The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Chapter 82
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

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CHAPTER 82

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

82.01 Definitions.

82.02 Applicability.

82.03 Remedies.

82.035 Remedy for unlawful detention by a transient occupant of residential property; recovery of transient occupant’s personal belongings.

82.04 Questions involved in this proceeding.

82.05 Service of process.

82.091 Judgment and execution.

82.101 Effect of judgment.

82.01 Definitions.—As used in this chapter, the term:

(1) “Forcible entry” means entering into and taking possession of real property with force, in a manner that is not peaceable, easy, or open, even if such entry is authorized by a person entitled to possession of the real property and the possession is only temporary or applies only to a portion of the real property.

(2) “Real property” means land or any existing permanent or temporary building or structure thereon, and any attachments generally held out for the use of persons in possession of the real property.

(3) “Record titleholder” means a person who holds title to real property as evidenced by an instrument recorded in the public records of the county in which the real property is located.

(4) “Unlawful detention” means possessing real property, even if the possession is temporary or applies only to a portion of the real property, without the consent of a person entitled to possession of the real property or after the withdrawal of consent by such person.

(5) “Unlawful entry” means the entry into and possessing of real property, even if the possession is temporary or for a portion of the real property, when such entry is not authorized by law or consented to by a person entitled to possession of the real property.

History.—s. 1, ch. 1630, 1868; RS 1687; GS 2152; RGS 3456; CGL 5309; s. 33, ch. 67-254; s. 2, ch. 2018-94.

82.02 Applicability.—

(1) This chapter does not apply to residential tenancies under part II of chapter 83.

(2) This chapter does not apply to the possession of real property under chapter 513 or chapter 723.

History.—s. 2, ch. 1630, 1868; RS 1688; GS 2153; RGS 3457; CGL 5310; s. 33, ch. 67-254; s. 13, ch. 73-330; s. 19, ch. 77-104; s. 3, ch. 2018-94.

82.03 Remedies.—

(1) A person entitled to possession of real property, including constructive possession by a record titleholder, has a cause of action against a person who obtained possession of that real property by forcible entry, unlawful entry, or unlawful detention and may recover possession and damages. The person entitled to possession is not required to notify the prospective defendant before filing the action.

(2) If the court finds that the entry or detention by the defendant is willful and knowingly wrongful, the court must award the plaintiff damages equal to double the reasonable rental value of the real property from the beginning of the forcible entry, unlawful entry, or unlawful detention until possession is delivered to the plaintiff. The plaintiff may also recover other damages, including, but not limited to, damages for waste.

(3) Actions for possession and damages may be bifurcated.

(4) All actions under this chapter must be brought by summary procedure as provided in s. 51.011, and the court shall advance the cause on the calendar.

History.—s. 3, ch. 1630, 1868; RS 1689; GS 2154; RGS 3458; CGL 5311; s. 33, ch. 67-254; s. 423, ch. 95-147; s. 4, ch. 2018-94.

82.035 Remedy for unlawful detention by a transient occupant of residential property; recovery of transient occupant’s personal belongings.—

(1) As used in this section, the term “transient occupant” means a person whose residency in real property intended for residential use has occurred for a brief length of time, is not pursuant to a lease, and whose occupancy was intended as transient in nature.

(a) Factors that establish that a person is a transient occupant include, but are not limited to:

1. The person does not have an ownership interest, financial interest, or leasehold interest in the property entitling him or her to occupancy of the property.

2. The person does not have any property utility subscriptions.

3. The person cannot produce documentation, correspondence, or identification cards sent or issued by a government agency, including, but not limited to, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles or the supervisor of elections, which show that the person used the property address as an address of record with the agency within the previous 12 months.

4. The person pays minimal or no rent for his or her stay at the property.

5. The person does not have a designated space of his or her own, such as a room, at the property.

6. The person has minimal, if any, personal belongings at the property.

7. The person has an apparent permanent residence elsewhere.

(b) Minor contributions made for the purchase of household goods, or minor contributions towards other household expenses, do not establish residency.

