The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Finally, Appellants argue that the trial court analyzed its motion under the incorrect statute. FAHI sought relief pursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067, Florida Statutes. The trial court order denying FAHI's motion relies upon section 78.068, which imposes a higher standard for obtaining a writ of replevin without notice and hearing. Compare § 78.067(2), Fla. Stat. (2019)with § 78.068, Fla. Stat. (2019). Section 78.068 is inapplicable to this case because there was notice and hearing. See Brown v. Reynolds , 872 So. 2d 290, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The trial court should have analyzed FAHI's motion under section 78.067, not section 78.068.Section 78.065(2) lists instructions that an order directing the defendants to show cause must include. Specifically, Sections 78.065(2)(b)-(d) require the order to include instructions about service of the complaint and of the order. Because counsel for the defendants has appeared in this action and receives electronic service through CM/ECF, the requirements in Sections 78.065(2)(b)-(d) are satisfied. --------Replevin is a statutory remedy under Florida law that permits "[a]ny person whose personal property is wrongfully detained by any other person [to] recover said personal property and any damages sustained by reason of the wrongful taking or detention . . . . Fla. Stat. § 78.01. "Section 78.01 provides two alternative procedures for obtaining a writ of replevin under Florida law prior to entry of a final judgment awarding possession." California First Leasing Corp. v. Orlando Sun Resort & Spa, LLC, 2009 WL 2423108, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2009). "Pursuant to Sections 78.065 and 78.067, and in the absence of an effective waiver, the defendant must be given notice and a show cause hearing held before the writ of replevin may issue prior to the entry of final judgment. Pursuant to section 78.068, the prejudgment writ may issue without notice and a hearing, but the plaintiff must post a bond." Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So. 2d 290, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). See also Gazil, Inc. v. Super Food Servs., Inc., 356 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 1978) (Fla. Stat. § 78.068 "meets the five part test for minimum due process requirements").The petition for writ of mandamus is granted. Within a reasonable time, not to exceed 20 days from issuance of mandate in this cause, the circuit court shall comply with the dictates of Section 78.065, Florida Statutes, by either directing the clerk to issue a writ of replevin pursuant to Section 78.065(1), or by issuing an order to show cause complying with the requirements of Section 78.065(2). Because we are confident that the circuit court will comply, we withhold issuance of the formal writ.Next, we address the statutes that authorize Siemens to seek a writ of replevin prior to entry of a final judgment, thereby allowing Siemens “to obtain possession of the property during the pendency of the replevin action and until the parties' claims are finally adjudicated.” Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So.2d 290, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). “Chapter 78 of the Florida Statutes provides two separate and distinct methods of obtaining a writ of replevin prior to the entry of final judgment in the replevin action.” Id. First, “[p]ursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067, and in the absence of an effective waiver, the defendant must be given notice and a show cause hearing held before the writ of replevin may issue prior to the entry of final judgment.” Id. Second, “[p]ursuant to section 78.068, the prejudgment writ may issue without notice and a hearing, but the plaintiff must post a bond.” Id.If the statutory requirements are sufficiently alleged in the complaint, "the court shall promptly issue an order directed to the defendant to show cause why the claimed property should not be taken from the possession of the defendant and delivered to plaintiff." § 78.065(2).In this case, Brown filed a "Motion for Hearing and/or Show Cause Order" and invoked sections 78.065 and 78.067, which provided for issuance of a writ of replevin prior to the entry of final judgment but after notice and a hearing. Brown asserted in his motion that Frank had procedurally defaulted and that an order to show cause should issue. Brown's motion reflects confusion about the operation of sections 78.065 and 78.067. On the one hand, Brown asked the circuit court to enter an order to show cause, which necessarily must precede a hearing on an order to show cause. On the other hand, Brown requested "a hearing on the order to show cause" as if such an order had already been entered. Nevertheless, because Brown specifically referenced an "order to show cause" as provided for in sections 78.065 and 78.067, Brown's motion cannot be construed as a request by him for a final adjudication on the merits of his claim. As framed by Brown's motion, the scope of the hearing he requested was limited to whether a show cause order should issue or whether Brown was entitled to a writ of replevin prior to final judgment pursuant to the procedure he had invoked… In those replevin cases to which these rules are applicable, the clerk of the county court shall set the hearing required by section 78.065(2)(a), Florida Statutes (prejudgment replevin order to show cause hearings) and rule 7.050(d) (pretrial conferences) at the same time.By statute, the Bank is granted an absolute, unconditional right to the issuance of an order to show cause, followed by a hearing at which the Bank is granted an opportunity to show that it is entitled to possession of the motor home pending final disposition of the case. See Prestige Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Advantage Car Rental Sales, Inc., 656 So.2d 541, 545 (Fla. DCA 1995); Morse Operations, Inc. v. Superior Rent-A-Car, Inc., 593 So.2d 1079, 1080-81 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); § 78.065(2), Fla. Stat. (2001); § 78.067(2), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Comcoa, Inc. v. Coe, 587 So.2d 474, 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The trial court's order deprived the Bank of its legislatively-bestowed rights, and no plenary appeal following entry of final judgment is adequate to restore those rights to the Bank. The Bank must instead rely upon this court, in this proceeding, to provide it with the protection intended by the statutes.. . . these rules are applicable, the clerk of the county court shall set the hearing required by section 78.065 . . .
