The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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The Government recommended a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months, underscoring Sheldon's progression from viewing to producing child pornography and using social media to groom minors. Sheldon sought a downward variance to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum. He argued that this was his first criminal offense, that the sentencing guidelines should carry minimal weight because they were "skewed," that the Government's recommendation amounted to a life sentence, and emphasized his acceptance of the nature and circumstances of the offense.The dispute in this case centers around tens of millions of dollars' worth of printed circuit boards, manufactured by Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Jiangmen Benlida Printed Circuit Co., Ltd. (“Benlida”) which it sold and distributed to Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Circuitronix, LLC. Benlida complains that Circuitronix owes it over $13 million for unpaid invoices for printed circuit boards which Benlida delivered. (3rd Am. Compl. (“Compl.” or the “complaint”), ECF No. 26.) Circuitronix, however, in its counterclaim, maintains, to the contrary, that it overpaid Benlida, by over $10 million, and seeks to recover that overpayment. (Ans. and Countercl., ECF No. 34.) The Court granted summary judgment in Circuitronix's favor with respect to the entirety of Benlida's complaint (SJ Order, ECF No. 221) and thereafter held a six-day jury trial on Circuitronix's claims against Benlida. After deliberating, the jury unanimously found that Benlida had breached the parties' contract, awarding $7,585,847 in damages to Circuitronix. (Verdict, ECF No. 273.) Five days into the trial, Benlida moved for reconsideration of the Court's order granting summary judgment. (Benlida's Mot., ECF No… It is true that the jury found Manago guilty of carjacking with a firearm. But Manago could have been convicted of carjacking with a deadly weapon as a principal even if the jury did not believe he personally possessed a gun. See Lopez v. State, 833 So.2d 283, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ("The law of principals allows Lopez to be convicted of [carjacking with a firearm and robbery with a firearm] regardless of whether he personally possessed a firearm . . . ."). In fact, the State, in its closing argument, emphasized that "intent that a carjacking occur[s]" was sufficient under the principal theory for the jury to convict Manago of first-degree felony murder. See Williams, 242 So.3d at 292 (holding that intent to commit the underlying felony for felony murder does not "equal intent to kill"). And the jury was instructed that "to convict of First Degree Felony Murder, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or intent to kill."We review the denial of a motion to reopen under Rule 4(a)(6) for abuse of discretion. McDaniel v. Moore, 292 F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2002). As a result, we will not reverse a decision of the district court unless we determine that, at a minimum, that court made a clear error in judgment or applied an incorrect legal standard. Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2013). "A court, by definition, abuses its discretion when it bases a decision on an erroneous legal premise," United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 874 (11th Cir. 2011), or "on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law," Jackson v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).As the prevailing party, Plaintiff now requests an award of attorney's fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); cf Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party), superseded by rule on other grounds, Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). After issuance of an order awarding EAJA fees, the United States Department of the Treasury will determine whether Plaintiff owes a debt to the government. If Plaintiff has no discernable federal debt, the government will accept Plaintiff's assignment of EAJA fees and pay the fees directly to Plaintiff's counsel.A party may recover an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA if the following prerequisites are met: (1) the party seeking the award is the prevailing party; (2) the application for such fees, including an itemized justification for the amount sought, is timely filed (i.e., filed within thirty days of final judgment in the action); (3) the claimant had a net worth of less than $2 million at the time the complaint was filed; (4) the position of the government was not substantially justified; and (5) no special circumstances exist that would make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). A party who obtains a sentence-four remand in a Social Security case is considered a prevailing party under the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). To be “substantially justified” under the EAJA, the government's position must be “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person, ” which requires that the government's position have a reasonable basis in both law and fact. Monroe, 569 Fed.Appx. at 834 (internal quotation and citation omitted).As the prevailing party, Plaintiff now requests an award of attorney's fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); cf. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party), superseded by rule on other grounds, Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(c)(2)(B). After issuance of an order awarding EAJA fees, the United States Department of the Treasury will determine whether Plaintiff owes a debt to the government. If Plaintiff has no discernable federal debt, the government will accept Plaintiff's assignment of EAJA fees and pay the fees directly to Plaintiff's counsel.Before the Court is Plaintiff's Unopposed Petition for Attorney's Fees (Doc. 31), brought pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2412. On July 25, 2023, this Court entered an Order reversing and remanding the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings (Doc. 29). The Clerk then entered judgment in Plaintiff's favor (Doc. 30). As the prevailing party, Plaintiff now requests an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $7,477.13 (Doc. 31). See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); cf. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party). Having considered the motion, Defendant's lack of objection, and the pertinent factors regarding an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion.A federal court should remand to state court any case that has been improperly removed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party attempting to invoke the federal court's jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). “Not only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation.” Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). Indeed, “[d]ue regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.” Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).SLAPP: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. Anti-SLAPP state statutes are common throughout the United States. See generally Nicole J. Ligon, Protecting Local News Outlets from Fatal Legal Expenses, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. Online 280, 292 (2020) ("[A]nti-SLAPP statutes[] have been enacted in thirty-one states.").. . . Enterprises, Inc. , 498 U.S. 292, 299, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991). . . .
. . . The Federalist No. 45, p. 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). . . .
. . . Williams , 194 U.S. 279, 292, 24 S.Ct. 719, 48 L.Ed. 979 (1904) ; U. S. Const., Preamble. . . .
. . . . ----, 137 S.Ct. 954, 197 L.Ed.2d 292 (2017), the Court canvassed pre-1938 patent cases invoking equity . . .
. . . See, e.g., id. , at 292 (describing King Henry VIII's order requiring villages to maintain targets at . . .
. . . Florida Dept. of Financial Servs. , 479 Fed.Appx. 289, 292 (CA11 2012) (similarly if less commonly, dismissing . . .
. . . United States , 483 U.S. 350, 358, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987). . . .
. . . Radcliffe , 292 F.3d 1209, 1213-1215 (C.A.9 2002) (noncitizen inadmissible because he admitted to health . . .
. . . Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 234-235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) ; Skidmore v. . . .
. . . Soil near Tammy Peters's daycare playground, for example, still shows an arsenic level of 292 ppm. . . .
. . . California , 110 U.S. 516, 538, 4 S.Ct. 292, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884), the Court held that the Grand Jury . . .
. . . Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. , 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (quoting United . . .
. . . No. 19-292 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Ryan , 811 F.3d 292, 297, n. 5 (CA9 2015). . . .
. . . Agee , 453 U.S. 280, 292, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (quoting Harisiades v. . . . Erwin , 484 U.S. 292, 108 S.Ct. 580, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988). . . .
. . . Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 241, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). . . .
. . . No. 19-292 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . State, 235 So. 3d 292, 292-93 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied, Bowles v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, 139 S. . . . See In re Johnson, 935 F.3d at 292-93, 2019 WL 3814384, at *5 ; In re Cathey, 857 F.3d at 229. . . .
. . . Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ("[The minimum contacts test] acts . . .
. . . State, 235 So. 3d 292, 292-93 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam), cert. denied, Bowles v. . . . Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 292, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) ; see also Gonzalez v. . . .
. . . Wright , 76 F.3d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1996) ). . . . Earle , 405 F.3d 278, 292 (5th Cir. 2005) ). . . .
. . . Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 229-31, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) ). Id. . . .
. . . Id. at 292-93. Bio-Medical leaned heavily on the context in which the amendments were passed. . . . Id. at 292-93. . . . Id. at 292. . . . Id. at 292-93. Osborne does not grapple with any of these factors in his brief. . . . Id. at 292. And there exist grounds to view the Bio-Medical dicta with skepticism. . . .
. . . HULL, Circuit Judge: After a jury trial, John David Stahlman appeals his conviction and 292-month sentence . . . The probation officer recommended a low-end sentence of 292-months' imprisonment. . . . The district court then sentenced Stahlman to 292 months' imprisonment. . . . We therefore affirm Stahlman's 292-month sentence. VI. . . . CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Stahlman's § 2422 child enticement conviction and 292 . . .
. . . State, 235 So. 3d 292, 292-93 (Fla. 2018). . . .
. . . Williams , 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) ). . . .
. . . Baker Hughes Inc. , 292 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2002). . . . executive position[ ]" was not "the type[ ] of motive that support[s] a strong inference of scienter." 292 . . . See Abrams , 292 F.3d at 433 ("[I]nventory write downs ... can easily arise from negligence, oversight . . .
. . . Swint , 456 U.S. 273, 292, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) ). . . .
. . . Greenfield , 474 U.S. 284, 292, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) ; Mathenia v. . . .
. . . Haskins , 966 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing how qualified immunity is inappropriate when . . .
. . . California , 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 292, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884). . . .
