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Florida Statute 95.11 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 95.11 Case Law from Google Scholar
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Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 95.11

The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
Title VIII
LIMITATIONS
Chapter 95
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS; ADVERSE POSSESSION
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 95.11
95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.—Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:
(1) WITHIN TWENTY YEARS.—An action on a judgment or decree of a court of record in this state.
(2) WITHIN FIVE YEARS.—
(a) An action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country.
(b) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument, except for an action to enforce a claim against a payment bond, which shall be governed by the applicable provisions of paragraph (5)(e), s. 255.05(10), s. 337.18(1), or s. 713.23(1)(e), and except for an action for a deficiency judgment governed by paragraph (5)(h).
(c) An action to foreclose a mortgage.
(d) An action alleging a willful violation of s. 448.110.
(e) Notwithstanding paragraph (b), an action for breach of a property insurance contract, with the period running from the date of loss.
(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.—
(a) An action founded on negligence.
(b) An action relating to the determination of paternity, with the time running from the date the child reaches the age of majority.
(c) An action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, with the time running from the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion of the contract or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest; except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. In any event, the action must be commenced within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion of the contract or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest. However, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims that arise out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out or attempted to be set out in a pleading may be commenced up to 1 year after the pleading to which such claims relate is served, even if such claims would otherwise be time barred. With respect to actions founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property, if such construction is performed pursuant to a duly issued building permit and if a local enforcement agency, state enforcement agency, or special inspector, as those terms are defined in s. 553.71, has issued a final certificate of occupancy or certificate of completion, then as to the construction which is within the scope of such building permit and certificate, the correction of defects to completed work or repair of completed work, whether performed under warranty or otherwise, does not extend the period of time within which an action must be commenced. Completion of the contract means the later of the date of final performance of all the contracted services or the date that final payment for such services becomes due without regard to the date final payment is made.
(d) An action to recover public money or property held by a public officer or employee, or former public officer or employee, and obtained during, or as a result of, his or her public office or employment.
(e) An action for injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including fixtures.
(f) An action founded on a statutory liability.
(g) An action for trespass on real property.
(h) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property.
(i) An action to recover specific personal property.
(j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud.
(k) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts.
(l) An action to rescind a contract.
(m) An action for money paid to any governmental authority by mistake or inadvertence.
(n) An action for a statutory penalty or forfeiture.
(o) An action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort, except as provided in subsections (4), (5), and (7).
(p) Any action not specifically provided for in these statutes.
(q) An action alleging a violation, other than a willful violation, of s. 448.110.
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.—
(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional.
(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued, except that this 4-year period shall not bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the child’s eighth birthday. An “action for medical malpractice” is defined as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care. The limitation of actions within this subsection shall be limited to the health care provider and persons in privity with the provider of health care. In those actions covered by this paragraph in which it can be shown that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury the period of limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred, except that this 7-year period shall not bar an action brought on behalf of a minor on or before the child’s eighth birthday. This paragraph shall not apply to actions for which ss. 766.301-766.316 provide the exclusive remedy.
(c) An action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime.
(d) An action for wrongful death.
(e) An action founded upon a violation of any provision of chapter 517, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but not more than 5 years from the date such violation occurred.
(f) An action for personal injury caused by contact with or exposure to phenoxy herbicides while serving either as a civilian or as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States during the period January 1, 1962, through May 7, 1975; the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.
(g) An action for libel or slander.
(5) WITHIN ONE YEAR.—
(a) An action for specific performance of a contract.
(b) An action to enforce an equitable lien arising from the furnishing of labor, services, or material for the improvement of real property.
(c) An action to enforce rights under the Uniform Commercial Code—Letters of Credit, chapter 675.
(d) An action against any guaranty association and its insured, with the period running from the date of the deadline for filing claims in the order of liquidation.
(e) Except for actions governed by s. 255.05(10), s. 337.18(1), or s. 713.23(1)(e), an action to enforce any claim against a payment bond on which the principal is a contractor, subcontractor, or sub-subcontractor as defined in s. 713.01, for private work as well as public work, from the last furnishing of labor, services, or materials or from the last furnishing of labor, services, or materials by the contractor if the contractor is the principal on a bond on the same construction project, whichever is later.
(f) Except for actions described in subsection (8), a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction, filed by or on behalf of a prisoner as defined in s. 57.085.
(g) Except for actions described in subsection (8), an action brought by or on behalf of a prisoner, as defined in s. 57.085, relating to the conditions of the prisoner’s confinement.
(h) An action to enforce a claim of a deficiency related to a note secured by a mortgage against a residential property that is a one-family to four-family dwelling unit. The limitations period shall commence on the day after the certificate is issued by the clerk of court or the day after the mortgagee accepts a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
(6) LACHES.—Laches shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter regardless of lack of knowledge by the person sought to be held liable that the person alleging liability would assert his or her rights and whether the person sought to be held liable is injured or prejudiced by the delay. This subsection shall not affect application of laches at an earlier time in accordance with law.
(7) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS BASED ON ABUSE.—An action founded on alleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04, may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later.
(8) WITHIN 30 DAYS FOR ACTIONS CHALLENGING CORRECTIONAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.—Any court action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to s. 944.28(2) must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the prisoner disciplinary proceedings through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section.
(9) SEXUAL BATTERY OFFENSES ON VICTIMS UNDER AGE 16.—An action related to an act constituting a violation of s. 794.011 involving a victim who was under the age of 16 at the time of the act may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any such action other than one which would have been time barred on or before July 1, 2010.
(10) FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS RESULTING IN DEATH FROM ACTS DESCRIBED IN S. 782.04 OR S. 782.07.—Notwithstanding paragraph (4)(d), an action for wrongful death seeking damages authorized under s. 768.21 brought against a natural person for an intentional tort resulting in death from acts described in s. 782.04 or s. 782.07 may be commenced at any time. This subsection shall not be construed to require an arrest, the filing of formal criminal charges, or a conviction for a violation of s. 782.04 or s. 782.07 as a condition for filing a civil action.
(11) COURT COSTS AND FINES.—Notwithstanding subsection (1), an action to collect court costs, fees, or fines owed to the state may be commenced at any time.
History.—s. 10, ch. 1869, 1872; s. 1, ch. 3900, 1889; RS 1294; GS 1725; s. 10, ch. 7838, 1919; RGS 2939; CGL 4663; s. 1, ch. 21892, 1943; s. 7, ch. 24337, 1947; s. 24, ch. 57-1; s. 1, ch. 59-188; s. 1, ch. 67-284; s. 1, ch. 71-254; s. 30, ch. 73-333; s. 7, ch. 74-382; s. 7, ch. 75-9; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 11, ch. 78-435; s. 1, ch. 80-322; s. 34, ch. 83-38; s. 1, ch. 84-13; s. 1, ch. 85-63; s. 139, ch. 86-220; s. 1, ch. 86-231; s. 1, ch. 86-272; s. 1, ch. 88-397; s. 20, ch. 90-109; s. 1, ch. 92-102; s. 520, ch. 95-147; s. 2, ch. 95-283; s. 4, ch. 96-106; s. 1, ch. 96-167; s. 15, ch. 98-280; s. 2, ch. 99-5; s. 12, ch. 99-137; s. 2, ch. 2001-211; s. 15, ch. 2005-230; s. 1, ch. 2005-353; s. 1, ch. 2006-145; s. 2, ch. 2010-45; s. 1, ch. 2010-54; s. 1, ch. 2011-39; s. 13, ch. 2012-100; s. 1, ch. 2012-211; s. 1, ch. 2013-137; s. 18, ch. 2016-24; s. 18, ch. 2017-37; s. 1, ch. 2017-101; s. 10, ch. 2017-107; ss. 1, 2, ch. 2018-97.

F.S. 95.11 on Google Scholar

F.S. 95.11 on Casetext

Amendments to 95.11


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 95.11
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 95.11.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All

  1. Moss v. Dixon

    3:21-cv-1026-MMH-MCR (M.D. Fla. May. 26, 2023)
    Regarding Moss's wrongful death claim (Count I), “the Florida statute of limitations for a wrongful-death action is two years.” Taylor v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 441 Fed.Appx. 664, 665 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(d)). As to the remaining state law claims, a four-year statute of limitations applies. See Doc. 80 at 22-24; Doc. 88 at 4-8. “In Florida, a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of death.” Fulton Cnty. Adm'r v. Sullivan, 753 So.2d 549, 552 (Fla. 1999). Ridley died on October 12, 2017, and Moss did not file this lawsuit until October 12, 2021. Thus, the wrongful death claim is untimely unless some principle of tolling applies.
    PAGE 20

  2. Peers v. Brown

    No. 21-13089 (11th Cir. May. 24, 2023)
    At all times relevant to this case prior to March 24, 2023, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a) provided that the two-year period of limitations applied to actions for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice. Effective March 24, that provision moved, without substantive modification, to § 95.11(4)(b). The new § 95.11(4)(a) provides that a two-year period of limitations applies to "an action founded on negligence." We simply cite to § 95.11(4) for clarity- regardless, a two-year period of limitations applies to either subsection. Moreover, even if amendment of this section purported to modify the applicable length of time to bring a claim, Florida courts apply statutes of limitations prospectively "unless the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect is express, clear and manifest." Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales, 400 So.2d 965, 967 (Fla. 1981); see also Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994).
    PAGE 9

