Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 337.27 (2025)
Exercise of power of eminent domain by department; procedure; title; cost.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
FL-LEGleg.state.fl.us
JustiaFla. Statutes
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
337.27 Exercise of power of eminent domain by department; procedure; title; cost.—
(1) The power of eminent domain is vested in the department to condemn all necessary lands and property, including rights of access, air, view, and light, whether public or private, for the purpose of securing and utilizing transportation rights-of-way, including, but not limited to, any lands reasonably necessary for securing applicable permits, areas necessary for management of access, borrow pits, drainage ditches, water retention areas, rest areas, replacement access for landowners whose access is impaired due to the construction of a facility, and replacement rights-of-way for relocated rail and utility facilities; for existing, proposed, or anticipated transportation facilities on the State Highway System or State Park Road System; or in a transportation corridor designated by the department; or for the purposes of screening, relocation, removal, or disposal of junkyards and scrap metal processing facilities. The department shall also have the power to condemn any material and property necessary for such purposes. The secretary of the Department of Transportation may delegate the authority to execute eminent domain resolutions to the department’s chief administrative officer of the district in which the property is located, or to the chief administrative officer of the Office of Florida Turnpike if the property is to be acquired for a turnpike system project.
(2) Title to any land acquired in the name of the department vests in the state.
(3) The department is authorized to pay the judgment or compensation, including deposits required, awarded in any such proceedings out of any funds available to the department for the maintenance or construction of any transportation facility on the State Highway System, on the State Park Road System, or in a transportation corridor designated by the department.
(4) When the department acquires property for a transportation facility or in a transportation corridor through the exercise of eminent domain authority, or by purchase or donation, it is not subject to any liability imposed by chapter 376 or chapter 403 for preexisting soil or groundwater contamination due solely to its ownership. This section does not affect the rights or liabilities of any past or future owners of the acquired property nor does it affect the liability of any governmental entity for the results of its actions which create or exacerbate a pollution source. The department and the Department of Environmental Protection may enter into interagency agreements for the performance, funding, and reimbursement of the investigative and remedial acts necessary for property acquired by the department.
History.—s. 106, ch. 29965, 1955; s. 18, ch. 57-318; ss. 23, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 1, ch. 80-312; s. 165, ch. 84-309; s. 2, ch. 84-319; s. 3, ch. 87-164; s. 1, ch. 87-242; s. 18, ch. 88-168; s. 6, ch. 89-232; s. 132, ch. 92-152; s. 166, ch. 94-356; s. 64, ch. 99-385.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13
cases, 1966–2009 · leading case: DOT v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 532 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1988).
DOT v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 532 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1988). “This subsection shall be construed as a specific recognition by the Legislature that this means of limiting the rising costs to the state of property acquisition is a public purpose and that, without this limitation, the viability of many public projects will be threatened.”
State v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 507 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). “We are here concerned with the constitutionality of section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985).”
Sys. Components Corp. v. Florida Deparment of Transp., 14 So. 3d 967 (Fla. 2009). “1988) (upholding the constitutionality of section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985)).”
State v. Barbara's Creative Jewelry, 728 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). “While appellees claim that the cost of acquisition is a compensation issue, we disagree in the context of section 337.27 and conclude that it is an issue of necessity and public purpose.”
City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992). “27(2) authorizes the DOT to acquire the land in its entirety if by doing so the acquisition cost will be less than the cost of acquiring only a portion of the property.”
State, Dept. of Transp. v. Patel, 768 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). “DOT took the position that, if the jury's determination of the value of the whole property was equal to or less than the "acquisition costs" of the partial taking, DOT would seek a whole take under section 337.27(2), Florida Statutes (1997).”
