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Florida Statute 202.11 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research

F.S. 202.11 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title XIV
TAXATION AND FINANCE

Chapter 202
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES TAX SIMPLIFICATION LAW

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F.S. 202.11

202.11 Definitions.—As used in this chapter, the term:

(1) “Communications services” means the transmission, conveyance, or routing of voice, data, audio, video, or any other information or signals, including video services, to a point, or between or among points, by or through any electronic, radio, satellite, cable, optical, microwave, or other medium or method now in existence or hereafter devised, regardless of the protocol used for such transmission or conveyance. The term includes such transmission, conveyance, or routing in which computer processing applications are used to act on the form, code, or protocol of the content for purposes of transmission, conveyance, or routing without regard to whether such service is referred to as voice-over-Internet-protocol services or is classified by the Federal Communications Commission as enhanced or value-added. The term does not include:

(a) Information services.

(b) Installation or maintenance of wiring or equipment on a customer’s premises.

(d) The sale of advertising, including, but not limited to, directory advertising.

(e) Bad check charges.

(f) Late payment charges.

(g) Billing and collection services.

(h) Internet access service, electronic mail service, electronic bulletin board service, or similar online computer services.

(2) “Dealer” means a person registered with the department as a provider of communications services in this state.

(3) “Department” means the Department of Revenue.

(4) “Direct-to-home satellite service” has the meaning ascribed in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. s. 303(v).

(5) “Information service” means the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, using, or making available information via communications services, including, but not limited to, electronic publishing, web-hosting service, and end-user 900 number service. The term includes data processing and other services that allow data to be generated, acquired, stored, processed, or retrieved and delivered by an electronic transmission to a purchaser whose primary purpose for the underlying transaction is the processed data or information. The term does not include video service.

(6) “Internet access service” has the same meaning as ascribed to the term “Internet access” by s. 1105(5) of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. s. 151 note, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-108.

(7) “Mobile communications service” means commercial mobile radio service, as defined in 47 C.F.R. s. 20.3 as in effect on June 1, 1999. The term does not include air-ground radiotelephone service as defined in 47 C.F.R. s. 22.99 as in effect on June 1, 1999.

(8) “Person” has the meaning ascribed in s. 212.02.

(9) “Prepaid calling arrangement” means:

(a) A right to use communications services, other than mobile communications services, for which a separately stated price must be paid in advance, which is sold at retail in predetermined units that decline in number with use on a predetermined basis, and which consist exclusively of telephone calls originated by using an access number, authorization code, or other means that may be manually, electronically, or otherwise entered; or

(b) A right to use mobile communications services that must be paid for in advance and is sold at retail in predetermined units that expire or decline in number on a predetermined basis if:

1. The purchaser’s right to use mobile communications services terminates upon all purchased units’ expiring or being exhausted unless the purchaser pays for additional units;

2. The purchaser is not required to purchase additional units; and

3. Any right of the purchaser to use units to obtain communications services other than mobile communications services is limited to services that are provided to or through the same handset or other electronic device that is used by the purchaser to access mobile communications services.

Predetermined units described in this subsection may be quantified as amounts of usage, time, money, or a combination of these or other means of measurement.

(10) “Purchaser” means the person paying for or obligated to pay for communications services.

(11) “Retail sale” means the sale of communications services for any purpose other than for resale or for use as a component part of or for integration into communications services to be resold in the ordinary course of business. However, any sale for resale must comply with s. 202.16(2) and the rules adopted thereunder.

(12) “Sale” means the provision of communications services for a consideration.

(13) “Sales price” means the total amount charged in money or other consideration by a dealer for the sale of the right or privilege of using communications services in this state, including any property or other service, not described in paragraph (a), which is part of the sale and for which the charge is not separately itemized on a customer’s bill or separately allocated under subparagraph (b)8. The sales price of communications services may not be reduced by any separately identified components of the charge which constitute expenses of the dealer, including, but not limited to, sales taxes on goods or services purchased by the dealer, property taxes, taxes measured by net income, and universal-service fund fees.

(a) The sales price of communications services includes, whether or not separately stated, charges for any of the following:

1. The connection, movement, change, or termination of communications services.

2. The detailed billing of communications services.

3. The sale of directory listings in connection with a communications service.

4. Central office and custom calling features.

5. Voice mail and other messaging service.

6. Directory assistance.

7. The service of sending or receiving a document commonly referred to as a facsimile or “fax,” except when performed during the course of providing professional or advertising services.

(b) The sales price of communications services does not include charges for any of the following:

1. An excise tax, sales tax, or similar tax levied by the United States or any state or local government on the purchase, sale, use, or consumption of any communications service, including, but not limited to, a tax imposed under this chapter or chapter 203 which is permitted or required to be added to the sales price of such service, if the tax is stated separately.

2. A fee or assessment levied by the United States or any state or local government, including, but not limited to, regulatory fees and emergency telephone surcharges, which must be added to the price of the service if the fee or assessment is separately stated.

3. Communications services paid for by inserting coins into coin-operated communications devices available to the public.

