Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The stated purpose of chapter 316 is to "make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state and its several counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities." § 316.002, Fla. Stat. This section notes that municipalities are authorized in section 316.008 to enact supplemental measures to "control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions." Id. Bicycles are listed in section 316.008(1)(h) as one of those subjects that municipalities are permitted to regulate on the streets and highways under their jurisdictions within the reasonable exercise of the police power. With the exception of the regulations permitted by section 316.008, local governments are specifically prohibited from passing or attempting to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of chapter 316....

...The legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions ... Section 316.008 provides that: The provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power, from: * * * * * * (h) Regulating the operation of bicycles....

...city is hereby given jurisdiction, supervision and control over the same; said city is also hereby given the power and authority to regulate and/or license any and all businesses, trades, occupations and/or concessions conducted upon said beach. [4] § 316.008, Fla....

...26-127 provides: No person shall stop, stand, or park a vehicle on any portion of a street lane designated for the exclusive use of vehicular movement, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the direction of a police officer. Section 316.008(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), allows local authorities to regulate or prohibit "stopping, standing, or parking" on streets and highways under their jurisdiction....

...(1989). Local governments are authorized to create additional traffic regulations in limited circumstances, but chapter 316 does not appear to permit local governments to criminalize conduct which the state has expressly declared to be noncriminal. § 316.008, Fla....

Enumerating certain “powers of local authorities,” section 316.008, Florida Statutes, specifies that: (1) The

...governments and the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. In City of Aventura v. Masone, 89 So. 3d 233, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), the Third District Court of Appeal held that Aventura’s ordinance was a valid exercise of municipal power under section 316.008(1)(w), Florida Statutes (2008), which specifically grants “local authorities, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power,” authority for “[r]egulating,...

...y preempted by state law. The Fifth District ruled that the imposition of penalties other than those specifically provided for by state statute “for running a red light in a particular municipality does not fall within the specific authority of section 316.008(1)(w)[,]” Florida Statutes (2008), which the court concluded “appears to contemplate only unique situations for which a statewide law is lacking or is inadequate.” Id....

...For the reasons we explain, we agree with the Fifth District and conclude that the ordinances are not valid. I. In arguing that the respective ordinances are valid, both Aventura and Orlando rely on the specific power provided to local authorities by section 316.008(1)(w) for “[r]egulating, restricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices.” Udowychenko and Masone, who challenged the validity of the ordinances in order to set aside fines imposed under the ordinances, contend that section 316.008(1)(w) does not authorize the municipal enforcement regime adopted by the ordinances, an enforcement regime that they contend is at odds in multiple ways with the enforcement regime adopted by state law. As is clear from the arguments presented by the parties, the crux of these consolidated cases is whether section 316.008(1)(w) provides authority for the ordinances....

...The Legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions....

...uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on a matter covered by this chapter unless expressly authorized.” (Emphasis added.) As indicated in section 316.002, section 316.008 contains an enumeration of specific powers that local authorities may exercise to control traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions “within the reasonable exercise of the police power.” Section 316.008(1)(w)—the crucial provision at issue here— provides that local authorities are not precluded from “[r]egulating, restricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices or personnel on public streets and highways,...

...316. The ordinances consequently can be sustained as a valid exercise of municipal authority only if they are—as the express preemption provision of section 316.007 requires— expressly authorized by statute. Orlando and Aventura only point to section 316.008(1)(w) as the source of such an express authorization. That provision, however, is not equal to the task. The Orlando and Aventura ordinances establish a regime for the punishment of red light violations that is distinct from the statutory regime for the punishment of such violations. Section 316.008(1)(w)’s grant of authority for “[r]egulating, restricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices” does not, however, explicitly provide authority for local governments to adopt measures for the punishment of conduct that is already subject to punishment under the framework established by chapters 316 and 318. As broadly described in section 316.002, the powers granted to municipalities by section 316.008 are powers by which “municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions.” “Control[ling] certain traffic movement” through “[r]egulating, restricting, or monitoring traffic by...

...undertaking enforcement measures—that is, imposing punishment—outside the framework established by chapters 316 and 318 for conduct that is proscribed by -9- chapter 316 and subject to punishment under chapter 318. Certain provisions of section 316.008 do grant express authority to local authorities to adopt additional measures with respect to the punishment of violations. See §§ 316.008(4), 316.008(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). But section 316.008(1)(w) is silent with respect to the punishment of violations. Contrary to the dissent, our decision in Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1993), does not support the reliance of Orlando and Aventura on section 316.008(1)(w) to escape the sweep of the express preemption provisions of chapter 316 and chapter 318. Thomas dealt with a local ordinance adopted under the authority granted to local governments by section 316.008(1)(h) for “[r]egulating the operation of bicycles.” Id....

...But that statement is in the context of the Court’s general discussion of municipal authority to “legislate concurrently in areas that are not expressly preempted by the State.” Id. It has no application where express preemption is operative. The reasoning of Thomas, therefore, does not support the conclusion that section 316.008(1) grants local governments the authority to establish code enforcement regimes for the punishment of specific conduct that is already proscribed and subject to punishment under state law. The prohibition and punishment of red light violations are matters “covered by” chapter 316, and section 316.008(1)(w) does not “expressly authorize[]” local ordinances on those matters. § 316.007, Fla. Stat. (2008). The Orlando and Aventura ordinances therefore are expressly preempted by state law. Nothing in - 11 - section 316.008(1)(w) provides that municipalities are granted the authority to enact an enforcement regime different from the enforcement regime applicable under the provision of section 316.075(4) that red light violations are “punishable pursuant to chapter 318.” And nothing in section 316.008(1)(w) creates an exception from the express preemption imposed by section 318.121 of any fines other than the penalties imposed as provided in chapter 318. IV. The Orlando and Aventura ordinances are invalid because they are expressly preempted by state law....

...See id. Prior to the passage of that Act, however, the Legislature had already granted municipalities such as Orlando and Aventura the power to enact red light ordinances pursuant to the powers expressly granted to municipal governments through section 316.008, Florida Statutes (2008), entitled “Powers of local 1....