. . . Dept. of Labor , 292 Kan. 17, 248 P.3d 1287, 1290 (2011) (distinguishing "directory language such as . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 285, 292 (D.D.C. 2012) ("[T]he royalties program for federal and Indian oil and gas leases is . . .
. . . Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc. , 808 F.3d 281, 292 (6th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Butler , 547 F.3d 285, 292 (5th Cir. 2008). III. . . .
. . . Schaefer , 509 U.S. 292, 296-97, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993) (holding sentence four remand . . .
. . . Schofield , 292 F.3d 709, 710-11 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (reversing dismissal of habeas petition . . .
. . . Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 228, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. . . .
. . . Ct. 2647, 204 L.Ed.2d 292 (2019) ; United States v. . . .
. . . California , 571 U.S. 292, 298, 134 S.Ct. 1126, 188 L.Ed.2d 25 (2014) ; see U.S. Const. amend. IV. . . .
. . . Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 292 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). . . .
. . . In Duke's case, the two-level decrease yielded a new guideline range of 292 to 365 months for the drug . . .
. . . Fensterer , 474 U.S. 15, 19, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) ; Davis v. . . . Fensterer , 474 U.S. at 20, 106 S.Ct. 292. . . .
. . . Ct. 2573, 201 L.Ed.2d 292 (2018). . . .
. . . App'x 290, 292 (6th Cir. 2002). . . .
. . . Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ. , 447 F.3d 292, 313 (4th Cir. 2006) ). . . .
. . . Hill , 440 F.3d 292, 297-98 (6th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . J.A. 292. . . .
. . . So the Guidelines yielded a range of 292 to 365 months in prison. . . .
. . . Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 580, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ). B. . . .
. . . Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244, 54 S. Ct. 695, 78 L. Ed. 1230 (1934) ). . . .
. . . Court of Nevada, Humboldt Cty. , 542 U.S. 177, 189, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (emphasis . . .
. . . United States , 517 U.S. 292, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996), the Court noted: The separate conviction . . .
. . . R. 63 (Minutes of Proceedings) (Page ID #292); R. 64 (Criminal Judgment at 2) (Page ID #294). . . . R. 63 (Minutes of Proceedings) (Page ID #292); R. 64 (Criminal Judgment at 2) (Page ID #294). . . .
. . . Sykes , 292 F.3d 495, 497 (6th Cir.), cert. denied , 537 U.S. 965, 123 S.Ct. 400, 154 L.Ed.2d 322 (2002 . . . Id. at 569 (citing Sykes , 292 F.3d at 497 ) (addressing waiver as an excuse to the administrative exhaustion . . .
. . . Id. at 292-94. . . .
. . . California , 571 U.S. 292, 298, 134 S.Ct. 1126, 188 L.Ed.2d 25 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. . . .
. . . Intel Corp. , 292 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added), aff'd , 542 U.S. 241, 124 S.Ct. 2466 . . .
. . . Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) ); see also Batterton v. . . .
. . . Cook, 557 S.W.3d 286, 292 (Ark. Ct. . . .
. . . Court of Nevada, Humboldt Cty. , 542 U.S. 177, 183, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (noting that . . .
. . . FAA , 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2002). III. . . . Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 243-44, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (Scalia, J. dissenting), and . . .
. . . No. 292.) . . . Supp. 3d 292, 298 (D. Mass. 2017) ; see also Windley , 864 F.3d at 38-39. . . .
. . . Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 295-96 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sotomayor, J.) . . . Sols., Inc., 55 Cal.4th 1185, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, 292 P.3d 871, 875 (2013) ("[O]rdinarily, the statute . . . Aryeh, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, 292 P.3d at 875. . . .
. . . In re Mickey Thompson Entertainment Group, Inc. , 292 B.R. 415, 420 (9th Cir. . . .
. . . Leggett , 292 F.2d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1961) ). . . .
. . . Sessions , 885 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) and Cass Sunstein, Chevron . . .
. . . Flores , 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) ). . . .
. . . See In re Marriage of Slayton , 292 Ill. . . .
. . . 1534-35, as well as payments made on revolving lines of credit, see In re Fabricators Supply, Inc. , 292 . . . In re Fabricators Supply , 292 B.R. at 532. . . . In re Fabricators Supply, Inc. , 292 B.R. 531, 532 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003). Appellee's Br. 33. . . .
