Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 376.305 (2025)
Removal of prohibited discharges.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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376.305 Removal of prohibited discharges.—
(1) Any person discharging a pollutant as prohibited by ss. 376.30-376.317 shall immediately undertake to contain, remove, and abate the discharge to the satisfaction of the department. However, such an undertaking to contain, remove, or abate a discharge shall not be deemed an admission of responsibility for the discharge by the person taking such action. Notwithstanding this requirement, the department may undertake the removal of the discharge and may contract and retain agents who shall operate under the direction of the department.
(2) If the person causing the discharge, or the person in charge of facilities at which the discharge has taken place, fails to act immediately, the department may arrange for the removal of the pollutant; except that, if the pollutant was discharged into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, the department shall act in accordance with the national contingency plan for removal of such pollutant as established pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, and the costs of removal incurred by the department shall be paid in accordance with the applicable provisions of that law. Federal funds provided under that act shall be used to the maximum extent possible prior to the expenditure of state funds.
(3) No action taken by any person to contain or remove a discharge, whether such action is taken voluntarily or at the request of the department or its designee, shall be construed as an admission of liability for the discharge.
(4) No person who, voluntarily or at the request of the department or its designee, renders assistance in containing or removing any pollutant shall be liable for any civil damages to third parties resulting solely from the acts or omissions of such person in rendering such assistance, except for acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful misconduct.
(5) Nothing in ss. 376.30-376.317 shall affect the right of any person to render assistance in containing or removing any pollutant or any rights which that person may have against any third party whose acts or omissions in any way have caused or contributed to the discharge of the pollutant.
(6) The Legislature created the Abandoned Tank Restoration Program in response to the need to provide financial assistance for cleanup of sites that have abandoned petroleum storage systems. For purposes of this subsection, the term “abandoned petroleum storage system” means a petroleum storage system that has not stored petroleum products for consumption, use, or sale since March 1, 1990. The department shall establish the Abandoned Tank Restoration Program to facilitate the restoration of sites contaminated by abandoned petroleum storage systems.
(a) To be included in the program:
1. An application must be submitted to the department certifying that the system has not stored petroleum products for consumption, use, or sale at the facility since March 1, 1990.
2. The owner or operator of the petroleum storage system when it was in service must have ceased conducting business involving consumption, use, or sale of petroleum products at that facility on or before March 1, 1990.
3. The site is not otherwise eligible for the cleanup programs pursuant to s. 376.3072.
4. The site is not otherwise eligible for the Petroleum Cleanup Participation Program under s. 376.3071(13) based on any discharge reporting form received by the department before January 1, 1995, or a written report of contamination submitted to the department on or before December 31, 1998.
(b) In order to be eligible for the program, petroleum storage systems from which a discharge occurred must be closed pursuant to department rules before an eligibility determination. However, if the department determines that the owner of the facility cannot financially comply with the department’s petroleum storage system closure requirements and all other eligibility requirements are met, the petroleum storage system closure requirements shall be waived. The department shall take into consideration the owner’s net worth and the economic impact on the owner in making the determination of the owner’s financial ability.
(c) Sites accepted in the program are eligible for site rehabilitation funding as provided in s. 376.3071.
(d) The following sites are excluded from eligibility:
1. Sites on property of the Federal Government;
2. Sites contaminated by pollutants that are not petroleum products; or
3. Sites where the department has been denied site access.
(e) Participating sites are subject to a deductible as determined by rule, not to exceed $10,000.
History.—s. 84, ch. 83-310; s. 13, ch. 86-159; s. 12, ch. 90-98; s. 13, ch. 91-305; s. 6, ch. 92-30; s. 2, ch. 94-311; s. 1016, ch. 95-148; s. 4, ch. 96-277; s. 60, ch. 2007-5; s. 7, ch. 2014-151; s. 8, ch. 2016-184.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10
cases, 1988–2010 · leading case: Aramark Unif. & Apparel v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2004).
Aramark Unif. & Apparel v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2004). “, § 376.305(2) Fla. Stat. (2002) ("If the person causing the discharge.”
Suddath Van Lines v. Dept. of Envir. Prot., 668 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “§ 376.305(7), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1992). I find that this interpretation by the Department is reasonable and consistent with case law.”
Kaplan v. Peterson, 674 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). “" § 376.305(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). Section 376.”
Kerper v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 894 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). “etent, substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ improperly shifted the burden of proof to Kerper to prove that he did not discharge the used oil; (3) the ALJ abused his discretion by admitting evidence of prior bad acts; (4) the ALJ abused his discretion by excluding one of Kerper's…”
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Germany, 712 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). “See § 376.305, .313, Fla. Stat. (1987). Deford apparently filed a crossclaim against Germany and its owners, William and Kathy Germany [collectively "the Germanys" or appellees].”
Z.K. Mart, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot., 38 So. 3d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The contamination was reported to the appellee Department of Environmental Protection, and the appellant began cleanup activities as required under section 376.305, Florida Statutes. After an extensive delay, the appellant submitted a Site Assessment Report, as mandated by…”
Ober v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 688 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). “§ 376.305(7), Fla. Stat. (1995). Rule 62-770.”
D'Alto v. State Dept. of Env't Prot., 860 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “(current version at § 376.305(6), Fla. Stat. (2002)).”
J.H. Williams Oil Co. v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 707 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). “” See § 376.305(6), Fla. Stat. (1991), repealed by ch.”
Com. Coating Corp. v. State, 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 213 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g 1988). “Section 376.305(5), F.S. Reasons for EDI Program ineligibility can include the nature of the substance discharged, the statutory ineligibility criteria contained in Section 366.”
— 376.305(1) — 1 case
Kaplan v. Peterson, 674 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). “" § 376.305(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). Section 376.”
— 376.305(2) — 2 cases
Aramark Unif. & Apparel v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2004). “, § 376.305(2) Fla. Stat. (2002) ("If the person causing the discharge.”
Z.K. Mart, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot., 38 So. 3d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The contamination was reported to the appellee Department of Environmental Protection, and the appellant began cleanup activities as required under section 376.305, Florida Statutes. After an extensive delay, the appellant submitted a Site Assessment Report, as mandated by…”
— 376.305(5) — 1 case
Com. Coating Corp. v. State, 33 Fla. Supp. 2d 213 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g 1988). “Section 376.305(5), F.S. Reasons for EDI Program ineligibility can include the nature of the substance discharged, the statutory ineligibility criteria contained in Section 366.”
— 376.305(6) — 2 cases
D'Alto v. State Dept. of Env't Prot., 860 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “(current version at § 376.305(6), Fla. Stat. (2002)).”
J.H. Williams Oil Co. v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 707 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). “” See § 376.305(6), Fla. Stat. (1991), repealed by ch.”
— 376.305(7) — 2 cases
Suddath Van Lines v. Dept. of Envir. Prot., 668 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “§ 376.305(7), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1992). I find that this interpretation by the Department is reasonable and consistent with case law.”
Ober v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 688 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). “§ 376.305(7), Fla. Stat. (1995). Rule 62-770.”
— 376.305(7)(a) — 1 case
Suddath Van Lines v. Dept. of Envir. Prot., 668 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “§ 376.305(7), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1992). I find that this interpretation by the Department is reasonable and consistent with case law.”
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