The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
|
||||||
|
Regarding Moss's wrongful death claim (Count I), “the Florida statute of limitations for a wrongful-death action is two years.” Taylor v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 441 Fed.Appx. 664, 665 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(d)). As to the remaining state law claims, a four-year statute of limitations applies. See Doc. 80 at 22-24; Doc. 88 at 4-8. “In Florida, a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of death.” Fulton Cnty. Adm'r v. Sullivan, 753 So.2d 549, 552 (Fla. 1999). Ridley died on October 12, 2017, and Moss did not file this lawsuit until October 12, 2021. Thus, the wrongful death claim is untimely unless some principle of tolling applies.
At all times relevant to this case prior to March 24, 2023, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(a) provided that the two-year period of limitations applied to actions for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice. Effective March 24, that provision moved, without substantive modification, to § 95.11(4)(b). The new § 95.11(4)(a) provides that a two-year period of limitations applies to "an action founded on negligence." We simply cite to § 95.11(4) for clarity- regardless, a two-year period of limitations applies to either subsection. Moreover, even if amendment of this section purported to modify the applicable length of time to bring a claim, Florida courts apply statutes of limitations prospectively "unless the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect is express, clear and manifest." Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales, 400 So.2d 965, 967 (Fla. 1981); see also Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994).
AFFIRMED. See Larson &Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So.3d 36, 42 (Fla. 2009) ("[O]nce a judgment adverse to the client has reached the point of finality, 'the last element constituting the [malpractice] cause of action occurs,' § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002)-that is, the element of 'loss to the client,' Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A. [v. Sec. Nat'l Servicing Corp.], 969 So.2d [962,] 966 [(Fla. 2007)]-and the cause of action is or should be 'discovered,' § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002)."); Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So.2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 1998).
Plaintiff does not contend -- nor can we conclude -- that Plaintiff would now be barred from refiling her claims by the applicable statutes of limitations. Cf. Mickles v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Where a dismissal without prejudice has the effect of precluding a plaintiff from refiling his claim due to the running of the statute of limitations, the dismissal is 'tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice ....'"). When the district court dis missed Plaintiff's complaint in June 2022, nothing suggested that Plaintiff's claims (arising from an August 2021 incident) were already time-barred. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (establishing a two-year limitations period for claims under the Fair Housing Act); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(f) (providing a four-year statute of limitations for actions founded on statutory liability); Silva v. Baptist Health S. Fla., Inc., 856 F.3d 824, 841 (11th Cir. 2017) (applying a four-year statute of limitations to ADA claims in Florida).
A. The language in section 95.11(3)(c) is clear and unambiguous.
In addition to being Heck barred, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims are also barred by the statute of limitations. In Florida, claims brought under § 1983 are subject to a 4-year statute of limitations. See Ellison v. Lester, 275 Fed.Appx. 900, 901-02 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he four-year statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida.”). “The statute of limitations on a section 1983 claim begins to run when ‘the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.'” Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008)). Thus, “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or should know: (1) that he has suffered the injury that forms the basis of his complaint; and (2) who has inflicted an injury.” Rager v. Augustine, 760 Fed.Appx. 947, 950 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Kingseal's “loss” here did not result from Hurricane Irma, nor was it triggered by the storm's landfall. Instead, Kingseal incurred a loss when the AHCA and DeSoto County required Kingseal to undertake additional repairs and renovations to bring its facility into compliance with applicable standards and to satisfy the FBC and the Code. Kingseal's Ordinance or Law endorsement was intended to address just such a loss. And because Kingseal sued within five years of that loss, this case does not run afoul of § 95.11(2)(e)'s five-year limitation period.
Affirmed. Almand Constr. Co. v. Evans, 547 So.2d 626, 628 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that, as to the statute of limitations, the homeowners' "knowledge of the settling of the house and resultant structural damage, which they concede they had as early as 1978, was sufficient to put them on notice that they had, or might have had, a cause of action"); Alexander v. Suncoast Builders, Inc., 837 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that the limitations period for latent defects begins to run "from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence" (quoting § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat.)).
Otherwise, Florida's four-year statute of limitation applies to Plaintiffs' Chapter 376 claims and the claims are barred. Florida statute § 95.11(3)(f) (imposes a four-year statute of limitations on actions “founded on statutory liability.”)
The University argues that Ms. Santiago's claims are time-barred by Florida's two-year statute of limitations, Section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes. Ms. Santiago initiated this lawsuit in October 2022, approximately two years and eight months after she resigned in February 2020. Therefore, if the two-year statute of limitations applies, Ms. Santiago's claims are time-barred. Ms. Santiago contends that the applicable statute of limitations is the federal “catch-all” four-year statute of limitations for causes of action “arising under an Act of Congress” enacted after 1990. Resp. at 2-3.
. . . ." § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. . . . See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(f) ; Speier-Roche v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am. . . . is " 'apparent from the face of the complaint' that the [FDUTPA] claim is time-barred" under Section 95.11 . . . relief claim premised on rights protected by FDUTPA is also four years under Florida Statute Section 95.11 . . .
. . . this Court issued its mandate, Adams filed a motion for return of personal property based on section 95.11 . . . Section 95.11(3)(i), under which Adams moved, governs actions to recover specific personal property and . . . Section 95.11(3)(i) applies where law enforcement did not seize the property as evidence or pursuant . . . Where a defendant untimely moves under section 95.11(3)(i), the trial court may summarily deny the motion . . . If the court determines that Adams's property is not subject to section 705.105(1), then section 95.11 . . .
. . . Manney disagreed, arguing that section 95.11(3)(c) was inapplicable. . . . Instead, she argued that section 95.11(4)(a), which provides a two-year statute of limitations for an . . . cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." § 95.11 . . . As is evident from the allegations in the complaint, section 95.11(3)(c) is not applicable to Manney's . . . Thus, a review of the plain language of section 95.11(3)(c) does not encompass Manney's claim against . . .
. . . The parties are on common ground that the applicable statute, section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes ( . . .
. . . interpretation of applicable Florida Supreme Court precedent as it applies to the interpretation of sections 95.11 . . . COMMENCEMENT OF A CIVIL ACTION OR PROCEEDING SUFFICIENT TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF REPOSE SET FORTH IN SECTION 95.11 . . .
. . . did not file its complaint until 2014, the Nortons claimed that DONI's lawsuit was barred by section 95.11 . . . a breach of contract claim following an approved short sale transaction was not subject to section 95.11 . . . But section 95.11(5)(h) does apply here, where a plaintiff seeks a deficiency judgment, a foreclosure . . . Therefore, DONI's action was timely under section 95.11(5)(h), and the trial court's entry of summary . . . The legislature specified that any action that would have been timely under section 95.11(2)(b) before . . .
. . . Grdic maintained that the statute of limitations, section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), barred . . .
. . . which codified the delayed discovery doctrine, and provides: An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11 . . . (3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date . . . See § 95.11(3)(o ) (establishing four-year statute of limitations for intentional torts not otherwise . . . covered by this section); § 95.11(3)(j) (establishing four-year statute of limitations for fraud). . . . For this assertion, Romay and ACV rely upon section 95.11(o ), Florida Statutes (2009) which provides . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . clearly stated: "[T]he two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related malpractice under section 95.11 . . .
. . . Consequently, the Mielkes claimed that the current complaint was time-barred pursuant to section 95.11 . . . A plaintiff has five years to bring a mortgage foreclosure action once a borrower has defaulted. § 95.11 . . .
. . . ." § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . widespread and fundamental misunderstanding, in Florida, regarding how the statute of limitations, § 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (2015). This time did not begin to run until Dr. Poole's death. . . .
. . . See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . This case presents an issue of first impression as to when the statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . . the second foreclosure action filed by Reverse Mortgage Solutions in 2014 was time-barred by section 95.11 . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. Affirmed. . . .
. . . See § 95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat. (2006) ; Goodwin v. . . . (first citing § 95.11(3)(o) ; and then citing Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. . . .
. . . See generally §§ 95.031, 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2006) ; see also Davis v. . . . See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 95.11(9) Fla. Stat. (2018). . . . . § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. . . . The statute currently in effect provides the same limitations period. § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
. . . . § 95.11 (2017). 30 Fla. Stat. Ann. 69-70 (2004). (h) Florida Administrative Code. . . .
. . . February 18, 2008, that all of the claims were governed by the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . .
. . . Ann. 95.11(2)(b). . . .
. . . From this date, the statute of repose, section 95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), began to run as . . . 558 qualifies as "an action," as the term is defined in the statute of repose, sections 95.011 and 95.11 . . . this chapter, [...] shall be barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this chapter [...]. 95.11 . . . registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest. §§ 95.011, 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(o) ; Primerica Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Mitchell, 48 F.Supp.2d 1363, 1368 (S.D. . . .
. . . filed on September 16, 2014 was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11 . . . , the statute of limitations to file a foreclosure action is five years from the date of default. § 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
. . . . § 95.11(4)(g) (establishing two-year limitations period for libel and slander claims). . . .
. . . Florida's fraud statute of repose provides in part: [I]n any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11 . . .
. . . The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim is two years, see § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. . . . See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). See § 766.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). See § 766.102, Fla. . . .