Jt. Ventures, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 519 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “26 (empowering it to execute instruments of sale, leases or conveyances), section 337.27 (permitting it to exercise its power of eminent domain by condemning all necessary lands and property for the purpose of securing transportation rights of way, including borrow pits,…”
Salfi v. Div. of Admin., State, Dep't of Transp., 312 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). “The property owners’ position is that the source of the power is found in Fla.Stat. § 337.27 (1973), and that rest areas are not there specified.”
Nye v. City of Ocala, 559 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). “401, Florida Statutes, in 1988 to explicitly authorize municipalities to exercise eminent domain powers granted to DOT in section 337.27(1) but did not include in this authorization the power granted to DOT by section 337.”
Hous. Auth. of Fort Lauderdale v. State Dep't of Transp., 385 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). “The statutory authority for the department to condemn property is found in Section 337.27(1), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: The power of eminent domain is vested in the [Division of Administration of the Department of Transportation] to condemn all necessary lands and…”
Dixie Oil Co. of Florida v. State, Dep't of Transp., 657 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “We do not need to determine whether the Department’s condemnation powers in section 337.27, Florida Statutes, can be reconciled with its regulatory powers in the Access Management Act because Dixie readily concedes that it presented evidence of, and presumably has now accepted…”
Karen's Tack, Inc. v. State Dep't of Transp., 754 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). “Appellants are the tenants in a shopping center who appeal an order granting a “quick take” of the entire shopping center pursuant to section 337.27(2), Florida Statutes (1997).”
— 337.27(1) — 3 cases
City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992). “27(2) authorizes the DOT to acquire the land in its entirety if by doing so the acquisition cost will be less than the cost of acquiring only a portion of the property.”
Hous. Auth. of Fort Lauderdale v. State Dep't of Transp., 385 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). “The statutory authority for the department to condemn property is found in Section 337.27(1), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: The power of eminent domain is vested in the [Division of Administration of the Department of Transportation] to condemn all necessary lands and…”
Nye v. City of Ocala, 559 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). “401, Florida Statutes, in 1988 to explicitly authorize municipalities to exercise eminent domain powers granted to DOT in section 337.27(1) but did not include in this authorization the power granted to DOT by section 337.”
— 337.27(2) — 5 cases
State v. Barbara's Creative Jewelry, 728 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). “While appellees claim that the cost of acquisition is a compensation issue, we disagree in the context of section 337.27 and conclude that it is an issue of necessity and public purpose.”
City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992). “27(2) authorizes the DOT to acquire the land in its entirety if by doing so the acquisition cost will be less than the cost of acquiring only a portion of the property.”
State, Dept. of Transp. v. Patel, 768 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). “DOT took the position that, if the jury's determination of the value of the whole property was equal to or less than the "acquisition costs" of the partial taking, DOT would seek a whole take under section 337.27(2), Florida Statutes (1997).”
Nye v. City of Ocala, 559 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). “401, Florida Statutes, in 1988 to explicitly authorize municipalities to exercise eminent domain powers granted to DOT in section 337.27(1) but did not include in this authorization the power granted to DOT by section 337.”
Karen's Tack, Inc. v. State Dep't of Transp., 754 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). “Appellants are the tenants in a shopping center who appeal an order granting a “quick take” of the entire shopping center pursuant to section 337.27(2), Florida Statutes (1997).”
— 337.27(3) — 4 cases
DOT v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 532 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1988). “This subsection shall be construed as a specific recognition by the Legislature that this means of limiting the rising costs to the state of property acquisition is a public purpose and that, without this limitation, the viability of many public projects will be threatened.”
State v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 507 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). “We are here concerned with the constitutionality of section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985).”
Sys. Components Corp. v. Florida Deparment of Transp., 14 So. 3d 967 (Fla. 2009). “1988) (upholding the constitutionality of section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985)).”
Nye v. City of Ocala, 559 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). “401, Florida Statutes, in 1988 to explicitly authorize municipalities to exercise eminent domain powers granted to DOT in section 337.27(1) but did not include in this authorization the power granted to DOT by section 337.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.