4. The sale or recharge of a prepaid calling arrangement.

5. The provision of air-to-ground communications services, defined as a radio service provided to a purchaser while on board an aircraft.

6. A dealer’s internal use of communications services in connection with its business of providing communications services.

7. Charges for property or other services that are not part of the sale of communications services, if such charges are stated separately from the charges for communications services.

8. Charges for goods or services that are not subject to tax under this chapter, including Internet access services but excluding any item described in paragraph (a), that are not separately itemized on a customer’s bill, but that can be reasonably identified from the selling dealer’s books and records kept in the regular course of business. The dealer may support the allocation of charges with books and records kept in the regular course of business covering the dealer’s entire service area, including territories outside this state.

(14) “Service address” means:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section:

1. The location of the communications equipment from which communications services originate or at which communications services are received by the customer;

2. In the case of a communications service paid through a credit or payment mechanism that does not relate to a service address, such as a bank, travel, debit, or credit card, and in the case of third-number and calling-card calls, the term “service address” means the address of the central office, as determined by the area code and the first three digits of the seven-digit originating telephone number; or

3. If the location of the equipment described in subparagraph 1. is not known and subparagraph 2. is inapplicable, the term “service address” means the location of the customer’s primary use of the communications service. For purposes of this subparagraph, the location of the customer’s primary use of a communications service is the residential street address or the business street address of the customer.

(b) In the case of video services and direct-to-home satellite services, the location where the customer receives the services in this state.

(15) “Unbundled network element” means a network element, as defined in 47 U.S.C. s. 153(29), to which access is provided on an unbundled basis pursuant to 47 U.S.C. s. 251(c)(3).

(16) “Private communications service” means a communications service that entitles the subscriber or user to exclusive or priority use of a communications channel or group of channels between or among channel termination points, regardless of the manner in which such channel or channels are connected, and includes switching capacity, extension lines, stations, and any other associated services that are provided in connection with the use of such channel or channels.

(17)(a) “Customer” means:

1. The person or entity that contracts with the home service provider for mobile communications services; or

2. If the end user of mobile communications services is not the contracting party, the end user of the mobile communications service. This subparagraph only applies for the purpose of determining the place of primary use.

(b) “Customer” does not include:

1. A reseller of mobile communications services; or

2. A serving carrier under an agreement to serve the customer outside the home service provider’s licensed service area.

(18) “Enhanced zip code” means a United States postal zip code of 9 or more digits.

(19) “Home service provider” means the facilities-based carrier or reseller with which the customer contracts for the provision of mobile communications services.

(20) “Licensed service area” means the geographic area in which the home service provider is authorized by law or contract to provide mobile communications service to the customer.

(21) “Place of primary use” means the street address representative of where the customer’s use of the mobile communications service primarily occurs, which must be:

(a) The residential street address or the primary business street address of the customer; and

(b) Within the licensed service area of the home service provider.

(22)(a) “Reseller” means a provider who purchases communications services from another communications service provider and then resells, uses as a component part of, or integrates the purchased services into a mobile communications service.

(b) “Reseller” does not include a serving carrier with which a home service provider arranges for the services to its customers outside the home service provider’s licensed service area.

(23) “Serving carrier” means a facilities-based carrier providing mobile communications service to a customer outside a home service provider’s or reseller’s licensed service area.

(24) “Video service” means the transmission of video, audio, or other programming service to a purchaser, and the purchaser interaction, if any, required for the selection or use of a programming service, regardless of whether the programming is transmitted over facilities owned or operated by the video service provider or over facilities owned or operated by another dealer of communications services. The term includes point-to-point and point-to-multipoint distribution services through which programming is transmitted or broadcast by microwave or other equipment directly to the purchaser’s premises, but does not include direct-to-home satellite service. The term includes basic, extended, premium, pay-per-view, digital video, two-way cable, and music services.

History.—ss. 2, 58, ch. 2000-260; ss. 2, 38, ch. 2001-140; s. 1, ch. 2003-254; ss. 1, 14, ch. 2005-187; s. 6, ch. 2005-280; s. 3, ch. 2007-29; s. 2, ch. 2012-70; s. 1, ch. 2014-36; s. 1, ch. 2014-38.

F.S. 202.11 on Google Scholar

F.S. 202.11 on Casetext

Amendments to 202.11

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 202.11

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 202.11.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court

