Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 440.16 (2025)
Compensation for death.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes: current through the 2025 Regular Session
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440.16 Compensation for death.—
(1) If death results from the accident within 1 year thereafter or follows continuous disability and results from the accident within 5 years thereafter, the employer shall pay:
(a) Within 14 days after receiving the bill, actual funeral expenses not to exceed $7,500.
(b) Compensation, in addition to the above, in the following percentages of the average weekly wages to the following persons entitled thereto on account of dependency upon the deceased, and in the following order of preference, subject to the limitation provided in subparagraph 2., but such compensation shall be subject to the limits provided in s. 440.12(2), shall not exceed $150,000, and may be less than, but shall not exceed, for all dependents or persons entitled to compensation, 662/3 or 66.67 percent of the average wage:
1. To the spouse, if there is no child, 50 percent of the average weekly wage, such compensation to cease upon the spouse’s death.
2. To the spouse, if there is a child or children, the compensation payable under subparagraph 1. and, in addition, 162/3 percent on account of the child or children. However, when the deceased is survived by a spouse and also a child or children, whether such child or children are the product of the union existing at the time of death or of a former marriage or marriages, the judge of compensation claims may provide for the payment of compensation in such manner as may appear to the judge of compensation claims just and proper and for the best interests of the respective parties and, in so doing, may provide for the entire compensation to be paid exclusively to the child or children; and, in the case of death of such spouse, 331/3 percent for each child. However, upon the surviving spouse’s remarriage, the spouse shall be entitled to a lump-sum payment equal to 26 weeks of compensation at the rate of 50 percent of the average weekly wage as provided in s. 440.12(2), unless the $150,000 limit provided in this paragraph is exceeded, in which case the surviving spouse shall receive a lump-sum payment equal to the remaining available benefits in lieu of any further indemnity benefits. In no case shall a surviving spouse’s acceptance of a lump-sum payment affect payment of death benefits to other dependents.
3. To the child or children, if there is no spouse, 331/3 percent for each child.
4. To the parents, 25 percent to each, such compensation to be paid during the continuance of dependency.
5. To the brothers, sisters, and grandchildren, 15 percent for each brother, sister, or grandchild.
(c) To the surviving spouse, payment of postsecondary student fees for instruction at any career center established under s. 1001.44 for up to 1,800 classroom hours or payment of student fees at any community college established under part III of chapter 1004 for up to 80 semester hours. The spouse of a deceased state employee shall be entitled to a full waiver of such fees as provided in ss. 1009.22 and 1009.23 in lieu of the payment of such fees. The benefits provided for in this paragraph shall be in addition to other benefits provided for in this section and shall terminate 7 years after the death of the deceased employee, or when the total payment in eligible compensation under paragraph (b) has been received. To qualify for the educational benefit under this paragraph, the spouse shall be required to meet and maintain the regular admission requirements of, and be registered at, such career center or community college, and make satisfactory academic progress as defined by the educational institution in which the student is enrolled.
(2) The dependence of a child, except a child physically or mentally incapacitated from earning a livelihood, shall terminate with the attainment of 18 years of age, with the attainment of 22 years of age if a full-time student in an accredited educational institution, or upon marriage.
(3) Where, because of the limitation in paragraph (1)(b), a person or class of persons cannot receive the percentage of compensation specified as payable to or on account of such person or class, there shall be available to such person or class that proportion of such percentage as, when added to the total percentage payable to all persons having priority of preference, will not exceed a total of said 662/3 or 66.67 percent, which proportion shall be paid:
(a) To such person; or
(b) To such class, share and share alike, unless the judge of compensation claims determines otherwise in accordance with the provisions of subsection (4).
(4) If the judge of compensation claims determines that payments in accordance with paragraph (3)(b) would provide no substantial benefit to any person of such class, the judge of compensation claims may provide for the payment of such compensation to the person or persons within such class who the judge of compensation claims considers will be most benefited by such payment.
(5) Upon the cessation of compensation under this section to any person, the compensation of the remaining persons entitled to compensation, for the unexpired part of the period during which their compensation is payable, shall be that which such persons would have received if they had been the only persons entitled to compensation at the time of the decedent’s death.
(6) Relationship to the deceased giving right to compensation under the provisions of this section must have existed at the time of the accident, save only in the case of afterborn children of the deceased.
History.—s. 16, ch. 17481, 1935; s. 7, ch. 18413, 1937; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(16); s. 5, ch. 20672, 1941; s. 1, ch. 26966, 1951; ss. 4-6, ch. 28241, 1953; s. 1, ch. 57-143; s. 2, ch. 67-239; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 6, ch. 73-127; s. 11, ch. 74-197; s. 8, ch. 75-209; s. 23, ch. 78-300; ss. 12, 124, ch. 79-40; ss. 9, 21, ch. 79-312; s. 2, ch. 82-237; s. 11, ch. 86-171; s. 4, ch. 87-330; ss. 13, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 21, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 19, 52, ch. 91-1; s. 28, ch. 91-46; s. 62, ch. 92-136; s. 21, ch. 93-415; s. 3, ch. 98-125; s. 1002, ch. 2002-387; s. 20, ch. 2003-412; s. 56, ch. 2004-64; s. 39, ch. 2004-357; s. 3, ch. 2014-109.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 101
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1942–2025 · leading case: De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989).
De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989). “See § 440.16(7), Fla. Stat. (1987). [2] Art. I, § 9, Fla.”
Terrinoni v. WESTWARD HO!, 418 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “There is no statutory language limiting termination of a parent's dependency to the happening of a specific event. Perhaps the legislative intent was to allow for flexibility in the individual situations concerning parents.”
Newton v. McCotter Motors, Inc., 475 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1985). “Refusing to enforce section 440.16 because he determined that application of this statute to this case would produce an unconstitutional result, the deputy commissioner awarded benefits to Betty Newton.”
Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972). “00 [funeral expenses under Fla. Stat. § 440.16 (1), F.S.A.] the court should enter a summary final judgment for the defendants, but if the court subscribes to plaintiff's theory of unconstitutional discrimination the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied.”
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “, dissenting) (disagreeing with the holding that section 440.16(1), which provides that for a death to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation law, it “must result within one year of the accident or must follow continuous disability and must result from the accident…”
Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Williams, 85 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1956). “The Deputy Commissioner further found that the mother of deceased was dependent upon him for support but account of the limits of 60% as set forth in Section 440.16, F.S., F.S.A., he did not award her any compensation.”
Domino's Pizza v. Wiederhold, 248 So. 3d 212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018). “§ 440.16, Fla. Stat. (2014) (“Relationship to the deceased giving right to compensation under the provisions of this section must have existed at the time of the accident, save only in the case of afterborn children of the deceased.”
In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers' Comp. Procedure, 674 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1996). “If the petition is for death benefits under section 440.16, Florida Statutes, items 1 through 4 of this section should be disregarded.”
Wise v. EL Copeland Builders, 435 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “15(10) provides only for an offset of federal benefits against " [w]eekly compensation benefits payable ... for disability resulting from injuries.”
Hecht v. Parkinson, 70 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1954). “Subsequent to the date of the accident, but prior to his death, section 440.16, Florida Statutes 1951, was amended so as to enlarge the benefits accruing to the widow in case of the death of an injured claimant, F.”
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Blackmon, 754 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). “Pursuant to section 440.16(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), appellee is entitled to 0,000 in workers' compensation, the maximum death award.”
Wood v. Harry Harmon Insulation, 511 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). “The claimant argues that the provision denies her access to the courts contrary to article I, section 21, Florida Constitution. For purposes of this challenge, however, we cannot discern any meaningful distinction between the operation of the statute in question and the…”
440.16(1): 11 cases
Newton v. McCotter Motors, Inc., 475 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1985). “Refusing to enforce section 440.16 because he determined that application of this statute to this case would produce an unconstitutional result, the deputy commissioner awarded benefits to Betty Newton.”
