Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 196.192 (2025)
Exemptions from ad valorem taxation.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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196.192 Exemptions from ad valorem taxation.—Subject to the provisions of this chapter:
(1) All property owned by an exempt entity, including educational institutions, and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation.
(2) All property owned by an exempt entity, including educational institutions, and used predominantly for exempt purposes shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use.
(3) All tangible personal property loaned or leased by a natural person, by a trust holding property for a natural person, or by an exempt entity to an exempt entity for public display or exhibition on a recurrent schedule is exempt from ad valorem taxation if the property is loaned or leased for no consideration or for nominal consideration.
For purposes of this section, each use to which the property is being put must be considered in granting an exemption from ad valorem taxation, including any economic use in addition to any physical use. For purposes of this section, property owned by a limited liability company, the sole member of which is an exempt entity, shall be treated as if the property were owned directly by the exempt entity. This section does not apply in determining the exemption for property owned by governmental units pursuant to s. 196.199.
History.—s. 3, ch. 71-133; s. 2, ch. 88-102; s. 2, ch. 89-122; s. 3, ch. 2007-106; s. 2, ch. 2008-193.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26
cases, 1972–2018 · leading case: Mastroianni v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 606 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Mastroianni v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 606 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “The property appraiser relied upon section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1989), for his position that the owner of the property must be an exempt entity for the property to be exempt from taxation.”
Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc., 404 U.S. 412 (1972). “06) and enacted new legislation, approved June 15, 1971, effective December 31, 1971, which provides, in relevant part, that church property is exempt from taxation only if the property is used predominantly for religious purposes and only "to the extent of the ratio that such…”
First Union Nat. Bank of Fla. v. Ford, 636 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). “It held that to be entitled to the tax exemption under section 196.192, a tax exempt entity had to be the owner as well as the user and occupant of the property.”
Ocean High. & Port Auth. v. Page, 609 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “; § 196.192, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988). Thus, under the plain language of section 196.”
Leon Co. Educ. Auth. v. Hartsfield, 698 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1997). “The court buttressed its conclusion by noting that prior to 1988, section 196.192(1) read: "All property used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation.”
Genesis Ministries, Inc. v. Gregory S. Brown, as Prop. etc., 250 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). “1st DCA 1992) (“[U]nder the plain language of section 196.192, an ad valorem tax exemption is only permitted when the property in question is both owned and used by the tax-exempt entity.”
The Nat'l Ctr. for Constr. Educ. etc. v. Ed Crapo, as Alachua Cnty. etc., 248 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). “Appellant argues that because it performs an educational function – a charitable purpose – and because the government spends tax dollars on education, Appellant is entitled to a tax exemption under section 196.”
First Baptist Church of San Antonio v. Bexar Cnty. Appraisal Review Bd., 833 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1992). “After the United States Supreme Court agreed to review a district court's judgment upholding the exemption, the Florida Legislature fended off the constitutional challenge with prompt action: specifically, by amending the statute to allow an exemption only if the property is…”
Metro. Dade Cty. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Cmty. Coll. Found., Inc., 545 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). “" This argument lacks merit because the language of Section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that property only has to be "used" for an exempt purpose in order to qualify for an exemption.”
Daniel v. TM Murrell Co., Inc., 445 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). “The lower court, basing its ruling upon section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1981) [1] and section 196.”
Robbins v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc., 748 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). “The trial court made this determination because Lessee: (1) insured the subject properties; (2) maintained the subject properties; (3) repaired the subject properties; (4) used the subject properties to render tax-exempt health care services; (5) was contractually liable for…”
Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Kapila (In Re Home & Hous. of Dade Cnty., Inc.), 220 B.R. 492 (S.D. Fla. 1998). “In 1988, the Debtor applied for and obtained a charitable exemption from the Taxes with respect to the Improved Properties pursuant to Florida Statute §§ 196.192, 196.195 and 196.196. The Debtor subsequently failed to file a new application or statement of oath pursuant to…”
— 196.192(1) — 13 cases
Mastroianni v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 606 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “The property appraiser relied upon section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1989), for his position that the owner of the property must be an exempt entity for the property to be exempt from taxation.”
Leon Co. Educ. Auth. v. Hartsfield, 698 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1997). “The court buttressed its conclusion by noting that prior to 1988, section 196.192(1) read: "All property used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation.”
First Union Nat. Bank of Fla. v. Ford, 636 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). “It held that to be entitled to the tax exemption under section 196.192, a tax exempt entity had to be the owner as well as the user and occupant of the property.”
Genesis Ministries, Inc. v. Gregory S. Brown, as Prop. etc., 250 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). “1st DCA 1992) (“[U]nder the plain language of section 196.192, an ad valorem tax exemption is only permitted when the property in question is both owned and used by the tax-exempt entity.”
Metro. Dade Cty. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Cmty. Coll. Found., Inc., 545 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). “" This argument lacks merit because the language of Section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that property only has to be "used" for an exempt purpose in order to qualify for an exemption.”
— 196.192(2) — 6 cases
First Baptist Church of San Antonio v. Bexar Cnty. Appraisal Review Bd., 833 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1992). “After the United States Supreme Court agreed to review a district court's judgment upholding the exemption, the Florida Legislature fended off the constitutional challenge with prompt action: specifically, by amending the statute to allow an exemption only if the property is…”
The Nat'l Ctr. for Constr. Educ. etc. v. Ed Crapo, as Alachua Cnty. etc., 248 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). “Appellant argues that because it performs an educational function – a charitable purpose – and because the government spends tax dollars on education, Appellant is entitled to a tax exemption under section 196.”
Pub. Hous. Assistance, Inc. v. Havill, 571 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
Southlake Cmty. Found., Inc. v. Havill, 707 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
Walden v. Hertz Corp., 320 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1975).
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