...individuals who violated these ordinances. - 13 - authorities.” These powers, which included the authority to “[r]egulat[e], restrict[], or monitor[] traffic by security devices or personnel on public streets and highways,” § 316.008(1)(w), Fla....

...[t]he Legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions. This section shall be supplemental to the other laws or ordinances of this chapter and not in conflict therewith. § 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2008). Included within section 316.008 is subsection (1)(w), which grants municipal governments the power to “[r]egulat[e], restrict[], or monitor[] traffic by security devices or personnel on public streets and highways, whether by public or private parties and provid[e] for the construction and maintenance of such streets - 15 - and highways.” § 316.008(1)(w), Fla....

...oes not support the majority’s interpretation. Rather than attempt to harmonize the ordinances in a way that does not conflict with the statutory scheme, the majority reads this authorizing section too narrowly. When sections 316.002 and 316.008 are examined together, “the plain text of the Uniform Traffic Control Law expressly confers authority to a municipal government to regulate traffic within its municipal boundaries as a reasonable exercise of its police power where such r...

...ura, 89 So. 3d at 236. In my view, the use of red light cameras by municipalities to enforce red light infractions within their municipal boundaries is a regulation that falls squarely within the authority granted to municipal governments through section 316.008(1)(w)....

...raffic accidents, and regulates and restricts red light infractions at those intersections through the issuance of its notices of violation.” Id. at 239. I agree with the reasoning of the Third District, which explained that “[s]ection 316.008 allows the local authorities to use their home rule powers to - 16 - effectuate certain restrictions and regulations but does not specify the means or the schemes for implementing such restrictions or regulations.” Id....

...By creating a system through which to impose penalties on drivers for running red lights, “the City has simply developed a procedure for carrying out its power to regulate, restrict or monitor traffic.” Id. Conversely, the majority concludes that section 316.008(1)(w) does not expressly authorize the municipal ordinances in this case because “ ‘[r]egulating, restricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices’ does not . . . explicitly provide authority for local governments to adopt measures for the punishment of conduct that is already subject to punishment under the framework established by chapters 316 and 318.” Majority op. at 9 (quoting § 316.008(1)(w), Fla....

...Uniform Traffic Control Law, to encompass the power to impose punishment for the violation of municipal regulations within an area already addressed by the state. In Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 1993), this Court reviewed a municipal ordinance enacted pursuant to section 316.008(1)(h), which granted the municipality the power to “[r]egulat[e] the operation of bicycles,” an area already covered by chapter 316. § 316.008(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (1989). Despite the fact that the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law already regulated the operation of - 17 - bicycles, this Court concluded that, pursuant to the authority granted in section 316.008(1)(h), a municipal government had the power to enact an ordinance that imposed noncriminal penalties for violations of conduct within an area already regulated by the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law, as long as the penalties imposed by the municipal ordinance did “not exceed the penalty imposed by the state.” Thomas, 614 So. 2d at 470. By concluding in Thomas that municipal governments had the power to impose penalties pursuant to section 316.008(1)(h), this Court interpreted the word “regulate” in the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law to encompass the power to impose fines for violations of municipal regulations within an area covered by chapter 316. Based on...

...In determining that the municipal government could impose non- criminal penalties for violations of conduct within an area covered by chapter 316, the Court did not rely on the absence of state regulation, but looked solely to whether the regulated conduct fell within one of the areas enumerated in section 316.008, within which municipalities are expressly authorized to act. See id. Here, just as in Thomas, the regulation undertaken by the municipalities falls - 18 - within an area enumerated in section 316.008....

...The plain text of the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law expressly confers authority to a municipal government to regulate traffic within its municipal boundaries where such regulation “does not conflict, but supplements the laws found therein.” City of Aventura, 89 So. 3d at 236; see § 316.002, Fla. Stat. (“Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions....

...That is because these municipal ordinances exist independently of the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law and represent supplemental enforcement mechanisms that have been expressly authorized by the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law pursuant to section 316.008(1)(w)....

...consistent with the purposes underlying Florida’s decision to grant municipal governments extensive powers of self-governance. City of Aventura, 89 So. 3d at - 24 - 237. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority that section 316.008(1)(w), which expressly authorizes municipalities to “[r]egulat[e], restrict[], or monitor[] traffic by security devices or personnel on public streets and highways, whether by public or private parties,” in a manner consistent...

...pal ordinances are not to conflict with those laws. Section 316.002, entitled “Purpose,” provides in pertinent part that: It is the legislative intent in the adoption of this chapter to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state.... Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions....

...lict with chapter 316, clearly indicates the Legislature’s intent to expressly preempt to the state the enforce *596 ment of traffic signal violations except for the limited local regulation allowed by the law. In this instance, the City relied on section 316.008(l)(w) as authorizing its action to enact the ordinance, which provides: § 316.008....

...tricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices or personnel on public streets and highways, whether by public or private parties and providing for the construction and maintenance of such streets and highways. Section 316.002 further states: “Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking....” However, the City’s ordinance enforces traffic violations of a subject area that is covered and enforced by state law. This is the type of conduct that is expressly prohibited in the language of section 316.002 and section 316.008....

...e publication of the Florida Statutes. 9 Effective July 1, 2010, the Legislature enacted the “Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Act” 10 within the Florida Uniform Traffic *597 Control Law, Chapter 2010-80, Laws of Florida, which included provisions in section 316.008 allowing a county or municipality to use “traffic infraction detectors” to “enforce s. 316.074(1) or s. 316.075(l)(c)l. when a driver fails to stop at a traffic signal on streets and highways under their jurisdiction under s. 316.0083.” The Act implemented a statewide red light enforcement program regulating the use of any traffic infraction detector 11 on state, county, and local municipal roads....

...The conclusion that local enforcement of traffic signal violations by cameras are preempted by state law admittedly conflicts with City of Aventura . In that case, the majority concluded that the city’s red light camera program “falls squarely within the specific authority carved out in section 316.008(l)(w) by the Florida legislature.” City of Aventura, 89 So.3d at 239 . However, the state’s authorization to municipalities to regulate traffic in section 316.008(l)(w) appears to contemplate only unique situations for which a statewide law is lacking or is inadequate....

