The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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Beyond this clear defect, the petition also fails to identify harm that is "real and ascertainable" rather than "speculative." See Mayport Hous. P'ship, Ltd. v. Albani, 244 So.3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So.3d 486, 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)). Husband suggests the court's order "has the potential to create post-filing, non-marital debt for which [he] may be, ultimately, responsible." (Emphasis added). Husband worries that "if [Wife] were not to pay" any debt she incurs with the credit card, then Husband would be on the hook for that balance. (Emphasis added). These tepid statements offering speculative concern are legally insufficient to show a material injury that could not be corrected on post-judgment appeal. See Emed Urgent &Primary Care, P.A. v. Rivas, 335 So.3d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ("Petitioners have failed to establish that they will suffer irreparable harm if the order under review stands. Petitioners offer only unsupported speculation of future harm, which is not sufficient to establish material injury.").In an interim order entered August 22, 2018, the circuit court denied the portion of ground three concerning counsel's effectiveness in challenging the description of the gun, grounds four, five, six, seven, nine, and ten of the second amended motion. Id. at 188-308. With regard to grounds one, two, the portion of ground three pertaining to potential exculpatory witnesses, eight, and eleven, the court stated it would schedule an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 211. The court appointed counsel for the evidentiary proceedings. Id. at 320. On March 11, 2019, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing and both Petitioner and his trial counsel, Thomas Cushman, testified. Id. at 498-587. On April 4, 2019, the court entered its Final Order Denying Motion for PostConviction Relief Following Evidentiary Hearing. Id. at 333-492. In its orders resolving the grounds raised by Petitioner, the court set forth the applicable law regarding postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Ex. 11 at 189-90, 335. The court attached portions of the record to its orders. See Attachments: Ex. 11 at 213308, Appendix A … Appellants contend that the district court erred by granting the City Appellees' motion to dismiss their federal § 1983 claims. Specifically, as to the City, however, the Appellants fail to include any arguments or authority to show how the district court erred in finding that the City was not liable for any claim. As such, they have abandoned their claims against the City. See Christmas v. Harris Cnty., Ga., 51 F.4th 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2022) (failure to raise an issue in an initial brief is a forfeiture of that issue). Further, on the merits, the Appellants fail to allege a direct causal link between the City's policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989); Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). Appellants do not allege facts to support their contention that the City had an officially promulgated policy or an unofficial custom or practice of allowing for excessive force, false arrest, or malicious prosecution by its officers. Rather, the Appellants make broad and conclusory allegations regarding the policies and training of City officers and fail to state… [*] The mother also contends that termination under the circumstances was not the "least restrictive means of protecting the children from harm, " under the circumstances. She misunderstands how that query works. See P.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 335 So.3d 804, 807-08 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (explaining that "'[l]east restrictive means' refers specifically to 'what actions were taken by the State before filing the petition to terminate the parent's rights, '" and "is a retrospective query that considers what DCF already did to salvage safely the parent-child relationship prior to its filing of the TPR petition" (quoting S.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 202 So.3d 769, 778 (Fla. 2016))). Because the department already had provided a case plan, which the mother completed, and reunification had been achieved once, we can find no due-process deficiency in this respect. See Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).Campbell's motions explicitly request compensation, attorney fees, appointment of counsel, and a “more definite statement.” These requests are frivolous-Campbell does not state any conceivable ground for entitlement to those remedies. To the extent Campbell seeks reconsideration of the dismissal, that implied request also lacks merit. Reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary measure that should be applied sparingly. Adams v. Beoneman, 335 F.R.D. 452, 454 (M.D. Fla. 2020). Campbell does not state any valid ground for reconsideration. Accordingly, Campbell's motions (Docs. 8 and 9) are denied.The text of the FLSA does not provide, and no Eleventh Circuit decision has ever held, that FLSA claims are exempt from Rule 41. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has reasoned that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply “in actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act no less than in any other case.” Vasconcelo v. Miami Auto Max, Inc., 981 F.3d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Casso-Lopez v. Beach Time Rental Suncoast, LLC, 335 F.R.D. 458, 461-462 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (holding parties may terminate an FLSA case by filing either a Rule 41 stipulation of dismissal with prejudice or a Rule 68(a) notice of acceptance of an offer of judgment “and the district court is immediately powerless to interfere”); Dicomo v. KJIMS Dev. Co., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-327-FtM-99CM, 2016 WL 6678420, *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2016) (“[T]he parties may dismiss [an FLSA] case in its entirety pursuant to the Joint Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice without further action from the Court as it is unconditional and self-executing.”).Walker's motions also lack merit. Reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary measure that should be applied sparingly. Adams v. Beoneman, 335 F.R.D. 452, 454 (M.D. Fla. 2020). Court orders are not intended as first drafts subject to revisions at a litigant's pleasure, so a movant must establish extraordinary circumstances supporting reconsideration. Gold Cross EMS, Inc. v. Children's Hosp. of Ala., 108 F.Supp.3d 1376, 1384 (S.D. Ga. 2015). “A motion for reconsideration should raise new issues, not merely readdress issues previously litigated.” PaineWebber Income Props. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 902 F.Supp. 1514, 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1995).While Defendants opted not to provide the Court with any of the information received from Mrs. Kampsky which would suggest an amount in controversy of $1,000,000, they did attach her interrogatory responses to the Notice and the Jurisdictional Response. See Plaintiff Beverly Kampsky's Answers to Defendants' Bradley Meester and Jamie Meester's Interrogatories (Doc. 1-4; Answer to Interrogatories); Jurisdictional Response at 25. A review of her responses significantly undermines Defendants' contention that a reasonable assessment of Mrs. Kampsky's damages exceeds $75,000, much less reaches $1,000,000. Mrs. Kampsky states that in the two years since her fall she has incurred less than $2,200 in medical bills and has lost only $6,400 in wages, a total of less than $8,600 in monetary damages. Answer to Interrogatories at 3-4. And she provides no information regarding any other damages. These discovery responses do nothing to support a contention that the amount in controversy in this case is in excess of $75,000. To the extent Defendants invite the Court to aggregate the value of Mr. and Mrs. Kampsky's claims to arrive at an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000, such an approach… Section 1915 requires a determination as to whether “the statements in the [applicant's] affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976).An applicant's “affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307; see also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) poverty guidelines are central to an assessment of an applicant's poverty. See Taylor v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 261 Fed.Appx. 399, 401 (3d Cir. 2008) (using HHS Guidelines as basis for section 1915 determination); Lewis v. Ctr. Mkt., 378 Fed.Appx. 780, 784 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming use of HHS guidelines). Further, the Section 1915 analysis requires “comparing the applicant's assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 Fed.Appx. 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014). Ultimately, permission to proceed in forma pauperis is… THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Sheheryar Alam Qazi's Motion for Compassionate Release, ECF No. [334]. The Government filed a Response, ECF No. [335], including exhibits under seal, ECF No. [337-2]. Qazi filed a Reply with supporting exhibits. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, all supporting and opposing submissions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise duly advised. For the following reason, the Motion is denied.. . . Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 409, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). . . . Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), Purkey is mentally incompetent to be . . .
. . . Geographers 335, 346-347, and Table 3 (1978); Cohen § 4.07(1)(a), at 289. . . .
. . . Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ). . . .
. . . Immigration and Customs Enforcement , 543 U.S. 335, 341-342, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005) ; . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 339, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), but because of a "balancing of competing . . .
. . . See 909 F.3d 335, 346 (2018). These factors make out a troubling tableau indeed. . . .
. . . United States , 218 U.S. 322, 335, 31 S.Ct. 85, 54 L.Ed. 1055 (1910). . . .
. . . United States , 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) ). . . .
. . . Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ; Baker v. . . . Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 344-345, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (Sixth Amendment); Furman v. . . . compartment of a car if the officer had probable cause to arrest the driver or a passenger. 556 U.S. at 335 . . .
. . . United States , 564 U.S. 319, 335, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011) ; Cutter v. . . .
. . . COURT OF APPEALS OF MASSACHUSETTS No. 19-335 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . In Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, the Supreme Court outlined the applicable analysis for procedural . . . used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." 424 U.S. at 335 . . . administrative burdens that [any] additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." 424 U.S. at 335 . . .
. . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), prohibiting the execution of the intellectually . . .
. . . Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), the Supreme Court "held that the Constitution 'restricts the State's . . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . .
. . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . . Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), contending that his mental illness at . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). . . . Miller , 335 F.3d at 893. . . .
. . . Daniels , 803 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Id. 616 F.2d at 335. . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). ii. . . .
. . . Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009). . . . Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). . . .
. . . Mobil Oil Corp. , 335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2003) ("As a general rule, we do not use certification . . .
. . . Hemingway , 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that a previous case, which assumed a sentencing . . .
. . . Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. , 335 S.W.3d 126, 139 (Tex. 2010) (quotation omitted). . . . Robinson , 335 S.W.3d at 148. . . . Robinson , 335 S.W.3d at 146 ("[C]ourts must be mindful that statutes are not to be set aside lightly . . . Robinson , 335 S.W.3d at 149. . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . . Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), with regard to insanity, "we leave . . .
. . . I.N.S. , 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). . . . Mukasey , 524 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) ; Kankamalage , 335 F.3d at 862. . . .
. . . Cty. of Middlesex , 379 N.J.Super. 205, 877 A.2d 330, 335 (App. . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the "issues decided by the higher court" are . . . Gammie , 335 F.3d at 893. . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). . . .
. . . City of Milwaukee , 850 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Allin v. . . .