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “, dissenting) (disagreeing with the holding that section 440.16(1), which provides that for a death to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation law, it “must result within one year of the accident or must follow continuous disability and must result from the accident…”
Wood v. Harry Harmon Insulation, 511 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). “The claimant argues that the provision denies her access to the courts contrary to article I, section 21, Florida Constitution. For purposes of this challenge, however, we cannot discern any meaningful distinction between the operation of the statute in question and the…”
LaBella v. Food Fair, Inc., 406 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
McCotter Motors, Inc. v. Newton, 453 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
440.16(1)(b): 6 cases
Terrinoni v. WESTWARD HO!, 418 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “There is no statutory language limiting termination of a parent's dependency to the happening of a specific event. Perhaps the legislative intent was to allow for flexibility in the individual situations concerning parents.”
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Blackmon, 754 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). “Pursuant to section 440.16(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), appellee is entitled to 0,000 in workers' compensation, the maximum death award.”
Gen. Elec. v. DeCubas, 504 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Wise v. EL Copeland Builders, 435 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “15(10) provides only for an offset of federal benefits against " [w]eekly compensation benefits payable ... for disability resulting from injuries.”
Blackburn for Blackburn v. Taylor, 566 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
440.16(1)(b)(4): 1 case
Wise v. EL Copeland Builders, 435 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “15(10) provides only for an offset of federal benefits against " [w]eekly compensation benefits payable ... for disability resulting from injuries.”
440.16(2): 17 cases
Terrinoni v. WESTWARD HO!, 418 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “There is no statutory language limiting termination of a parent's dependency to the happening of a specific event. Perhaps the legislative intent was to allow for flexibility in the individual situations concerning parents.”
Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Williams, 85 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1956). “The Deputy Commissioner further found that the mother of deceased was dependent upon him for support but account of the limits of 60% as set forth in Section 440.16, F.S., F.S.A., he did not award her any compensation.”
Hampton v. Owens-illinois Glass, Co., Paper Prod. Div., 140 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
Teel v. Nolen Brown Motors, 93 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1957).
White v. Roundtree Transp., Inc., 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
440.16(2)(a): 2 cases
& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. & City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). “, dissenting) (disagreeing with the holding that section 440.16(1), which provides that for a death to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation law, it “must result within one year of the accident or must follow continuous disability and must result from the accident…”
Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Shelton, 375 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
440.16(2)(d): 1 case
Terrinoni v. WESTWARD HO!, 418 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “There is no statutory language limiting termination of a parent's dependency to the happening of a specific event. Perhaps the legislative intent was to allow for flexibility in the individual situations concerning parents.”
440.16(2)(e): 1 case
Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972). “00 [funeral expenses under Fla. Stat. § 440.16 (1), F.S.A.] the court should enter a summary final judgment for the defendants, but if the court subscribes to plaintiff's theory of unconstitutional discrimination the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied.”
440.16(3): 2 cases
Johnson v. Johnson, 477 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Bowen v. City of Hollywood, 7 Fla. Supp. 94 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1955).
440.16(5): 2 cases
Williams v. S. Iron & Metal Co., 7 Fla. Supp. 128 (Fla. Indus. Comm'n 1955).
Irving v. Ametek, Inc., 756 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
440.16(6): 4 cases
Wise v. EL Copeland Builders, 435 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “15(10) provides only for an offset of federal benefits against " [w]eekly compensation benefits payable ... for disability resulting from injuries.”
Gonzalez v. CFS Cont'l, 451 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Crews v. Dep't of Transp., 591 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Hopkins v. E-Sys., Com. Div., 423 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
440.16(7): 3 cases
De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989). “See § 440.16(7), Fla. Stat. (1987). [2] Art. I, § 9, Fla.”
Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ayala, 501 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
Lopez v. Ideal Roofing Sys., 821 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
440.16(l)(a): 1 case
Stokes v. Schindler Elevator Corp./Broadspire, 60 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
440.16(l)(b): 6 cases
USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDermott, 929 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Theis v. City of Miami, 564 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1990).
Bestone East Coast USA Corp. v. Sanchez, 899 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Johnson v. Johnson, 477 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Yglesias, 831 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
440.16(l)(b)(5): 1 case
Rodriguez v. Prestress Decking Corp., 611 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
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