(2) A transient occupant unlawfully detains a residential property if the transient occupant remains in occupancy of the residential property after the party entitled to possession of the property has directed the transient occupant to leave. A transient occupancy terminates when a transient occupant begins to reside elsewhere, surrenders the key to the dwelling, or leaves the dwelling when directed by a law enforcement officer in receipt of an affidavit under subsection (3), the party entitled to possession, or a court. A transient occupancy is not extended by the presence of personal belongings of a former transient occupant.

(3) Any law enforcement officer may, upon receipt of a sworn affidavit of the party entitled to possession that a person who is a transient occupant is unlawfully detaining residential property, direct a transient occupant to surrender possession of residential property. The sworn affidavit must set forth the facts, including the applicable factors listed in paragraph (1)(a), which establish that a transient occupant is unlawfully detaining residential property.

(a) A person who fails to comply with the direction of the law enforcement officer to surrender possession or occupancy violates s. 810.08. In any prosecution of a violation of s. 810.08 related to this section, whether the defendant was properly classified as a transient occupant is not an element of the offense, the state is not required to prove that the defendant was in fact a transient occupant, and the defendant’s status as a permanent resident is not an affirmative defense.

(b) A person wrongfully removed pursuant to this subsection has a cause of action for wrongful removal against the person who requested the removal, and may recover injunctive relief and compensatory damages. However, a wrongfully removed person does not have a cause of action against the law enforcement officer or the agency employing the law enforcement officer absent a showing of bad faith by the law enforcement officer.

(4) A party entitled to possession of real property has a cause of action for unlawful detainer against a transient occupant pursuant to s. 82.03. The party entitled to possession is not required to notify the transient occupant before filing the action. If the court finds that the defendant is not a transient occupant but is instead a tenant of residential property governed by part II of chapter 83, the court may not dismiss the action without first allowing the plaintiff to give the transient occupant the notice required by that part and to thereafter amend the complaint to pursue eviction under that part.

(5) The party entitled to possession of a dwelling shall allow a former transient occupant to recover his or her personal belongings at reasonable times and under reasonable conditions.

(a) Unless otherwise agreed to, a reasonable time for the recovery of the former transient occupant’s personal belongings generally means a time period within 10 days after termination of the transient occupancy, when the party entitled to possession of the dwelling or a trusted third party can be present at the dwelling to supervise the recovery of the belongings.

(b) If the party entitled to possession of the dwelling reasonably believes that the former transient occupant has engaged in misconduct or has a history of violence or drug or alcohol abuse, it is reasonable for the party entitled to possession of the dwelling to impose additional conditions on access to the dwelling or the personal belongings. These conditions may include, but are not limited to, the presence of a law enforcement officer, the use of a mover registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, or the use of a trusted third party to recover the personal belongings. For purposes of this paragraph, misconduct includes, but is not limited to:

1. Intentional damage to the dwelling, to property owned by the party entitled to possession of the dwelling, or to property owned by another occupant of the dwelling;

2. Physical or verbal abuse directed at the party entitled to possession of the dwelling or another occupant of the dwelling; or

3. Theft of property belonging to the party entitled to possession of the dwelling or property of another occupant of the dwelling.

(c) The person entitled to possession of a dwelling may presume that the former transient occupant has abandoned personal belongings left at the dwelling if the former transient occupant does not seek to recover them within a reasonable time after the transient occupant surrenders occupancy of the dwelling. The time period to recover personal belongings may be extended due to the unavailability of the party entitled to possession of the dwelling to supervise the recovery of the personal belongings. Circumstances that may shorten the time include, but are not limited to, the poor condition of or the perishable or hazardous nature of the personal belongings, the intent of the former transient occupant to abandon or discard the belongings, or the significant impairment of the use of the dwelling by the storage of the former transient occupant’s personal belongings.