. . . Dep't of State , 292 F. . . . Savorgnan , 338 U.S. at 496, 70 S.Ct. 292. . . . Id. at 499, 70 S.Ct. 292. . . . Id. at 496, 70 S.Ct. 292. The Supreme Court disagreed. . . . Id. at 506, 70 S.Ct. 292. . . .
. . . See id. at 292-93, 125 S.Ct. 1517. . . .
. . . Crawley , 837 F.2d 291, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing as dictum a passage that "was unnecessary . . . Matthiessen , 857 F.2d at 407 n.3 ; see also Crawley , 837 F.2d at 292 (noting that a passage in a prior . . .
. . . See supra , at 292-93. . . . Op. at 292-94. . . .
. . . Co. , 48 Cal.3d 395, 257 Cal.Rptr. 292, 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989) ). . . .
. . . App. 292. . . . Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012) ("[W]hen Congress employs a term of . . .
. . . Langdon , 333 Ark. 662, 970 S.W.2d 292, 296 (1998) ). 1. Constitutional Violation "In Whalen v. . . .
. . . Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. . . . McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 31 N.Y.2d 862, 869, 340 N.Y.S.2d 171, 292 N.E.2d 310 (1972) (quoting this provision . . .
. . . AFGE, 292 F. Supp. 3d 145, 149-52 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated by Jan. 12, 2018, Minute Order; Hudson v. . . .
. . . Schaefer , 509 U.S. 292, 299, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993) ). . . .
. . . his criminal history, so the court treated Whyte as if he was in category V with a guideline range of 292 . . . Whyte's sentence of 300 months is near the bottom of his guideline range of 292 to 365 months with his . . .
. . . Ct. 954, 964, 197 L.Ed.2d 292 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Rosa , 399 F.3d 283, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding "repeated acquiescence" to an erroneous jury instruction . . .
. . . points to various sources, one identifying 283 businesses in thirty-nine states and another pointing to 292 . . .
. . . Sweeney , 22 N.Y.2d 297, 292 N.Y.S.2d 640, 239 N.E.2d 521 (1968) (" Gerzof "), in urging us to deviate . . . preparing and submitting ... specifications," thus rendering the contract illegal, 22 N.Y.2d at 303, 292 . . . statutory provisions that required competitive bidding and an award to the low bidder, see id. at 302, 292 . . . Hirschfeld , 101 A.D.2d 380, 385, 476 N.Y.S.2d 292, 295 (1st Dep't 1984) (same for innocent misrepresentation . . .
. . . I.N.S., 348 F.3d 289, 292 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[B]ecause [petitioner] appealed the BIA's ... denial of asylum . . .
. . . Roche Holdings Ltd. , 292 F.3d 361, 370 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. . . .
. . . Co. , 292 F.3d 583, 593 (8th Cir. 2002). . . .
. . . Stukenberg I , 907 F.3d at 292 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). . . . Stukenberg I , 907 F.3d at 292 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Id . . . .
. . . Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 229, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). . . .
. . . Insurance Company of America v. 290 Auto Body, Inc., No. 18-P-488, 95 Mass.App.Ct. 515, 127 N.E.3d 292 . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 272, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating "[a] pharmacist's sales of prescription drugs are not attributable . . .
. . . II at 292-93. . . .
. . . 201, 230, 233, 238, 242, 244, 245, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 274, 277, 280, 285, 286, 287, 290, 291, 292 . . .
. . . Mead Corp ., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). . . .
. . . applications which Rose Campbell doesn't know how to address or determine"); Ex. 2, ECF No. 94-4 at 292 . . . s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 292, ECF No. 94-2; Defs.' Resp. to Pl.' . . . . ¶ 292, ECF No. 131; Ex. 17, ECF No. 94-5 at 1706-07. Mr. . . .
. . . Bankr. 15-12500 D.I. 292-2. Del. Bankr. 15-12500 D.I. 292-2. . . . Bankr. 15-12500 D.I. 292. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. . . . Bankr. 15-12500 D.I. 292. Del. Bankr. 15-12500 D.I. 184-1, § 1.106. Del. . . . Bankr. 15-12500 D.I. 292, ¶ 28; see also Del. Bankr. 15-12500 D.I. 184-1, §§ 1.87-1.88; Del. . . . Bankr. 15-12500 D.I. 292, ¶ 3. D.I. 13, ¶¶ 44-48. Id. D.I. 22, ¶ 4. . . .
. . . Johnston , 559 F.3d 292, 295 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009) ). . . .