The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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The Court also declines to review the Bankruptcy Court's order as an interlocutory appeal. Interlocutory review is generally disfavored, however, district courts may review a non-final bankruptcy court order if (1) it presents a controlling question of law; (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) immediate appeal would advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. In re Pacific Forest Prods. Corp., 335 B.R. 910, 919 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2005) (Gold, J.). All three elements must be satisfied to justify interlocutory appeal. Id.To the extent that Briggs seeks to hold Columbia County through Sheriff Hunter vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of the employees responsible for Briggs's alleged injury, Briggs has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has soundly rejected the theory of respondeat superior as a basis for liability in § 1983 actions. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead, a county or municipality may be liable in a § 1983 action “only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier, 402 F.3d at 1115 (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must establish that an official policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-94. “A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The policy requirement is designed to “‘distinguish acts of the… The United States cites several cases that allegedly prove McEachern “failed to serve the Attorney General.” (Doc. 16 at 4-6.) But in each case the service package was sent to the wrong address, Smith v. United States, No. 5:21-CV-00237-TES, 2022 WL 1432541, at *2 (M.D. Ga. May 5, 2022), didn't identify the Attorney General, or was directed to a fictitious position, Van Manen v. United States, 838 F.Supp. 335, 337 (W.D. Mich. 1993). Those are not the facts here. McEachern sent her complaint to the right address and identified the Attorney General as the intended recipient. Notably absent from the United States' brief, meanwhile, are the cases where a court has allowed service “care of” the Attorney General. See, e.g., Winnemucca Indian Colony v. U.S. ex rel. Dep't of the Interior, No. 3:11-CV-00622-RCJ, 2012 WL 78198, at *9 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2012); cf. Cienciva v. Brozowski, No. 3:20-CV-2045, 2022 WL 2791752, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 15, 2022).Beyond this clear defect, the petition also fails to identify harm that is "real and ascertainable" rather than "speculative." See Mayport Hous. P'ship, Ltd. v. Albani, 244 So.3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So.3d 486, 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)). Husband suggests the court's order "has the potential to create post-filing, non-marital debt for which [he] may be, ultimately, responsible." (Emphasis added). Husband worries that "if [Wife] were not to pay" any debt she incurs with the credit card, then Husband would be on the hook for that balance. (Emphasis added). These tepid statements offering speculative concern are legally insufficient to show a material injury that could not be corrected on post-judgment appeal. See Emed Urgent &Primary Care, P.A. v. Rivas, 335 So.3d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ("Petitioners have failed to establish that they will suffer irreparable harm if the order under review stands. Petitioners offer only unsupported speculation of future harm, which is not sufficient to establish material injury.").In an interim order entered August 22, 2018, the circuit court denied the portion of ground three concerning counsel's effectiveness in challenging the description of the gun, grounds four, five, six, seven, nine, and ten of the second amended motion. Id. at 188-308. With regard to grounds one, two, the portion of ground three pertaining to potential exculpatory witnesses, eight, and eleven, the court stated it would schedule an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 211. The court appointed counsel for the evidentiary proceedings. Id. at 320. On March 11, 2019, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing and both Petitioner and his trial counsel, Thomas Cushman, testified. Id. at 498-587. On April 4, 2019, the court entered its Final Order Denying Motion for PostConviction Relief Following Evidentiary Hearing. Id. at 333-492. In its orders resolving the grounds raised by Petitioner, the court set forth the applicable law regarding postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Ex. 11 at 189-90, 335. The court attached portions of the record to its orders. See Attachments: Ex. 11 at 213308, Appendix A … Appellants contend that the district court erred by granting the City Appellees' motion to dismiss their federal § 1983 claims. Specifically, as to the City, however, the Appellants fail to include any arguments or authority to show how the district court erred in finding that the City was not liable for any claim. As such, they have abandoned their claims against the City. See Christmas v. Harris Cnty., Ga., 51 F.4th 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2022) (failure to raise an issue in an initial brief is a forfeiture of that issue). Further, on the merits, the Appellants fail to allege a direct causal link between the City's policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989); Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). Appellants do not allege facts to support their contention that the City had an officially promulgated policy or an unofficial custom or practice of allowing for excessive force, false arrest, or malicious prosecution by its officers. Rather, the Appellants make broad and conclusory allegations regarding the policies and training of City officers and fail to state… [*] The mother also contends that termination under the circumstances was not the "least restrictive means of protecting the children from harm, " under the circumstances. She misunderstands how that query works. See P.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 335 So.3d 804, 807-08 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (explaining that "'[l]east restrictive means' refers specifically to 'what actions were taken by the State before filing the petition to terminate the parent's rights, '" and "is a retrospective query that considers what DCF already did to salvage safely the parent-child relationship prior to its filing of the TPR petition" (quoting S.M. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 202 So.3d 769, 778 (Fla. 2016))). Because the department already had provided a case plan, which the mother completed, and reunification had been achieved once, we can find no due-process deficiency in this respect. See Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).Campbell's motions explicitly request compensation, attorney fees, appointment of counsel, and a “more definite statement.” These requests are frivolous-Campbell does not state any conceivable ground for entitlement to those remedies. To the extent Campbell seeks reconsideration of the dismissal, that implied request also lacks merit. Reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary measure that should be applied sparingly. Adams v. Beoneman, 335 F.R.D. 452, 454 (M.D. Fla. 2020). Campbell does not state any valid ground for reconsideration. Accordingly, Campbell's motions (Docs. 8 and 9) are denied.Plaintiff offered exhibits that were accepted into evidence. [Plaintiff's Exhibits PX 1-PX 31, PX 33-PX 265, PX 267, PX 335, PX 337, and PX 342-344]. The 64 Defendants did not offer any exhibits or witnesses. Counsel for the parties offered argument and answered questions posed by the Court.The text of the FLSA does not provide, and no Eleventh Circuit decision has ever held, that FLSA claims are exempt from Rule 41. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has reasoned that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply “in actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act no less than in any other case.” Vasconcelo v. Miami Auto Max, Inc., 981 F.3d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Casso-Lopez v. Beach Time Rental Suncoast, LLC, 335 F.R.D. 458, 461-462 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (holding parties may terminate an FLSA case by filing either a Rule 41 stipulation of dismissal with prejudice or a Rule 68(a) notice of acceptance of an offer of judgment “and the district court is immediately powerless to interfere”); Dicomo v. KJIMS Dev. Co., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-327-FtM-99CM, 2016 WL 6678420, *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2016) (“[T]he parties may dismiss [an FLSA] case in its entirety pursuant to the Joint Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice without further action from the Court as it is unconditional and self-executing.”).. . . Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 409, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). . . . Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), Purkey is mentally incompetent to be . . .
. . . Geographers 335, 346-347, and Table 3 (1978); Cohen § 4.07(1)(a), at 289. . . .
. . . Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ). . . .
. . . Immigration and Customs Enforcement , 543 U.S. 335, 341-342, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005) ; . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 339, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), but because of a "balancing of competing . . .
. . . See 909 F.3d 335, 346 (2018). These factors make out a troubling tableau indeed. . . .
. . . United States , 218 U.S. 322, 335, 31 S.Ct. 85, 54 L.Ed. 1055 (1910). . . .
. . . United States , 335 U.S. 1, 16, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) ). . . .
. . . Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ; Baker v. . . . Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 344-345, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (Sixth Amendment); Furman v. . . . compartment of a car if the officer had probable cause to arrest the driver or a passenger. 556 U.S. at 335 . . .
. . . United States , 564 U.S. 319, 335, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011) ; Cutter v. . . .
. . . COURT OF APPEALS OF MASSACHUSETTS No. 19-335 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . In Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, the Supreme Court outlined the applicable analysis for procedural . . . used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." 424 U.S. at 335 . . . administrative burdens that [any] additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." 424 U.S. at 335 . . .
. . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), prohibiting the execution of the intellectually . . .
. . . Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), the Supreme Court "held that the Constitution 'restricts the State's . . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . .
. . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . . Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), contending that his mental illness at . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). . . . Miller , 335 F.3d at 893. . . .
. . . Daniels , 803 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Id. 616 F.2d at 335. . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). ii. . . .
. . . Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009). . . . Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). . . .
. . . Mobil Oil Corp. , 335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2003) ("As a general rule, we do not use certification . . .
. . . Hemingway , 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that a previous case, which assumed a sentencing . . .
. . . Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. , 335 S.W.3d 126, 139 (Tex. 2010) (quotation omitted). . . . Robinson , 335 S.W.3d at 148. . . . Robinson , 335 S.W.3d at 146 ("[C]ourts must be mindful that statutes are not to be set aside lightly . . . Robinson , 335 S.W.3d at 149. . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . . Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), with regard to insanity, "we leave . . .
. . . I.N.S. , 335 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). . . . Mukasey , 524 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) ; Kankamalage , 335 F.3d at 862. . . .
. . . Cty. of Middlesex , 379 N.J.Super. 205, 877 A.2d 330, 335 (App. . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the "issues decided by the higher court" are . . . Gammie , 335 F.3d at 893. . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). . . .
. . . City of Milwaukee , 850 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Allin v. . . .
. . . Cnty. of Lake , 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). . . . County of Lake , 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018), it makes sense as a doctrinal matter to extend Kingsley . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. . . .
