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Florida Statute 394.9135 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 394.9135 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXIX
PUBLIC HEALTH
Chapter 394
MENTAL HEALTH
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 394.9135
394.9135 Immediate releases from total confinement; transfer of person to department; time limitations on assessment, notification, and filing petition to hold in custody; filing petition after release; order into custody of department after release.
(1)(a) If the anticipated release from total confinement of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense becomes immediate for any reason, the agency with jurisdiction shall upon immediate release from total confinement transfer that person to the custody of the department to be held in an appropriate secure facility.
(b) If a person who committed a sexually violent offense and who is serving an incarcerative sentence under the custody of the Department of Corrections, the Department of Juvenile Justice, or a local detention facility, or who is committed to the custody of the department due to an adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity is released, the state attorney, as designated in s. 394.913, may file a petition with the circuit court within 120 hours after the person’s release alleging that:
1. Section 394.9125, s. 394.913, or this section requires that the person be referred for consideration for civil commitment before release and the person was not referred because of a mistake, oversight, or intentional act; or
2. The person was referred for commitment consideration but, through a mistake, oversight, or intentional act, was released rather than transferred to the custody of the Department of Children and Families as required by this part.

If the judge determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person was released in contravention of s. 394.913 or this section, the judge shall order the person to be taken into custody and delivered to an appropriate secure facility designated by the Department of Children and Families.

(2) Within 72 hours after transfer pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) or receipt into the department’s custody pursuant to paragraph (1)(b) or s. 394.9125(4), the multidisciplinary team shall assess whether the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator. If the multidisciplinary team determines that the person does not meet the definition of a sexually violent predator, that person shall be immediately released. If at least two members of the multidisciplinary team, after all clinical evaluations have been conducted, determine that the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator, the team shall provide the state attorney, as designated by s. 394.913, with its written assessment and recommendation within the 72-hour period or, if the 72-hour period ends after 5 p.m. on a working day or on a weekend or holiday, within the next working day.
(3) Within 48 hours after receipt of the written assessment and recommendation from the multidisciplinary team, the state attorney, as designated in s. 394.913, may file a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and stating facts sufficient to support the allegation. If a petition is not filed within 48 hours after receipt of the written assessment and recommendation by the state attorney, the person shall be immediately released, except that, if the 48-hour period ends after 5 p.m. on a working day or on a weekend or holiday, the petition may be filed on the next working day without resulting in the person’s release. If a petition is filed pursuant to this section and the judge determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is a sexually violent predator, the judge shall order that the person be maintained in custody and held in an appropriate secure facility for further proceedings in accordance with this part.
(4) This section is not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with the time limitations which results in the release of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense is not dispositive of the case and does not prevent the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to this part.
History.s. 7, ch. 99-222; s. 2, ch. 2012-79; s. 4, ch. 2014-2; s. 103, ch. 2014-19.

F.S. 394.9135 on Google Scholar

F.S. 394.9135 on Casetext

Amendments to 394.9135


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 394.9135
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 394.9135.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

BARBER, v. STATE, 207 So.3d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. . . . Id. § 394.9135(3). . . . We conclude that the State’s petition is facially valid under the authority of section 394.9135(l)(a) . . . Instead, section 394.9135 applies with its own, distinct time table (with rounding-up provisions) for . . .

INSKO, v. STATE, 181 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . until February 15, 2005, at 7:58 p.m., when the State initiated commitment proceedings under section 394.9135 . . . requirement explained in Larimore requires the State to initiate commitment proceedings under section 394.9135 . . . We hold that lawful custody under section 394.9135(1) requires the State to initiate commitment proceedings . . . custody of the DCF prior to the expiration of the individual’s incarcerative sentence pursuant to section 394.9135 . . . Conversely, if the State first initiates commitment proceedings under section 394.9135(1) after the actual . . .

I. JACKSON, v. STATE, 166 So. 3d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 394.9135(1), (2). . . . .” § 394.9135(3). . . . . §§ .394.9135(3), 394.915, 394.916(1), 394.917(1). . . .

STATE v. REED,, 161 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 2015)

. . . FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE WHILE IN LAWFUL CUSTODY WHERE THE COMMITMENT PROCESS IS INITIATED UNDER SECTION 394.9135 . . .

REED, v. STATE, 159 So. 3d 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Here, the State initiated the commitment process under section 394.9135. . . . Section 394.9135(1) provides that when a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . The report was untimely because, as acknowledged by the State, the 72-hour period in section 394.9135 . . . This is not a jurisdictional defect, see § 394.9135(4), Fla. Stat. (2012); Larimore v. . . . We share Judge- Lawson’s views that the judicial gloss placed upon section 394.9135 by these decisions . . .