11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All

Robles v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Case No: 2:18-cv-280-FtM-29NPM (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2019) Cited 1 times
The Magistrate Judge considered only one issue on appeal: Whether the ALJ erred by failing to acknowledge or discuss the 'borderline age situation' in the case. (Doc. #26, p. 5.) The Magistrate Judge noted that an ALJ may not exclusively rely on grids when a claimant is unable to perform a full range of work, of if limited basic work skills. The Magistrate Judge considered a two-part test noting that plaintiff was within a few days or a few months of a higher age category as she was 54 years, 6 months, and 12 days old at the date of the decision. Applying the same factors under Grid Rule 202.11 to one of 'advanced age', the Magistrate Judge found that this would mandate a finding of disabled. Because the ALJ failed to acknowledge the borderline age issue, the Magistrate Judge found reversible error. The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit has not decided whether the ALJ has a responsibility to identify borderline age situation, but the Magistrate Judge was more persuaded by cases assigning responsibility. Being unpersuaded by the other arguments, the Magistrate Judge found remand to be heard on the issue was appropriate.
PAGE 5
Fernandez v. Acting Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin.
CASE NO. 8:16-cv-1542-T-MCR (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2017) Cited 1 times
If the claimant had the [RFC] to perform the full range of light work, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, a finding of "not disabled" would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.11. However, the additional limitations have little to no effect on the occupational base of unskilled light work. A finding of "not disabled" is therefore appropriate under the framework of this rule.
PAGE 4
Bear v. Berryhill
Case No. 5:16cv291-CJK (N.D. Fla. Jul. 26, 2017)
Claimant also failed to show the DOE and the Social Security standards are similar enough to make the DOE evaluation relevant to the ALJ's decision. The DOE letter suggested Bear would need to earn a GED before becoming employable. See Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 6A-25.005 (4)(a) (requiring DOE to address applicant's barriers to employment). T. 230. In contrast, the Social Security rule utilized for disability determination, Medical-Vocational Rule 202.11, requires only a "[l]imited or less" education level to be deemed employable considering Bear's age and RFC. "Limited or less" is defined by 20 CFR § 404.1564 as a seventh through eleventh grade formal education. In short, unlike the DOE's evaluation, Social Security law does not necessarily require Mr. Bear to obtain a GED to be deemed employable. See Medical-Vocational Rule 202.11. One can glean the asymmetry between the two standards from the differing educational requirements alone, notwithstanding other variables, and claimant failed to show the DOE evaluation is relevant, much less entitled to great weight, in a disability determination under Social Security law. Plaintiff, therefore, has not established the…
Tecnoglass, LLC v. RC Home Showcase, Inc.
301 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2017) Cited 5 times
Motion to dismiss
8 more...
RC Home's second argument—that copyright regulations specifically exclude "individual standard features, such as windows, doors, and other staple building components"—conflates the copyrighted technical drawings with the actual sliding glass doors and window wall systems depicted in those drawings. The regulation on which RC Home relies, 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(2), relates to the definition of "architectural work"—the second category of works related to architecture protected by section 102(a)(8) of the Copyright Act. In fact, the statutory definition of "architectural work" contains the same exclusionary language:
PAGE 1273
Richardson v. State
182 So. 3d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) Cited 2 times
Section 90.202(11) “is recognized to be a codification of the common law pre-dating the adoption of Florida's Evidence Code under which ‘Florida courts have taken judicial notice of facts which are “open and notorious”, involve “common notoriety” or are “commonly known”.’ Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 202.11, at 51 (footnotes omitted).” Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So.2d 538, 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Section 90.202, Florida Statutes (2012), provides in relevant part that a court may take judicial notice of:
PAGE 922
Darnley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Case No: 5:14-cv-134-Oc-CM (M.D. Fla. Sep. 29, 2015)
A. Whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard when he found Plaintiff not disabled based on Medical-Vocational Rules 202.18 and 202.11 rather than calling a VE to testify.
PAGE 5
Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes, Inc.
101 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Fla. 2015) Cited 4 times
Motion for summary judgment
The Court need not address the other statutory requirements, such as registration, because the parties' Motions raise only the issue of originality. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”); 37 C.F.R. 202.11(d)(3) (providing that building designs published (or buildings actually constructed) before December 1, 1990 cannot be registered); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (finding that Section 411(a)'s registration requirement is not jurisdictional).
PAGE 1212
Cabral v. Colvin
Case No. 8:13-cv-2130-T-DAB (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2014)
In making the alternative finding here, the ALJ noted that she must consider the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience in conjunction with the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (R. 34). Performing that analysis, the ALJ concluded that, based on a residual functional capacity for the full range of light work, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, a finding of "not disabled" is directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 and Rule 202.11. Id. This conclusion is not a "throw away" comment, but a reasoned analysis, based on the appropriate standards and supported by the findings and law cited. As the step five finding was made in accordance with proper standards and is supported by substantial evidence, the error at step four was harmless.
PAGE 11
Hodges v. Colvin
Case No. 4:12cv493-CAS (N.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2013)
At step five, the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff's age (44 as of January 22, 2010, the date of the ALJ's decision; 41 as of March 31, 2007, the last date insured for DIB; 35 as of May 19, 2001, the alleged onset date); education (8th grade and limited); work experience; and RFC; that "there are jobs in that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform," such as parking booth attendant. R. 20. First, the ALJ determined that under the Medical-Vocational Rules (the Grids) and specifically Rules 202.11 and 202.18 a finding of not disabled is directed based on Plaintiff's RFC for the full range of light work, considering Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience. R. 20.
PAGE 16
Allman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Case No. 6:12-cv-549-Orl-36DAB (M.D. Fla. Jul. 26, 2013)
If the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work, a finding of 'not disabled' would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.11. However, the claimant's ability to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of this level of work has been impeded by additional limitations. To determine the extent to which these limitations erode the unskilled light occupational base, the Administrative Law Judge asked the vocational expert whether jobs exist in the national economy for an individual with the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. The vocational expert testified that given all these factors the individual would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations at the light exertional level, SVP 2, such as small parts assembler (DOT 739.687-030 with 998 jobs in the State of Florida and 40, 3339 nationally); lunchroom or coffee shop attendant (DOT 311.477-014 with 8,742 jobs in the State of Florida and 162,800 nationally); and ticket taker (DOT 344.687-010 with 1,008 jobs in the State of Florida and 23,256 nationally).
PAGE 10
Cases from cite.case.law:
DESIGN BASICS, LLC, v. KERSTIENS HOMES DESIGNS, INC. T-, 341 F. Supp. 3d 920 (S.D. Ind. 2018)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2). . . .
DESIGN BASICS, LLC, v. LEXINGTON HOMES, INC., 858 F.3d 1093 (7th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 202.11(d) (“The following structures, features, or works cannot be registered: ... (2) Standard features . . .
G. ANDERS, v. A. BERRYHILL,, 688 F. App'x 514 (10th Cir. 2017)

. . . disabled under the applicable sedentary-work rule, 201.10, but pot under the applicable light-work- rule, 202.11 . . .
DESIGN BASICS, LLC, v. PETROS HOMES, INC., 240 F. Supp. 3d 712 (N.D. Ohio 2017)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2); Zitz v. Pereira, 119 F.Supp.2d 133, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). . . .
TECNOGLASS, LLC, v. RC HOME SHOWCASE, INC., 301 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2) ).) . . . The regulation on which RC Home relies, 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(2), relates to the definition of "architectural . . .
FORTGANG v. PEREIRAS ARCHITECTS UBIQUITOUS LLC, LLC,, 230 F. Supp. 3d 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2). . . .
VILLARREAL, v. W. COLVIN,, 221 F. Supp. 3d 835 (W.D. Tex. 2016)

. . . full range of light work, a finding of “not disabled” would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.11 . . .
RANIERI, d b a P. C. v. ADIRONDACK DEV. GROUP, LLC LLC J. Co. LLC J. Sr. J. Jr. Jr. LLC LLC LLC,, 164 F. Supp. 3d 305 (N.D.N.Y. 2016)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2); Zitz v. Pereira, 119 F.Supp.2d 133, 147 (E.D.N.Y.1999). . . .
RICHARDSON, v. STATE, 182 So. 3d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . and notorious”, involve “common notoriety" or are "commonly known”,’ Ehrhardt, Florida’Evi- - dence § 202.11 . . . Prac., Florida Evidence, § 202.11 (2015 ed.) . . .
SARI, v. AMERICA S HOME PLACE, INC., 129 F. Supp. 3d 317 (E.D. Va. 2015)

. . . . § 202.11. Purely utilitarian aspects of a work are similarly not protectable. . . . See 37 C.F.R. § 202.11. . . . stating that the stone and stucco fagade was a feature of Sari’s neighbor’s house)); see 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . . Windows are. standard features excluded from copyright protection. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d) (“The following . . . building components” that may not be registered and are thus not entitled to protection. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . .
LENNAR HOMES OF TEXAS SALES AND MARKETING, LTD. v. PERRY HOMES, LLC,, 117 F. Supp. 3d 913 (S.D. Tex. 2015)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2), as well as “common windows, doors, and other staple building components,” H.R.Rep. . . .
SUAREZ, v. W. COLVIN,, 102 F. Supp. 3d 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . light work, a finding of ‘not disabled’ would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 and Rule 202.11 . . .
L. COOKSEY, v. W. COLVIN,, 605 F. App'x 735 (10th Cir. 2015)

. . . P.App. 2 § 202.11 with id. § 202.18. . . .
A. SORENSON, v. WOLFSON,, 96 F. Supp. 3d 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(3), which “prescribes rules pertaining to the registration of architectural works.” . . . works that were “constructed or otherwise published” from the protections of the AWCPA. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . . The Court of Appeal’s definition of “constructed” in § 202.11(d)(3) should also apply to the definition . . .
HOME DESIGN SERVICES, INC. v. TURNER HERITAGE HOMES, INC., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . .”); 37 C.F.R. 202.11(d)(3) (providing that building designs published (or buildings actually constructed . . .
HUMPHREYS PARTNERS ARCHITECTS, L. P. v. LESSARD DESIGN, INC., 43 F. Supp. 3d 644 (E.D. Va. 2014)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2)) [hereinafter Ross II ]. . . . See 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(2); Boss III, 977 F.Supp.2d at 593. . . . See 87 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(2). . . . Ross III, 977 F.Supp.2d at 593 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(2)). . Id. (citing H.R.Rep. . . . See Appendix K. . 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(2). . Ross III, 977 F.Supp.2d at 593 (citing H.R.Rep. . . .
BOX, v. W. COLVIN,, 3 F. Supp. 3d 27 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)

. . . , education and work experience, a finding of ‘not disabled’ is directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.11 . . .
L. DURDEN, v. W. COLVIN,, 546 F. App'x 690 (9th Cir. 2013)

. . . Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 202.11. . . .
CHARLES W. ROSS BUILDER, INC. d b a v. OLSEN FINE HOME BUILDING, LLC, J. L., 977 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. Va. 2013)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2), or design elements that are functionally required, H.R.Rep. . . .
SCHOLZ DESIGN, INC. v. SARD CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, LLC,, 691 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 202.11(c)(4). . . .
E. ZALEWSKI v. T. P. BUILDERS, INC., 875 F. Supp. 2d 135 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . . § 202.11. . . . reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949, are explicitly excluded. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . .
CHANEY- EVERETT, v. J. ASTRUE,, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . were Claimant able to perform the full range of light work, Medical-Vocational Rule 202.18 and Rule 202.11 . . . For that reason, the ALJ’s application of Guidelines Rules 202.11 and 202.18 presumes that a significant . . . light of these factors, the ALJ properly determined that “under the framework” of Guidelines Rules 202.11 . . .
STACEY, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 451 F. App'x 517 (6th Cir. 2011)

. . . Rules 202.11 & 202.12.) . . .
E. MEYER, III, v. J. ASTRUE,, 662 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 2011)

. . . P, App. 2, R. 202.11. . . .
CHARLES W. ROSS BUILDER, INC. d b a v. OLSEN FINE HOME BUILDING, LLC, J. L., 827 F. Supp. 2d 607 (E.D. Va. 2011)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2). . . .
HOME DESIGN SERVICES, INC. v. STARWOOD CONSTRUCTION, INC., 801 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (D. Colo. 2011)

. . . . § 202.11(c)(3). . . .
CAUDILL, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 424 F. App'x 510 (6th Cir. 2011)

. . . Pursuant to Grid Rules 202.10 and 202.11, this compelled a determination that Caudill was not disabled . . .
FOREST RIVER, INC. v. HEARTLAND RECREATIONAL VEHICLES, LLC,, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753 (N.D. Ind. 2010)

. . . . § 202.11(b)(2). . . . [and] standard configurations of spaces." 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d) (emphasis added). . . .
MEZZACAPPA, v. J. ASTRUE,, 749 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . P, App. 2, § 202.11-.12, the finding that Mezzacappa can do light work is not supported by substantial . . .
DOZIER, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (D.S.C. 2010)

. . . See Tr. 30 (citing Medical-Vocational Rule 202.11). . . .
F. THOMAS v. ARTINO,, 723 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Md. 2010)

. . . . § 202.11(c)(4). . . .
HARVESTER, INC. d b a v. RULE JOY TRAMMELL RUBIO, LLC,, 716 F. Supp. 2d 428 (E.D. Va. 2010)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2)). . . . In support of this new position, Rule Joy cites 37 C.F.R. § 202.11, the section of the Code of Federal . . . Id. § 202.11(b)(2). . . . Id. § 202.11(d)(1). . . . Id. § 202.11(d)(2). . . .
CAMPBELL, v. J. ASTRUE,, 713 F. Supp. 2d 129 (N.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . had Plaintiff been able to perform the full range of light work, Medical-Vocational rules 202.10 and 202.11 . . . Defendant further argues that the ALJ properly used Medical-Vocational Rules 202.10 and 202.11 as a framework . . . P, App. 2 §§ 202.09-202.11. . . . The ALJ used Rules 202.10 and 202.11 as a framework for decision making, both of which direct a finding . . . P, App. 2 § 202.11. . Radiculopathy as a "[disorder of the spinal nerve roots.” . . .
GAYLORD, v. UNITED STATES,, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 202.11(b)(2). . . . Id. § 202.11(d)(1). . . .
GAYLORD, v. UNITED STATES,, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 202.11(b)(2). . . . Id. § 202.11(d)(1). . . .
SHOULARS, v. J. ASTRUE,, 671 F. Supp. 2d 801 (E.D.N.C. 2009)

. . . arguing the magistrate judge’s finding that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) improperly applied Rule 202.11 . . . Rule 202.09 directs a finding of “disabled,” whereas Rule 202.11 directs a finding of “not disabled.” . . . Rule 202.11 applies when the individual’s education level is “[l]imited or less.” 20 C.F.R. . . . P, App. 2 § 202.11. Both of these education levels are statutorily defined. . . . P, App. 2, Table 2, § 202.11. . . .
LEWIS, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 666 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Mich. 2009)

. . . able to do light work and closely approaching advanced age; the plaintiff argues that it should be 202.11 . . .
L. MORGAN, t a d b a v. HANNA HOLDINGS, INC., 635 F. Supp. 2d 404 (W.D. Pa. 2009)

. . . . § 202.11(c)(4). . . .
GAYLORD, v. UNITED STATES,, 85 Fed. Cl. 59 (Fed. Cl. 2008)

. . . . § 202.11(b)(2). . . . Id. at § 202.11(d)(1). . . .
E. PENA, v. J. ASTRUE,, 271 F. App'x 382 (5th Cir. 2008)

. . . The ALJ applied rule 202.11, which rejects a disability finding for an individual who has the residual . . .
PATRIOT HOMES, INC. v. FOREST RIVER HOUSING, INC. d b a, 548 F. Supp. 2d 647 (N.D. Ind. 2008)

. . . . § 202.11(b)(2). . . . [and] standard configurations of spaces ... ”. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d). . . . See, 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2); Black’s Law Dictionary 194-95 (8th ed.2004) (defining “building” as a . . .
HOME DESIGN SERVICES, INC. v. DAVID WEEKLEY HOMES, LLC, L. P., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2008)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(3)(I). . . . constitute publication for purposes of registration, unless multiple copies are constructed. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . . Furthermore, 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(c)(5) addresses designs of buildings built after December 1, 1990. . . .
L. MARTIN, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 240 F. App'x 941 (3d Cir. 2007)

. . . Rule 201.10 from the grid applicable to sedentary RFC directs a conclusion of disabled, whereas Rule 202.11 . . . The ALJ applied Rule 202.11 to arrive at his conclusion that Martin was not disabled. . . . limitations do not allow her to perform the full range of light work, using Medical-Vocational Rule 202.11 . . .
ORAVEC, v. SUNNY ISLES LUXURY VENTURES L. C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 2006)

. . . . § 202.11(c)(4). . . . . § 202.11(c)(2). It is difficult to square Oravec’s novel theory with the controlling regulations. . . .
In A. BRISCOE, T. D., 448 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2006)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 202.11[5] (3d ed. 1997) (“An order denying a motion to remand . . .
TISEO ARCHITECTS, INC. v. SSOE. INC., 431 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Mich. 2006)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(2). . . .
MANN, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 175 F. App'x 159 (9th Cir. 2006)

. . . under which a claimant in Mann’s position and limited to sedentary work is disabled; and grid rule 202.11 . . . Accordingly, we must uphold the agency’s decision as proper in its reliance on grid rule 202.11 as a . . .
ZABNER- WILLIS, v. W. GLADDEN,, 146 F. App'x 759 (5th Cir. 2005)

. . . Lieb, 915 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir.1990) (and decisions cited therein); 19 Moore’s Federal Practice § 202.11 . . .
H. REDFIELD, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 366 F. Supp. 2d 489 (E.D. Mich. 2005)

. . . P, App. 2, Sections 202.11 and 202.18 as a framework, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled . . .
JOHNSON, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 97 F. App'x 539 (6th Cir. 2004)

. . . Pursuant to Rule 202.11 of Table 2 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, a claimant possessing these . . . The administrative law judge therefore determined that Rule 202.11 applied to Johnson, thereby compelling . . . Johnson argues that the administrative law judge should have applied Rule 202.09 instead of Rule 202.11 . . . Because the record demonstrates that Johnson meets all the criteria listed in Rule 202.11, we find no . . .
MELWANI, v. FIRST USA BANK, N. A. N. A. v. N. A. AKA AKA v. AT T, 96 F. App'x 755 (2d Cir. 2004)

. . . . § 202.11. . . .
DELGADO, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 305 F. Supp. 2d 704 (S.D. Tex. 2004)

. . . therefore reached within the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule[s] 202.17, 202.18, 202.19, 202.10, 202.11 . . . perform the full range of light work, using Medical-Vocational Rule[s] 202.17, 202.18, 202.19, 202.10, 202.11 . . . the only Grid Rules that are suitable as a framework for decision-making are Rules 202.09, 202.10, 202.11 . . .
J. CIRALSKY, v. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,, 355 F.3d 661 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

. . . See 12 Moore’s §§ 59.32[1], 59.53[1]; 19 Moobe’s § 202.11[1][a], Unfortunately, it is not always clear . . .
NATIONAL MEDICAL CARE, INC. v. L. ESPIRITU, Jr. MD., 284 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.W. Va. 2003)

. . . . § 202.11(c)(4). . . .
OSHKESHEQUOAM, v. Jo BARNHART,, 274 F. Supp. 2d 985 (C.D. Ill. 2003)

. . . limitations do not allow her to perform the full range of light work, using MedicalYocational Rule 202.11 . . .
HERRERA, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 69 F. App'x 438 (10th Cir. 2003)

. . . P, App. 2, rule 202.11 (the grids) as a framework, the ALJ concluded that appellant was not disabled . . .
NEWBURN, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 62 F. App'x 300 (10th Cir. 2003)

. . . The issue is critical because Rule 202.11 of the Medical Vocational Guidelines (the “grids”), 20 C.F.R . . .
LUNA, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 56 F. App'x 427 (9th Cir. 2003)

. . . to produce evidence that Luna could perform any job categorized as light work, the use of grid rule 202.11 . . .
PICKARD, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (W.D. Tenn. 2002)