. . . than five years later; the foreclosure was barred by the five year statute of limitations of section 95.11 . . . any payment due within five years of the filing of the complaint, the action is not barred by section 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(j). . . . Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). . . .
. . . See § 95.11(4)(g), Fla. . . . See § 95.11(4)(g) ; § 95.031 ; Wagner , 629 So.2d at 114-15. . . . See § 95.11(4)(g) ; Bates , 31 So.3d at 213. Affirmed. Damoorgian and Kuntz, JJ., concur. . . .
. . . See § 95.11(3)(o ), Fla. . . . period in action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment); § 95.11 . . .
. . . The statute of limitations under section 95.11, Florida Statutes required Bellamy to have brought the . . . to section 732.108(2)(b) took effect to eliminate the limitations bar previously imposed by section 95.11 . . . with existing causes of action by eliminating the four year statute of limitations imposed by section 95.11 . . .
. . . and raised affirmative defenses, including the expiration of the statute of limitations under section 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(j) (1991) ; see also Goodwin v. Sphatt , 114 So.3d 1092, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. . . . except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in § 95.11 . . . STAT. § 95.11(3)(o) (1991) (stating that "any other intentional tort" shall be commenced within four . . .
. . . dismissed foreclosure action triggers application of the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(b), Fla Stat. (2018) ; see also, Rose v. Sonson, 208 So.3d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). . . .
. . . argues, the four-year state of limitations that he maintains applies under Florida Statute section 95.11 . . .
. . . complaint finding it was barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.11 . . . default on a default date within the five-year limitations period for bringing the action under section 95.11 . . . lender's foreclosure action was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations found in section 95.11 . . . any payment due within five years of the filing of the complaint, the action is not barred by section 95.11 . . .
. . . affirm because the claims were time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations outlined in section 95.11 . . . Likewise, their alternative argument, based on section 95.11(9), Florida Statutes (2010), fails because . . .
. . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .
. . . See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (2004) (providing two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice . . . See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . . § 95.11(4)(g). "Defamation encompasses both libel and slander[.]." Klayman v. . . .
. . . See § 95.11(3)(a), (4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015). For the reasons that follow, we reverse. . . . arguing that the second foreclosure action was time-barred by the five-year statute of limitations. § 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(b). By contrast, New York enforces a six-year limitations period. CPLR § 213(2). . . . Defendant BRE, citing to Florida Statutes § 95.11(3)(k), argues that a four-year period applies to the . . . Florida Statutes § 95.11(3)(k), however, applies to actions "not founded on a written instrument." . . . Stat. § 95.11(2)(b) ) ). . . . Therefore, as acknowledged by AHR Defendants, the Florida Statutes § 95.11(2)(b) and its five-year period . . .
. . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. . . .
. . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2015) ; Depicciotto v. . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(a). Id. . . . Stat. § 95.11(2)(a) is the appropriate limitations period to be applied to post-judgment discovery. . . . Florida Supreme Court also explained that “post-judgment discovery is not an ‘action,’ and section 95.11 . . .
. . . See § 95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013) ( "Actions ... shall be commenced ... . . .
. . . issued by a federal court in Florida is governed by the five-year limitations period provided in section 95.11 . . . District’s holding in Burshan that collection activity on a federal judgment is not governed by section 95.11 . . . See § 95.11(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . Although many decades, have passed since we decided Young, no amendment of section 95.11 has provided . . . Therefore, post-judgment discovery is not an “action,” and section 95.11 does not establish when it. . . .
. . . We disagree. ' Section 95.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes (2014) provides that an action to foreclose . . . widespread and fundamental misunderstanding, in Florida, regarding how the statute of limitations, § 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3), (6). . . .
. . . Although the lower court found Bishop’s mandamus petition to be time barred under section 95.11(5)(f) . . .
. . . found that the Republic's action was barred by the four-year limitations period set forth in sections 95.11 . . . later on April 29, 2009, was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11 . . . Sections 95.11(3)(f) and (p), states: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(a), (o), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .
. . . Section 95.11 reads, in relevant part, as follows: Actions other than for recovery of real property shall . . . including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts. § 95.11 . . . section 95.031(2)(a), and reads, in relevant part, as follows: An action founded, upon fraud under s. 95.11 . . . discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11 . . . See § 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2013); Beltran, M.D. v. Vincent P. . . . Section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes (2013), is the applicable statute governing the limitations period . . . Florida Statutes (2013), provides, in relevant part, as follows: An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2); Id. § 673.1181. . . .
. . . See § 95.11(3). . . . Indeed, a review of section 95.11 reveals .that undue influence claims can only fall under subsection . . . 95.11(3)(j), “[a] legal or equitable action founded on fraud.” . . . application of the delayed discovery doctrine, which states: An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11 . . . (3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date . . .