  3. Enlow v. E.C. Scott Wright, P.A.

    No. 5D21-2273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May. 19, 2023)
    AFFIRMED. See Larson &Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So.3d 36, 42 (Fla. 2009) ("[O]nce a judgment adverse to the client has reached the point of finality, 'the last element constituting the [malpractice] cause of action occurs,' § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002)-that is, the element of 'loss to the client,' Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A. [v. Sec. Nat'l Servicing Corp.], 969 So.2d [962,] 966 [(Fla. 2007)]-and the cause of action is or should be 'discovered,' § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002)."); Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So.2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 1998).
    PAGE 2

  4. Queen'Prinyah Godiah Nmiaa PA El-Bey v. Soc. 2700 Student Spaces

    No. 22-12408 (11th Cir. May. 16, 2023)
    Plaintiff does not contend -- nor can we conclude -- that Plaintiff would now be barred from refiling her claims by the applicable statutes of limitations. Cf. Mickles v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Where a dismissal without prejudice has the effect of precluding a plaintiff from refiling his claim due to the running of the statute of limitations, the dismissal is 'tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice ....'"). When the district court dis missed Plaintiff's complaint in June 2022, nothing suggested that Plaintiff's claims (arising from an August 2021 incident) were already time-barred. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (establishing a two-year limitations period for claims under the Fair Housing Act); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(f) (providing a four-year statute of limitations for actions founded on statutory liability); Silva v. Baptist Health S. Fla., Inc., 856 F.3d 824, 841 (11th Cir. 2017) (applying a four-year statute of limitations to ADA claims in Florida).
    PAGE 7

  5. Westpark Pres. Homeowners Ass'n v. Pulte Home Corp.

    No. 2D21-2084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May. 10, 2023)
    A. The language in section 95.11(3)(c) is clear and unambiguous.
    PAGE 6

  6. Bilal v. Benoit

    3:23cv4754-TKW-HTC (N.D. Fla. May. 8, 2023)
    In addition to being Heck barred, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims are also barred by the statute of limitations. In Florida, claims brought under § 1983 are subject to a 4-year statute of limitations. See Ellison v. Lester, 275 Fed.Appx. 900, 901-02 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida.”). “The statute of limitations on a section 1983 claim begins to run when ‘the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.'” Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008)). Thus, “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or should know: (1) that he has suffered the injury that forms the basis of his complaint; and (2) who has inflicted an injury.” Rager v. Augustine, 760 Fed.Appx. 947, 950 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003)).
    PAGE 18

  7. Kingseal, LLC v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co.

    2:23-cv-77-SPC-NPM (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2023)
    Kingseal's “loss” here did not result from Hurricane Irma, nor was it triggered by the storm's landfall. Instead, Kingseal incurred a loss when the AHCA and DeSoto County required Kingseal to undertake additional repairs and renovations to bring its facility into compliance with applicable standards and to satisfy the FBC and the Code. Kingseal's Ordinance or Law endorsement was intended to address just such a loss. And because Kingseal sued within five years of that loss, this case does not run afoul of § 95.11(2)(e)'s five-year limitation period.
    PAGE 11

  8. The Lexi Condo. Ass'n v. Moss & Assocs.

    No. 3D22-0006 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2023)
    Affirmed. Almand Constr. Co. v. Evans, 547 So.2d 626, 628 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that, as to the statute of limitations, the homeowners' "knowledge of the settling of the house and resultant structural damage, which they concede they had as early as 1978, was sufficient to put them on notice that they had, or might have had, a cause of action"); Alexander v. Suncoast Builders, Inc., 837 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that the limitations period for latent defects begins to run "from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence" (quoting § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat.)).
    PAGE 2

  9. Pinares v. United Techs. Corp.

    13-81179-Civ-Marra (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2023)
    Otherwise, Florida's four-year statute of limitation applies to Plaintiffs' Chapter 376 claims and the claims are barred. Florida statute § 95.11(3)(f) (imposes a four-year statute of limitations on actions “founded on statutory liability.”)
    PAGE 13

  10. Santiago v. Univ. of Miami

    1:22-CV-23384-BLOOM/DAMIAN (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2023)
    The University argues that Ms. Santiago's claims are time-barred by Florida's two-year statute of limitations, Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes. Ms. Santiago initiated this lawsuit in October 2022, approximately two years and eight months after she resigned in February 2020. Therefore, if the two-year statute of limitations applies, Ms. Santiago's claims are time-barred. Ms. Santiago contends that the applicable statute of limitations is the federal “catch-all” four-year statute of limitations for causes of action “arising under an Act of Congress” enacted after 1990. Resp. at 2-3.
    PAGE 9

    Cases from cite.case.law:

    ENLOW v. E. C. SCOTT WRIGHT, P. A. P. A., 274 So. 3d 1192 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . ." § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

    CLEVELAND CLINIC FLORIDA a a v. CHILDREN S CANCER CARING CENTER, INC. a, 274 So. 3d 1102 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. . . . See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. . . .

    COVENANT BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. VASALLO CONSTRUCTION, INC., 273 So. 3d 236 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . See § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. . . .

    PADILLA L. v. PORSCHE CARS NORTH AMERICA, INC. a, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(f) ; Speier-Roche v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am. . . . is " 'apparent from the face of the complaint' that the [FDUTPA] claim is time-barred" under Section 95.11 . . . relief claim premised on rights protected by FDUTPA is also four years under Florida Statute Section 95.11 . . .

    L. ADAMS, Jr. v. STATE, 273 So. 3d 195 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . this Court issued its mandate, Adams filed a motion for return of personal property based on section 95.11 . . . Section 95.11(3)(i), under which Adams moved, governs actions to recover specific personal property and . . . Section 95.11(3)(i) applies where law enforcement did not seize the property as evidence or pursuant . . . Where a defendant untimely moves under section 95.11(3)(i), the trial court may summarily deny the motion . . . If the court determines that Adams's property is not subject to section 705.105(1), then section 95.11 . . .

    D. MANNEY, v. MBV ENGINEERING, INC. f k a MOIA, f k a L., 273 So. 3d 214 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . Manney disagreed, arguing that section 95.11(3)(c) was inapplicable. . . . Instead, she argued that section 95.11(4)(a), which provides a two-year statute of limitations for an . . . cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11 . . . As is evident from the allegations in the complaint, section 95.11(3)(c) is not applicable to Manney's . . . Thus, a review of the plain language of section 95.11(3)(c) does not encompass Manney's claim against . . .

    GOLEY, v. GOLEY,, 272 So. 3d 800 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . See § 95.11, Fla. Stat. . . .

    A. BROZ, v. R. E. REECE,, 272 So. 3d 512 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . The parties are on common ground that the applicable statute, section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes ( . . .

    GINDEL, Li, D v. CENTEX HOMES,, 272 So. 3d 417 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . interpretation of applicable Florida Supreme Court precedent as it applies to the interpretation of sections 95.11 . . . COMMENCEMENT OF A CIVIL ACTION OR PROCEEDING SUFFICIENT TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF REPOSE SET FORTH IN SECTION 95.11 . . .

    DYCK- O NEAL, INC. v. NORTON, 267 So. 3d 478 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . did not file its complaint until 2014, the Nortons claimed that DONI's lawsuit was barred by section 95.11 . . . a breach of contract claim following an approved short sale transaction was not subject to section 95.11 . . . But section 95.11(5)(h) does apply here, where a plaintiff seeks a deficiency judgment, a foreclosure . . . Therefore, DONI's action was timely under section 95.11(5)(h), and the trial court's entry of summary . . . The legislature specified that any action that would have been timely under section 95.11(2)(b) before . . .

    M. GRDIC, v. HSBC BANK USA, N. A. AS TRUSTEE, FOR REGISTERED HOLDERS OF ACE SECURITIES CORP., 267 So. 3d 473 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . Grdic maintained that the statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), barred . . .

    TEJERA, v. LINCOLN LENDING SERVICES, LLC,, 271 So. 3d 97 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . which codified the delayed discovery doctrine, and provides: An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11 . . . (3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date . . . See § 95.11(3)(o ) (establishing four-year statute of limitations for intentional torts not otherwise . . . covered by this section); § 95.11(3)(j) (establishing four-year statute of limitations for fraud). . . . For this assertion, Romay and ACV rely upon section 95.11(o ), Florida Statutes (2009) which provides . . .

    LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM GULF COAST MEDICAL CENTER, v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,, 272 So. 3d 431 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. . . .

    OTERO v. J. ARCIA,, 264 So. 3d 1140 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . clearly stated: "[T]he two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related malpractice under section 95.11 . . .

    L. MIELKE C. v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR GSAA HOME EQUITY TRUST, 264 So. 3d 249 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . Consequently, the Mielkes claimed that the current complaint was time-barred pursuant to section 95.11 . . . A plaintiff has five years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action once a borrower has defaulted. § 95.11 . . .

    L. GRANT, v. CITIZENS BANK, N. A. F K A RBS N. A., 263 So. 3d 156 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . ." § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . widespread and fundamental misunderstanding, in Florida, regarding how the statute of limitations, § 95.11 . . .

    F. BROWN A K A F. v. A. POOLE,, 261 So. 3d 708 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (2015). This time did not begin to run until Dr. Poole's death. . . .

    SOUTHERN SPECIALTIES, INC. a v. FARMHOUSE TOMATOES, INC. a, 259 So. 3d 869 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. . . .

    HAYES, v. REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC., 260 So. 3d 391 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . This case presents an issue of first impression as to when the statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . . the second foreclosure action filed by Reverse Mortgage Solutions in 2014 was time-barred by section 95.11 . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Affirmed. . . .

    HOME TITLE COMPANY OF MARYLAND, INC. a v. J. LASALLA,, 257 So. 3d 640 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (2006) ; Goodwin v. . . . (first citing § 95.11(3)(o) ; and then citing Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. . . .

    D. H. v. ADEPT COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC., 271 So. 3d 870 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . See generally §§ 95.031, 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2006) ; see also Davis v. . . . See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 95.11(9) Fla. Stat. (2018). . . . . § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. . . . The statute currently in effect provides the same limitations period. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. . . .

    BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, v. ARNOUX,, 257 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

    IN RE AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 257 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11 (2017). 30 Fla. Stat. Ann. 69-70 (2004). (h) Florida Administrative Code. . . .

    W. FOLEY, Jr. T. v. AZAM,, 257 So. 3d 1134 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . February 18, 2008, that all of the claims were governed by the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . .

    UNI- SYSTEMS, LLC, v. UNITED STATES TENNIS ASSOCIATION, INC. LLC, LLP, P. C., 350 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)

    . . . Ann. 95.11(2)(b). . . .

    GINDEL, Li, D v. CENTEX HOMES,, 267 So. 3d 403 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . From this date, the statute of repose, section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), began to run as . . . 558 qualifies as "an action," as the term is defined in the statute of repose, sections 95.011 and 95.11 . . . this chapter, [...] shall be barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this chapter [...]. 95.11 . . . registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest. §§ 95.011, 95.11 . . .

    AER ADVISORS INC. J. E. v. FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC,, 327 F. Supp. 3d 278 (D. Mass. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(o) ; Primerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Mitchell, 48 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1368 (S.D. . . .

    BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. H. GRAYBUSH a k a B. a k a, 253 So. 3d 1188 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . filed on September 16, 2014 was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11 . . . , the statute of limitations to file a foreclosure action is five years from the date of default. § 95.11 . . .

    WELLS FARGO BANK N. A. v. DIZ,, 253 So. 3d 705 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

    BUZZFEED, INC. v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 318 F. Supp. 3d 347 (D.D.C. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(4)(g) (establishing two-year limitations period for libel and slander claims). . . .

    A. GAROFALO, LLC, LLC LLC, v. PROSKAUER ROSE LLP,, 253 So. 3d 2 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . Florida's fraud statute of repose provides in part: [I]n any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11 . . .

    SIMMONS, v. JACKSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,, 253 So. 3d 59 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim is two years, see § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. . . . See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). See § 766.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). See § 766.102, Fla. . . .

    CAN FINANCIAL, LLC, v. R. KRAZMIEN a k a a k a M., 253 So. 3d 8 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . than five years later; the foreclosure was barred by the five year statute of limitations of section 95.11 . . . any payment due within five years of the filing of the complaint, the action is not barred by section 95.11 . . .

    BREXENDORF, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A., 319 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(j). . . . Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). . . .

    WEEKS, v. TOWN OF PALM BEACH, A B., 252 So. 3d 258 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(4)(g), Fla. . . . See § 95.11(4)(g) ; § 95.031 ; Wagner , 629 So.2d at 114-15. . . . See § 95.11(4)(g) ; Bates , 31 So.3d at 213. Affirmed. Damoorgian and Kuntz, JJ., concur. . . .

    P. NAILS, v. WALMART,, 252 So. 3d 332 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(3)(o ), Fla. . . . period in action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment); § 95.11 . . .

    DIXON, v. BELLAMY,, 252 So. 3d 349 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . The statute of limitations under section 95.11, Florida Statutes required Bellamy to have brought the . . . to section 732.108(2)(b) took effect to eliminate the limitations bar previously imposed by section 95.11 . . . with existing causes of action by eliminating the four year statute of limitations imposed by section 95.11 . . .

    U. S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, FOR REGISTERED HOLDERS OF CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST ASSET- BACKED PASS- THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES v. F. WILSON J., 252 So. 3d 306 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . and raised affirmative defenses, including the expiration of the statute of limitations under section 95.11 . . .

    WEATHERLY, v. PERSHING, LLC,, 322 F. Supp. 3d 746 (N.D. Tex. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(j) (1991) ; see also Goodwin v. Sphatt , 114 So.3d 1092, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. . . . except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in § 95.11 . . . STAT. § 95.11(3)(o) (1991) (stating that "any other intentional tort" shall be commenced within four . . .

    AVELO MORTGAGE, LLC, v. VERO VENTURES, LLC, a a n k a d b a d b a C. P. St. St., 254 So. 3d 439 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . dismissed foreclosure action triggers application of the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11 . . .

    IN RE BENITEZ,, 250 So. 3d 153 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(b), Fla Stat. (2018) ; see also, Rose v. Sonson, 208 So.3d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). . . .

    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. HEALTH AND WELLNESS SERVICES, INC., 389 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

    . . . argues, the four-year state of limitations that he maintains applies under Florida Statute section 95.11 . . .

    U. S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, FOR LEHMAN XS TRUST MORTGAGE PASS- THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES v. MORELLI, a k a M., 249 So. 3d 717 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . complaint finding it was barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.11 . . . default on a default date within the five-year limitations period for bringing the action under section 95.11 . . . lender's foreclosure action was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations found in section 95.11 . . . any payment due within five years of the filing of the complaint, the action is not barred by section 95.11 . . .

    R. R. S. B. v. NEW LIFE COMMUNITY CHURCH OF CMA, INC., 248 So. 3d 232 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . affirm because the claims were time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations outlined in section 95.11 . . . Likewise, their alternative argument, based on section 95.11(9), Florida Statutes (2010), fails because . . .

    U. S. BANK, N. A. I v. GONZALES, 244 So. 3d 407 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, v. R. TORRES,, 245 So. 3d 985 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

    GONZALEZ, v. M. STERN, D. L., 244 So. 3d 1187 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (2004) (providing two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice . . . See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

    NORKIN, v. THE FLORIDA BAR, a, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(4)(g). "Defamation encompasses both libel and slander[.]." Klayman v. . . .

    NATIONAL DEAF ACADEMY, LLC, v. TOWNES,, 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(3)(a), (4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

    WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. v. C. RENDON a k a, 245 So. 3d 917 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015). For the reasons that follow, we reverse. . . . arguing that the second foreclosure action was time-barred by the five-year statute of limitations. § 95.11 . . .

    WILCHFORT v. M. KNIGHT, REIT REIT LLC, REIT, BRE W. W. B. S. M., 307 F. Supp. 3d 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(2)(b). By contrast, New York enforces a six-year limitations period. CPLR § 213(2). . . . Defendant BRE, citing to Florida Statutes § 95.11(3)(k), argues that a four-year period applies to the . . . Florida Statutes § 95.11(3)(k), however, applies to actions "not founded on a written instrument." . . . Stat. § 95.11(2)(b) ) ). . . . Therefore, as acknowledged by AHR Defendants, the Florida Statutes § 95.11(2)(b) and its five-year period . . .

    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, FOR REGISTERED HOLDERS OF LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST ASSET- BACKED CERTIFICATES SERIES v. M. MILLER, M. a k a a k a, 239 So. 3d 789 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. . . .

    DESAI, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY,, 240 So. 3d 729 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2015) ; Depicciotto v. . . .

    A. SALINAS, v. RAMSEY,, 881 F.3d 876 (11th Cir. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(2)(a). Id. . . . Stat. § 95.11(2)(a) is the appropriate limitations period to be applied to post-judgment discovery. . . . Florida Supreme Court also explained that “post-judgment discovery is not an ‘action,’ and section 95.11 . . .

    INLET MARINA OF PALM BEACH, LTD. v. SEA DIVERSIFIED, INC., 237 So. 3d 395 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013) ( "Actions ... shall be commenced ... . . .

    A. SALINAS, v. RAMSEY,, 234 So. 3d 569 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . issued by a federal court in Florida is governed by the five-year limitations period provided in section 95.11 . . . District’s holding in Burshan that collection activity on a federal judgment is not governed by section 95.11 . . . See § 95.11(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . Although many decades, have passed since we decided Young, no amendment of section 95.11 has provided . . . Therefore, post-judgment discovery is not an “action,” and section 95.11 does not establish when it. . . .

    VELDEN, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC,, 234 So. 3d 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)

    . . . We disagree. ' Section 95.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes (2014) provides that an action to foreclose . . . widespread and fundamental misunderstanding, in Florida, regarding how the statute of limitations, § 95.11 . . .

    COMMODORES ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, v. MCCLARY, LLC,, 879 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 2018)

    . . . . § 95.11(3), (6). . . .