(d) If the person entitled to possession of the dwelling unreasonably withholds access to a former transient occupant’s personal belongings, the former transient occupant may bring a civil action for damages or the recovery of the property. The court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs.

(6) This section shall be construed in recognition of the right to exclude others as one of the most essential components of property rights.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2015-89; s. 1, ch. 2018-83; s. 5, ch. 2018-94.

Note.—Former s. 82.045.

82.04 Questions involved in this proceeding.—The court shall determine only the right of possession and any damages. Unless it is necessary to determine the right of possession or the record titleholder, the court may not determine the question of title.

History.—s. 4, ch. 1630, 1868; RS 1690; GS 2155; RGS 3459; CGL 5312; s. 33, ch. 67-254; s. 13, ch. 73-330; s. 19, ch. 77-104; s. 424, ch. 95-147; s. 6, ch. 2018-94.

82.05 Service of process.—

(1) After at least two attempts to obtain service as provided by law, if the defendant cannot be found in the county in which the action is pending and either the defendant does not have a usual place of abode in the county or there is no person 15 years of age or older residing at the defendant’s usual place of abode in the county, the sheriff must serve the summons and complaint by attaching them to some conspicuous part of the real property involved in the proceeding. The minimum amount of time allowed between the two attempts to obtain service is 6 hours.

(2) If a plaintiff causes, or anticipates causing, a defendant to be served with a summons and complaint solely by attaching them to some conspicuous part of real property involved in the proceeding, the plaintiff must provide the clerk of the court with two additional copies of the summons and the complaint and two prestamped envelopes addressed to the defendant. One envelope must be addressed to the defendant’s residence, if known. The second envelope must be addressed to the defendant’s last known business address, if known. The clerk of the court shall immediately mail the copies of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, note the fact of mailing in the docket, and file a certificate in the court file of the fact and date of mailing. Service is effective on the date of posting or mailing, whichever occurs later, and at least 5 days must have elapsed after the date of service before a final judgment for removal of the defendant may be entered.

History.—s. 20, ch. 1630, 1868; RS 1691; GS 2156; RGS 3460; CGL 5313; s. 33, ch. 67-254; s. 7, ch. 2018-94.

82.091 Judgment and execution.—

(1) If the court enters a judgment for the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall recover possession of the real property that he or she is entitled to and damages and costs. The court shall award a writ of possession to be executed without delay and execution for the plaintiff’s damages and costs.

(2) If the court enters a judgment for the defendant, the court shall order that the defendant recover costs.

History.—s. 15, ch. 1630, 1868; RS 1702; GS 2167; RGS 3471; CGL 5324; s. 33, ch. 67-254; s. 426, ch. 95-147; s. 8, ch. 2018-94.

Note.—Former s. 82.16.

82.101 Effect of judgment.—No judgment rendered either for the plaintiff or the defendant bars any action of trespass for injury to the real property or ejectment between the same parties respecting the same real property. A judgment is not conclusive as to the facts therein in any future action for trespass, ejectment, or quiet title. A judgment rendered either for the plaintiff or the defendant pursuant to this chapter may be superseded, in whole or in part, by a subsequent judgment in an action for trespass for injury to the real property, ejectment, or quiet title involving the same parties with respect to the same real property.

History.—s. 20, ch. 1630, 1868; RS 1703; GS 2168; RGS 3472; CGL 5325; s. 33, ch. 67-254; s. 9, ch. 2018-94.

Note.—Former s. 82.17.

F.S. 82 on Google Scholar

F.S. 82 on Casetext

Amendments to 82

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 82

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 82.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

MCGIRT, v. OKLAHOMA, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (U.S. 2020)

. . . State Penitentiary , 368 U.S. 351, 356-358, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962) (holding that allotment . . . Seymour , 368 U.S., at 357-358, 82 S.Ct. 424. . . . See Seymour , 368 U.S., at 357-358, 82 S.Ct. 424. . . . State Penitentiary , 368 U.S. 351, 358, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962). . . .