MOREL, v. STATE, 138 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Phillips, the Florida Supreme Court concluded: [S]ection 394.9135 was enacted as a safety valve for certain . . . To the contrary, the staff analyses explain that section 394.9135 addresses situations where a release . . . Thus, section 394.9135 would be utilized in situations where the award of credit and/or gain-time causes . . . We hold that lawful custody under section 394.9135(1) requires the State to initiate commitment proceedings . . . Conversely, if the State first initiates commitment proceedings under section 394.9135(1) after the actual . . .

STATE v. PHILLIPS,, 119 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 2013)

. . . (quoting § 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. (2004)). . . . In addition, we found that the jurisdictional disclaimer provision in section 394.9135(4) “should not . . . We initially determine that Larimore’s construction of section 394.9135 controls the issue before us. . . . We are not persuaded by the State’s definition of “lawful custody” under section 394.9135. . . . The term “total confinement” appears in both commitment procedures, sections 394.913 and 394.9135. . . . See § 394.9135(1), Fla. . . .

A. EVANS, v. STATE, 125 So. 3d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State . . . State, 866 So.2d 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004): Section 394.9135 establishes the procedure where the anticipated . . . Id. § 394.9135(1). . . . rendered unlawful by a judicially mandated change in the person’s release date would render section 394.9135 . . . This, in turn, would render section 394.9135 meaningless in most of the cases for which the statute appears . . .

S. ANDERSON, v. STATE, 93 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Children and Family Services upon that person’s “immediate release from total confinement” under section 394.9135 . . . statutory scheme than the temporary remedy of pretrial release, which is in fact provided for in section 394.9135 . . .

MOREL, v. E. WILKINS,, 84 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2012)

. . . In accordance with the Act’s immediate release provisions set forth in section 394.9135, Florida Statutes . . . Commitment proceedings were instituted against Morel pursuant to section 394.9135, Florida Statutes ( . . . procedures when the anticipated release from total confinement “becomes immediate for any reason.” § 394.9135 . . . it likely that the person will commit another sexually violent offense if not confined. §§ 394.192, 394.9135 . . . and held in an appropriate secure facility for further proceedings in accordance with this part.” § 394.9135 . . . See §§ 394.913(2), 394.9135(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . See generally §§ 394.913(2)-(3), 394.9135(3), 394.914, 394.916(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

L. BOATMAN, v. STATE, 77 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 2011)

. . . Section 394.9135 provides for expedited procedures when the anticipated release from total confinement . . . “becomes immediate for any reason.” § 394.9135(1), Fla. . . .

K. BISHOP, v. SHELDON,, 68 So. 3d 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Family Services (DCF) when the person is immediately released for some reason as provided in section 394.9135 . . . Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State . . . commitment petition on that same date and was entitled to proceed against Bishop pursuant to section 394.9135 . . .

In COMMITMENT OF PHILLIPS. v., 69 So. 3d 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . released from the DOC and was transferred to the Florida Civil Commitment Center pursuant to section 394.9135 . . . We recognize that section 394.9135 provides a procedure for the DOC to initiate commitment proceedings . . . Thus, we do not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow the State . . . Section 394.9135(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides as follows: If the anticipated release from total . . . Section 394.9135(2) requires the multidisciplinary team to determine whether the person qualifies as . . .

MADISON, v. STATE, 27 So. 3d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . is transferred to the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services pursuant to section 394.9135 . . .

MARSH, v. STATE, 14 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Children and Family Services upon that person’s “immediate release from total confinement” under section 394.9135 . . . custody at the time any initial steps are taken in the commitment process under either section 394.913 or 394.9135 . . .

LARIMORE, v. STATE, 2 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 2008)

. . . The Gordon court also found that section 394.9135 provides a “safety valve for a situation where ‘the . . . See § 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . We now turn to section 394.9135(4). . . . Even though section 394.9135 is replete with references to the individual being in custody, the First . . . Neither section 394.913(4) nor section 394.9135(4) can be read in isolation. . . .

WARD, v. STATE, 936 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Florida Department of Children and Families of all potential committees under the Act)(emphasis added); § 394.9135 . . .

KEPHART, v. D. HADI, D. v., 932 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2006)

. . . . § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2002). . The district courts have also been ambiguous. . . . . § 394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

LARIMORE, v. STATE, 917 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . In addition, section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (1999) (a new section created by the amendment), provides . . . If the petition is not filed within 48 hours, the person is entitled to immediate release. § 394.9135 . . . However, the provisions of section 394.9135 are not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with the time . . . See also § 394.9135(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . The court rejected the argument that section 394.9135(4) allowed the state to start proceedings against . . .

MOORE, v. STATE, 909 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . To date, no other appellate court has interpreted section 394.9135(4) in the same way as Gordon. . . . Judge Sawaya also explained the proper application of section 394.9135 as follows: Section 394.9135 applies . . . The procedure established by section 394.9135 requires that in instances such as this, the person will . . . Both Judge Sawaya’s and Judge Cope’s analyses of section 394.9135, particularly section 394.9135(4), . . . See § 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

DEMICK, v. HADI,, 894 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Demick argued that the State failed to comply with the various time standards set forth in section 394.9135 . . .