. . . . §§ 95.11(2)(b), 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .
. . . Stat. (2016); see also generally § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. . . .
. . . Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), provides that an action for legal malpractice “shall run . . . final judgment, the two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related malpractice under section 95.11 . . .
. . . . §§ 95.11(3)(e), 95.031. . . .
. . . . § 95.11(4)(d). The reasons for the Plaintiffs' 2012 MVD remained unexplained for six months. . . .
. . . widespread and fundamental misunderstanding, in Florida, regarding how the statute of limitations, § 95.11 . . .
. . . by Appellant Jerry Layne Rogers, Sr., as time-barred under the one-year limitation period of section 95.11 . . . As such, Appellant’s negligence claim should not have been dismissed under section 95.11(5)(g). . . . the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim of medical malpractice as time-barred under section 95.11 . . .
. . . a loan relying on a faulty appraisal, claims based on that faulty appraisal and subject to section 95.11 . . . See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. . . . Id. § 95.11(4)(a). . . . Ass’n, 581 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Fla. 1991) (holding that “‘privity’ as used in section 95.11(4)(b) means . . .
. . . deadline in this provision was inapplicable; that rather, the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . .
. . . on the same default as long as the action was brought within five years of the, default per section 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(b),(c). . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3). . . .
. . . filing of a claim would not be barred by the five year state of limitations under Florida Statute § 95.11 . . .
. . . of default; therefore, they argued, it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, section 95.11 . . .
. . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Anton. . . . See Section § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Court and the Fourth District reversed, finding that under a prior version of § 95.11(2)(e), the statute . . . See Rizo, 133 So.3d at 1114 n.1 (citing. § 95.11(2)(e), Fla. . . . contract,” the' limitations period runs from the date of loss); Luciano, 156 So.3d at 1110 n.1 (citing § 95.11 . . . Stat. (2011)) (§ 95.11(2)(e) was amended in 2011 to provide that the limitations period for an action . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1). . . . Stat. § 95.11(2)(b)-(c), § 95.031(1), § 95.281; Smith, 61 F.3d at 1561; Bartram, 211 So.3d at 1012, 1019 . . .
. . . January 30, 2008, which allegedly renders the negligence count against her barred by Florida Statute § 95.11 . . . Progressive also argues that the policy expired on June 30, 2Ó08, which means that § 95.11(2) would bar . . .
. . . See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). We find this portion of the trial court’s order to be error. . . .
. . . brought on a subsequent default within the five-year statute of limitations period found in section 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)0), Fla. stat. . § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. . § 95.03l(2)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . .
. . . challenges the trial court’s reliance on the one-year statute of limitations period found in section 95.11 . . . Appellee correctly concedes that section 95.11(5)(g) is not applicable to the case at hand and that appellant . . . correctional services in Florida should be the four-year statute of limitations period outlined in section 95.11 . . .
. . . period-such as the claim raised in Count II-must be brought within four years pursuant to Florida Statute § 95.11 . . .
. . . Because we conclude that section 95.11(5)(h) does not apply to the current cause of action, we reverse . . . Section 95.11(2)(b) provides in relevant part that “[ajctions other than for recovery of real property . . . However, [Whitney Bank] argues the language used in section 95.11(5)(h) to describe the commencement . . . Under section 95.11(5)(h), [Whitney Bank’s] claims are barred. . . . The unambiguous language of section 95.11(5)(h) states that a cause of action accrues under its terms . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(a), and a claim of libel within two, id. § 95.11(4)(g). . . . See id. § 95.11(3)(k). . . . See id. § 95.11(3)(a), (4)(g). . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(p). In California, it is one year. See Canatella v. . . .
. . . previously dismissed foreclosure suits on the same note, and because the statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (action to foreclose mortgage must be commenced within 5 years). . . . 1.420(a)(1), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and by the -statute of limitations provided • by section 95.11 . . .
. . . . § 95.11(3)(p). . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(b) (2016). . See Fla. Stat. § 95.04; Nolden v. . . .
. . . constrained to dismiss the Bank’s action based on the applicable five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11 . . .
. . . 2015), which held that the one-year statute of limitations for prisoners bringing suit under , section 95.11 . . .
. . . Nationstar is correct that section 95.11,, Fla. . . . Stat. § 95.11. It does not prohibit any conduct or create any private right of action. . . . Thus, to the extent her claim relies on section 95.11, the negligence claim is dismissed with prejudice . . .
. . . See § 95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008). In Mr. . . .
. . . . § 95.11(2)(b). . . . .
. . . motion for summary judgment, contending in part that the two-year statute of limitations of section 95.11 . . .
. . . it had not been brought within the bar of the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11 . . .