. . . App. 4th 335, 347, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 (2001). . . .
. . . App'x 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff's declaration stating . . . App'x at 335 (holding that "the fact that the state court action was initiated against [plaintiff] in . . . App'x at 335 (deferring to the district court's finding, based on the billing statements, "that any or . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ; Caldwell v. . . .
. . . Acxiom Corp. , 612 F.3d 325, 335 (5th Cir. 2010). . . .
. . . Ct. 988, 994, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017). . . . Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 343 (2d Cir. 2006) ("IDEA exhaustion in the instant case is excused under the . . .
. . . Chater, 64 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1995), where Judge Posner expressed skepticism that a state agency would . . . Bowen , 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir.1988). . . .
. . . Compare In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig. , 223 F.R.D. 335, 348-51 (E.D. . . .
. . . United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) ). . . .
. . . (In re LWD, Inc. ), 335 F. . . .
. . . Ristine , 335 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2003). . . . Ristine, 335 F.3d at 695-96. . . .
. . . United States , 564 U.S. 319, 335, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011), in increasing the sentence . . .
. . . Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ; see also Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12-16 . . . probative value of hearings and decrease the "risk of erroneous deprivation," Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . . .
. . . Webb , 335 F.3d 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that inquiry into relevant conduct "requires the . . .
. . . Ltd. , 335 F. Supp. 3d 526, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). . . . See RegenLab , 335 F. . . .
. . . Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (explaining that courts identify due . . . Massage Envy Franchising, LLC , 887 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Wyman , 335 F.3d 80, 90 (2d Cir. 2003). I. . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ). . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 339, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (quoting Imbler v. . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]ssues decided by the [Supreme] [C]ourt need not be identical . . .
. . . Motorola, Inc. , 245 F.3d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Although in the proper context ... a slogan[ ] can . . .
. . . administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." 424 U.S. at 335 . . .
. . . City of Milwaukee , 850 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2017). . . . City of Milwaukee , 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (failure-to-intervene claims failed where plaintiff's . . .
. . . O'Sullivan , 335 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36, 110 S.Ct. 1093. . . . See Buie, 494 U.S. at 327, 335-36, 110 S.Ct. 1093. . . .
. . . Co. , 917 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2019). EEOC v. . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), Hart arranged for a psychologist to . . .
. . . App'x 335. . . . Herrick Co. , 360 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2004). . . .
. . . Norfolk Southern Corp. , 335 F. App'x 220, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Holifield v. . . . Opsatnik , 335 F. App'x at 223 (citing Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. . . .
. . . E.P.A. , 748 F.3d 333, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). . . .
. . . Barnhart , 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) ; Newton v. . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . .
. . . Willett , 751 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2014) ("Direct evidence of a conspiracy is unnecessary; each element . . .
. . . State , 572 S.W.3d 325, 335-36 (Tex. App. . . .
. . . Shaw , 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003) ). . . .
. . . Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003). . . . Virgin Enterprises Ltd., 335 F.3d at 151 ("Noting that neither side had submitted evidence on the sophistication . . .
. . . Cty. of Lake , 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . App'x 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (analogizing to Pace while distinguishing Pena ) (internal citations omitted . . .
. . . Id. at 335 (Page ID #657). . . .
. . . Hubert , 909 F.3d 335, 351-52 (11th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). . . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (holding the Eighth Amendment bans . . .
. . . In re Casco Chemical Co. , 335 F.2d 645, 651. . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ; Eddings , 455 U.S. at 110-17, 102 S.Ct . . .
. . . City of Allegan , 826 F.3d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 2016) (Merritt, J., dissenting in part) (citation and internal . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis . . .
. . . Signed July 24, 2019 JASMINE GRACE-LOUISE EDWARDS, Plaintiff, Pro Se, 335 Valley Drive, Syracuse, NY . . .
. . . Superior Court , 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223 (1990), are satisfied: (1) "the issue . . .
. . . United States , 335 U.S. 451, 460, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring), then . . .
. . . Powell, 149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945) ). . . . Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). . . .
. . . Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335, 343-44, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (explaining that "the [s]tate . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). . . .
. . . Kroger Tex., L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Gaubert , 499 U.S. 315, 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. . . .
. . . Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). . . . See Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .
. . . Co. of America, 341 S.W.3d 323, 335-36 (Tex. 2011). . . .
. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 311, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ). . . .
. . . administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement[s] would entail." 424 U.S. at 335 . . . Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . . Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .
. . . Corps. , 419 U.S. 102, 134, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974) ). . . .
. . . Sound Transit , 335 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). . . . also held that "agency regulations cannot independently create rights enforceable through § 1983." 335 . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). He has not done so. . . . Miller , 335 F.3d at 893 (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. . . .
. . . Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("undercut"); Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency . . .