Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 394.9135 (2025)
Immediate releases from total confinement; transfer of person to department; time limitations on assessment, notification, and filing petition to hold in custody; filing petition after release; order into custody of department after release.
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394.9135 Immediate releases from total confinement; transfer of person to department; time limitations on assessment, notification, and filing petition to hold in custody; filing petition after release; order into custody of department after release.—
(1)(a) If the anticipated release from total confinement of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense becomes immediate for any reason, the agency with jurisdiction shall upon immediate release from total confinement transfer that person to the custody of the department to be held in an appropriate secure facility.
(b) If a person who committed a sexually violent offense and who is serving an incarcerative sentence under the custody of the Department of Corrections, the Department of Juvenile Justice, or a local detention facility, or who is committed to the custody of the department due to an adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity is released, the state attorney, as designated in s. 394.913, may file a petition with the circuit court within 120 hours after the person’s release alleging that:
1. Section 394.9125, s. 394.913, or this section requires that the person be referred for consideration for civil commitment before release and the person was not referred because of a mistake, oversight, or intentional act; or
2. The person was referred for commitment consideration but, through a mistake, oversight, or intentional act, was released rather than transferred to the custody of the Department of Children and Families as required by this part.
If the judge determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person was released in contravention of s. 394.913 or this section, the judge shall order the person to be taken into custody and delivered to an appropriate secure facility designated by the Department of Children and Families.
(2) Within 72 hours after transfer pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) or receipt into the department’s custody pursuant to paragraph (1)(b) or s. 394.9125(4), the multidisciplinary team shall assess whether the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator. If the multidisciplinary team determines that the person does not meet the definition of a sexually violent predator, that person shall be immediately released. If at least two members of the multidisciplinary team, after all clinical evaluations have been conducted, determine that the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator, the team shall provide the state attorney, as designated by s. 394.913, with its written assessment and recommendation within the 72-hour period or, if the 72-hour period ends after 5 p.m. on a working day or on a weekend or holiday, within the next working day.
(3) Within 48 hours after receipt of the written assessment and recommendation from the multidisciplinary team, the state attorney, as designated in s. 394.913, may file a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and stating facts sufficient to support the allegation. If a petition is not filed within 48 hours after receipt of the written assessment and recommendation by the state attorney, the person shall be immediately released, except that, if the 48-hour period ends after 5 p.m. on a working day or on a weekend or holiday, the petition may be filed on the next working day without resulting in the person’s release. If a petition is filed pursuant to this section and the judge determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is a sexually violent predator, the judge shall order that the person be maintained in custody and held in an appropriate secure facility for further proceedings in accordance with this part.
(4) This section is not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with the time limitations which results in the release of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense is not dispositive of the case and does not prevent the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to this part.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 40
cases, 1999–2016 · leading case: Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2009).
Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2009). “" § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So.”
State v. Phillips, 119 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 2013). “Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State to take steps to initiate a commitment proceeding against a person who while in lawful custody obtains an order for immediate release for any reason.”
Moore v. State, 909 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). “9135 applies when the release from total confinement of the person to be committed becomes "immediate for any reason.”
In Re Commitment of Phillips, 69 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). “Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State to take steps to initiate a commitment proceeding against a person who while in lawful custody obtains an order for immediate release for any reason.”
Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2012). “In accordance with the Act’s immediate release provisions set forth in section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2002), Morel was then transferred to the FCCC in DeSoto County, which is located within the Twelfth Judicial Circuit.”
Gordon v. Regier, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “Gordon was not in custody at the time that he was seized pursuant to a seventy-two-hour hold authorized by section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2000), but instead had been released from the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) and was in the civilian population, we hold…”
State v. Ducharme, 881 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). “Commitment proceedings were instituted against Ducharme pursuant to section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2000).”
Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2006). “§ 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2002). [11] The district courts have also been ambiguous.”
Larimore v. State, 917 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “In addition, section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (1999) (a new section created by the amendment), provides that if anticipated release from total confinement becomes immediate for any reason, the person shall be transferred upon release to the custody of the Department of…”
State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002). “§ 394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, unlike these other states that require an adversarial hearing within seventy-two hours of detention, Florida's use of a seventy-two hour time period after detention provides no explicit due process protection and only speeds the process by…”
State v. Kobel, 757 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). “§ 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (1999). [5] Since the state was proceeding under section 394.”
Tanguay v. State, 880 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2004). “On April 10, a multidisciplinary team, pursuant to section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (1999), recommended to the State that it begin civil commitment proceedings against Gordon under the Act and a petition was filed.”
394.9135(1): 23 cases
Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2009). “" § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So.”
State v. Phillips, 119 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 2013). “Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State to take steps to initiate a commitment proceeding against a person who while in lawful custody obtains an order for immediate release for any reason.”
In Re Commitment of Phillips, 69 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). “Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State to take steps to initiate a commitment proceeding against a person who while in lawful custody obtains an order for immediate release for any reason.”
Gordon v. Regier, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “Gordon was not in custody at the time that he was seized pursuant to a seventy-two-hour hold authorized by section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2000), but instead had been released from the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) and was in the civilian population, we hold…”
Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2012). “In accordance with the Act’s immediate release provisions set forth in section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2002), Morel was then transferred to the FCCC in DeSoto County, which is located within the Twelfth Judicial Circuit.”
394.9135(1)(a): 1 case
Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2009). “" § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So.”
394.9135(2): 13 cases
Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2009). “" § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So.”
State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002). “§ 394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, unlike these other states that require an adversarial hearing within seventy-two hours of detention, Florida's use of a seventy-two hour time period after detention provides no explicit due process protection and only speeds the process by…”
Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2006). “§ 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2002). [11] The district courts have also been ambiguous.”
In Re Commitment of Phillips, 69 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). “Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State to take steps to initiate a commitment proceeding against a person who while in lawful custody obtains an order for immediate release for any reason.”
Kephart v. Kearney, 826 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
394.9135(3): 15 cases
Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2009). “" § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So.”
Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2012). “In accordance with the Act’s immediate release provisions set forth in section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2002), Morel was then transferred to the FCCC in DeSoto County, which is located within the Twelfth Judicial Circuit.”
Larimore v. State, 917 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “In addition, section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (1999) (a new section created by the amendment), provides that if anticipated release from total confinement becomes immediate for any reason, the person shall be transferred upon release to the custody of the Department of…”
State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002). “§ 394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, unlike these other states that require an adversarial hearing within seventy-two hours of detention, Florida's use of a seventy-two hour time period after detention provides no explicit due process protection and only speeds the process by…”
State v. Ducharme, 881 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). “Commitment proceedings were instituted against Ducharme pursuant to section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2000).”
394.9135(4): 10 cases
Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2009). “" § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So.”
Moore v. State, 909 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). “9135 applies when the release from total confinement of the person to be committed becomes "immediate for any reason.”
Larimore v. State, 917 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “In addition, section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (1999) (a new section created by the amendment), provides that if anticipated release from total confinement becomes immediate for any reason, the person shall be transferred upon release to the custody of the Department of…”
State v. Phillips, 119 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 2013). “Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State to take steps to initiate a commitment proceeding against a person who while in lawful custody obtains an order for immediate release for any reason.”
Gordon v. Regier, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “Gordon was not in custody at the time that he was seized pursuant to a seventy-two-hour hold authorized by section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2000), but instead had been released from the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) and was in the civilian population, we hold…”
394.9135(l)(a): 2 cases
Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2009). “" § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So.”
William Junior Barber v. State of Florida, 207 So. 3d 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
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