316.125
Vehicle entering highway from private road or driveway or emerging from alley, driveway or building.
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316.125 Vehicle entering highway from private road or driveway or emerging from alley, driveway or building.—
(1) The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from an alley, building, private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered which are so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
(2) The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway within a business or residence district shall stop the vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across the alley, building entrance, road or driveway, or in the event there is no sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the street to be entered where the driver has a view of approaching traffic thereon and shall yield to all vehicles and pedestrians which are so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
(3) A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a moving violation as provided in chapter 318.
History.—s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 121, ch. 99-248.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1989–2021 · leading case: State v. Nelson
State v. Nelson (2015)
“The statute at issue is section 316.125, Florida Statutes (2013), and it governs entry of vehicles onto adjacent highways from adjoining business locations and parking lots.”
State v. Rodriguez (2005)
“Section 316.125 requires in subsection (1) that a vehicle entering the road from a private road or driveway yield to approaching road traffic, and in subsection (2) that a vehicle entering a road from a private road or driveway in a business or residential district stop before…”
Rosenfeld v. Seltzer (2008)
“At the charge conference, the Rosenfelds requested the court to read section 316.125(2), Florida Statutes, regarding the duty of a motorist to stop when exiting a driveway along a sidewalk, and to read Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 4.”
Craig v. School Bd. of Broward County (1996)
“The instruction based on section 316.125(1), Florida Statutes (1989), was properly given.”
Beeman v. Cosmides (2002)
“Beeman maintains that section 316.125, Florida Statutes (2001), 2 required Mrs.”
CRUSE v. PAYNE (2021)
“2 I do not adopt or address the magistrate judge’s alternative conclusion that the stop was lawful because Plaintiff violated Florida Statute § 316.125(2)—that is, that even if the officer knew there was no stop sign, there was still probable cause for the stop because the road…”
Caratozzola v. State (1989)
“On September 30, 1988, appellant, Donna Caratozzola, was cited with a traffic citation for failing to yield while entering a highway from a private roadway contrary to F. S. § 316.125. *10 2. In the trial court the appellant filed a motion to dismiss the cause due to lack of…”
— 316.125(1) — 1 case
Craig v. School Bd. of Broward County (1996)
“The instruction based on section 316.125(1), Florida Statutes (1989), was properly given.”
— 316.125(2) — 4 cases
State v. Nelson (2015)
“The statute at issue is section 316.125, Florida Statutes (2013), and it governs entry of vehicles onto adjacent highways from adjoining business locations and parking lots.”
State v. Rodriguez (2005)
“Section 316.125 requires in subsection (1) that a vehicle entering the road from a private road or driveway yield to approaching road traffic, and in subsection (2) that a vehicle entering a road from a private road or driveway in a business or residential district stop before…”
Rosenfeld v. Seltzer (2008)
“At the charge conference, the Rosenfelds requested the court to read section 316.125(2), Florida Statutes, regarding the duty of a motorist to stop when exiting a driveway along a sidewalk, and to read Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 4.”
CRUSE v. PAYNE (2021)
“2 I do not adopt or address the magistrate judge’s alternative conclusion that the stop was lawful because Plaintiff violated Florida Statute § 316.125(2)—that is, that even if the officer knew there was no stop sign, there was still probable cause for the stop because the road…”
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