. . . from issuance of mandate in this cause, the circuit court shall comply with the dictates of Section 78.065 . . . , Florida Statutes, by either directing the clerk to issue a writ of replevin pursuant to Section 78.065 . . . (1), or by issuing an order to show cause complying with the requirements of Section 78.065(2). . . .
. . . First, “[pjursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067, and in the absence of an effective waiver, the defendant . . .
. . . .” § 78.065(2). . . .
. . . motion for the issuance of a writ of replevin prior to the entry of final judgment pursuant to sections 78.065 . . . On March 11, 2002, Brown filed a motion pursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067 requesting the entry of . . . Pursuant to' sections 78.065 and 78.067, and in the absence of an effective waiver, the defendant must . . . Case In this case, Brown filed a “Motion for Hearing and/or Show Cause Order” and invoked sections 78.065 . . . Brown’s motion reflects confusion about the operation of sections 78.065 and 78.067. . . .
. . . these rules are applicable, the clerk of the county court shall set the hearing required by section 78.065 . . .
. . . Superior Rent-A-Car, Inc., 593 So.2d 1079, 1080-81 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); § 78.065(2), Fla. . . .
. . . The trial court referred to §§ 78.065-78.068, 78.20, and 78.21, Fla. Stat. . . . .
. . . The new form is the replevin order to show cause prescribed by section 78.065, Florida Statutes (1979 . . .
. . . The new form is the replevin order to show cause prescribed by section 78.065, Florida Statutes (1979 . . .
. . . In T and T, the panel stated in dicta that "[sjection 78.065, Florida statutes (1989), did not require . . . The requirement of bond is not created by section 78.065, however; it appears in section 78.068(3). . . .
. . . to possession of personal property, entered after a replevin show cause hearing pursuant to section 78.065 . . .
. . . Under sections 78.065 and 78.067, a show cause hearing must occur before a replevin writ is issued. . . .
. . . complaint and an affidavit, the trial court had previously issued an order to show cause under section 78.065 . . . Section 78.065(2)(e) plainly says that the defendant “has the right to file affidavits on his behalf . . .
. . . The new form is the replevin order to show cause prescribed by section 78.065, Florida Statutes (1979 . . .
. . . these rules are applicable, the clerk of the county court shall set the hearing required by Ssection 78.065 . . .
. . . its right to possession of some 1,150 automobiles, after a show cause hearing pursuant to sections 78.065 . . . Morse elected to proceed pursuant to sections 78.065 and 78.067. . . .
. . . application for subsequent hearing before the court, after notice to the defendant, as is prescribed under 78.065 . . . [e.s.] . 78.065 Order to show cause; contents.— (1) The court without delay shall examine the complaint . . .
. . . Section 78.065, Florida Statutes (1989), did not require appellee as the party seeking replevin to post . . .
. . . . § 78.065(2)(e), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . .
. . . these rules are applicable, the clerk of the county court shall set the hearing required by Section 78.065 . . .
. . . these rules are applicable, the Clerk of the County Court shall set the hearing required by section 78.065 . . .
. . . See §§ 49.011(7), 78.065(2)(c), Fla.Stat.; Neil v. . . .
. . . In so doing we note the provisions of Sections 78.065 and 78.067 which clearly spell out provisions for . . . Section 78.065(2)(e), and 78.067(2). No similar language appears in Section 78.068. . . .
. . . The new form is the replevin order to show cause prescribed by section 78.065, Florida Statutes (1979 . . .
. . . On June 6 the trial court entered its order to show cause pursuant to § 78.065, Fla.Stat. (1975). . . .
. . . Gonzalez filed a motion to quash service of the order on the ground that Section 78.065, Florida Statutes . . . The section of the replevin statute alleged to be constitutionally offensive is Section 78.065(2), Florida . . . We do not find 1.140 and 1.500, Fla.R.Civ.P. to be specifically contrary to the portions of Sec. 78.065 . . .