Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 68.093 (2025)
Florida Vexatious Litigant Law.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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68.093 Florida Vexatious Litigant Law.—
(1) This section may be cited as the “Florida Vexatious Litigant Law.”
(2) As used in section, the term:
(a) “Action” means an action:
1. Governed by the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 5.025 of the Florida Probate Rules, or the Florida Small Claims Rules; or
2. In another state court or federal court governed by rules of procedure that are comparable to the rules of procedure specified in subparagraph 1.
(b) “Security” means an undertaking by a vexatious litigant to ensure payment to a party in an amount reasonably sufficient to cover the party’s anticipated, reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney fees and taxable costs.
(c) “Vexatious litigant” means a person, as defined in s. 1.01(3), proceeding pro se, who:
1. In the immediately preceding 7-year period, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more actions in any court that have been finally and adversely determined against such person, except that an action may not be included for purposes of this subparagraph if the court finds that the action was commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in good faith;
2. After an action has been finally and adversely determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate either the validity of the determination against the same party as to whom the action was finally determined or the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law determined by the final and adverse determination against the same party as to whom the action was finally determined;
3. Repeatedly files pleadings, requests for relief, or other documents that have been the subject of previous rulings by the court in the same action;
4. Repeatedly files unmeritorious pleadings, requests for relief, or other documents; conducts unnecessary discovery; or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay in any action; or
5. Has been previously found to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to this section or by another state court or a federal court.
An action is not deemed to be “finally and adversely determined” if an appeal in that action is pending.
(3)(a) In any action pending in any court of this state, any party may move the court, upon notice and hearing, for an order requiring an opposing party to furnish security. The motion shall be based on the grounds, and supported by a showing, that the opposing party subject to the motion is a vexatious litigant and is not reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of the action against the moving party.
(b) At the hearing for an order to post security, the court shall consider any evidence, written or oral, by witness or affidavit, which may be relevant to the consideration of the motion. No determination made by the court in such a hearing shall be admissible on the merits of the action or deemed to be a determination of any issue in the action. If, after hearing the evidence, the court determines that the opposing party subject to the motion is a vexatious litigant and is not reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of the action against the moving party, the court shall order the vexatious litigant to furnish security to the moving party in an amount and within such time as the court deems appropriate.
(c) If the vexatious litigant fails to post security required by an order of the court under this section and the vexatious litigant is:
1. A plaintiff or petitioner, the court shall immediately issue an order dismissing the action with prejudice as to the moving party for whose benefit the security was ordered; or
2. A defendant or respondent, the court may immediately issue an order imposing one or more of the following sanctions, as appropriate:
a. Denial of the vexatious litigant’s request for relief;
b. Striking of the vexatious litigant’s pleading or other document or part thereof; or
c. Rendition of a judgment by default against the vexatious litigant.
(d) If the motion for an order to post security is filed before the trial in an action, the action shall be automatically stayed and the moving party need not plead or otherwise respond to the vexatious litigant’s complaint, pleading, request for relief, or other document until 10 days after the motion for an order to post security is denied. If the motion for an order to post security is granted, the moving party shall respond or plead no later than 10 days after the required security has been furnished.
(4) In addition to any other relief provided in this section, the court in any judicial circuit may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, enter a prefiling order prohibiting a vexatious litigant from commencing, pro se, any new action in the courts of that circuit without first obtaining leave of the court. Disobedience of such an order may be punished as contempt of court. Leave of court shall be granted by the court only upon a showing that the proposed action is meritorious and is not being filed for the purpose of delay or harassment. The court may condition the filing of the proposed action upon the furnishing of security as provided in this section.
(5) The clerk of the court may not file any new action by a pro se vexatious litigant against whom a prefiling order has been entered unless the vexatious litigant has obtained an order from the court allowing such filing. If the clerk of the court mistakenly allows a pro se vexatious litigant to file any new action in contravention of a prefiling order, any party to that action may file with the clerk and serve on the vexatious litigant and all other parties a notice stating that the vexatious litigant is subject to a prefiling order. The filing of such a notice shall automatically stay the litigation against all parties to the action. The court shall automatically dismiss the action with prejudice within 10 days after the filing of such notice unless the vexatious litigant files a motion for leave to file the new action. If the court issues an order granting leave, the pleadings or other responses to the complaint need not be filed until 10 days after the date of service by the vexatious litigant of a copy of the order granting leave.
(6) The clerk of a court must provide copies of all prefiling orders to the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court, who must maintain a registry of all vexatious litigants.
(7) An automatic stay imposed under this section remains in effect until the court:
(a) In its discretion, vacates the stay;
(b) Rules, as applicable, on the motion for an order to post security under paragraph (3)(d) or the motion for leave under subsection (5); or
(c) Dismisses the action under subsection (5).
(8) The relief provided under this section shall be cumulative to any other relief or remedy available under the laws of this state or the rules of court, including, but not limited to, the relief provided under s. 57.105.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 38
cases (12 in the last 5 years), 2004–2026 · leading case: Smith v. Fisher, 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Smith v. Fisher, 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “We write primarily to address the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2005) under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.”
Walker v. Ellis, 989 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “§ 68.093(4), Fla. Stat. (2007). Further, section 68.”
Dane P. Abdool v. Pam Bondi, etc., 141 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2014). “See § 68.093, Fla. Stat. (2013). While these statutes do not address capital litigation, they do demonstrate that the Legislature retains the authority to direct the Clerk to collect information for the benefit of other branches of government.”
