440.091
Law enforcement officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, or paramedic; when acting within the course of employment.
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440.091 Law enforcement officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, or paramedic; when acting within the course of employment.—
(1) If an employee:
(a) Is elected, appointed, or employed full time by a municipality, the state, or any political subdivision and is vested with authority to bear arms and make arrests and the employee’s primary responsibility is the prevention or detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state;
(b) Was discharging that primary responsibility within the state in a place and under circumstances reasonably consistent with that primary responsibility; and
(c) Was not engaged in services for which he or she was paid by a private employer, and the employee and his or her public employer had no agreement providing for workers’ compensation coverage for that private employment;
the employee is considered to have been acting within the course of employment. The term “employee” as used in this subsection includes all certified supervisory and command personnel whose duties include, in whole or in part, responsibilities for the supervision, training, guidance, and management of full-time law enforcement officers, part-time law enforcement officers, or auxiliary law enforcement officers but does not include support personnel employed by the employing agency.
(2) If a firefighter as defined by s. 112.191(1)(b) is engaged in extinguishing a fire, or protecting and saving life or property due to a fire in this state in an emergency, and such activities would be considered to be within the course of his or her employment as a firefighter and covered by the employer’s workers’ compensation coverage except for the fact that the firefighter was off duty or that the location of the fire was outside the employer’s jurisdiction or area of responsibility, such activities are considered to be within the course of employment. This subsection does not apply if the firefighter is performing activities for which he or she is paid by another employer or contractor.
(3) If an emergency medical technician or paramedic is appointed or employed full time by a municipality, the state, or any political subdivision, is certified under chapter 401, is providing basic life support or advanced life support services, as defined in s. 401.23, in an emergency situation in this state, and such activities would be considered to be within the course of his or her employment as an emergency medical technician or paramedic and covered by the employer’s workers’ compensation coverage except for the fact that the location of the emergency was outside of the employer’s jurisdiction or area of responsibility, such activities are considered to be within the course of employment. The provisions of this subsection do not apply if the emergency medical technician or paramedic is performing activities for which he or she is paid by another employer or contractor.
History.—s. 1, ch. 82-146; s. 43, ch. 89-289; s. 56, ch. 90-201; s. 52, ch. 91-1; s. 102, ch. 97-103; s. 1, ch. 2002-236.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2023 · leading case: PALM BEACH CTY. SHERIFF'S OFFICE v. Ginn
PALM BEACH CTY. SHERIFF'S OFFICE v. Ginn (1990)
“" Section 440.091, Florida Statutes, specifically delineates the circumstances under which law enforcement officers act within the course of their employment for purposes of coverage by the workers' compensation law.”
City of Fort Lauderdale v. Abrams (1990)
“The City controverted the claim, arguing that the accident did not arise out of and in the course and scope of claimant's employment as defined in section 440.091, Florida Statutes (1985).”
Hanstein v. City of Ft. Lauderdale (1990)
“But the judge erroneously construed section 440.091, Florida Statutes, as precluding coverage in the present case.”
Klyse v. City of Largo (2000)
“Appellant alleges that the judge of compensation claims (JCC) mistakenly applied section 440.091, Florida Statutes, to an officer who is on duty at the time of the accident.”
Garcia v. City of Hollywood (2007)
“He was not in the process of carrying out any "primary responsibility" as delineated by Section 440.091, Florida Statutes. Id. Similarly, at the time of the accident, Sergeant Redding was not in the process of carrying out a "primary responsibility" of his job as a police…”
Mount Sinai Hosp. v. City of Miami Beach (1988)
“Section 440.091, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that an injured law enforcement officer "shall be deemed to have been acting within the course of employment" at the time of the injury if he was discharging his "primary responsibility" (prevention or detection of crime or…”
Levine v. Brevard County Sheriff's Department (1995)
“” § 440.091, Fla. Stat. (1991). This limited exception to the going and coming rule recognizes that employment as a law enforcement officer is unique in the sense that an off-duty officer is subject to on-duty status twenty-four hours a day, depending upon the exigencies of a…”
City of North Bay Village v. Millerick (1998)
“…in 1987, but the applicable statute remains unchanged in the present version of the Workers' Compensation Law. See § 440.091 Fla.Stat. (1997).”
City of Lakeland v. Schiel (1997)
“091 creates an exception to the deviation rule for law enforcement officers such that officers are within the course of their employment when they are acting in discharge of their “primary responsibility” as long as they are not being paid by a private employer and the public…”
Levy County Sheriff's Office v. Allen (2014)
“This Court found that the officer was discharging his “primary responsibility while traveling to the police station, and it was not necessary to actually issue a citation or take any affirmative action in this regard for the officer to be within the course of his employment as…”
Gilreath v. Charlotte County Board of County Commissioners (1992)
“We reject the E/C’s contention that section 440.091, Florida Statutes, requires affirmance.”
Whitehead v. Orange County Sheriff's Department (2005)
“When the Claimant requested workers’ compensation benefits, his employer objected because the Claimant was allegedly not in the course and scope of his employment, or discharging his duties under section 440.091(1). This court rejected that contention, because the Claimant “was…”
— 440.091(1) — 2 cases
Levy County Sheriff's Office v. Allen (2014)
“This Court found that the officer was discharging his “primary responsibility while traveling to the police station, and it was not necessary to actually issue a citation or take any affirmative action in this regard for the officer to be within the course of his employment as…”
Whitehead v. Orange County Sheriff's Department (2005)
“When the Claimant requested workers’ compensation benefits, his employer objected because the Claimant was allegedly not in the course and scope of his employment, or discharging his duties under section 440.091(1). This court rejected that contention, because the Claimant “was…”
— 440.091(1)(a) — 1 case
— 440.091(2) — 1 case
City of North Bay Village v. Millerick (1998)
“…in 1987, but the applicable statute remains unchanged in the present version of the Workers' Compensation Law. See § 440.091 Fla.Stat. (1997).”
— 440.091(l)(a) — 1 case
Levy County Sheriff's Office v. Allen (2014)
“This Court found that the officer was discharging his “primary responsibility while traveling to the police station, and it was not necessary to actually issue a citation or take any affirmative action in this regard for the officer to be within the course of his employment as…”
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