The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Fort Lauderdale Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Corgnati , 715 So.2d 311, 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting Rollins, Inc. v. Heller , 454 So.2d 580, 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)); see also The Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Air Cap. Grp., LLC , 614 F. App'x. 460, 472 (11th Cir. 2015) ("[P]laintiffs must marshal evidence to prove the gap in value between what was promised and what was delivered, unless defendant palmed off a product that was truly worthless. In the latter situation, plaintiff may recoup the full price he paid for the valueless good or service." (emphasis in original)). "For purposes of recovery under FDUTPA, 'actual damages' do not include consequential damages." Rollins, Inc. v. Butland , 951 So.2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also Smith , 872 So.2d at 994 ("Actual damages, as pertaining to FDUTPA, does not include 'actual consequential' damages."); Morgan v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Fla., LLC , No. 9:21-cv-80549, 2021 WL 4709787, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2021) (finding that a customer's out-ofpocket expenses caused by a rental car company not providing promised vehicle with disability accommodations were consequential damages not cognizable under FDUTPA)… “[I]t is a fundamental principle of contracts that in order for a contract to be binding and enforceable, there must be a meeting of the minds on all essential terms and obligations of the contract.” Silk Road Trading & Shipping Co. v. World Fuel Servs. Corp., 572 F.Supp.3d 1296, 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (quotation omitted); see also Kolodziej, 774 F.3d at 741 (“[M]utual assent is a prerequisite for the formation of any contract.” (citing Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So.2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989)). “While a ‘meeting of the minds' may not be necessary as to every term for a contract to be formed, mutual assent is necessary as to essential terms.” LSQ Funding Grp., L.C. v. EDS Field Servs., 879 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting David v. Richman, 568 So.2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1990)). A court evaluates the existence of mutual assent “by analyzing the parties' agreement process in terms of offer and acceptance.” Kolodziej, 774 F.3d at 741. “A valid contract-premised on the parties' requisite willingness to contract-may be ‘manifested through written or spoken words, or inferred in whole or in part from the parties' conduct.'” Id. (quoting L & H Constr. Co. v. Circle Redmont… On June 24, 2016, Mr. Garner filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief 3.850(a), (1), (b) (2) [sic] Alternatively, Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence 3.800(a), arguing that his two consecutive life sentences with the possibility of review after twenty-five years constituted a de facto life sentence and were thus impermissible for a juvenile under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Atwell v. State, 197 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2016), abrogated by State v. Michel, 257 So.3d 3, 6 (Fla. 2018).The presiding District Judge has previously set forth the framework for compensation to witnesses who appear in federal court proceedings. James v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 645, 651 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Morrison v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 97 F.3d 460 (11th Cir. 1996)). “A witness who appears before a federal court ‘or before any person authorized to take his deposition pursuant to any rule or order of a court of the United States' is entitled to fees and allowances, including ‘an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day's attendance.'” Id. at 651 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) & (b)). “Section 1920 of title 28 provides that ‘[a] judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs . . . fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses.'” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3)). Taken together, these two statutes provide that no more than $40 a day could be charged as cost of attendance. Id. at 651. Nevertheless, § 1821 also provides for additional travel-related compensation. See e.g., Peeler v. KVH Indus., Inc., No. 12-CV-1584-T-33TGW, 2014 WL 12617558, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2014) (“A witness is also entitled to the actual expenses of… Over a decade later, on May 24, 2013, the trial court granted Mr. Streeter resentencing on the nonhomicide counts for which he had received life imprisonment. (Doc. 18-3, Ex. 64) That decision was prompted by Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), which held that the Eighth Amendment “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender” convicted of a nonhomicide offense. Mr. Streeter was resentenced to a “280-year aggregate sentence” for the nonhomicide offenses. Streeter v. State, 163 So.3d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). The state appellate court reversed, holding that the 280-year sentence violated Graham because it did “not afford any meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. The court also held that the two mandatory life sentences for first-degree murder were unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), which outlawed “mandatory life without parole” for juveniles. Id.A motion in limine is a "motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). These motions "are generally disfavored." Acevedo v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 317 F.Supp.3d 1188, 1192 (S.D. Fla. 2017). "Evidence is excluded upon a motion in limine only if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose." Id. "A motion in limine is not the proper vehicle to resolve substantive issues, to test issues of law, or to address or narrow the issues to be tried." McHale v. Crown Equip. Corp., No. 8:19-cv-707-VMC-SPF, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194217, 2021 WL 4527509, at *1, *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2021) (citing LSQ Funding Grp. v. EDS Field Servs., 879 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2012)). "Nor may a party use a motion in limine to sterilize the other party's presentation of the case." Harris v. Wingo, No. 2:18-CV-17-FTM-29MRM, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209165, 2021 WL 5028201, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2021) (cleaned up). Additionally, as the Supreme Court has cautioned:The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) holds that written arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. This reflects the strong federal policy toward resolving disputed arbitrable issues through arbitration; for, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a likely defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); see also Milestone v. Citrus Specialty Grp., Inc., No. 8:19-cv-2341-T-02JSS, 2019 WL 5887179, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2019) (stating that “[a] strong policy exists in favor of resolving disputes by arbitration”). That said, courts “are not to twist the language of the contract to achieve a result which is favored by federal policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.” Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotations omitted). And “parties will not be required to… The Defendant was sentenced on March 19, 2014. This occurred after the United States Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), but prior to the enactment of § 921.1401, Florida Statutes. Cognizant of the flux in law regarding sentencing of juvenile offenders, the court applied then existing case law, including Toye v. State, 133 So.3d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), and determined that while Miller prohibits imposition of a mandatory life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender, a life sentence could be imposed after considering certain factors. As § 921.1401, Florida Statutes, did not exist, the sentencing Court looked at Sections 921.0026 and 921.141, Florida Statutes, along with other non-statutory factors which applied in this case.2. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiff against Defendants listed on the Amended Schedule “A” of Plaintiff's Notice (DE 25-1), excluding Defendant Does numbered 51,84, 99, 104, 360361, 377, 387, 389, 390, 399, 404, 408, 410, 422, 427, 433, 437, 440, 441, 443, 448, 449, 451, 455, 457, 458, 460, 461, 471, 473, 478, 483 to 485, 498, 512, 517, 538, 540, 547, 558, 559, 561, 565, 566, 576, 577, 582, 595, 598, 623, 626,In both criminal and civil proceedings, the determination of whether a defendant is entitled to Stand Your Ground immunity has been made at pretrial evidentiary hearings where the defendant must prove that the immunity attaches by a preponderance of the evidence. [ Dennis, 51 So.3d at] 460 (criminal case); Pages v. Seliman-Tapia, 134 So.3d 536, 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (civil case). We recognize that a pretrial hearing cannot afford the immunity purportedly guaranteed by the plain language of this statute in the criminal context, for the simple reason that there appears to be no way to do so in most cases.. . . Sitgreaves); id., at 460 (Rep. Gallatin). . . .