    BISHOP, v. COONROD,, 231 So. 3d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Although the lower court found Bishop’s mandamus petition to be time barred under section 95.11(5)(f) . . .

    REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, v. DASSUM, 255 So. 3d 390 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

    . . . found that the Republic's action was barred by the four-year limitations period set forth in sections 95.11 . . . later on April 29, 2009, was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11 . . . Sections 95.11(3)(f) and (p), states: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced . . .

    KENDRON, v. SCI FUNERAL SERVICES OF FLORIDA, LLC d b a, 230 So. 3d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(a), (o), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

    FLATIRONS BANK, v. ALAN W. STEINBERG LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,, 233 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Section 95.11 reads, in relevant part, as follows: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall . . . including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts. § 95.11 . . . section 95.031(2)(a), and reads, in relevant part, as follows: An action founded, upon fraud under s. 95.11 . . . discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11 . . . See § 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2013); Beltran, M.D. v. Vincent P. . . . Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (2013), is the applicable statute governing the limitations period . . . Florida Statutes (2013), provides, in relevant part, as follows: An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11 . . .

    A. GREEN, v. SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC,, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(2); Id. § 673.1181. . . .

    FLANZER, v. KAPLAN, 230 So. 3d 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . See § 95.11(3). . . . Indeed, a review of section 95.11 reveals .that undue influence claims can only fall under subsection . . . 95.11(3)(j), “[a] legal or equitable action founded on fraud.” . . . application of the delayed discovery doctrine, which states: An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11 . . . (3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date . . .

    LEXON INSURANCE COMPANY, v. CITY OF CAPE CORAL, LLC,, 238 So. 3d 356 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

    . . . . §§ 95.11(2)(b), 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

    WEAVER, v. C. MYERS, M. D., 229 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. 2017)

    . . . Stat. (2016); see also generally § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. . . .

    V. FOREST, v. L. BATTS P. A. f k a L. P. A., 228 So. 3d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), provides that an action for legal malpractice “shall run . . . final judgment, the two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related malpractice under section 95.11 . . .

    EGHNAYEM, M. v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, M. v. v. v., 873 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . §§ 95.11(3)(e), 95.031. . . .

    IN RE ENGLE CASES, 283 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(4)(d). The reasons for the Plaintiffs' 2012 MVD remained unexplained for six months. . . .

    BOLLETTIERI RESORT VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,, 228 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 2017)

    . . . widespread and fundamental misunderstanding, in Florida, regarding how the statute of limitations, § 95.11 . . .

    ROGERS, Sr. v. L. JONES,, 227 So. 3d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . by Appellant Jerry Layne Rogers, Sr., as time-barred under the one-year limitation period of section 95.11 . . . As such, Appellant’s negligence claim should not have been dismissed under section 95.11(5)(g). . . . the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim of medical malpractice as time-barred under section 95.11 . . .

    LLANO FINANCING GROUP, LLC, v. F. PETIT,, 230 So. 3d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . a loan relying on a faulty appraisal, claims based on that faulty appraisal and subject to section 95.11 . . . See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. . . . Id. § 95.11(4)(a). . . . Ass’n, 581 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Fla. 1991) (holding that “‘privity’ as used in section 95.11(4)(b) means . . .

    CITY OF COOPER CITY, v. S. JOLIFF, J., 227 So. 3d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . deadline in this provision was inapplicable; that rather, the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . .

    HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, FOR REGISTERED HOLDERS OF NOMURA HOME EQUITY HOME LOAN, INC. v. ESTATE OF PETERCEN a k a, 227 So. 3d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . on the same default as long as the action was brought within five years of the, default per section 95.11 . . .

    E. ESPINOZA, a v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, BAC L. P. N. A., 708 F. App'x 625 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(2)(b),(c). . . .

    HECHT, v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, USA,, 710 F. App'x 794 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(3). . . .

    DORTA, v. CITIBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, FOR LEHMAN BROTHERS- BNC MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST BNC, 707 F. App'x 660 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . filing of a claim would not be barred by the five year state of limitations under Florida Statute § 95.11 . . .

    U. S. BANK, N. A. NA, NA v. M. DIAMOND,, 228 So. 3d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . of default; therefore, they argued, it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, section 95.11 . . .

    BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION v. O. ANTON,, 230 So. 3d 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Anton. . . . See Section § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. . . .

    SIEGEL v. TOWER HILL SIGNATURE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 225 So. 3d 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Court and the Fourth District reversed, finding that under a prior version of § 95.11(2)(e), the statute . . . See Rizo, 133 So.3d at 1114 n.1 (citing. § 95.11(2)(e), Fla. . . . contract,” the' limitations period runs from the date of loss); Luciano, 156 So.3d at 1110 n.1 (citing § 95.11 . . . Stat. (2011)) (§ 95.11(2)(e) was amended in 2011 to provide that the limitations period for an action . . .

    BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON As FOR NATIONSTAR HOME EQUITY TRUST A, v. L. PEDERSEN, J., 706 F. App'x 542 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1). . . . Stat. § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1), § 95.281; Smith, 61 F.3d at 1561; Bartram, 211 So.3d at 1012, 1019 . . .

    ANDREASEN, v. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY,, 276 F. Supp. 3d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . January 30, 2008, which allegedly renders the negligence count against her barred by Florida Statute § 95.11 . . . Progressive also argues that the policy expired on June 30, 2Ó08, which means that § 95.11(2) would bar . . .

    VICTORVILLE WEST LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, v. INVERRARY ASSOCIATION, INC. a, 226 So. 3d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). We find this portion of the trial court’s order to be error. . . .

    WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, II, v. BH- NV INVESTMENTS LLC,, 230 So. 3d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . brought on a subsequent default within the five-year statute of limitations period found in section 95.11 . . .

    IN RE PALM AVENUE PARTNERS, LLC, M. K. O D. J. Co. LLC, v. LLC E. T. LLC LLC P. C., 576 B.R. 239 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)0), Fla. stat. . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . § 95.03l(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . .

    PARKER, Sr. v. GEO GROUP, INC., 224 So. 3d 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . challenges the trial court’s reliance on the one-year statute of limitations period found in section 95.11 . . . Appellee correctly concedes that section 95.11(5)(g) is not applicable to the case at hand and that appellant . . . correctional services in Florida should be the four-year statute of limitations period outlined in section 95.11 . . .

    CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL, LLC, v. PERDIDO LAND DEVELOPMENT CO. INC., 303 F. Supp. 3d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . period-such as the claim raised in Count II-must be brought within four years pursuant to Florida Statute § 95.11 . . .

    WHITNEY BANK, a a FDIC a v. GRANT, Jr. D., 223 So. 3d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Because we conclude that section 95.11(5)(h) does not apply to the current cause of action, we reverse . . . Section 95.11(2)(b) provides in relevant part that “[ajctions other than for recovery of real property . . . However, [Whitney Bank] argues the language used in section 95.11(5)(h) to describe the commencement . . . Under section 95.11(5)(h), [Whitney Bank’s] claims are barred. . . . The unambiguous language of section 95.11(5)(h) states that a cause of action accrues under its terms . . .

    J. JACOBS, Jr. v. ESTEFAN,, 705 F. App'x 829 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(a), and a claim of libel within two, id. § 95.11(4)(g). . . . See id. § 95.11(3)(k). . . . See id. § 95.11(3)(a), (4)(g). . . .

    GOMEZ, a v. CALIFORNIA, No., 702 F. App'x 872 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(p). In California, it is one year. See Canatella v. . . .

    A. FORERO L. v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC,, 223 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . previously dismissed foreclosure suits on the same note, and because the statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (action to foreclose mortgage must be commenced within 5 years). . . . 1.420(a)(1), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and by the -statute of limitations provided • by section 95.11 . . .

    MUNCHAK, v. RUCKNO Dr. L. Dr. Dr. Dr., 692 F. App'x 100 (3d Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(3)(p). . . .

    IN RE EDDY,, 572 B.R. 774 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(2)(b) (2016). . See Fla. Stat. § 95.04; Nolden v. . . .

    H. KLEBANOFF v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, f k a CWALT, 228 So. 3d 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . constrained to dismiss the Bank’s action based on the applicable five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . .

    HALVELAND, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, a, 219 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . 2015), which held that the one-year statute of limitations for prisoners bringing suit under , section 95.11 . . .

    OWENS- BENNIEFIELD, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . Nationstar is correct that section 95.11,, Fla. . . . Stat. § 95.11. It does not prohibit any conduct or create any private right of action. . . . Thus, to the extent her claim relies on section 95.11, the negligence claim is dismissed with prejudice . . .

    DESYLVESTER, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f k a ON BEHALF OF HOLDERS OF ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST MORTGAGE PASS- THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES DBA, 219 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008). In Mr. . . .

    IN RE ATLAS ROOFING CORPORATION CHALET SHINGLE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. v., 321 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Ga. 2017)

    . . . . § 95.11(2)(b). . . . .

    RIVERWOOD NURSING CENTER, LLC, d b a v. F. GILROY, F. III, P. A. A, 219 So. 3d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . motion for summary judgment, contending in part that the two-year statute of limitations of section 95.11 . . .

    N. PETERS a k a N. n k a v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, f k a, 227 So. 3d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . it had not been brought within the bar of the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11 . . .