The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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On appeal, the Department asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the offer of judgment because section 73.032(5) divested the court of any discretion to award costs incurred after the rejection of the offer of judgment. EPIC responds that application of section 73.032(5) constitutes a sanction that must be invoked by the timely filing of a motion pursuant to rule 1.442(g), which the Department failed to do. Thus, the question raised by this appeal is whether section 73.032(5) constitutes a sanction, the imposition of which is controlled by the procedural requirements of rule 1.442(g).
In addition to amending section 73.092, chapter 94-162 also amended section 73.032 in order to allow a defendant in an eminent domain proceeding to make an offer of judgment. If a defendant is successful in obtaining a judgment in excess of its offer, the Department must pay fees pursuant to subsections (2) and (3), even if the Department has made a written offer under subsection (1). See § 73.032(6), Fla. Stat. (1995). Because Smithbilt made no offer of judgment, this provision has no direct application in this case.
The county filed a declaration of quick taking against the property of A G in which there was a good-faith estimate of value of $725,000. Two months later, the county made a written offer to A G to acquire the property for $836,000. The offer was refused and the condemnation proceedings continued. An order of taking was entered and an amount equal to the good-faith estimate was deposited in the registry of the court. Thereafter, pursuant to section 73.032, Florida Statutes (1993), the county served A G with an offer of judgment for $836,000, which was accepted.
Section 73.032, Florida Statutes, provides the "exclusive offer of judgment provisions for eminent domain actions." Section 73.032(4)(a) requires that the offer of judgment
The majority opinion finds comfort in Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Bennett, 158 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). A careful reading of this case does not support the proposition that a landowner is precluded from accepting the good faith estimate as full payment for land taken. Bennett was the fourth appeal in an eminent domain action. See Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Bennett, 124 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960); Bennett v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 131 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1961); and Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Bennett, 149 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). These cases stand for the proposition that the good faith estimate is not binding on the condemning authority's position at trial. This holding does not persuade me on the issue at hand because offers are seldom admissible or binding on a party's position at trial. See, e.g., § 45.061 (offers of settlement); § 73.032 (offers of judgment in eminent domain actions); § 768.79 (offer of judgment).
We also agree with the department's assertion that it need not be penalized for including reference to section 73.032 in its offer, "in an abundance of caution," even though that statute was not effective as to previously filed actions. Section 73.032 supplies procedural rules for offers made in an eminent domain proceeding that were previously found in section 73.092 and the rules of civil procedure. There was no confusion created by the department's offer as it was clearly substantively founded on section 73.092.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if an offer of judgment made by the petitioner, pursuant to s. 73.032, is rejected and the verdict or judgment is less than or equal to the offer of judgment, no attorney's fees or costs shall be awarded for time spent by the attorney or costs incurred after the time of rejection of the offer, except for apportionment or other supplemental proceedings.
. . . because, in determining EPIC’s entitlement to costs, the trial court failed to properly apply section 73.032 . . . because the final judgment award was less than the offer of judgment, EPIC was precluded, under section 73.032 . . . EPIC responds that application of section 73.032(5) constitutes a sanction that must be invoked by the . . . We hold that section 73.032(5) is not a sanction as that term is used in rule 1.442. . . . fees and costs without a determina tion as to whether any of those costs were prohibited by section 73.032 . . .
. . . rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061, 73.032 . . .
. . . If substantive, section 73.032, Florida Statutes (1997), controls and requires that an offer be served . . . Because the differing time requirements between rule 1.442 and section 73.032 are impossible to reconcile . . .
. . . In addition to amending section 73.092, chapter 94-162 also amended section 73.032 in order to allow . . . See § 73.032(6), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . offers that do not comply with all of the requirements to create an offer of judgment under section 73.032 . . .
. . . Thereafter, pursuant to section 73.032, Florida Statutes (1993), the county served A&G with an offer . . .
. . . On February 20,1995, the department presented an offer of judgment pursuant to section 73.032, Florida . . . Section 73.032, Florida Statutes, provides the “exclusive offer of judgment provisions for eminent domain . . . Section 73.032(4)(a) requires that the offer of judgment 1. be in writing; 2. settle all pending claims . . . , offer of judgment for $126,400 clearly met all of the statutory requirements set forth in section 73.032 . . .
. . . See, e.g., § 45.061 (offers of settlement); § 73.032 (offers of judgment in eminent domain actions); . . .
. . . rule was amended to reconcile, where possible, sections 44.102(6) (formerly 44.102(5)(b)), 45.061, 73.032 . . .
. . . The department’s offer stated that it was being made “pursuant to Florida Statutes Sections 73.032, 73.092 . . . agree with the department’s assertion that it need not be penalized for including reference to section 73.032 . . . Section 73.032 supplies procedural rules for offers made in an eminent domain proceeding that were previously . . . argument that by the department’s reference, in the offer of judgment to the later-adopted section 73.032 . . . The additional reference to section 73.032 was mere surplus-age, as that statute by its terms could not . . .
. . . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if an offer of judgment made by the petitioner, pursuant to s. 73.032 . . .