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOME, v. PENNSYLVANIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 2367 (U.S. 2020)

. . . The Departments dispute that women will be adversely impacted by the 2018 exemptions. 82 Fed. . . . They were also aware of Zubik 's instructions. 82 Fed. Reg. 47799. . . . The measure thus failed to "assuage[ ]" their "sincere religious objections." 82 Fed. . . . See 82 Fed. Reg. 47813-47814 ; 83 Fed. Reg. 8487 ; 85 Fed. Reg. 722-723 (2020). . . . See 82 Fed. . . .

P. BARR, v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary." 468 U.S. 641, 652-653, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 . . . Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (case-or-controversy requirement reflects . . . Vitale , 370 U.S. 421, 430, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962). . . .

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2082 (U.S. 2020)

. . . League of Women Voters of Cal. , 468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984). . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 31, pp. 2-3; see, e.g., App. 48-55, 64-82. . . . the Act by recruiting new physicians who have or can obtain admitting privileges." 250 F.Supp.3d at 82 . . . Id., at 88 ; see id., at 79, 82, 87-88. • In sum, "Act 620 does not advance Louisiana's legitimate interest . . . See 250 F.Supp.3d at 77-78 ; App. 48-55, 64-82. . . . the Act by recruiting new physicians who have or can obtain admitting privileges." 250 F.Supp.3d at 82 . . . replaced if the admitting privileges requirement forced them to leave abortion practice. 250 F.Supp.3d at 82 . . . See id ., at 81-82 ; App. 113-114. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. THURAISSIGIAM, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id. , at 82. . . . See, e.g. , Ex parte Kaine , 14 F.Cas. 78, 82 (No. 7,597) (CC SDNY 1853) (granting the writ to a prisoner . . . The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 82, gave the federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (U.S. 2020)

. . . United States , 368 U.S. 208, 229, 82 S.Ct. 289, 7 L.Ed.2d 240 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). . . . (noting that Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See, e.g. , Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 Yale L. J. 573, 583-584 (1973). . . . State Bd. of Ed. , 1 Cal.3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal.Rptr. 175 (1969). . . . I. xxxv. (1704) 82, I may .. not suffer my self to be outdone by the weaker Sex. 1732 [see FAIR a. . . .

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, v. COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION LLC, v., 140 S. Ct. 1837 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See 82 Stat. 919, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq. . . . through the National Park Service shall become a part of the [N]ational [P]ark [S]ystem ." § 10(c), 82 . . . head of an agency "to transfer to the appropriate secretary jurisdiction over such lands ." § 6(e), 82 . . . L. 82-336, 66 Stat. 69 (emphasis added). Similar language appears in a host of other statutes. . . . See § 5(a), 82 Stat. 920. . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . (Hawaii, same); Act of Aug. 24, 1912, § 4, 37 Stat. 513 (Alaska, same); Act of Aug. 23, 1968, § 4, 82 . . . L. 90-497, § 1, 82 Stat. 842 (Guam, same); Act of May 4, 1812, § 3, 2 Stat. 723 (D. . . . to "alter, amend, modify, and repeal any and all laws ... of every character." §§ 27, 32, id. , at 82 . . . Zdanok , 370 U.S. 530, 546, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that . . . 179 (Wyoming); Act of May 2, 1890, § 4, 26 Stat. 83 (Oklahoma); Act of Apr. 12, 1900, § 27, 31 Stat. 82 . . .

BANISTER, v. DAVIS,, 140 S. Ct. 1698 (U.S. 2020)

. . . League of Women Voters of Cal. , 468 U.S. 364, 373, n. 10, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) (internal . . .

MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS, v. UNITED STATES v. v. v., 140 S. Ct. 1308 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), the federal courts have lacked this power . . .