...Here the Legislature has mandated that drivers stop at red light signals and has provided the mechanism to enforce that mandate. The imposition of separate and additional penalties for running a red light in a particular municipality does not fall ■within the specific authority of section 316.008(l)(w)....

...tographic or electronic images or streaming video of only the rear of a motor vehicle at the time the vehicle fails to stop behind the stop bar or clearly marked stop line when facing a traffic control signal steady red light. Any notification under s. 316.0083(l)(b) or traffic citation issued by the use of a traffic infraction detector must include a photograph or other recorded image showing both the license tag of the offending vehicle and the traffic control device being violated....

...e antitrust laws, it must demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy." Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41, 105 S.Ct. 1713. City Defendants argue the city derives authority from Florida Statute § 316.008, which provides legislatively-granted power to control traffic on its public streets and roadways....

...tands as the City's legislative body "would have no authority to delegate such unbridled authority in the first place." (Dkt. 149 at 20). The Court initially notes the court in Duck Tours rejected the City of Key West's argument that Florida Statute § 316.008 provided them with authorization to articulate ordinances that displaced competition....

...The Legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of municipal traffic *785 that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions....

...empted by sections 316.002 and 316.007; if not, do any other provisions of Florida law require express or implied preemption, or are they in conflict; and if the ordinances would otherwise be preempted, whether they are nonetheless permissible under section 316.008....

...tion has not been expressly preempted. Thus, we find Phantom of Brevard to be distinguishable because the broad preemptions in sections 316.002 and 316.007 preclude supplemental ordinances covering the subject of chapter 316 other than as allowed by section 316.008....

...ment of boards of county commissioners and supervisors of election in elections. Id. at 886-87 . Unlike the Election Code, chapter 316 is comprehensive and does not plainly acknowledge a role for local authorities, other than specifically granted in section 316.008....

...Experimental Regulation to Cover Special Conditions? Finally, we look to chapter 316 again to determine if the Legislature has *789 created an exception to the preemption of the ordinances. Section 316.002 does allow municipalities to control certain traffic movement or parking as provided by section 316.008. Section 316.008(1) sets forth in 23 subsections subject matter in which “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power” from regulating. But few provisions of section 316.008 could apply the ordinances at issue here. The local governments argue that section 316.008(l)(t), which allows local governments to adopt “temporary or experimental regulations as may be necessary to cover emergencies or special conditions,” applies to the ordinances thereby exempting them from the express preemption created by sections 316.002 and 316.007....

...t 16, 2016). The local governments do not identify what is being tested or when-the test will end. They do not identify what they hope to confirm or disprove from the experiment. 13 The vest and insurance requirements are not experimental, and since section 316.008(1)(t) sets forth a two-pronged test before an exception to preemption can be made, the fact that no experiment is being conducted is a sufficient basis to prohibit the application of the exception in section 316.008(1)(t) to avoid preemption....

...http://www.visitflorida.org/ resources/research (last visited August 16, 2016). We agree with Appellant’s argument that the trial court improperly interpreted “special conditions.” We find that the special conditions which can be regulated by 316.008(l)(t) are things unique to the local community....

...ce lies with the Legislature. 14 Finally, the local governments cite to Thomas v. State, 583 So.2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), as authority for the ordinances. But Thomas is also distinguishable because regulation of bicycles is specifically allowed by section 316.008(1)(h). The vehicles which the local governments attempt to regulate with the ordinances are not bicycles and thus do not fall under the exception in section 316.008(1)(h)....

...See § 97.0115, Fla. Stat. . We do not address Appellant’s argument that the ordinances do not concern traffic movement or parking excepted from preemption by section 316,002, and therefore could not fall under any exception to express preemption under section 316.008....

...The local governments would read “experiment” in a broad sense. While it is conceivable that local governments could act as “laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems,” Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 , 129 S.Ct. 711 , 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), we do not read section 316.008(1)(t) so broadly as to allow local governments to do whatever they want related to regulation of vehicles, as long as the ordinance is called an experiment....

...g ch. 316, F. S., recognized that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain traffic ordinances regulating municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside of the municipalities, s. 316.002 . Section 316.008 expressly enumerates those areas within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking on the streets and highways in their respective jurisdictions. Among those areas so enumerated, paragraphs (g), (m), (n), and (p) of s. 316.008 (1) respectively empower a municipality in the reasonable exercise of its police power to restrict the use of streets; to prohibit or regulate the use of controlled access roadways by any class or kind of traffic; to prohibit or regulate t...

...se of its police power, a municipality may regulate or prohibit the use of certain streets within the municipality by any class or kind of traffic or designate and restrict or regulate the use of its public streets as prescribed by the provisions of s. 316.008 ....

...terms that are mutually agreeable to the parties. 9 It may also provide for the installation of multiparty stop signs by the parties controlling the roads covered by the agreement if it is determined that such signage will enhance traffic safety. 10 Section 316.008 , Florida Statutes, further recognizes that local authorities may regulate, among other things, stopping, standing or parking on "streets and highways under their jurisdiction[.]" 11 The term "[s]treet or highway" is defined as "[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of ....

...nsult with the sheriff and no such agreement shall take effect prior to October 1 (the beginning of the county's fiscal year), unless the requirement is waived in writing by the sheriff. 10 See ss. 316.006 (2)(b)3. and 316.006(3)(b)4., Fla. Stat. 11 Section 316.008 (1)(a), Fla....

...Trinh's traffic citation was not an appropriate remedy. Based upon our resolution of this case, we need not address this latter issue. This court accepted jurisdiction from the county court in this matter.4 The certified questions are as follows: 1. DOES SECTION 316.0083(1)(a) AUTHORIZE A MUNICIPALITY TO CONTRACT WITH A THIRD PARTY VENDOR TO SORT IMAGES FROM A TRAFFIC INFRACTION DETECTOR SYSTEM INTO QUEUES BASED ON WRITTEN DIRECTIVES FROM THE MUNICIPALITY? 2. DO SECTIONS 316.640(5)(a) AND 316.0083, FLORIDA STATUTES, PROHIBIT A MUNICIPALITY FROM CONTRACTING WITH A THIRD PARTY VENDOR TO ELECTRONICALLY GENERATE AND MAIL A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND UNIFORM TRAFFIC CITATION AFTER...