. . . Section 404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and section 416.969 of Regulations No. 16 and Rule 202.11, Table . . . summary judgment, plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in finding she was not disabled based on Rule 202.11 . . . The ALJ determined, based on Rule 202.11 of the grids, that the plaintiff, being a person closely approaching . . .
PHILA. CITY COUNCIL C. L. A. L. B. W. Jr. F. L. M. W. R. A NAACP W. NAACP v. S. SCHWEIKER, R. E., 40 F. App'x 672 (3d Cir. 2002)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 202.11[6], at 202-56 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) . . .
WILLIAMS, v. G. MASSANARI,, 171 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ill. 2001)

. . . The ALJ, using the VE’s testimony and Rule 202.11 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, determined Williams . . .
F. DONAHUE, v. G. MASSANARI,, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Mich. 2001)

. . . that Plaintiff could perform a full range of light work to allow a “not disabled” finding under Rule 202.11 . . .
ROTUNNO, v. G. MASSANARI,, 17 F. App'x 926 (10th Cir. 2001)

. . . See Rule 202.11. Finally, Mr. . . .
In DOE, D. P. M. v. UNITED STATES, 253 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 202.11[2] [c]. . . .
A. GOODWIN, v. A. HALTER,, 140 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D.N.C. 2001)

. . . that he was allowed a sit/stand option and customary breaks and meal periods; and that applying Rule 202.11 . . .
DAVISON, v. A. HALTER,, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (S.D. Ala. 2001)

. . . . § 202.00, Rules 202.10 & 202.11, or medium work, see 20 C.F.R. § 203.00, Rule 203.19. . . .
REGINO CAVAZOS, v. S. APFEL,, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Ind. 2000)

. . . age, educational background, and work experience, Sections 404.1569 and 416.969 and Rules 202.10 and 202.11 . . .
SYKES, Sr. v. S. APFEL, S., 228 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2000)

. . . The ALJ’s decision states that “using medical-vocational ‘grid’ rule 202.11, Table 1, Subpart P, Appendix . . .
RICHARD J. ZITZ, INC. v. DOS SANTOS PEREIRA, T., 232 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2000)

. . . . § 202.11(d)(3), architectural works that “were constructed or otherwise published before December 1 . . . It is possible to read “constructed” in 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(d)(3) to mean either what the plaintiff or . . . the following reasons, we believe that the better reading of the word “constructed” in 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . . works that were “constructed or otherwise published” from the protections of the AWC-PA. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . .
SILVEIRA, v. S. APFEL, v. S., 204 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2000)

. . . education), and a third set of rules analogous to the rules at issue in Sil-veira’s case (Rules 202.09 and 202.11 . . .
ATTIA d b a v. SOCIETY OF THE NEW YORK HOSPITAL a k a HOK TCA P. C., 201 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1999)

. . . . § 202.11(b)(4) ("Where dual copyright claims exist in technical drawings and the architectural work . . .
J. ZITZ, v. PEREIRA, 119 F. Supp. 2d 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . Section 202.11 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs the registration of architectural plans and . . . 1990, or the buildings were constructed or otherwise published before December 1,1990. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . . C.F.R. § 202.11(c)(2). . . . See 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(c)(2). (1998). . . . Pursuant to Regulation § 202.11(d), buildings constructed or plans otherwise published before December . . .
UNITED STATES v. GLENS FALLS NEWSPAPERS, INC. d b a, 160 F.3d 853 (2d Cir. 1998)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 202.11[3] (3d Ed.1998). . . .
RHEIN BUILDING COMPANY HGM v. GEHRT a k a Hy A J. d b a R. J., 21 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Wis. 1998)

. . . . § 202.11(c)(4). . . . respect to the technical drawings and architectural work must be registered separately. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . . constitute publication for purposes of registration unless multiple copies are constructed. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . .
THE YANKEE CANDLE COMPANY, INC. v. NEW ENGLAND CANDLE COMPANY, INC., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Mass. 1998)

. . . . § 202.11(b)(2) (1997). . . . . § 202.11(d)(1) (1997). . . .
WILCUTTS, v. S. APFEL,, 143 F.3d 1134 (8th Cir. 1998)

. . . The first ALJ held that Rules 202.11 and 202.12 of the Medical Vocational Guidelines (Grid), 20 C.F.R . . . Rule 202.11 provides that an individual closely approaching advanced age with a limited education and . . .
IRIZARRY, v. S. APFEL,, 994 F. Supp. 106 (D.P.R. 1998)

. . . capacity for light work, and the claimant’s age, education, work experience, section 404.1569 and Rule 202.11 . . .
MARADIE, v. B. MARADIE,, 680 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 202.11, at 51 (footnotes omitted). See, Makos, 64 So.2d at 673. . . .
E. WOLFE, v. S. CHATER,, 86 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 1996)

. . . . § 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Rules 202.11 & 202.12. . . .
K. HOPE, INC. v. ONSLOW COUNTY, TREANTS ENTERPRISES, v, ONSLOW COUNTY, A. MERCER, Sr. t a v. ONSLOW COUNTY,, 911 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.N.C. 1995)