GEORGIA, v. PUBLIC. RESOURCE. ORG, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Yermian , 468 U.S. 63, 77, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Scott , 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) ; Craig v. . . . Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) ; Mapp v. . . . Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. . . . Stat. § 54-82 ; Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. § 3.270 (2019); Ind. . . . Maxie , App. 82; Williams , App. 104. . . .

K. KAHLER, v. KANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Biggs, The Guilty Mind 82 (1955). . . . Felter , 25 Iowa 67, 82, 84 (1868) ; see Leland , 343 U.S. at 801, 72 S.Ct. 1002 (recognizing such skepticism . . . Jorrick , 269 Kan. 72, 82, 4 P.3d 610, 617 (2000) (quoting Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity . . . Felter , 25 Iowa 67, 82-83 (1868) ; Hopps v. People , 31 Ill. 385, 391-392 (1863). . . .

L. ALLEN, v. A. COOPER, III,, 140 S. Ct. 994 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). . . .

E. RODRIGUEZ, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,, 140 S. Ct. 713 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). . . . La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. , 304 U.S. 92, 110, 58 S.Ct. 803, 82 L.Ed. 1202 (1938). . . .

C. HERNANDEZ, v. MESA, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 735 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), held that "[t]here is no federal general . . . Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). . . .

V. CANNON, v. BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,, 140 S. Ct. 234 (U.S. 2019)

. . . No. 19-82 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

G NDARA- GORRITZ, v. SCOTIABANK DE PUERTO RICO,, 603 B.R. 871 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Docket No. 82.) . . .

UNITED STATES, v. ROMERO, Jr., 935 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Snow, 82 F.3d 935, 942 (10th Cir. 1996). . . .

ELHADY, v. H. KABLE,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 562 (E.D. Va. 2019)

. . . MSJ Ex. 11 at 82-84. . . .

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR, v., 935 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Preston , 873 F.3d 877, 881-82 (11th Cir. 2017). . . . invalidated search warrant-in other words, when they act in "good faith." 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 . . . Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 916, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). . . .

G. STEPHENS v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a, 935 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Coll. , 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996), and a party cannot make it sufficient simply by finding . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-82, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). . . .

BIRD, v. i DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DHS, R., 935 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Grattan , 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) ). . . .

IN RE CORPORATE RESOURCE SERVICES, INC. S. v., 603 B.R. 888 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 117 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing lower court decision to preclude expert . . .

SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL- DENVER, INC. v. M. AZAR II, U. S., 391 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Ludwig , 82 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ; see also Lacson v. U.S. . . .

PEREZ- SANCHEZ, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 2781-82. . . . Id. at 82, 130 S. Ct. at 597. . . .

ALMANZA, v. UNITED STATES,, 935 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . IPCom GmbH & Co ., KG , 667 F.3d 1270, 1281-82 (Fed. . . .

SEMPLE, a a k a a v. GRISWOLD, Be USA A., 934 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HAWKINS, a. k. a. D III, a. k. a., 934 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. ADAMS,, 934 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 924, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. HOPPER,, 934 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . See R.82 at 1 ("This marks the first instance in Undersigned Counsel's career in which he levels an objection . . .

COLE v. CARSON, v., 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Slaton , 508 F.3d 576, 581-82 (11th Cir. 2007) ). . . . Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 381-82, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (same); Allen v. . . .

BACA v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, G. T. L. M., 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) )). . . . and 'common to all members of the public' " (quoting Ex parte Levitt , 302 U.S. 633, 636, 58 S.Ct. 1, 82 . . . Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) ). . . . McDonnell , 299 F.3d 1173, 1180-82 (10th Cir. 2002) (analyzing whether the Colorado Department of Human . . .

BURKE, v. REGALADO, v., 935 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. , 82 F. . . . reviews and failed to discipline an officer who repeatedly used unjustified violence. 882 F.2d at 581-82 . . . Id. at 581-82. In Rodriguez v. . . . Gutierrez-Rodriguez , 882 F.2d at 581-82 ; see also Rodriguez , 891 F.3d at 806 (upholding a combined . . . Cartagena , 882 F.2d 553, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1989) (same result when police supervisors were deliberately . . .

