95.031
Computation of time.
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95.031 Computation of time.—Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.
(1) A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. For the purposes of this chapter, the last element constituting a cause of action on an obligation or liability founded on a negotiable or nonnegotiable note payable on demand or after date with no specific maturity date specified in the note, and the last element constituting a cause of action against any endorser, guarantor, or other person secondarily liable on any such obligation or liability founded on any such note, is the first written demand for payment, notwithstanding that the endorser, guarantor, or other person secondarily liable has executed a separate writing evidencing such liability.
(2)(a) An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11(3), including constructive fraud, must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.
(b) An action for products liability under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, rather than running from any other date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), except as provided within this subsection. Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action for products liability, including a wrongful death action or any other claim arising from personal injury or property damage caused by a product, to recover for harm allegedly caused by a product with an expected useful life of 10 years or less, if the harm was caused by exposure to or use of the product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product. All products, except those included within subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., are conclusively presumed to have an expected useful life of 10 years or less.
1. Aircraft used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight, vessels of more than 100 gross tons, railroad equipment used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight, and improvements to real property, including elevators and escalators, are not subject to the statute of repose provided within this subsection.
2. Any product not listed in subparagraph 1., which the manufacturer specifically warranted, through express representation or labeling, as having an expected useful life exceeding 10 years, has an expected useful life commensurate with the time period indicated by the warranty or label. Under such circumstances, no action for products liability may be brought after the expected useful life of the product, or more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product, whichever is later.
3. With regard to those products listed in subparagraph 1., except for escalators, elevators, and improvements to real property, no action for products liability may be brought more than 20 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessor who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product. However, if the manufacturer specifically warranted, through express representation or labeling, that the product has an expected useful life exceeding 20 years, the repose period shall be the time period warranted in representations or label.
(c) The repose period prescribed in paragraph (b) does not apply if the claimant was exposed to or used the product within the repose period, but an injury caused by such exposure or use did not manifest itself until after expiration of the repose period.
(d) The repose period prescribed within paragraph (b) is tolled for any period during which the manufacturer through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant and took affirmative steps to conceal the defect. Any claim of concealment under this section shall be made with specificity and must be based upon substantial factual and legal support. Maintaining the confidentiality of trade secrets does not constitute concealment under this section.
History.—s. 3, ch. 74-382; s. 1, ch. 75-234; s. 2, ch. 77-54; ss. 1, 2, ch. 78-289; s. 1, ch. 78-418; s. 1, ch. 80-280; s. 44, ch. 81-259; s. 10, ch. 85-80; s. 2, ch. 86-272; s. 2, ch. 90-105; s. 11, ch. 99-225; s. 20, ch. 2003-154.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 521
cases (95 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: Elaine Hess, etc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
Elaine Hess, etc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2015)
“” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). An action “accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc. (1985)
“We have reconsidered our decision in Battilla wherein we expressly held: The circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by the statute of limitations, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We reverse on the authority of Overland Construction Co.”
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Phlieger (1987)
“1980), stated: The circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by the statute of limitations, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We reverse on the authority of Overland Construction Co.”
D.H. v. Adept Community Services, Inc. (2018)
“See generally §§ 95.031, 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2006); see also Davis v.”
Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Industries, Inc. (2009)
“SILVESTRONE AND THE CONFLICT IN THE CASES Florida law provides that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002), and that a legal malpractice action must be brought within two years "from the time…”
Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co. (1987)
“Prior to the plaintiff's accident, this Court had held in a product liability action that as applied section 95.031 was unconstitutional because it denied access to the courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution.”
Grove Isle Ass'n v. Grove Isle Associates, LLLP (2014)
“§ 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2011). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
Bollettieri Resort Villas Condominium Association, Inc. v. the Bank of New York Mellon, etc. (2017)
“” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2013). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Tina Russo, etc. (2015)
“” § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. PM USA and R.J. Reynolds contend that (1) the plain language of the statute requires proof of reliance on an act committed no more than twelve years before the complaint was filed, and (2) the trial court erred in denying their'requested jury…”
D.H. Ex Rel. R.H. v. Adept Community Services, Inc. (2017)
“1996)); see also § 95.031. The question of tolling, in contrast, is concerned with determining whether, after a plaintiff's cause of action has accrued, an applicable statute suspends the running of the limitations period for a defined length of time.”
