The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Chapter 68
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS

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F.S. 68.093

68.093 Florida Vexatious Litigant Law.—

(1) This section may be cited as the “Florida Vexatious Litigant Law.”

(2) As used in section, the term:

(a) “Action” means a civil action governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and proceedings governed by the Florida Probate Rules, but does not include actions concerning family law matters governed by the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure or any action in which the Florida Small Claims Rules apply.

(b) “Defendant” means any person or entity, including a corporation, association, partnership, firm, or governmental entity, against whom an action is or was commenced or is sought to be commenced.

(c) “Security” means an undertaking by a vexatious litigant to ensure payment to a defendant in an amount reasonably sufficient to cover the defendant’s anticipated, reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney’s fees and taxable costs.

(d) “Vexatious litigant” means:

1. A person as defined in s. 1.01(3) who, in the immediately preceding 5-year period, has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more civil actions in any court in this state, except an action governed by the Florida Small Claims Rules, which actions have been finally and adversely determined against such person or entity; or

2. Any person or entity previously found to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to this section.

An action is not deemed to be “finally and adversely determined” if an appeal in that action is pending. If an action has been commenced on behalf of a party by an attorney licensed to practice law in this state, that action is not deemed to be pro se even if the attorney later withdraws from the representation and the party does not retain new counsel.

(3)(a) In any action pending in any court of this state, including actions governed by the Florida Small Claims Rules, any defendant may move the court, upon notice and hearing, for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security. The motion shall be based on the grounds, and supported by a showing, that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and is not reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of the action against the moving defendant.

(b) At the hearing upon any defendant’s motion for an order to post security, the court shall consider any evidence, written or oral, by witness or affidavit, which may be relevant to the consideration of the motion. No determination made by the court in such a hearing shall be admissible on the merits of the action or deemed to be a determination of any issue in the action. If, after hearing the evidence, the court determines that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and is not reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of the action against the moving defendant, the court shall order the plaintiff to furnish security to the moving defendant in an amount and within such time as the court deems appropriate.

(c) If the plaintiff fails to post security required by an order of the court under this section, the court shall immediately issue an order dismissing the action with prejudice as to the defendant for whose benefit the security was ordered.

(d) If a motion for an order to post security is filed prior to the trial in an action, the action shall be automatically stayed and the moving defendant need not plead or otherwise respond to the complaint until 10 days after the motion is denied. If the motion is granted, the moving defendant shall respond or plead no later than 10 days after the required security has been furnished.

(4) In addition to any other relief provided in this section, the court in any judicial circuit may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, enter a prefiling order prohibiting a vexatious litigant from commencing, pro se, any new action in the courts of that circuit without first obtaining leave of the administrative judge of that circuit. Disobedience of such an order may be punished as contempt of court by the administrative judge of that circuit. Leave of court shall be granted by the administrative judge only upon a showing that the proposed action is meritorious and is not being filed for the purpose of delay or harassment. The administrative judge may condition the filing of the proposed action upon the furnishing of security as provided in this section.

(5) The clerk of the court shall not file any new action by a vexatious litigant pro se unless the vexatious litigant has obtained an order from the administrative judge permitting such filing. If the clerk of the court mistakenly permits a vexatious litigant to file an action pro se in contravention of a prefiling order, any party to that action may file with the clerk and serve on the plaintiff and all other defendants a notice stating that the plaintiff is a pro se vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order. The filing of such a notice shall automatically stay the litigation against all defendants to the action. The administrative judge shall automatically dismiss the action with prejudice within 10 days after the filing of such notice unless the plaintiff files a motion for leave to file the action. If the administrative judge issues an order permitting the action to be filed, the defendants need not plead or otherwise respond to the complaint until 10 days after the date of service by the plaintiff, by United States mail, of a copy of the order granting leave to file the action.

(6) The clerk of a court shall provide copies of all prefiling orders to the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court, who shall maintain a registry of all vexatious litigants.

(7) The relief provided under this section shall be cumulative to any other relief or remedy available to a defendant under the laws of this state and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, including, but not limited to, the relief provided under s. 57.105.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2000-314.