Eric A. Welch v. Mark S. Inch, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Corr., 264 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “After Eric Welch appealed the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing his action, the Florida Department of Corrections filed a cross-appeal of the portion of the order denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a “vexatious litigant” pursuant to section…”
Smith v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 883 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. 2008). “10, § 8803 (e) (1999) (requiring litigant who has filed frivolous or malicious litigation to obtain leave of court to file any actions); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 68.093 (West 2005) (requiring security from plaintiff who has lost five or more civil actions pro se in the past five years…”
Jordan v. State Ex Rel. Dep't of Motor Vehs. & Pub. Saf., 110 P.3d 30 (Nev. 2005). “10, § 8803 (e) (1999); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 68.093 (West Supp. 2005); Haw.”
Kozich v. Cavallaro (In Re Kozich), 406 B.R. 949 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2009). “Kozich was found to be a vexatious litigant by the 17th Judicial Circuit and the clerk sent notice to the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court for inclusion in the Vexatious Litigant Registry pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 68.093 (6). On April 5, 2005, the Florida Circuit Court Judge…”
May v. Barthet, 934 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2006). “NOTES [1] The Fourth District considered a challenge to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit's application of the Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2003), to the petitioner.”
Theophile v. State, 967 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). “Although our affirmance is without prejudice, we note that continuous filings that are deemed insufficient in nature can potentially subject Appellant to "vexatious *950 litigant" sanctions under section 68.093(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2006), or other sanctions available under…”
Favreau v. Favreau, 940 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). “4th DCA 2004); see also § 68.093, Fla. Stat. (2005) (the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law).”
Glenn C. Smith v. Attorney Gen., State of Florida, 637 F. App'x 574 (11th Cir. 2016). “Briefly stated, Smith challenges the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant statute, Fla. Stat. § 68.093 . No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.”
G.W. v. Rushing, 22 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). “to be a vexatious litigant as authorized by section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2006), and instructed the clerk “not to accept any pleadings, notices or other documents from Petitioner [G.”
— 68.093(2)(a) — 1 case
G.W. v. Rushing, 22 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). “to be a vexatious litigant as authorized by section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2006), and instructed the clerk “not to accept any pleadings, notices or other documents from Petitioner [G.”
— 68.093(2)(c) — 3 cases
Smith v. Fisher, 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “We write primarily to address the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2005) under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.”
Eric A. Welch v. Mark S. Inch, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Corr., 264 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “After Eric Welch appealed the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing his action, the Florida Department of Corrections filed a cross-appeal of the portion of the order denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a “vexatious litigant” pursuant to section…”
Bryan Walters v. State of Florida (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
— 68.093(2)(c)(1) — 1 case
Gary Steinberg v. Eva Cudak (Fla. 4th DCA 2026).
— 68.093(2)(c)(2) — 1 case
Rashedah Amatulah v. Daniel E. Palmier (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).
— 68.093(2)(d) — 5 cases
Smith v. Fisher, 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “We write primarily to address the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2005) under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.”
Theophile v. State, 967 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). “Although our affirmance is without prejudice, we note that continuous filings that are deemed insufficient in nature can potentially subject Appellant to "vexatious *950 litigant" sanctions under section 68.093(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2006), or other sanctions available under…”
Prater v. McDonough, 947 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Devon a. Brown v. Miami-dade Cnty. (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).
Samuel Lee Smith, Jr. v. State of Florida (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
— 68.093(3) — 3 cases
Eric A. Welch v. Mark S. Inch, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Corr., 264 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “After Eric Welch appealed the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing his action, the Florida Department of Corrections filed a cross-appeal of the portion of the order denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a “vexatious litigant” pursuant to section…”
Alex Mistivar v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Off. (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).
Bryan Walters v. State of Florida (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
— 68.093(3)(a) — 4 cases
Smith v. Fisher, 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “We write primarily to address the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2005) under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.”
Eric A. Welch v. Mark S. Inch, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Corr., 264 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “After Eric Welch appealed the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing his action, the Florida Department of Corrections filed a cross-appeal of the portion of the order denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a “vexatious litigant” pursuant to section…”
Gary Steinberg v. Eva Cudak (Fla. 4th DCA 2026).
Bryan Walters v. State of Florida (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
— 68.093(3)(b) — 3 cases
Smith v. Fisher, 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “We write primarily to address the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2005) under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.”
Eric A. Welch v. Mark S. Inch, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Corr., 264 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “After Eric Welch appealed the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing his action, the Florida Department of Corrections filed a cross-appeal of the portion of the order denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a “vexatious litigant” pursuant to section…”
Bryan Walters v. State of Florida (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
— 68.093(3)(c) — 1 case
Smith v. Fisher, 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “We write primarily to address the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2005) under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.”
— 68.093(3)(d) — 1 case
Eric A. Welch v. Mark S. Inch, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Corr., 264 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “After Eric Welch appealed the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing his action, the Florida Department of Corrections filed a cross-appeal of the portion of the order denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a “vexatious litigant” pursuant to section…”
— 68.093(4) — 7 cases
Walker v. Ellis, 989 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “§ 68.093(4), Fla. Stat. (2007). Further, section 68.”
Eric A. Welch v. Mark S. Inch, Sec'y of Florida Dep't of Corr., 264 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). “After Eric Welch appealed the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing his action, the Florida Department of Corrections filed a cross-appeal of the portion of the order denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a “vexatious litigant” pursuant to section…”
Alex Mistivar v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Off. (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).
Devon a. Brown v. Miami-dade Cnty. (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).
Tera B. Lau v. Adewale Olude (Fla. 5th DCA 2025).
— 68.093(5) — 3 cases
Walker v. Ellis, 989 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “§ 68.093(4), Fla. Stat. (2007). Further, section 68.”
May v. Barthet, 886 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
Dixon v. Epiq Corp. Restructuring, LLC (S.D. Fla. 2022).
— 68.093(d) — 1 case
Frank DePinto v. Corporal Hoffman, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
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