STATE v. DUCHARME,, 892 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2000), sets out a detailed procedure which the state must follow . . . when release from total confinement of a person to be committed becomes “immediate for any reason.” § 394.9135 . . . It provides: 394.9135. . . . (Ducharme was transferred on June 16 and the report was given to the state on June 19.) § 394.9135(2) . . . Thereafter, 394.9135 provides that the state has 48 hours after receipt of the report (here, on June . . .

STATE v. DUCHARME,, 881 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Commitment proceedings were instituted against Ducharme pursuant to section 394.9135, Florida Statutes . . . Section 394.9135 applies when the release from total confinement of the person to be committed becomes . . . “immediate for any reason.” § 394.9135(1), Fla. . . . not prevent it from instituting proceedings under the Act. § 394.9135(4), Fla. . . . It appears to me that the State complied with the requirements of section 394.9135. . . .

TANGUAY, v. STATE, 880 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2004)

. . . On April 10, a multidisciplinary team, pursuant to section 394.9135, Florida Statutes (1999), recommended . . . that in situations where the expiration of a defendant’s criminal sentence becomes imminent, section 394.9135 . . . Because Gordon was not transferred to the custody of DCF in accordance with section 394.9135, but instead . . . commitment petition was filed sixteen days later, more than two months before the effective date of section 394.9135 . . . juvenile commitment, or, for confinements concluding after the May 26, 1999, effective date of section 394.9135 . . .

ENNIS, v. REGIER,, 869 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . insufficient and because the State had failed to comply with various time standards set forth in section 394.9135 . . . See § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

WASHINGTON, v. STATE, 866 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Id. § 394.9135(1). . . . Id. § 394.9135(1). . . . Id. § 394.9135(2)-(3). . . . Id. § 394.9135(3). . . . Id. § 394.9135(4). . . .

STATE v. MITCHELL,, 848 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . . § 394.9135(3), Fla. Stat. (1999).” Id. at 563. . . .

L. GARNER, v. STATE, 839 So. 2d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See also § 394.9135(1), Fla. . . .

SIRMONS, v. REGIER,, 846 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Otherwise, he would have been immediately subject to the procedure outlined in section 394.9135. . . .

GORDON, v. REGIER,, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . in custody at the time that he was seized pursuant to a seventy-two-hour hold authorized by section 394.9135 . . . On April 10, 2000, the multidisciplinary team, pursuant to section 394.9135, recommended to the State . . . Rather, the Act contemplates that pursuant to section 394.9135(1), when the release from total confinement . . . In support of this argument, the State cites to subsection 394.9135(4), which states: The provisions . . . Subsection (3) of section 394.9135 states that, in the “safety valve” situation, if a petition is not . . .

STATE v. ROMPRE,, 837 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . because there had been a complete failure to comply with the time requirements set forth in section 394.9135 . . . That the State of Florida failed to comply with the provisions of Florida Statute 394.9135. . . . entitled to release because of the failure to comply with the time limitations set forth in section 394.9135 . . . , it was error to dismiss the State’s petition in its entirety because of subsection (4) of Section 394.9135 . . . Section 394.9135 provides: Immediate releases from total confinement; transfer of person to department . . .

STATE v. GOODE,, 830 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2002)

. . . . § 394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . Later the court noted: Section 394.9135(3) contemplates that a judge will make an ex parte probable cause . . .

KEPHART, H. J. v. KEARNEY,, 826 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 394.9135(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . to have the person involuntarily committed, “stating facts sufficient to support such allegation.” § 394.9135 . . .

STATE v. J. WAGNER,, 825 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . the State, but concluded that he was entitled to immediate release from custody pursuant to section 394.9135 . . .

HARRIS, v. STATE, 879 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . What is now codified as sections 394.913 and 394.9135, Florida Statutes (2001), does make assessment . . .

A. WIDEL, v. VENZ,, 805 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

A. WIDEL, v. VENZ,, 792 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

WATROUS, v. STATE, 793 So. 2d 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 394.9135. . . . See § 394.9135. This alone constitutes an automatic extension of the person’s confinement. . . .

TANGUAY, v. STATE, 782 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 394.9135, Fla.Stat. (2000). . . .

STATE v. KOBEL,, 757 So. 2d 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Pursuant to the immediate release provision of the Act, section 394.9135, Kobel was transferred from . . . Under section 394.9135(2), during the first three days after the expiration of a criminal sentence, the . . . See § 394.9135(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in an immediate release situation under section 394.9135, Valdez . . . Weekly D2576, - So.2d -, 1999 WL 1037986 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov.17, 1999), was filed under section 394.9135 . . .

MEADOWS, v. KRISCHER, W. A., 763 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . See § 394.9135(3). . . . See §§ 394.913(3)(e), 394.9135(3). . . .