Avco Corp. v. Neff (2010)
“Petitioners filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the 18-year statute of repose in GARA 2 and the 12-year statute of repose in section 95.031 (2)(b). 3 Avco asserted that it did not manufacture anything for the aircraft subsequent to its…”
Universal Engineering Corp. v. Perez (1984)
“[3] It is interesting to note that the circuit court's orders granting summary judgment for Universal did not make reference to the particular statute of repose under consideration, but Universal in its motions to that court argued that the applicable statute of repose barring…”
— 95.031(1) — 156 cases
Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Industries, Inc. (2009)
“SILVESTRONE AND THE CONFLICT IN THE CASES Florida law provides that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002), and that a legal malpractice action must be brought within two years "from the time…”
D.H. v. Adept Community Services, Inc. (2018)
“See generally §§ 95.031, 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2006); see also Davis v.”
Grove Isle Ass'n v. Grove Isle Associates, LLLP (2014)
“§ 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2011). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
Bollettieri Resort Villas Condominium Association, Inc. v. the Bank of New York Mellon, etc. (2017)
“” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2013). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
D.H. Ex Rel. R.H. v. Adept Community Services, Inc. (2017)
“1996)); see also § 95.031. The question of tolling, in contrast, is concerned with determining whether, after a plaintiff's cause of action has accrued, an applicable statute suspends the running of the limitations period for a defined length of time.”
— 95.031(2) — 150 cases
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Phlieger (1987)
“1980), stated: The circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by the statute of limitations, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We reverse on the authority of Overland Construction Co.”
Elaine Hess, etc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2015)
“” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). An action “accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc. (1985)
“We have reconsidered our decision in Battilla wherein we expressly held: The circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by the statute of limitations, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We reverse on the authority of Overland Construction Co.”
Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co. (1987)
“Prior to the plaintiff's accident, this Court had held in a product liability action that as applied section 95.031 was unconstitutional because it denied access to the courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution.”
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Tina Russo, etc. (2015)
“” § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. PM USA and R.J. Reynolds contend that (1) the plain language of the statute requires proof of reliance on an act committed no more than twelve years before the complaint was filed, and (2) the trial court erred in denying their'requested jury…”
— 95.031(2)(a) — 43 cases
Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (2003)
Elaine Hess, etc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2015)
“” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). An action “accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
— 95.031(2)(b) — 17 cases
Avco Corp. v. Neff (2010)
“Petitioners filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the 18-year statute of repose in GARA 2 and the 12-year statute of repose in section 95.031 (2)(b). 3 Avco asserted that it did not manufacture anything for the aircraft subsequent to its…”
Elaine Hess, etc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2015)
“” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). An action “accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
— 95.031(2)(c) — 1 case
— 95.031(2)(d) — 9 cases
Elaine Hess, etc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2015)
“” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). An action “accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
Avco Corp. v. Neff (2010)
“Petitioners filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the 18-year statute of repose in GARA 2 and the 12-year statute of repose in section 95.031 (2)(b). 3 Avco asserted that it did not manufacture anything for the aircraft subsequent to its…”
Stimpson v. Ford Motor Co. (2008)
Romero v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2013)
— 95.031(3) — 1 case
— 95.031(a) — 1 case
— 95.031(c) — 1 case
Appleby v. Knauf Gips KG (2023)
— 95.031(d) — 1 case
Appleby v. Knauf Gips KG (2023)
— 95.031(l) — 1 case
D.H. Ex Rel. R.H. v. Adept Community Services, Inc. (2017)
“1996)); see also § 95.031. The question of tolling, in contrast, is concerned with determining whether, after a plaintiff's cause of action has accrued, an applicable statute suspends the running of the limitations period for a defined length of time.”
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