. . . Cnty. of Lake , 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). . . . County of Lake , 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018), it makes sense as a doctrinal matter to extend Kingsley . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. . . .
. . . App. 4th 335, 347, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 (2001). . . .
. . . App'x 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff's declaration stating . . . App'x at 335 (holding that "the fact that the state court action was initiated against [plaintiff] in . . . App'x at 335 (deferring to the district court's finding, based on the billing statements, "that any or . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ; Caldwell v. . . .
. . . Acxiom Corp. , 612 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2010). . . .
. . . Ct. 988, 994, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017). . . . Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 343 (2d Cir. 2006) ("IDEA exhaustion in the instant case is excused under the . . .
. . . Chater, 64 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1995), where Judge Posner expressed skepticism that a state agency would . . . Bowen , 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir.1988). . . .
. . . Compare In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig. , 223 F.R.D. 335, 348-51 (E.D. . . .
. . . United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) ). . . .
. . . (In re LWD, Inc. ), 335 F. . . .
. . . Ristine , 335 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2003). . . . Ristine, 335 F.3d at 695-96. . . .
. . . United States , 564 U.S. 319, 335, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011), in increasing the sentence . . .
. . . Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ; see also Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12-16 . . . probative value of hearings and decrease the "risk of erroneous deprivation," Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . . .
. . . Webb , 335 F.3d 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that inquiry into relevant conduct "requires the . . .
. . . Ltd. , 335 F. Supp. 3d 526, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). . . . See RegenLab , 335 F. . . .
. . . Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (explaining that courts identify due . . . Massage Envy Franchising, LLC , 887 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Wyman , 335 F.3d 80, 90 (2d Cir. 2003). I. . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 339, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (quoting Imbler v. . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]ssues decided by the [Supreme] [C]ourt need not be identical . . .
. . . Motorola, Inc. , 245 F.3d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Although in the proper context ... a slogan[ ] can . . .
. . . administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." 424 U.S. at 335 . . .
. . . City of Milwaukee , 850 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2017). . . . City of Milwaukee , 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (failure-to-intervene claims failed where plaintiff's . . .
. . . O'Sullivan , 335 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36, 110 S.Ct. 1093. . . . See Buie, 494 U.S. at 327, 335-36, 110 S.Ct. 1093. . . .
. . . Co. , 917 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2019). EEOC v. . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), Hart arranged for a psychologist to . . .
. . . App'x 335. . . . Herrick Co. , 360 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2004). . . .
. . . Norfolk Southern Corp. , 335 F. App'x 220, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Holifield v. . . . Opsatnik , 335 F. App'x at 223 (citing Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. . . .
. . . E.P.A. , 748 F.3d 333, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). . . .
. . . Barnhart , 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) ; Newton v. . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . .
. . . Willett , 751 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2014) ("Direct evidence of a conspiracy is unnecessary; each element . . .
. . . State , 572 S.W.3d 325, 335-36 (Tex. App. . . .
. . . Shaw , 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003) ). . . .
. . . Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003). . . . Virgin Enterprises Ltd., 335 F.3d at 151 ("Noting that neither side had submitted evidence on the sophistication . . .
. . . Cty. of Lake , 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . App'x 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (analogizing to Pace while distinguishing Pena ) (internal citations omitted . . .
. . . Id. at 335 (Page ID #657). . . .
. . . Hubert , 909 F.3d 335, 351-52 (11th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (holding the Eighth Amendment bans . . .
. . . In re Casco Chemical Co. , 335 F.2d 645, 651. . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ; Eddings , 455 U.S. at 110-17, 102 S.Ct . . .
. . . City of Allegan , 826 F.3d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 2016) (Merritt, J., dissenting in part) (citation and internal . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis . . .
. . . Signed July 24, 2019 JASMINE GRACE-LOUISE EDWARDS, Plaintiff, Pro Se, 335 Valley Drive, Syracuse, NY . . .
. . . Superior Court , 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223 (1990), are satisfied: (1) "the issue . . .
. . . United States , 335 U.S. 451, 460, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring), then . . .
. . . Powell, 149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945) ). . . . Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . .
. . . Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335, 343-44, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (explaining that "the [s]tate . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). . . .
. . . Kroger Tex., L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Gaubert , 499 U.S. 315, 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. . . .
. . . Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). . . . See Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .
. . . Co. of America, 341 S.W.3d 323, 335-36 (Tex. 2011). . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 311, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ). . . .
. . . administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement[s] would entail." 424 U.S. at 335 . . . Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . . Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .
. . . Corps. , 419 U.S. 102, 134, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974) ). . . .
. . . Sound Transit , 335 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). . . . also held that "agency regulations cannot independently create rights enforceable through § 1983." 335 . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). He has not done so. . . . Miller , 335 F.3d at 893 (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("undercut"); Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency . . .