57.105
Attorney’s fee; sanctions for raising unsupported claims or defenses; exceptions; service of motions; damages for delay of litigation.
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57.105 Attorney’s fee; sanctions for raising unsupported claims or defenses; exceptions; service of motions; damages for delay of litigation.—
(1) Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee, including prejudgment interest, to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially presented to the court or at any time before trial:
(a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense; or
(b) Would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.
(2) At any time in any civil proceeding or action in which the moving party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that any action taken by the opposing party, including, but not limited to, the filing of any pleading or part thereof, the assertion of or response to any discovery demand, the assertion of any claim or defense, or the response to any request by any other party, was taken primarily for the purpose of unreasonable delay, the court shall award damages to the moving party for its reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, which may include attorney’s fees, and other loss resulting from the improper delay.
(3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), monetary sanctions may not be awarded:
(a) Under paragraph (1)(b) if the court determines that the claim or defense was initially presented to the court as a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable expectation of success.
(b) Under paragraph (1)(a) or paragraph (1)(b) against the losing party’s attorney if he or she has acted in good faith, based on the representations of his or her client as to the existence of those material facts.
(c) Under paragraph (1)(b) against a represented party.
(d) On the court’s initiative under subsections (1) and (2) unless sanctions are awarded before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(4) A motion by a party seeking sanctions under this section must be served but may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.
(5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party’s attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection.
(6) The provisions of this section are supplemental to other sanctions or remedies available under law or under court rules.
(7) If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract. This subsection applies to any contract entered into on or after October 1, 1988.
(8) Attorney fees may not be awarded under this section in proceedings for an injunction for protection pursuant to s. 741.30, s. 784.046, or s. 784.0485, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner knowingly made a false statement or allegation in the petition or that the respondent knowingly made a false statement or allegation in an asserted defense, with regard to a material matter as defined in s. 837.011(3).
History.—s. 1, ch. 78-275; s. 61, ch. 86-160; ss. 1, 2, ch. 88-160; s. 1, ch. 90-300; s. 316, ch. 95-147; s. 4, ch. 99-225; s. 1, ch. 2002-77; s. 9, ch. 2003-94; s. 1, ch. 2010-129; s. 4, ch. 2019-167.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1,564
cases (145 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case: Florida Hurricane Protection & Awning, Inc. v. Pastina
Florida Hurricane Protection & Awning, Inc. v. Pastina (2010)
“In 1988, the Florida Legislature amended section 57.105, Florida Statutes, to add subsection (2), the predecessor to subsection (7), to provide mutuality of attorney's fees as a remedy in contract cases.”
Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Fitzgerald (2017)
“Fitzgerald demanded attorney’s fees “pursuant to terms of the agreement between the parties and Florida Statutes, Section 57.105.” The case proceeded to a non-jury trial, and on January 15, 2014, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Fitzgerald after finding that…”
Albritton v. Ferrera (2005)
“" § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (1999); see also Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.”
Pino v. Bank of New York (2013)
“In a motion for sanctions brought pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2009), and dated February 17, 2009, Pino alleged that the unrecorded Assignment of Mortgage in the amended complaint was fraudulently backdated and had been created with the intent to commit fraud on…”
Florida Community Bank, N.A. v. Red Road Residential, LLC (2016)
“442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and the sanction provisions found in section 57.105, provide potential, substantive fee recovery mechanisms that might be applicable to a defendant asserting a non-party defense.”
Koch v. Koch (2010)
“4th DCA 2008) (noting that court can award fees as sanction under section 57.105 or based on the inherent authority of the court).”
HARVEY LEE DAVIS and ERIC MCCABE v. KENNETH I. BAILYNSON (2019)
“Appellate Analysis “In determining whether to award attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2001), the trial court applies an abuse of discretion standard.”
Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty (2011)
“See § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2002). This statute was amended to include a safe harbor provision under subsection (4), which took effect on July 1, 2002, while the present case was ongoing at the trial level.”
Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum (2005)
“See § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2000). We granted review.”
Mullins v. Kennelly (2003)
“, appeal an order assessing attorney's fees against them pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1999). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.”
Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (1982)
“The Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orange County, upheld the constitutionality of section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1979), thereby giving this Court jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution (1972).”
Martin County Conservation Alliance v. Martin County (2011)
“Because Appellants pursued appellate review without any foundation in law or fact, they are properly subject to sanctions under section 57.105, Florida Statutes. Appellants’ asserted basis for standing on appeal, that a future circuit court may interpret the land use plan…”
— 57.105(1) — 308 cases
Koch v. Koch (2010)
“4th DCA 2008) (noting that court can award fees as sanction under section 57.105 or based on the inherent authority of the court).”