F.S. 68.093 on Google Scholar

F.S. 68.093 on Casetext

Amendments to 68.093

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 68.093

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 68.093.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

A. WELCH, v. S. INCH,, 264 So. 3d 383 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a "vexatious litigant" pursuant to section 68.093 . . . Welch a vexatious litigant under section 68.093 and order Welch to show cause why he should not be sanctioned . . . Section 68.093(3)(b) describes "the hearing upon any defendant's motion for an order to post security . . . The Department sought, pursuant to section 68.093(4) to prohibit Welch from filing any new action. . . . On appeal, however, it has not challenged the merits of the denial of its motion under section 68.093 . . .

C. SMITH, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, L. L. D. In, 637 F. App'x 574 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 68.093. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm. . . . Stat. § 68.093 is unconstitutional on its face. . . .

IN RE T. KOZICH,, 534 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 68.093(6). It was against that backdrop that this Court in 2009 prohibited Mr. . . .

LEWIS, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 143 So. 3d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . appellant is a vexatious litigant, and any such determination must be reached in compliance with section 68.093 . . .

P. ABDOOL, v. BONDI,, 141 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2014)

. . . See § 68.093, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

C. HARTLEY, v. EIGHTH JUDICIAL COUNTY COURT OF UNION COUNTY,, 129 So. 3d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . circuit court also erred as a matter of law by finding appellant to be a vexatious litigant under section 68.093 . . .

SMITH, v. L. L. HATCHER, C. O. C. O. D., 117 So. 3d 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . scope of their employment, and an order deeming him to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 68.093 . . . court explained, as follows: [T]his Court finds that the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law of Section 68.093 . . . Court finds that the Plaintiff met the threshold for being declared a vexatious litigant under Section 68.093 . . . We also reject Appellant’s argument that section 68.093 is unconstitutional. See Smith v. . . .

G. W. v. RUSHING,, 22 So. 3d 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Donnellan signed December 29, 2006, that decreed G.W. to be a vexatious litigant as authorized by section 68.093 . . . See § 68.093(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

SMITH, v. HERNANDEZ,, 20 So. 3d 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The court also entered an order finding Smith to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 68.093, . . . Smith also raises constitutional challenges to sections 945.10(3) and 68.093(4). . . . Further, we find no constitutional infirmity in sections 945.10(3) and 68.093(4). . . .

In KOZICH, T. v. A., 406 B.R. 949 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009)

. . . . § 68.093(6). On April 5, 2005, the Florida Circuit Court Judge Robert L. . . . Stat. § 68.093 to impose sanctions under that statute, neither am I required to turn a blind eye toward . . . Stat. section 68.093, by the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, and has been barred from filing pro se causes . . . By its terms, § 68.093 applies to actions "governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and proceedings . . .

A. McGRATH, v. P. CARON,, 8 So. 3d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See, e.g., § 68.093, Fla. Stat. (2008) (Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law); Smith v. . . . Fisher, 965 So.2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093 . . .

WALKER, v. ELLIS, A., 989 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 68.093(4), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: The court in any judicial circuit may . . . courts of that circuit without first obtaining leave of the administrative judge of that circuit. § 68.093 . . . Further, section 68.093(5), Florida Statutes, provides, “The clerk of the court shall not file any new . . . See § 68.093(5), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). . . .

E. PFLAUM, v. PFLAUM,, 974 So. 2d 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Pflaum is a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 68.093, Florida Statutes. . . .

THEOPHILE, v. STATE, 967 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . insufficient in nature can potentially subject Appellant to “vexatious litigant sanctions under section 68.093 . . .

SMITH, v. A. FISHER, M. D., 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . We write primarily to address the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093 . . . Fisher moved for an order requiring Smith to provide security pursuant to section 68.093. . . . . § 68.093(2)(d)l, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . Smith responded with a motion that section 68.093 be declared unconstitutional. . . . Section 68.093 satisfies the second Klu-ger test. In Mitchell v. . . .

T. PRATER, v. R. McDONOUGH,, 947 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . previous actions have been finally and adversely determined against [him]” in accordance with section 68.093 . . .

FAVREAU, v. FAVREAU,, 940 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Barthet, 886 So.2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); see also § 68.093, Fla. . . .

MAY, v. C. BARTHET,, 934 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2006)

. . . a challenge to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit's application of the Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093 . . .

Dr. J. WEAVER, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF LEON COUNTY,, 896 So. 2d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . . § 68.093(4), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

MAY, v. C. BARTHET, M. K. R. D. G. N., 886 So. 2d 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . § 68.093(5). Appellees responded to the complaint by initiating that statutory procedure. . . .