The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXVIII
NATURAL RESOURCES; CONSERVATION, RECLAMATION, AND USE

Chapter 375
OUTDOOR RECREATION AND CONSERVATION LANDS

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F.S. 375.251

375.251 Limitation on liability of persons making available to public certain areas for recreational purposes without charge.—

(1) The purpose of this section is to encourage persons to make land, water areas, and park areas available to the public for outdoor recreational purposes by limiting their liability to persons using these areas and to third persons who may be damaged by the acts or omissions of persons using these areas.

(2)(a) An owner or lessee who provides the public with an area for outdoor recreational purposes owes no duty of care to keep that area safe for entry or use by others, or to give warning to persons entering or going on that area of any hazardous conditions, structures, or activities on the area. An owner or lessee who provides the public with an area for outdoor recreational purposes:

1. Is not presumed to extend any assurance that the area is safe for any purpose;

2. Does not incur any duty of care toward a person who goes on the area; or

3. Is not liable or responsible for any injury to persons or property caused by the act or omission of a person who goes on the area.

(b) Notwithstanding the inclusion of the term “public” in this subsection and subsection (1), an owner or lessee who makes available to any person an area primarily for the purposes of hunting, fishing, or wildlife viewing is entitled to the limitation on liability provided herein so long as the owner or lessee provides written notice of this provision to the person before or at the time of entry upon the area or posts notice of this provision conspicuously upon the area.

(c) The Legislature recognizes that an area offered for outdoor recreational purposes may be subject to multiple uses. The limitation of liability extended to an owner or lessee under this subsection applies only if no charge is made for entry to or use of the area for outdoor recreational purposes and no other revenue is derived from patronage of the area for outdoor recreational purposes. An owner may derive revenue from concessions or special events but will only retain liability protection under this subsection if such revenue is used exclusively to maintain, manage, and improve the outdoor recreational area.

(3)(a) An owner of an area who enters into a written agreement concerning the area with a state agency for outdoor recreational purposes, where such agreement recognizes that the state agency is responsible for personal injury, loss, or damage resulting in whole or in part from the state agency’s use of the area under the terms of the agreement subject to the limitations and conditions specified in s. 768.28, owes no duty of care to keep the area safe for entry or use by others, or to give warning to persons entering or going on the area of any hazardous conditions, structures, or activities thereon. An owner who enters into a written agreement concerning the area with a state agency for outdoor recreational purposes:

1. Is not presumed to extend any assurance that the area is safe for any purpose;

2. Does not incur any duty of care toward a person who goes on the area that is subject to the agreement; or

3. Is not liable or responsible for any injury to persons or property caused by the act or omission of a person who goes on the area that is subject to the agreement.

(b) This subsection applies to all persons going on the area that is subject to the agreement, including invitees, licensees, and trespassers.

(c) It is the intent of this subsection that an agreement entered into pursuant to this subsection should not result in compensation to the owner of the area above reimbursement of reasonable costs or expenses associated with the agreement. An agreement that provides for such does not subject the owner or the state agency to liability even if the compensation exceeds those costs or expenses. This paragraph applies only to agreements executed after July 1, 2012.

(4) This section does not relieve any person of liability that would otherwise exist for deliberate, willful, or malicious injury to persons or property. This section does not create or increase the liability of any person.

(5) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Area” includes land, water, and park areas.

(b) “Outdoor recreational purposes” includes, but is not limited to, hunting; fishing; wildlife viewing; swimming; boating; camping; picnicking; hiking; pleasure driving; nature study; water skiing; motorcycling; visiting historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites; and traversing or crossing for the purpose of ingress and egress to and from, and access to and from, public lands or lands owned or leased by a state agency which are used for outdoor recreational purposes.

History.—ss. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ch. 63-313; s. 1, ch. 75-17; s. 7, ch. 87-328; s. 1, ch. 2012-203; s. 1, ch. 2021-56.

F.S. 375.251 on Google Scholar

F.S. 375.251 on Casetext

Amendments to 375.251

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 375.251

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 375.251.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

WILLS, v. UNITED STATES, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1277 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 375.251, applies and shields the United States from liability. See Def.’s Exhibit C-2 at 2-3. . . . .

SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, v. DAIAGI,, 824 So. 2d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 375.251, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . . Fischer, the Supreme Court reversed summary judgment based on section 375.251, ruling that questions . . . first district also reversed a summary judgment for a private landowner which was based on section 375.251 . . .

MONZON, v. UNITED STATES, 253 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2001)

. . . . § 375.251, and the district court relied on this statute as an alternate ground for dismissal of Plaintiffs . . .

HOWARD, v. UNITED STATES US a S., 181 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)

. . . . § 375.251(2)(b); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 477-4; Wash. Rev.Code § 4.24.210. . . .

M. GOODMAN, v. JUNIPER SPRINGS CANOE RENTALS RECREATION, INC., 983 F. Supp. 1384 (M.D. Fla. 1997)

. . . United States has moved for summary judgment stating that Florida’s recreational use statute, Section 375.251 . . . In relevant part, section 375.251 provides: An owner or lessee who provides the public with a park area . . . the patronage of the general public, is con ducted on such park area or land, or any part thereof. § 375.251 . . . Stat. § 375.251; licensing fees charged to boat and seaplane charger operators do not “change the fact . . .

DENNIS, v. CITY OF TAMPA,, 581 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . . § 375.251, Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

COX, v. COMMUNITY SERVICES DEPARTMENT,, 543 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . applied constitutionally and retroactively to appellant’s action against the county, and (2) that section 375.251 . . . The trial court erred in applying section 375.251, Florida Statutes, to the county-owned and operated . . . The final summary judgment in favor of the county, based on the application of section 375.251, Florida . . .

ZUK, v. UNITED STATES, 698 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

. . . Stat. § 375.251 applies to FTCA actions where the requirements of the statute are met. Kleer v. . . . Therefore, both the FTCA and Fla.Stat. § 375.251 are applicable to the instant action. C. . . . Fla.Stat. § 375.251(1). . . . . § 375.251. See Kleer, 761 F.2d at 1495. . . . Fla.Stat. § 375.251(5). . . .

AVALLONE, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CITRUS COUNTY,, 493 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1986)

. . . Section 375.251, Florida Statutes, would exempt private persons from liability under these circumstances . . .

A. TERRELL, v. UNITED STATES BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA, v. CITY OF PARKER,, 783 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1986)

. . . . § 375.251 (West 1974). . . . Section 375.251 exempts from tort liability landowners who gratuitously provide the public with outdoor . . . In Kleer, we held that section 375.251 barred a suit brought against the United States by a plaintiff . . . We therefore affirm the district court’s rejection of the United States’ claim that section 375.251 shields . . .

KLEER, v. UNITED STATES, 761 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985)

. . . Judge: In this Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit, we affirm the district court’s ruling that section 375.251 . . . Our resolution of the issue turns upon the construction of section 375.251 in Abdin v. . . . Relying upon section 375.251, the state trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant. . . . Statutory Construction The Abdin rule is consistent with the purpose of section 375.251. . . . Fla.Stat.Ann. § 375.251(1). . . .

CITY OF PENSACOLA, v. G. STAMM, 448 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . The final point raised by the city of Pensacola is that section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1981), which . . . In our opinion, section 375.251 is intended to encourage private persons or entities to make their property . . . The final point made by the Board is that section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1981), should be applied . . .

ARIAS v. STATE FARM FIRE CASUALTY COMPANY E., 426 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Appellees also assert that under the provisions of Section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1979), the defendant . . . Section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1979), provides in pertinent part: (1) The purpose of this act is . . .

Q. CHAPMAN, v. PINELLAS COUNTY, a, 423 So. 2d 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . 392 So.2d 911 (Fla.3d DCA), petition for review denied, 389 So.2d 1113 (Fla.1980), held that section 375.251 . . . We agree with Yelvington and hold that section 375.251 does not apply to counties. . . . We think the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting section 375.251 was to encourage private owners . . . No such waiver existed at that time, and it is logical to conclude that section 375.251 was not designed . . .

SEA FRESH FROZEN PRODUCTS, INC. v. ABDIN, 411 So. 2d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . commercial activity” on the ramp property to such an extent as to deprive it of the protection of section 375.251 . . . I would remand this case for a new trial only. .Section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1975) states in part . . . The appellant was legally entitled to the benefits under section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1975), and . . .

CAKORA, a A. A. v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY,, 388 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . favor of the county on the sole basis that the duty of care owing to Cakora as set forth in Section 375.251 . . . Yelvington, 389 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), that Section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1977), is not . . .

DAVIS v. R. TEDDER,, 388 So. 2d 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Appellant also contends that Section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1979), limits liability for injury in . . .

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, v. Y. YELVINGTON O., 392 So. 2d 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . The County asserts first, that Section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1975), relieves it of any duty of care . . . Thus, the statement in McPhee that Section 375.251 does not apply to a county could be considered dictum . . . We now hold that Section 375.251 does not apply to a county. . . .

ABDIN, v. FISCHER, 374 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1979)

. . . This is a direct appeal from a circuit court’s order upholding the constitutionality of section 375.251 . . .

McPHEE, v. DADE COUNTY, a, 362 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . The appellees also rely on Section 375.251, Florida Statutes (1975) for immunity. . . .