316.655
Penalties.
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316.655 Penalties.—
(1) A violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, except those violations with a specific criminal charge, as enumerated in s. 318.17, are infractions, as defined in s. 318.13(3). Except for violations of s. 316.302, infractions of this chapter are punishable as provided in chapter 318. Any person convicted of a violation of or otherwise found to be in violation of s. 316.063, s. 316.3025, s. 316.516, s. 316.545, or s. 316.550 shall be punished as specifically provided in that section.
(2) A driver convicted of a violation of any offense prohibited by this chapter or any other law of this state regulating motor vehicles, which resulted in an accident, may have his or her driving privileges revoked or suspended by the court if the court finds such revocation or suspension warranted by the totality of the circumstances resulting in the conviction and the need to provide for the maximum safety for all persons who travel on or who are otherwise affected by the use of the highways of the state. In determining whether suspension or revocation is appropriate, the court shall consider all pertinent factors, including, but not limited to, such factors as the extent and nature of the driver’s violation of this chapter, the number of persons killed or injured as the result of the driver’s violation of this chapter, and the extent of any property damage resulting from the driver’s violation of this chapter.
History.—s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 2, ch. 74-377; ss. 1, 4, ch. 76-31; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 3, ch. 77-456; s. 15, ch. 81-218; s. 6, ch. 83-218; s. 20, ch. 84-359; s. 3, ch. 85-87; s. 18, ch. 86-296; s. 1, ch. 87-246; s. 8, ch. 87-270; s. 2, ch. 87-378; s. 6, ch. 92-165; s. 65, ch. 94-209; s. 11, ch. 94-306; s. 906, ch. 95-148; s. 8, ch. 95-247; s. 26, ch. 95-267; s. 40, ch. 96-350; s. 45, ch. 97-300; s. 15, ch. 2012-181.
Note.—Former s. 316.026.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 31
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1979–2022 · leading case: Stoletz v. State
Stoletz v. State (2004)
“4th DCA 2001), wherein the Fourth District concluded that the defendant's driver's license could not be permanently revoked for a second DUI conviction under section 316.655 because the more specific statute, section 322.”
Whipple v. State (2001)
“The trial court erroneously revoked appellant's driving privileges pursuant to section 316.655, Florida Statutes (1999).”
Bischoff v. Florida (2003)
“2045 (1); Fla. Stat. § 316.655 (1); Fla. Stat. § 318.”
State v. Champe (1979)
“25, Florida Statutes (1977), cannot constitutionally be levied on civil penalties (as opposed to criminal fines), the state asks: Are the penalties imposed for traffic infractions under §§ 316.655 and 318.18, Florida Statutes, to be considered as "fines" or "civil penalties"…”
Cheatem v. State (1982)
“026, which subsequently became section 316.655, was also enacted. [3] Appellant points out that when the city adopted chapter 316, the relevant statutes were sections 316.”
Gasset v. State (1986)
“, it chose to maintain criminal sanctions for certain serious traffic offenses, including reckless driving and fleeing or eluding an officer, see § 316.655(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (1985), thereby indicating the state's view of the seriousness of these offenses and the state's…”
City of Aventura v. Masone (2011)
“(2) Section 316.655 provides that all traffic infractions be punished under the provisions of chapter 318, and section 318.”
Stoletz v. State (2003)
“Whipple’s driver’s license after his second DUI conviction under section 316.655, because the more specific statute, section 322.”
Lewek v. State (1997)
“1994); see also §§ 316.655, 322.26(8), 322.27(2), 322.28(2), 322.”
Whirley v. State (1984)
“08(2), which excepted from the definition of "misdemeanor," "any violation of any provision of chapter 316" and section 316.655, which read in pertinent part: (1) A violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, except criminal offenses enumerated in section (4), shall be…”
State v. Smith (1991)
“See § 316.655, Fla. Stat. (1989). See also Ch.”
Houle v. State (2010)
“The trial court, however, revoked appellant’s driving privileges pursuant to section 316.655(2), not section 322.28(4)(a).”
— 316.655(1) — 5 cases
Cheatem v. State (1982)
“026, which subsequently became section 316.655, was also enacted. [3] Appellant points out that when the city adopted chapter 316, the relevant statutes were sections 316.”
Gasset v. State (1986)
“, it chose to maintain criminal sanctions for certain serious traffic offenses, including reckless driving and fleeing or eluding an officer, see § 316.655(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (1985), thereby indicating the state's view of the seriousness of these offenses and the state's…”
Thompson v. Office of the Public Defender of the Ninth Judicial Circuit In & For Orange County (1980)
State v. Rahn (1983)
State v. Garcia (1997)
— 316.655(1)(3) — 1 case
State v. Smith (1993)
— 316.655(2) — 6 cases
Stoletz v. State (2004)
“4th DCA 2001), wherein the Fourth District concluded that the defendant's driver's license could not be permanently revoked for a second DUI conviction under section 316.655 because the more specific statute, section 322.”
State v. Champe (1979)
“25, Florida Statutes (1977), cannot constitutionally be levied on civil penalties (as opposed to criminal fines), the state asks: Are the penalties imposed for traffic infractions under §§ 316.655 and 318.18, Florida Statutes, to be considered as "fines" or "civil penalties"…”
Stoletz v. State (2003)
“Whipple’s driver’s license after his second DUI conviction under section 316.655, because the more specific statute, section 322.”
Houle v. State (2010)
“The trial court, however, revoked appellant’s driving privileges pursuant to section 316.655(2), not section 322.28(4)(a).”
Reed v. State (1999)
— 316.655(3) — 1 case
— 316.655(4) — 2 cases
J.R.S. v. State (1986)
State v. Schell (1985)
— 316.655(4)(f) — 2 cases
State v. Armstrong (1982)
State v. Schell (1985)
— 316.655(5) — 2 cases
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