . . .

SANOFI- AVENTIS U. S. LLC, IP, v. DR. REDDY S LABORATORIES, INC. Dr. s USA, LLC, LLC, LLC,, 933 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Haworth , 300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937) ). . . . Cross-Appellants' Br. 57-58. However, this argument plainly mischaracterizes the reference. . . .

YOUKHANNA v. CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS C., 934 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Haworth , 300 U.S. 227, 239-40, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). . . .

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, v. F. MCGAHN II,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . . ¶ 57. . . .

GUNNELLS, v. TEUTUL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996). . . .

IN RE J. SHENK, Sr. J. Sr. v. U. S., 603 B.R. 671 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 2019)

. . . Hr'g Tr, p. 56 at 14-25; p. 57 at 1-14. . . . Hr'g Tr. p. 56 at 14-25; p. 57 at 1-14. . . .

IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE S SUNDAY TICKET ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Jr. v. LLC LLC NFL LLC LLC LP LLC LLC NFL LP LLC LP LLC LP Co. LLC LP LLC, 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Patten , 226 U.S. 525, 544, 33 S.Ct. 141, 57 L.Ed. 333 (1913) ). . . .

J. MALOUF, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,, 933 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 1850, 1856-57, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016). . . . Ct. at 1856-57. . . .

MCMICHAEL, v. TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED RIGP DCL, L. L. C. USA,, 934 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mosley was 57 years old, and Kennedy was 51 years old. Their ages make discrimination less likely. . . .

UNITED STATES v. MARCHAN,, 935 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . result in a recommendation for a reduced sentence and that his Guidelines sentence was between 46 to 57 . . .

M. RODEN, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 548 (S.D. Ohio 2019)

. . . PageID 57-67. . . . Evidence of Record The evidence of record is adequately summarized in the ALJ's decision (PageID 57-67 . . .

IN RE ASCOT FUND LIMITED, a, 603 B.R. 271 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . (Ex. 57 at Bates No. AF-0000648.) . . .

PAUL G. a BY AND THROUGH STEVE G. v. MONTEREY PENINSULA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 933 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 756-57. . . .

LAFFERTY, v. BENZON,, 933 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) ). . . .

MTD PRODUCTS INC. v. IANCU,, 933 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at col. 3 l. 41-col. 4 l. 57. . . .

IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT T MOBILITY, LLC,, 933 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. col. 5 ll. 64-67; id. col. 6 ll. 57-61. . . .

BASTARDO- VALE, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES, 934 F.3d 255 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 556-57. Id. at 556 (citing SEC v. . . . 648 F.3d at 1102-04 ; Gao, 595 F.3d at 554-55 ; N-A-M, 587 F.3d at 1056 ; Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 156-57 . . .

UNITED STATES EX REL. CHARTE v. AMERICAN TUTOR, INC. Jr. Sr., 934 F.3d 346 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 55, 57. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) ; N.J. Stat. . . .

CLARK, v. WARDEN,, 934 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jernigan , 492 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). . . .

UNITED STATES v. JONES,, 935 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pulido , 555 U.S. 57, 58, 129 S.Ct. 530, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008) ; accord United States v. . . .

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, v. HOSPIRA, INC. v. Dr. s Dr. s, 933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . cation was immaterial because pemetrexed dissociates from its counterion in solution, DRL J.A. 8555-57 . . .

UNITED STATES v. NG LAP SENG, Ng, Ng W. C., 934 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (stating, in construing § 666, . . . United States , 522 U.S. at 56-57, 118 S.Ct. 469 (stating that § 666 's "expansive, unqualified language . . . Bonito , 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1995). . . . United States , 504 U.S. 255, 260, 269, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) ). . . .

IN RE FIFTH AVENUE AND RELATED PROPERTIES, 934 F.3d 147 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . December 2008); 50 (from the confidential source before December 2008); 52 (same); 54 (same); 56 (same); 57 . . .

BAKALIAN v. CENTRAL BANK OF REPUBLIC OF TURKEY T. C. v. T. C. v. T. C. v. T. C., 932 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . INS , 323 F.3d 150, 155-57 (1st Cir. 2003). . . .

E. ANDREWS, v. SIRIUS XM RADIO INC., 932 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Maracich , 570 U.S. at 57, 133 S.Ct. 2191 (emphases added). . . .

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, N. A. v. UNITED STATES,, 932 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. of Educ. , 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1937) ). . . . deprived Washington Federal of its "property interest[ ] in the promised six percent dividend," J.A. 57 . . . Bank stock without just compensation in the form of a market return on the invested capital," J.A. 57 . . . J.A. 57 ¶ 90. . . .

L. ROMANSKY, v. SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI, 933 F.3d 293 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Oregon , 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937) ; see Cole v. . . .

MARKS JLF, a GWF, a GJH, a GJR, v. HUDSON, 933 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) and citing Hale v. . . .

PARENT PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY LEAGUE M. W. a F. D. S. S. a S. Y. v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS J., 934 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 752 ; see also id. at 755-57. . . .

P. DYER, v. VENTRA SANDUSKY, LLC,, 934 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dyer Dep. at 55-57. . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. HARPER,, 934 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). . . . See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59, 106 S.Ct. 366. . . .

BOUCHER, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,, 934 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . App. 57. . . . App. 57. . . . Corps Manual at 17-18, 57-58 & n.1. See also Corps Supplement at 99. . . .

WINDRIDGE OF NAPERVILLE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, v. PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 932 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 55, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2015) (applying District of Columbia law). . . .

T. SCHMITT v. LAROSE,, 933 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . safeguards necessary for a system of prior restraint to survive constitutional challenge. 380 U.S. at 57 . . . Gov't of Nashville , 274 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing Freedman , 380 U.S. at 57-59, 85 S.Ct . . .

LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL- CIO v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 392 F. Supp. 3d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 651, 656-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). . . .

KORTRIGHT CAPITAL PARTNERS LP, TY v. INVESTCORP INVESTMENT ADVISERS LIMITED,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . (Trial Tr. at 56-57 (Taylor); see P-11, § 3.2.) . . . (Trial Tr. at 955-57, 1040-41 (Erdely); see P-198; P-199; P-200.) . . .

UNITED STATES v. DAVIS,, 932 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . level would have been 19, and his alternative guideline range before departures would have been 46-57 . . .