UNITED STATES v. BEGAY,, 934 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 90-618, § 203, 82 Stat. 1214 (1968). . . . Ct. 2272, 2279-82, 195 L.Ed.2d 736 (2016) did not overrule Fernandez-Ruiz . 923 F.3d 1197, 1202-03 (9th . . .

UNITED STATES v. CUEVAS- LOPEZ,, 934 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ortiz-Gutierrez , 36 F.3d 80, 82 (9th Cir. 1994) ; see also United States v. . . . of violence for which the defendant was sentenced to at least five years imprisonment." 36 F.3d at 82 . . .

REGAN v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA,, 934 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Thruway Auth. , 584 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of E. . . .

MYMAIL, LTD. v. OOVOO, LLC, IAC, 934 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . J.A. 733, J.A. 734 n.8, J.A. 740, J.A. 750-82. In Yahoo! . . . (ECF Nos. 101, 109, 110), at J.A. 450-72, J.A. 722-82, J.A. 844-914. . . .

BRAND v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, 934 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . argued in the alternative that if they are not entitled to 100% coverage than they are entitled to 82% . . . parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the Insured Directors' proposed alternative allocations of 82% . . . Only in the summary judgment reply brief did the Insured Directors seek alternative allocations of 82% . . .

SENNE v. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP. LLC LLC LP St. LLC LLC LLC LLC L. P. L. P. LLC LLC L. P. AZPB L. P. P LLC LLC LP LLP LLC LLC,, 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. of Sacramento Cty. , 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581-82, 114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d 666 (1974). . . . Nordstrom, Inc. , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 889, 393 P.3d 375, 381-82 (2017). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BROWN,, 935 F.3d 43 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . See Preacely , 628 F.3d at 82 n.2. . . . App'x 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2017) (same). . . .

NEW YORK STATE CITIZENS COALITION FOR CHILDREN, v. J. POOLE,, 935 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . it has quantified the costs of the specific expenses listed in Section 675(4)," Poole , 922 F.3d at 82 . . .

LEWIS, v. CITY OF UNION CITY, GEORGIA,, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Echazabal , 536 U.S. 73, 86, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 153 L.Ed.2d 82 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) ). . . .

HAWKINS v. I- TV DIGITALIS TAVKOZLESI ZRT. f k a DMCC Rt. DIGI RCS RDS S. A. RCS S. A. DIGI N. V. v. i- TV f k a DMCC Rt. DIGI RCS RDS S. A. RCS S. A. DIGI N. V., 935 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . MacDonald Moving Servs., Inc. , 124 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1997). . . .

UNITED STATES v. PAWLAK,, 935 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . .; the computer's host name; and the computer's media access control," id. at 581-82. . . . Venson , 82 F. . . . Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation . . .

WAL- MART STORES, INCORPORATED L. L. C. s v. TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, 935 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Section 82 of the bill raises the five P permit limit created by Tex. Alco. Bev. . . . H.B. 1545, §§ 82, 84. . . . Dias , 468 U.S. 263, 270, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984) (considering the constitutionality of . . .

DEJORIA, v. MAGHREB PETROLEUM EXPLORATION, S. A., 935 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CLARK,, 935 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital scale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin . . .

ROMO, v. P. BARR,, 933 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). . . . Ct. at 2781-82. . . .

LILLY, v. CITY OF NEW YORK NYPD No. NYPD No., 934 F.3d 222 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87-88, 110 S.Ct. 1679, 109 L.Ed.2d 74 (1990) (holding that it is the party's right . . .

UNITED STATES v. W. HARNEY,, 934 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 919-21, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). . . .

UNITED STATES v. POPE,, 934 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74, 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (internal quotation omitted . . .

IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE S SUNDAY TICKET ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Jr. v. LLC LLC NFL LLC LLC LP LLC LLC NFL LP LLC LP LLC LP Co. LLC LP LLC, 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma , 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.28, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 82 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984) ( NCAA . . . Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 82 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984). . . . agreements is largely governed by the Supreme Court's decision in NCAA , 468 U.S. 85, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 82 . . . Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. , 370 U.S. 690, 698-99, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962) (quoting United . . . amended on denial of reh'g , 886 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Continental Ore Co. , 370 U.S. at 699, 82 . . .

J. MALOUF, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,, 933 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . See id. at 881-82, 111 S.Ct. 2631 (noting that special trial judges "take testimony, conduct trials, . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLAIR,, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . III, 82. . . .

LATURNER, v. UNITED STATES,, 933 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Bland , 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962) illustrates how preemption applies in the context . . . Id. at 664-65, 82 S.Ct. 1089. . . . Id. at 669-70, 82 S.Ct. 1089. . . . interpretation of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the Government bonds," id. at 669-70, 82 . . . not "fail[ ] to give effect to a term or condition under which a federal bond is issued," id. at 669, 82 . . .

IN RE M. STERLING,, 933 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 370 U.S. 626, 634, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) ). . . .

RAYMOND, v. UNITED STATES, 933 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962) ). . . .

OWNER OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. L. B. L. LLC G. v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION S. PTC K. PTC T. PTC T. Sr. PTC N. PTC P. PTC R. PTC s, 934 F.3d 283 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . App. 81-82. . . . Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984) ; see Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. . . .

MCMICHAEL, v. TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED RIGP DCL, L. L. C. USA,, 934 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . CSC Logic, Inc. , 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves , 530 U.S. at . . .

RAM REZ- P REZ, v. P. BARR,, 934 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder, 734 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2013). . . .

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS, INC. v. MANGAN, G. J., 933 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sec'y of State , 717 F.3d 1238, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) ; see also Buckley , 424 U.S. at 82-84, 96 S.Ct . . .

LANDMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, v. DEERFIELD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. J., 933 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ehlco Liquidating Tr. , 186 Ill. 2d 127, 151, 237 Ill.Dec. 82, 708 N.E.2d 1122 (1999). . . .

SLOAN, v. SAUL,, 933 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2 (1982). . . . POMS DI 25005.020 ; see also SSR 82-61, at *2. . . . SSR 82-61, at *2. . . .

ADAM AND EVE JONESBORO, LLC, v. PERRIN, In, 933 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence , 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). . . .

NAUMOVSKI, v. NORRIS, 934 F.3d 200 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 681-82, 1339. Id. at 1377. Sp. App. 39 (emphasis added). App. 20. Sp. App. 37. . . .

CLARK, v. WARDEN,, 934 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. JONES,, 935 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 923 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding that Johnson error in sentencing was not structural . . .

IN RE MIAMI METALS I, INC., 603 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . (citing In re Ore Cargo, Inc. , 544 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1976) ); Am. . . .

UNITED STATES v. JOBE,, 933 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (quoting Brown v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. PAUP,, 933 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937) (sentence was final judgment even . . .

IN RE FIFTH AVENUE AND RELATED PROPERTIES, 934 F.3d 147 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 909, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ). . . . 2008); 77 (from surveillance before December 2008); 81 (learned from Geramian before December 2008); 82 . . .

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, N. A. v. UNITED STATES,, 932 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. of Educ. , 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1937) ). . . . Brand , 303 U.S. 95, 105, 58 S.Ct. 443, 82 L.Ed. 685 (1938). For example, in Hall v. . . .

SIEGEL, s s v. HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS, INC. HSBC USA, N. A. HBUS,, 933 F.3d 217 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . UBS AG , 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013) (" 'A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads . . .

FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC. v. COUNTY OF LEHIGH,, 933 F.3d 275 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 2081-82 & n.16 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) . . . See In re Krebs , 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008). . . .

PARENT PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY LEAGUE M. W. a F. D. S. S. a S. Y. v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS J., 934 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). . . .

BOUCHER, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,, 934 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. 81-82. . . . Id. at 82. . . .

VALBRUNA SLATER STEEL CORPORATION, v. JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY,, 934 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Marrese , 470 U.S. at 381-82, 105 S.Ct. 1327. . . .

DOE, v. MCKESSON, 935 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence , 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (reasonable . . .

CONSTANCE S. v. SAUL,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 583 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . as familiar with policy and regulations, also reviewed the documentary record, and his analysis (R. 82 . . .

WINDRIDGE OF NAPERVILLE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, v. PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 932 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Insurance Co. , 82 F. Supp. 3d 55, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2015) (applying District of Columbia law). . . . one would feel that the insured had been made whole; only repainting the whole room would do that. 82 . . .

T. SCHMITT v. LAROSE,, 933 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 304 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); Dobrovolny v. . . .

KORTRIGHT CAPITAL PARTNERS LP, TY v. INVESTCORP INVESTMENT ADVISERS LIMITED,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . (Trial Tr. at 673, 678 (Vamvakas); Trial Tr. at 881-82, 993, 1015 (Erdely).) . . . (See Trial Tr. at 747-81, 849-50 (Vamvakas); see also Trial Tr. at 980-82 (Erdely).) . . . (See Trial Tr. at 311-14 (Taylor); Trial Tr. at 830 (Vamvakas); Trial Tr. at 1281-82 (Popplewell); accord . . .

WOZNIAK, v. ADESIDA,, 932 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Scherer , 468 U.S. 183, 192-96, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) ; Archie v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SIMPSON, 932 F.3d 1154 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . sophisticated computer user" who had done "more than merely possess child pornography." 625 F.3d at 481-82 . . .

UNITED STATES v. ELDRED, 933 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ; see also Davis v. . . . Sheppard , 468 U.S. 981, 989-90, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) ("[W]e refuse to rule that an . . .

UNITED STATES v. PRADO,, 933 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Shellef , 507 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The district court had jurisdiction over the prosecution of . . . Martinez , 543 U.S. 371, 380-82, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005) (discussing the canon of constitutional . . .

CANT v. M. MOODY S. S., 933 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). . . .

UNITED STATES v. LEAL,, 933 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ready , 82 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1996). . . . Black , 201 F.3d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 2000) ; Ready , 82 F.3d at 558-60 ; United States v. . . .

IN RE DOBOS, s v., 603 B.R. 31 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See In re Spirtos , 221 F.3d at 1081-82 ("The period during which [creditor] may renew her judgment does . . . See generally In re Spirtos , 221 F.3d at 1081-82 (considering § 108(c) and California Code of Civil . . .

ASSOCIATION OF EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS AGCO CNH LLC v. BURGUM, s, 932 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Branson, 82 F. Supp. 2d 844, 875 (N.D. . . .

L. PAGE, v. KING,, 932 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Brown , 676 F.3d at 901 (quoting Carden v Montana , 626 F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1980) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. RIVERA- CARRASQUILLO, a k a KX, a k a a k a a k a n V a k a, 933 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) )). . . .

JONES, v. A. BERRYHILL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 831 (M.D. Tenn. 2019)

. . . that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferrable job skills (See SSR 82 . . . Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 778 F.2d 279, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1985). . . . Id. at 9, referencing 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5848-49, 20 CFR §§ 404.1504, 416.904, 404.1520c, 416.920c. . . .

VIRNETX INC. v. APPLE INC., 931 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Grier Brothers Co. , 258 U.S. 82, 42 S.Ct. 196, 66 L.Ed. 475 (1922). . . .

CAMPBELL, H. C. H. v. UNITED STATES,, 932 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . discrimination was authorized under § 363 ); and In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. , 99 F.3d 573, 575, 581-82 . . .