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Florida Statute 400.17 - Full Text and Legal Analysis
Florida Statute 400.17 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
Link to State of Florida Official Statute
F.S. 400.17 Case Law from Google Scholar Google Search for Amendments to 400.17

The 2025 Florida Statutes

Title XXIX
PUBLIC HEALTH
Chapter 400
NURSING HOMES AND RELATED HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
View Entire Chapter
400.17 Bribes, kickbacks, certain solicitations prohibited.
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Bribe” means any consideration corruptly given, received, promised, solicited, or offered to any individual with intent or purpose to influence the performance of any act or omission.
(b) “Kickback” means that part of the payment for items or services which is returned to the payor by the provider of such items or services with the intent or purpose to induce the payor to purchase the items or services from the provider.
(2) Whoever furnishes items or services directly or indirectly to a nursing home resident and solicits, offers, or receives any:
(a) Kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing of such items or services or the making or receipt of such payment; or
(b) Return of part of an amount given in payment for referring any such individual to another person for the furnishing of such items or services;

is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or by fine not exceeding $5,000, or both.

(3) No person shall, in connection with the solicitation of contributions to nursing homes, willfully misrepresent or mislead anyone, by any manner, means, practice, or device whatsoever, to believe that the receipts of such solicitation will be used for charitable purposes, if such is not the fact.
(4) Solicitation of contributions of any kind in a threatening, coercive, or unduly forceful manner by or on behalf of a nursing home by any agent, employee, owner, or representative of a nursing home shall be grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation of the license for any nursing home on behalf of which such contributions were solicited.
(5) The admission, maintenance, or treatment of a nursing home resident whose care is supported in whole or in part by state funds may not be made conditional upon the receipt of any manner of contribution or donation from any person. However, this may not be construed to prohibit the offer or receipt of contributions or donations to a nursing home which are not related to the care of a specific resident. Contributions solicited or received in violation of this subsection shall be grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation of a license for any nursing home on behalf of which such contributions were solicited.
History.s. 16, ch. 69-309; s. 16, ch. 70-361; s. 3, ch. 76-168; s. 3, ch. 76-201; s. 1, ch. 77-457; ss. 2, 3, ch. 81-318; ss. 22, 79, 83, ch. 83-181; s. 30, ch. 93-177; s. 49, ch. 93-217.

F.S. 400.17 on Google Scholar

F.S. 400.17 on CourtListener

Amendments to 400.17


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 400.17
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S400.17 - BRIBERY - NURSING HOME BRIBE KICKBACK - M: F

Cases Citing Statute 400.17

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1994).

Cited 43 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1994 WL 1904

...e as constitutional. Addressing the argument that the extent of the statute's reach was unclear, the Court said: Finally, appellees have presented us with an array of acts which, although arguably *845 well intended, might be deemed punishable under section 400.17(2)(a). We are constrained by fundamental principles of appellate review to decline appellees' invitation to decide whether these hypothetical acts would fall within the proscriptions of section 400.17(2)(a)....
...Carroll, 104 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1958); Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage District v. Certain Lands, 80 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1955); DuPuis v. 79th Street Hotel, Inc., 231 So.2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); 3 Fla.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 286 (1978). The fact that the general conduct to which section 400.17(2)(a) is directed is plainly within its terms is a sufficient basis for our finding that this provision is not unconstitutionally vague....
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Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1979).