...2014), the Supreme Court of Florida determined that these pre-Act ordinances, which "create[d] a municipal code enforcement system for the disposition of red light violations that [was] entirely separate from the enforcement system established under chapters 316 and 318," were not authorized under section 316.008(1)(w), Florida Statutes (2008), and were expressly preempted by sections 316.002 and 316.007. -4- enforce violations of sections 316.074(1) and 316.075(1)(c), Florida Statutes, for a driver's failure to stop at a red light traffic signal." City of Fort Lauderdale v....

...This paragraph does not prohibit the department, a county, or a municipality from issuing notification as provided in paragraph (b) to the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation of s. 316.074(1) or s. 316.075(1)(c)1. § 316.0083 (emphasis added)....

...motor vehicle at the time the vehicle fails to stop behind the stop bar or clearly marked stop line when facing a traffic control signal steady red light. 6 In Dhar, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that section 316.0083 was unconstitutional as applied to short-term vehicle renters because "the unequal statutory treatment of short-term automobile renters bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." 185 So....

...2014), that pre-Act municipal ordinances, which "create[d] a municipal code enforcement system for the disposition of red light violations that [was] entirely separate from the enforcement system established under chapters 316 and 318," were not authorized under section 316.008(1)(w), Florida Statutes (2008), and were expressly preempted by sections 316.002 and 316.007. - 15 - any business rules between the City of Hollywood and ATS in reaching its decision. De...

...under the City of Hollywood's red light camera program with ATS, Eric Arem denied the violation and requested a trial. After hearing the testimony of the TIEO who issued the UTC, the county court found that the City of Hollywood's red light camera program did not comply with sections 316.0083(1)(a) and 316.650(3)(c)10 because the City had improperly delegated various tasks to ATS....

...issue citations for traffic infractions, which means only law enforcement officers and traffic enforcement officers are entitled to determine who gets prosecuted for a red light violation." Id. at 364. In addition, "[a]lthough the legislature in section 316.0083(1)(a) did permit cities to delegate the review of information obtained from a traffic infraction detector, it did not permit cities to delegate their authority to issue any resulting traffic citations anywhere in these statutes."...

...court certified questions of great public importance to the district court, and the district court accepted jurisdiction. The district court only addressed two of the certified questions, which were as follows: 1. Does Florida Statute 316.0083(1)(a) authorize a municipality to delegate and have a private vendor actually issue Florida Uniform Traffic Citations, when notices of violation, (also issued by the vendor), are not complied with,...

...ty of Aventura. Id. at D1754. Ultimately, the court held that the review completed by ATS was authorized under the Act, stating as follows: [W]e hold that the review of red light camera images authorized by section 316.0083(1)(a) allows a municipality's vendor, as its agent, to review and sort images to forward to a police officer where, as here, (1) the vendor's decisions in this regard are strictly circumscribed...

...in any determination made by the vendor. Id. at D1753. In addition, the court certified the following questions of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court: 1. Does the review of red light camera images authorized by section 316.0083(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), allow a municipality's vendor, as its agent, to sort images to forward to the law enforcement officer, where the controlling contract and City guidelines limit...

...at D1759 (Wells, J., specially concurring). VI. DISCUSSION The legal issues in this case, although stated somewhat differently than in Arem, are substantially the same issues that were addressed in Arem. As in that case, we must determine whether section 316.0083(1)(a) authorized the City to contract with ATS to record and screen data of potential red light violations and then to process and mail a notice of violation and UTC to violators upon authorization by a TIEO. On appe...

...4 So. 3d at 363-64. In addition, we have no quarrel with the Arem court's conclusion that "[i]n Florida . . . only law enforcement officers and [TIEOs] are entitled to determine who gets prosecuted for a red light violation." Id. at 364 (citing §§ 316.0083(3), .640(5)(a)). However, we part company with the Fourth District when it concludes that "the TIEO[] merely acquiesces in the vendor's decision to issue the citation," and that under the initial review of the computer images of purported violations that the processors exercise "unfettered discretion to decide which images are sent to the TIEO[] and which ones are not." Id. at 365. Undoubtedly, section 316.0083(1)(a) permits "a review of information from a traffic infraction detector by an authorized ....

...Eric Arem’s motion to dismiss a red light camera prosecution against him. The county court certified the following questions of great public importance pursuant to section 34.017, Florida Statutes (2011), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.160(d): 1. Does Florida Statute 316.0083(1)(a) authorize a municipality to delegate and have a private vendor actually issue Florida Uniform Traffic Citations, when notices of  violation, (also issued by the vendor), are not complied with, where...

...d be issued. We decline to answer the second question posed by the county court because the City’s improper delegation of authority in this case renders the citation void at its inception. Factual and Procedural Background Section 316.0083, Florida Statutes, known as the Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Program (the “Act”), authorizes local governments to use red light cameras to enforce violations of sections 316.074(1) and 316.075(1)(c)1; both of which prohibit the running of red lights. See Ch. 2013-160, § 5, -2- Laws of Fla.; § 316.008(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). The Act specifically authorizes the use of TIEOs to enforce red light violations. § 316.0083(1), Fla....

...knowledge of the communication, what information was sent to the Clerk, and when it was done. . . . .... The procedure employed by the City of Hollywood in this case is also actually contrary to Florida Statute 316.0083 (1)(a) which provides in pertinent part: ....

...71-135, Laws of Fla. -5- “stated purpose” of chapter 316 is “outlined” in section 316.002). Section 316.002 expressly limits the power of municipalities to legislate over traffic matters, as follows: “Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions.” Id. The powers of a municipality to legislate on traffic matters are thus limited to those enumerated in section 316.008. Finally, section 316.002 makes it “unlawful for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.” Id. Consistent with section 316.002, section 316.007, like a...