. . . Moreover, the argument that N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-202.11 is pre-emptive centers almost completely upon the . . . N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-202.11, “Restrictions as to adult establishments,” reads in pertinent part: No person . . . N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-202.12 establishes that first-time violations of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-202.11 constitute . . . First, if N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-202.11 can be said to regulate conduct at all (and it clearly does not), . . . This Court shares the Fourth Circuit’s doubts as to the efficacy of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-202.11. . . .
CUNNINGHAM, v. SHALALA,, 880 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ill. 1995)

. . . Accordingly, taking into consideration Cunningham’s RFC, age, and education, the Secretary applied Rule 202.11 . . .
L. EAVES v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 877 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Tex. 1995)

. . . ALJ concluded that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy and pursuant to Rule 202.11 . . .
WALHOOD v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 875 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Tex. 1995)

. . . Pursuant to Rule 202.11 of Appendix 2, the ALJ found plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 18-19). IV. . . .
SIBLEY, v. SHALALA,, 863 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1994)

. . . prior work experience, the Grid would still direct a finding of “not disabled” under Rules 202.10 or 202.11 . . . P, App. 2, §§ 202.10; 202.11. . . .
McKINNEY, a k a a k a v. STATE, 640 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 202.11, at 51-52 (1994 ed.); see also Forbes v. Bushnell Steel Constr. . . .
BRYCE PALAZZOLA ARCHITECTS AND ASSOCIATES, INC. v. A. M. E. GROUP, INC., 865 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Mich. 1994)

. . . Regulation § 202.11(d) provides as follows: (D) Works Excluded. . . . December 1, 1990, to constitute “construction,” thus excluding the structure as provided in 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . .
M. SAFRANSKI, v. E. SHALALA,, 836 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Ill. 1993)

. . . Rule 202.11 in Table No. 2 of Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, in conjunction with Regulation . . .
SHIELDS, XXX- XX- XXXX v. SULLIVAN, M. D., 801 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1992)

. . . If the claimant were limited to no more than the full range of light work, Rule 202.11, Table No. 2 would . . .
SCIVALLY, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 966 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1992)

. . . work, and the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, section 404.1569 and Rule 202.10 and 202.11 . . .
MANZO, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 784 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.J. 1991)

. . . Section 404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and Rules 202.10 and 202.11, Table No. 2 of Appendix 2, Subpart . . .
HILL, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 769 F. Supp. 467 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)

. . . the difference between being disabled under Rules 202.01 or 202.02 or being not disabled under Rules 202.11 . . .
SWARNER, a v. UNITED STATES P. W. A. H. a, 937 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1991)

. . . . § 202.11(a)(1), 32 C.F.R. § 297.5(a)(2) and DoD Directive 5400.7-R. . . . enterprise publication will be made available equally to any other publisher who requests it." 32 C.F.R. § 202.11 . . .
K. MOORE, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 919 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1990)

. . . On October 5, 1988, the ALJ concluded that Rules 202.10 and 202.11 of the Appendix 2 of the Secretary . . . Under Rules 202.10 and 202.11 of the guidelines, a claimant with Moore’s profile (fifty-three years of . . .
JOHNSON, v. Dr. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 894 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1990)

. . . Under rules 202.10 and 202.11 of the guidelines, a claimant with Johnson’s profile (fifty years of age . . . See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Sub-part P, App. 2, Table No. 2, Rules 202.10 and 202.11. . . .
A. BAINEY, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 732 F. Supp. 582 (W.D. Pa. 1990)

. . . Appendix 2, Table No. 2, Rule 202.11. (Tr. at 18). . . .
CHAVEZ, v. R. BOWEN,, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988)

. . . See Rule 202.11. . . .
H. PAULSON, v. R. BOWEN,, 836 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1988)

. . . .-10 and 202.11 of Table No. 2, 20 C.F.R., Appendix 2, to reach the conclusion that Paulson was “not . . . The AU applied Rules 202.10 and 202.11 of Table No. 2, 20 C.F.R., App. 2, to reach the conclusion that . . . the erroneous finding that Paulson could perform “light” work, the AU applied Grid Rules 202.10 and 202.11 . . . Grid Rules 202.10, 202.11, and 202.12 each direct a finding of “not disabled,” irrespective of the level . . .
MULLINS, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 836 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1987)

. . . P, app. 2, Table 1, Rule 201.11, and Table 2, Rules 202.11, 202.12. C. . . . P., app. 2, Table 2, Rules 202.11, 202.12. . . .
E. GAMER, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 815 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1987)

. . . Compare 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, App. 2, §§ 201.10 and 201.14 (1984) with 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, App. 2, §§ 202.11 . . .
M. CLEATON, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, L. GWALTNEY, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, V. TAYLOR, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 815 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1987)

. . . It therefore applied Grid Rules 202.02 and 202.11 of Table No. 2 and concluded that Taylor was not disabled . . .

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