Cited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida

...Gen., Tallahassee, for appellants. Douglas L. Williams, of Orr, Nathan & Williams, Miami, for appellees. SUNDBERG, Justice. This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, which initially and directly passed upon the validity of section 400.17, Florida Statutes (1977). The issue presented is whether section 400.17(2)(a), which in pertinent part proscribes the solicitation, offer, or receipt of a bribe in connection with the furnishing of services to a nursing home patient, is unconstitutionally vague....
...We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. Appellees, George N. Leader, Mary Pellatier, and Greynolds Park Manor, Inc., were charged by information with receiving a bribe in connection with furnishing services to a nursing home patient in violation of *4 section 400.17(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977)....
...[1] Prior to commencement of criminal proceedings in the County Court for Dade County, Florida, appellees filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Dade County, alleging that they were being illegally restrained and deprived of their property by virtue of the unconstitutionality of section 400.17....
...otice to potential violators of its provisions. The circuit judge concluded that because of the vagueness and breadth of the statute, innocent conduct of individuals or of nursing homes could come within its ambit. Accordingly, the judge found "that Section 400.17, Florida Statutes, 1977, is ... void." For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial judge erred in finding section 400.17, Florida Statutes (1977), unconstitutional....
...n conjunction with the provisions under which they were charged, produced such inconsistencies as to render the charging provisions impermissibly vague. However, these litigants did not possess the requisite standing to argue that the subsections of 400.17 under which they were not charged were void for vagueness....
...ving [commission] assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the [state's] laws." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 611, 93 S.Ct. at 2915; accord, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). *5 Further, an attack upon section 400.17 as unconstitutionally overbroad will not lie absent an assertion that the provision proscribes constitutionally protected speech or activities....
...Consequently, the scope of the circuit court's review should have been limited to a determination of whether subsection (2)(a) and the corresponding definitional provision, subsection (1)(b), are unconstitutionally vague. Although the lower court ruled upon the validity of section 400.17 as a whole, we will confine our inquiry to the boundaries dictated by the foregoing principles....
...Buchanan, 191 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1966); Roberts v. Schumacher, 127 Fla. 461, 173 So. 827 (1937); Lehman v. Sawyer, 106 Fla. 396, 143 So. 310 (1932); Buchanan v. State ex rel. Hunt, 171 So.2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). We now come to the crux of the case before us — whether section 400.17, subsections (1)(b) and (2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), are unconstitutionally vague....
...ct in terms so vague that individuals of common intelligence must guess at their meaning. Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1978); D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1977); State v. Wershow, 343 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1977). Subsection (1)(b) of section 400.17 defines a "bribe" as: [A]ny consideration corruptly given, received, promised, solicited, or offered to any individual with intent or purpose to influence the performance of any act or omission....
...n the parameters of the statute. Because of its all-encompassing nature, the remainder of the statute lent equally inept assistance to those who sought to determine what conduct was prohibited. In contrast, the statute before us is not "open-ended." Section 400.17(2)(a) delineates the proscribed conduct with sufficient specificity....
...hing items or services to a nursing home patient. Through application of the key phrase, corrupt intent to influence the performance of these designated duties, persons of ordinary intelligence may reasonably determine what conduct is unlawful under section 400.17(2)(a)....
...Appellees purportedly made it clear that the furnishing of these services — admission and retention of patients — was contingent upon, and therefore would be influenced by, the payment of these "contributions." This alleged conduct clearly fell within the ambit of section 400.17(2)(a)....
...These sanctions are in the form of denial, suspension, or revocation of the nursing home's license. The other subsections, in contradistinction, provide criminal penalties for their violators. Finally, appellees have presented us with an array of acts which, although arguably well intended, might be deemed punishable under section 400.17(2)(a). We are constrained by fundamental principles of appellate review to decline appellees' invitation to decide whether these hypothetical acts would fall within the proscriptions of section 400.17(2)(a)....
...Carroll, 104 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1958); Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage District v. Certain Lands, 80 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1955); DuPuis v. 79th Street Hotel, Inc., 231 So.2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); 3 Fla.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 286 (1978). The fact that the general conduct to which section 400.17(2)(a) is directed is plainly within its terms is a sufficient basis for our finding that this provision is not unconstitutionally vague....
...548, 579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954); State v. Dye, 346 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1977). *7 Accordingly, the order of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, finding section 400.17, Florida Statutes (1977), to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, is quashed and this cause is reversed and remanded to that tribunal for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The relevant portions of § 400.17, Fla....

This Florida statute resource is curated by Graham W. Syfert, Esq., a Jacksonville, Florida personal injury and workers' compensation attorney. Attorney Syfert regularly works with Chapter 400 in the context of nursing home negligence and represents clients throughout Northeast Florida. For legal consultation, call 904-383-7448.