Ferere v. Shure (2011)
HARVEY LEE DAVIS and ERIC MCCABE v. KENNETH I. BAILYNSON (2019)
“Appellate Analysis “In determining whether to award attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2001), the trial court applies an abuse of discretion standard.”
— 57.105(1)(a) — 18 cases
Peyton v. Horner (2006)
Montgomery v. Larmoyeux (2009)
— 57.105(1)(a)(b) — 2 cases
Smith v. Gore (2006)
Langer v. Langer (2005)
— 57.105(1)(b) — 13 cases
HARVEY LEE DAVIS and ERIC MCCABE v. KENNETH I. BAILYNSON (2019)
“Appellate Analysis “In determining whether to award attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2001), the trial court applies an abuse of discretion standard.”
Thomas v. Patton (2006)
— 57.105(2) — 75 cases
Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Fitzgerald (2017)
“Fitzgerald demanded attorney’s fees “pursuant to terms of the agreement between the parties and Florida Statutes, Section 57.105.” The case proceeded to a non-jury trial, and on January 15, 2014, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Fitzgerald after finding that…”
— 57.105(3) — 14 cases
Cullen v. Marsh (2010)
Martin County Conservation Alliance v. Martin County (2011)
“Because Appellants pursued appellate review without any foundation in law or fact, they are properly subject to sanctions under section 57.105, Florida Statutes. Appellants’ asserted basis for standing on appeal, that a future circuit court may interpret the land use plan…”
— 57.105(3)(a) — 9 cases
Paul v. Avrahami (2017)
— 57.105(3)(b) — 6 cases
Dan Pronman, Gary Pronman and Mark P. Bockstein v. Brian Styles and Movie Star Musclecars, Inc. (2015)
Tedrow v. Cannon (2016)
— 57.105(3)(c) — 11 cases
HARVEY LEE DAVIS and ERIC MCCABE v. KENNETH I. BAILYNSON (2019)
“Appellate Analysis “In determining whether to award attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2001), the trial court applies an abuse of discretion standard.”
Paul v. Avrahami (2017)
— 57.105(4) — 90 cases
Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty (2011)
“See § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2002). This statute was amended to include a safe harbor provision under subsection (4), which took effect on July 1, 2002, while the present case was ongoing at the trial level.”
Pino v. Bank of New York (2013)
“In a motion for sanctions brought pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2009), and dated February 17, 2009, Pino alleged that the unrecorded Assignment of Mortgage in the amended complaint was fraudulently backdated and had been created with the intent to commit fraud on…”
Koch v. Koch (2010)
“4th DCA 2008) (noting that court can award fees as sanction under section 57.105 or based on the inherent authority of the court).”
Montgomery v. Larmoyeux (2009)
— 57.105(5) — 23 cases
Davidson v. Ramirez (2007)
Koch v. Koch (2010)
“4th DCA 2008) (noting that court can award fees as sanction under section 57.105 or based on the inherent authority of the court).”
— 57.105(6) — 10 cases
Florida Hurricane Protection & Awning, Inc. v. Pastina (2010)
“In 1988, the Florida Legislature amended section 57.105, Florida Statutes, to add subsection (2), the predecessor to subsection (7), to provide mutuality of attorney's fees as a remedy in contract cases.”
— 57.105(7) — 143 cases
Florida Hurricane Protection & Awning, Inc. v. Pastina (2010)
“In 1988, the Florida Legislature amended section 57.105, Florida Statutes, to add subsection (2), the predecessor to subsection (7), to provide mutuality of attorney's fees as a remedy in contract cases.”
Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Fitzgerald (2017)
“Fitzgerald demanded attorney’s fees “pursuant to terms of the agreement between the parties and Florida Statutes, Section 57.105.” The case proceeded to a non-jury trial, and on January 15, 2014, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Fitzgerald after finding that…”
Florida Community Bank, N.A. v. Red Road Residential, LLC (2016)
“442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and the sanction provisions found in section 57.105, provide potential, substantive fee recovery mechanisms that might be applicable to a defendant asserting a non-party defense.”
— 57.105(8) — 1 case
— 57.105(a) — 1 case
— 57.105(b) — 2 cases
HARVEY LEE DAVIS and ERIC MCCABE v. KENNETH I. BAILYNSON (2019)
“Appellate Analysis “In determining whether to award attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2001), the trial court applies an abuse of discretion standard.”
Sexton v. Ferguson (2011)
— 57.105(l) — 1 case
— 57.105(l)(a) — 15 cases
Pino v. Bank of New York (2013)
“In a motion for sanctions brought pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2009), and dated February 17, 2009, Pino alleged that the unrecorded Assignment of Mortgage in the amended complaint was fraudulently backdated and had been created with the intent to commit fraud on…”
In Re Wille (2005)
Puglisi v. Puglisi (2014)
— 57.105(l)(b) — 14 cases
Maradriaga v. 7-ELEVEN (2010)
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