...Whether the City has the authority to outsource the issuance of these citations, or to outsource any other statutory duty, must therefore be derived from the plain wording of the statutes. Here, the applicable statutes are clear and unambiguous. Section 316.0083(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part: A notice of violation and a traffic citation may not be issued for failure to stop at a red light if the driver is making a right- hand turn in a careful and prudent manner at an intersection where right-hand turns are permissible....

...fraction detector by an authorized employee or agent of the department, a county, or a municipality before issuance of the traffic citation by the traffic infraction enforcement officer. -6- § 316.0083(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Section 316.650 (3)(c) also provides: If a traffic citation is issued under s. 316.0083, the traffic infraction enforcement officer shall provide by electronic transmission a replica of the traffic citation data to the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense or its traffic violations bureau...

...(2011) (emphasis added). In Florida, only law enforcement officers and traffic enforcement officers have the legal authority to issue citations for traffic infractions, which means only law enforcement officers and traffic enforcement officers are entitled to determine who gets prosecuted for a red light violation. See § 316.0083(3); see also § 316.640, Fla....

...sheriff’s or police department. § 316.640(5)(a). Section 316.640(5)(a) permits employees of a sheriff’s department or police department of a municipality, without conveying arrest powers, to become TIEOs empowered to issue traffic citations under section 316.0083. However, the statute does not authorize a private vendor to issue citations, either expressly or impliedly. Although the legislature in section 316.0083(1)(a) did permit cities to delegate the review of information obtained from a traffic infraction detector, it did not permit cities to delegate their authority to issue any resulting traffic citations anywhere in these statutes. Had the legislature intended to allow for delegation of this authority or responsibility, just as it expressly allowed for delegating the review of traffic infraction detector information by employees or agents under section 316.0083(1)(a), it could have easily done so....

of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities

...OF SUCH AN "ATV" OR OF A MOTORCYCLE REQUIRED TO WEAR HELMETS AND EYE PROTECTIVE DEVICES WHILE USING SUCH VEHICLES ON A BEACH ROAD? QUESTION ONE Your first question asks if vehicular traffic on the beach is a "special condition" within the meaning of s. 316.008 (1)(t), F.S., such that a municipality may adopt and enforce experimental regulations pertaining to the safety equipment requirements for the above-described "ATV," when such a vehicle is used on an Atlantic beach road within the limits of such municipality....

...The Legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions....

...316 enforceable wherever the public has the right to travel by motor vehicle). Sherman v. Reserve Insurance Company, 350 So.2d 349 (4th D.C.A. Fla., 1977). The Atlantic beach road in question is open to public vehicular traffic, and thus Ch. 316's provisions apply there. Section 316.008 (1)(t), F.S., which is alluded to in your inquiry, does not furnish a municipality with authority to enact any ordinance in conflict with the safety requirements imposed by Ch....

...ecessary to cover emergencies or special conditions. (e.s.) Section 316.007 , F.S., provides that municipal authority to enact ordinances on matters covered by Ch. 316 must be granted by express statutory authority; s. 316.002 , F.S., specifies that s. 316.008 's enumeration pertains to municipal control of traffic "movement or parking." (e.s.) None of the subjects enumerated in s. 316.008 , F.S., including paragraph (1)(t), appear to relate to municipal regulation of safety equipment required on motor vehicles used on a beach road....

...dards of Ch. 316) reflects a legislative plan that no other exceptions were intended. Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 , 817 (Fla. 1976). And see, AGO 80-80; Inf.Op. to Charles R. Sessions, City of Flagler Beach, dated June 20, 1984, noting that since s. 316.008 , F.S., lists exceptions to the general rule of preemption expressed in s....

...1967) (holding that express exceptions made in a statute give rise to a strong inference that no other exceptions are intended, and exceptions will not be implied where words of the statute are free from ambiguity). Therefore, it is my opinion that s. 316.008 (1)(t), F.S., does not authorize a municipality to adopt and enforce regulations pertaining to the safety equipment requirements for the above-described "ATV" when it is used on an Atlantic beach road within the limits of said municipality....

..., such equipment. See, s. 316.211 (1), (2), and (4), F.S. In summary, it is my opinion until legislatively determined otherwise that: (1) Chapter 316 , F.S., imposes uniform safety standards for motor vehicles used on the public roads of this state; s. 316.008 (1)(t), F.S., does not authorize a municipality to adopt and enforce regulations pertaining to the safety equipment requirements for a four-wheeled "ATV," when it is used on an Atlantic beach road which is open to the public for vehicular traffic and within the limits of said municipality....

...the policy power must be lawfully delegated before it can be exercised and there was no statutory delegation thereof.) In contrast, I note the explicit and specifically detailed authorization granted by ss. 239.53, et seq., supra , and ss. 316.006 , 316.008 , and 316.072 , F....

...e counties and municipalities. These sections grant extensive power to promulgate parking and traffic regulations governing vehicles, pedestrians, and ridden or herded animals (ss. 239.53 and 239.54, F. S.), and vehicles, bicycles, and pedestrians (ss. 316.008 and 316.072 , F....

...316 apply ` wherever vehicles have the right to travel.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 316.072 (1), F. S. Jurisdiction to control traffic is vested specifically and solely in the state, municipalities, and counties of Florida. Section 316.006 , F. S. Section 316.008 (1), F....

good moral character, a requirement under INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427. USCIS determined that Socarras'

...The issue before the Court involves the interpretation of the Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Program, which grants local governments' traffic enforcement officers the power to issue citations for traffic infractions captured by red light cameras. See ch. 2010-80, § 5, Laws of Fla.; § 316.0083(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). In addition to this grant of authority, section 316.0083(1)(a)"does not prohibit a review of information" from red light cameras by a local government's authorized agent before issuance of the traffic citation by a trained traffic enforcement officer. § 316.0083(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). In this case, this Court is asked to determine the meaning of the word "review," as used in section 316.0083(1)(a)....

...City of Aventura v. Jimenez , 211 So.3d 158 , 160 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). The Third District also certified a question of great public importance, which, for purposes of clarity, we rephrase as follows: 1 Does a local government have the authority under section 316.0083(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), to contract with a private third-party vendor to review and sort information from red light cameras, in accordance with written guidelines provided by the local government, before sending that informat...

...4th DCA 2014), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a traffic citation, holding that the City of Hollywood's red light camera enforcement program amounted to an unlawful delegation of the City's police power under section 316.0083(1)(a)....

...roadside citation." Id. The Third District thus concluded that there was no unconstitutional delegation of authority and reversed the dismissal of the citation. ANALYSIS The issue before the Court involves the meaning of the word "review" as used in section 316.0083(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...affic Control Law." § 316.001, Fla. Stat. (2014). We then turn to the Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Act, which authorizes traffic enforcement officers to issue traffic citations based on images from red light cameras. Ch. 2010-80, § 5, Laws of Fla.; § 316.0083(1)(a), Fla....

...In layman's terms, a traffic infraction detector is a red light camera. See id. Section 316.0076, Florida Statutes (2014), expressly preempts the "[r]egulation of the use of cameras for enforcing the provisions of" chapter 316 "to the state." Express preemption notwithstanding, section 316.008, Florida Statutes (2014), states that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power" from using red light cameras. Id. § 316.008(1) ; accord id. (8). Section 316.0083(1)(a) expressly authorizes a traffic infraction enforcement officer to issue a traffic citation for a violation of certain red light traffic infractions. Id. § 316.0083(1)(a). Section 316.0083(1)(a) also states: This paragraph does not prohibit a review of information from a traffic infraction detector by an authorized employee or agent of the department, a county, or a municipality before issuance of the traffic citation by the traffic infraction enforcement officer....

...The Rephrased Certified Question Jimenez argued to the county court and the Third District that the City's red light camera enforcement program amounted to an unlawful delegation of police powers by giving the Vendor "unfettered discretion that exceeded the City's statutory authority to use an agent to 'review' images" under section 316.0083(1)(a)....

...Jimenez , 211 So.3d at 159 -60 . In this Court, Jimenez does not pursue his unlawful delegation argument and argues instead that the City's red light camera enforcement program (A) unlawfully exceeds the authority conferred upon the City by the Legislature because "review" under section 316.0083(1)(a) is limited to determining whether images from red light cameras are "complete and usable"; and (B) is unconstitutional because it violates the uniformity principle set forth in chapter 316....

...Whether the City Exceeded its Statutory Authority in Contracting with the Vendor to Review the Red Light Camera Images Jimenez argues that the City's red light camera program exceeds the authority granted by the Legislature with respect to the meaning of the word "review" as used in section 316.0083(1)(a). Specifically, Jimenez asserts that the word "review" as used in section 316.0083(1)(a) is limited to ensuring that the images from the red light camera are complete and usable, as opposed to the review conducted by the Vendor in this case, which, according to Jimenez, involves making a preliminary determination as to whether a traffic infraction has occurred....

..."In addition, examining the history of the legislation is a helpful tool in determining legislative intent." Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips , 126 So.3d 186 , 192 (Fla. 2013). The Legislature did not define, or otherwise elaborate upon, the word "review" in section 316.0083(1)(a)....

...t of the entire section in order to ascertain legislative intent for the provision.' " Larimore v. State , 2 So.3d 101 , 114 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC , 986 So.2d 1260 , 1265 (Fla. 2008) ). Section 316.0083(1)(a), in its entirety, provides: For purposes of administering this section, the department, a county, or a municipality may authorize a traffic infraction enforcement officer under s....

...fficer. This paragraph does not prohibit the department, a county, or a municipality from issuing notification as provided in paragraph (b) to the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation of s. 316.074(1) or s. 316.075(1)(c)1. § 316.0083(1)(a), Fla....

...Under the statute, the review contemplated is "of information from a traffic infraction detector," id. , which, as section 316.003(87) makes clear, consists of "photographic or electronic images or streaming video." Id. § 316.003(87). Reading the provision in its entirety, we conclude that section 316.0083(1)(a) allows a local government's authorized agent to review images from red light cameras for any purpose short of making the probable cause determination to issue a traffic citation....

...ecifically trained technician employed by the agency or its contractor that, based on inspection of photographs or other recorded images," the driver of the vehicle committed a traffic infraction. Fla. HB No. 325, § 3 (filed Nov. 6, 2009) (proposed § 316.0083(1)(d) )....

...ities to an agent, the Legislature clearly intended that the ultimate authority to issue a citation would remain with a trained traffic enforcement officer. Thus, this argument does not support Jimenez's narrow interpretation of the word "review" in section 316.0083(1)(a)....

...... to ensure accuracy and data integrity." Fla. Admin Code R. 14-100.002(3). Jimenez asserts that this administrative rule's definition of the word "review," which is limited to ensuring accuracy, supports his interpretation of the word "review" in section 316.0083(1)(a)....

...Further, the word "review" does not appear in the toll enforcement statute. Lastly, the administrative rule Jimenez cites does not even pertain to the statute at issue in this case. We thus conclude that this argument does not support Jimenez's narrow interpretation of the word "review" in section 316.0083(1)(a). Ultimately, Jimenez cannot escape the fact that the term "review," as used in section 316.0083(1)(a), indicates some evaluative component, and there is no indication that the Legislature intended the most restrictive version of the term in the context of this statute. We therefore hold that section 316.0083(1)(a) authorizes a local government to contract with a private third-party vendor to review and sort information from red light cameras, in accordance with written guidelines provided by the local government, before sending that info...

...d sorting the images before sending to a trained traffic enforcement officer who determines whether probable cause exists and a citation should be issued. Thus, the City's red light camera enforcement program does not exceed the authority granted in section 316.0083(1)(a)....

...infraction enforcement officers. 211 So.3d at 173-74 (Wells J., specially concurring). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Jimenez's arguments that the City's red light camera enforcement program (A) unlawfully exceeds the grant of authority in section 316.0083(1)(a), and (B) violates the uniformity principle set forth in chapter 316, are without merit....

...As part of this express authorization, the Legislature has permitted a local government's agent to review information from red light cameras for any purpose short of making the probable cause determination as to whether a traffic infraction was committed. We thus hold that section 316.0083(1)(a) authorizes a local government to contract with a private third-party vendor to review and sort information from red light cameras, in accordance with written guidelines provided by the local government, before sending that info...

...LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur. LEWIS, J., concurs in result. CANADY, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which POLSTON and LAWSON, JJ., concur. The question that was certified by the Third District asks: Does the review of red light camera images authorized by section 316.0083(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), allow a municipality's vendor, as its agent, to sort images to forward to the law enforcement officer, where the controlling contract and City guidelines limit the Vendor to deciding whether the images...

...Jimenez also argues that the City's red light camera enforcement program is invalid because it is preempted by state law. We need not address this argument because it is dependent upon our agreement with Jimenez regarding the meaning of "review" in section 316.0083(1)(a).

of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the areas within which municipalities

crash reports by using the power granted by section 316.008(1)(k), Florida Statutes? In sum: 1. Escambia

...d in subsection (2). . . ." 5 (e.s.) "STATE ROAD" is defined by section 316.003 (50), Florida Statutes, as "[a]ny highway designated as a state-maintained road by the Department of Transportation." 6 In setting forth the powers of local authorities, section 316.008 , Florida Statutes, recognizes that local authorities may regulate, among other things, stopping, standing or parking on "streets and highways under their jurisdiction[.]" 7 State roads are not within the jurisdiction of local authori...

...ed to or required for use as a transportation facility. (23) "Road" means a way open to travel by the public, including, but not limited to, a street, highway, or alley. The term includes associated sidewalks, the roadbed, the right-of-way. . . ." 7 Section 316.008 (1)(a), Fla....

for reasons other than those set forth in section 316.008, Florida Statutes? 3) If commercial horse-drawn

...nd the authority of this office to declare it invalid. You question whether this ordinance setting the speed limit in a residential district is one of those matters within the power of a local authority, such as a municipality, to properly regulate. Section 316.008 (1), F.S., provides that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power, from [p...

...316 , F.S., recognizes that there are certain traffic regulatory matters over which a municipality may by ordinance regulate, it is unlawful for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of Ch. 316. Section 316.002 , F.S. Section 316.008 , F.S., expressly enumerates those matters over which a municipality may control traffic movement or parking on the streets and highways within its jurisdiction. Among those areas enumerated, paragraph (j) of s 316.008 (1) empowers a municipality in the reasonable exercise of its police power to alter or establish speed limits, but this paragraph goes on to expressly state that such alteration or establishment must be done "within the provisions of this cha...

...That opinion concluded that a municipal traffic ordinance enacted prior to the effective date of the Uniform Traffic Control Law could continue to be enforced provided the activity regulated by such ordinance is a proper subject of municipal traffic regulation pursuant to s 316.008 , F.S....

...the provisions of [Ch. 316.]" Thus, there is no conflict between the opinion reached here and the conclusion of AGO 74-248 since a municipality may continue to enforce ordinances on subjects proper for municipal traffic regulation as specified in s 316.008 , F.S., except where there is a conflict between the ordinance and a provision of Ch....

of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities

of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities

parking in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, section 316.008(1), Florida Statutes, recognizes that the provisions

movement of traffic outside of municipalities. Section 316.008, F.S., expressly enumerates those areas within

movement of traffic outside of municipalities.5 Section 316.008, Florida Statutes, expressly recognizes areas

of traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities

...2 Section 316.075 (3), Fla. Stat. (1995), contains specific exceptions for turning right on red after stopping and left on red from a one-way street intersecting a one-way street with traffic moving to the left. 3 Section 316.006 (3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). 4 Section 316.008 (1)(w), Fla....

authorized by the Uniform Traffic Control Law. Section 316.008(1)(a), F.S., provides that local authorities

...Chapter 316 , Florida Statutes, constitutes the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law and was enacted to make uniform traffic laws applicable throughout the state and its counties and uniform traffic ordinances applicable in all municipalities.1 Section 316.002 , Florida Statutes, states that "[s]ection 316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions. . . . It is unlawful for any local authority to pass or to attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter." Section 316.008 , Fla....

...sly preempted to the state by general law. 4 Cf., Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 94-5 (1994), wherein this office concluded that a municipality was not preempted from regulating safety equipment for bicycles under Chapter 316 , Fla. Stat., and that pursuant to section 316.008 (1), Fla....

authorized to adopt an ordinance pursuant to section 316.008(1)(s), Florida Statutes, that would permit

this chapter unless expressly authorized."). Section 316.008, F.S. (1986 Supp.), enumerates the matters

...In enacting Chapter 316 , Florida Statutes, the Legislature recognized that there are conditions that require municipalities to pass certain traffic ordinances regulating municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside of municipalities. 7 Section 316.008 , Florida Statutes, expressly recognizes areas in which local authorities may exercise control with respect to the streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power....

...not inconsistent with this chapter, placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic." 6 303 So.2d 74 , 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). 7 Section 316.002 , Fla. Stat. 8 Section 316.008 (1)(j), Fla....

authority to control or regulate traffic thereon. Section 316.008, F. S., empowers municipalities, with respect

...l traffic infraction punishable under Chapter 318 , Florida Statutes. There is no apparent obstacle to the city offering a voluntary inspection and registration program as a service to those persons operating golf carts within the city's boundaries. Section 316.008 , Florida Statutes, enumerates the powers that may be exercised by local governments relating to streets and highways within their jurisdictions....

...r less, without need for a license, registration, or insurance. 3 See s. 316.002 , Fla. Stat., setting forth the Legislature's intent in adopting Chapter 316 , Fla. Stat. 4 See Preamble to Ch. 71-135, Laws of Florida, creating Ch. 316 , Fla. Stat. 5 Section 316.008 , Fla....

...Stat., and other related statutes). See also, s. 322.04 (1)(e), Fla. Stat., exempting from the requirement of a driver's license "[a]ny person operating a golf cart, as defined in s. 320.01 , which is operated in accordance with the provisions of s. 316.212 ." 11 Section 316.008 (1)(g), (m), and (n), Fla....

B. Paul Pettie Margate City Attorney Pompano Beach QUESTION: May a municipality pursuant to s. 316.008 (1)(d) and (f), F. S., control and regulate certain traffic movement under s. 316.008 , F. S., by resolution or may it act only by ordinance? SUMMARY: A municipality controlling and regulating traffic movement within its jurisdiction under police power delegated to it under ss. 316.002 and 316.008 (1)(d) and (f), F....

...reamble to Ch. 71-135 , Laws of Florida, creating Ch. 316, F. S. The Legislature recognized that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances regulating municipal traffic, and it expressly specified that s. 316.008 , F....

...S., provides that the provisions of Ch. 316 shall be applicable and uniform throughout the state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, `and no [municipality] shall enact or enforce any ordinance on a matter covered by [Ch. 316] unless expressly authorized.' Section 316.008 provides such express authorization for the `certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of municipal traffic' and `the area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking' referred to in s....

...ction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power , to designate `particular highways or roadways for use by traffic moving in one direction,' and `any street as a through street or . . . any intersection as a stop or yield intersection.' Section 316.008 (1)(d) and (f), F....

...eral municipalities. Moreover, these and other provisions of Ch. 316, F. S., constitute an express preemption of this area of traffic control and regulation to the state within the contemplation of s. 166.021 (3)(c). Sections 316.002 , 316.007 , and 316.008 (1), F....

...orizing municipalities and other local authorities to control and regulate certain traffic movement or parking on the streets and highways within their jurisdiction in the reasonable exercise of the police power delegated to them by the Legislature. Section 316.008 , F....

...Petersburg, 153 So. 141 (Fla. 1933). The designation of a street as a one-way street for the movement of traffic or a street as a through street or an intersection as a stop or yield intersection is a legislative act exercised under the police power, s. 316.008 (1), F....

...or to move in a particular direction; s. 316.123 , F. S., providing for stop or yield intersections; and s. 316.074 , F. S., requiring the driver of any vehicle to obey the applicable instructions of any lawfully placed traffic control device. While s. 316.008 does not specify whether the prescribed regulation of traffic within a municipality shall be by ordinance or resolution, various provisions within Ch....

...h any authority and jurisdiction to enforce the proscribed traffic offenses and regulations. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing considerations, I must conclude that a municipality, in exercising the police power delegated to it by ss. 316.002 and 316.008 (1)(d) and (f), F....

expresslyauthorized.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 316.008, F. S., represents such express authorization

...3 The Legislature has specifically provided that "[r]egulation of the use of cameras for enforcing the provisions of this chapter is expressly preempted to the state." 4 Thus, the authority of local governments such as the City of Aventura to legislate in this area is limited. 5 Question One Section 316.008 (7), Florida Statutes, provides the powers to be exercised by local authorities under the act: "(a) A county or municipality may use traffic infraction detectors to enforce s. 316.074 (1) or s. 316.075 (1)(c)1. when a driver fails to stop at a traffic signal on streets and highways under their jurisdiction under s. 316.0083 ....

...allation of any such detectors only within the unincorporated area of the county. A county may authorize installation of any such detectors by interlocal agreement on roads under its jurisdiction." A framework for enforcement of the act is provided. Section 316.0083 (1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that within thirty days after the violation the city must send notification to the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation....

...The statute also makes provision for notification of a violation in situations where the vehicle involved in the violation is owned jointly. 7 In the event that payment is not made within thirty days after notification of the violation, a traffic citation shall be issued. 8 Section 316.0083 (1)(c)1.d., Florida Statutes, requires that "[t]he traffic citation shall be mailed to the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation no later than 60 days after the date of the violation." Delivery of the traffic citation by mail constitutes issuance of the citation....

...e, custody or control of the motor vehicle at the time of the violation. Your question relates to the procedure for issuing a traffic citation to the person identified in the affidavit as in control of the motor vehicle at the time of the violation. Section 316.0083 (1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, provides that: "The owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation is responsible and liable for paying the uniform traffic citation issued for a violation of s....

...tation for violation of s. 316.074 (1) or s. 316.075 (1)(c)1, when the driver failed to stop at a traffic signal." 12 Thus, the statute recognizes that a traffic citation may be issued "upon receipt of an affidavit" submitted to the city pursuant to 316.0083(d)1., Florida Statutes....

...2 Section 1, ch. 2010-80 , Laws of Fla. 3 Section 3, ch. 2010-80 , Laws of Fla. 4 Id. 5 See, e.g. , Ops. Att'y Gen. Fla. 10-32 (2010) and 10-28 (2010) (discussing preemption and municipal authority to legislate on matters preempted to the state). 6 See s. 316.0083 (b)1.b., Fla. Stat. 7 Section 316.0083 (1)(c)1.c., Fla. Stat. 8 Section 316.0083 (1)(c)1.a., Fla. Stat. 9 Id. 10 Section 316.0083 (1)(c)1.c., Fla. Stat. 11 Section 316.0083 (1)(d)2., Fla. Stat. And see s. 316.0083 (1)(d)4., making submission of a false affidavit a second degree misdemeanor. 12 Section 316.0083 (1)(d)3., Fla....

...es . The legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of traffic outside such municipalities. Section 316.008 , F....

...This section shall be supplemental to the other laws or ordinances of this chapter and not in conflict therewith. It is unlawful for any local authority to pass or attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 316.008 , F....

...rcise of the police power, from: (h) Regulating the operation of bicycles. Section 316.003 (2), F. S., defines `bicycle' to include a `moped' propelled by a pedalactivated helper motor with a maximum rating of 1 1/2 brake horsepower. No provision of s. 316.008 , F....

...s. Section 316.11(3), F. S., provides that the provisions of s. 316.111, F. S., governing bicycle regulations shall not apply upon a street set aside as a play street as authorized by Ch. 316, F. S., or as designated by municipal authority. Also see s. 316.008 (1)(p) authorizing municipalities to designate and regulate traffic on play streets....

...icipal charter, has nonexclusive jurisdiction over the prosecution, trial, adjudication, and punishment of violations of Ch. 316, supra, when a violation occurs within the municipality and the person charged is charged by a municipal police officer. Section 316.008 (2)....