. . . Salvation Army , 460 F.2d 553, 558-559 (C.A.5 1972) ; Rayburn v. . . . significance in the fact that Morrissey-Berru and Biel did not have clerical titles. 769 Fed.Appx. at 460 . . . fact that Morrissey-Berru and Biel had less formal religious schooling than Perich. 769 Fed.Appx. at 460 . . . school did ask her to attend a catechist course on the history of the Catholic Church. 769 Fed.Appx. 460 . . . , 460-461 (2019) ; 911 F.3d 603, 605, 611, n. 6 (2018). . . .
. . . Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 435 U.S. 519, 524, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) ). . . .
. . . Perry Local Educators' Assn. , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (content-based . . .
. . . government aid does not end up being used for "sectarian education" or "religious education." 393 Mont. at 460 . . .
. . . Kraft Pizza Co. , 460 F.3d 971, 975-976 (CA8 2006) ; Hunt Masters, Inc. v. . . .
. . . See, e.g. , App. 370-371, 391, 460-461. . . .
. . . Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 472-473, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010). . . .
. . . still did not provide an adequate explanation for the September 2017 rescission. 315 F.Supp.3d 457, 460 . . . Leavitt , 460 F.3d 1, 5-6 (CADC 2006) (Garland, J.) . . . Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 435 U.S. 519, 551, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). . . . Leavitt , 460 F.3d 1, 6 (2006) (Garland, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . . ----, 137 S.Ct. 1239, 197 L.Ed.2d 460 (2017) ; Adams v. School Bd. of St. . . . Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate , 990 F.2d 458, 460 (CA9 1993) ; EEOC v. . . .
. . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). . . .
. . . LaHue , 460 U.S. 325, 337, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). . . .
. . . F.3d, at 677 ; Kachalsky , 701 F.3d, at 101 ; Drake , 724 F.3d, at 440 ; Masciandaro , 638 F.3d, at 460 . . .
. . . Summum , 555 U.S. 460, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) ). . . .
. . . Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (quoting Washington State Grange . . . U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980), to depictions of animal cruelty, Stevens , supra , at 460 . . .
. . . Id. , at 460, 110 S.Ct. 792. . . .
. . . Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); Brown v. . . .
. . . Celebrezze , 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). . . .
. . . Johnson , 421 U.S. at 459-460, 95 S.Ct. 1716 (emphasis added). . . . Aikens , 460 U.S. 711, 715-716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). . . .
. . . FMR LLC , 571 U.S. 429, 459-460, 134 S.Ct. 1158, 188 L.Ed.2d 158 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in principal . . .
. . . No. 19-460 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 466, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010), the First Amendment claimant had . . .
. . . Wade, 100 N.M. 152, 667 P.2d 459, 460 (N.M. Ct. . . . See Diaz, 908 P.2d at 259-62 ; Wade, 667 P.2d at 460. . . . Wade , 100 N.M. 152, 667 P.2d 459, 460 (N.M. Ct. . . .
. . . Bowersox , 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding "that counsel's confusion about the applicable . . .
. . . Thompson , 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). . . . Humphries , 562 U.S. 29, 131 S.Ct. 447, 178 L.Ed.2d 460 (2010). . . . See Thompson , 490 U.S. at 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904. The answer here is a resounding "NO." . . .
. . . Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which prohibited mandatory life without . . .
. . . Ayers , 782 F.3d 425, 460 n.62 (9th Cir. 2015) )). Even if the weaknesses in Moore's and Dr. . . .
. . . Celebrezze , 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). . . . complete and accurate, that information is only relevant to but one piece of the Anderson balancing test. 460 . . . Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), the Court addressed "whether Ohio's . . . Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564. . . .
. . . Trial Tr. 460-61. . . . Costello, 460 F.3d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 2006). . . . Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (quoting Lewis v. . . . Hawkins, 460 F.3d at 244 (cleaned up). . . . Arafet, 13 N.Y.3d 460, 464-65, 892 N.Y.S.2d 812, 920 N.E.2d 919 (2009). . . .
. . . not] a credible threat of future prosecution under the Ordinance"); see also Steffel , 415 U.S. at 460 . . .
. . . Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 470, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) ("The First Amendment's guarantee . . .
. . . California , 460 U.S. 605, 636 n.26, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983), for the proposition that . . .
. . . Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344-45, 102 S.Ct. 460, 70 L.Ed.2d 530 (1981) ("Federal judges have no general supervisory . . .
. . . Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 485, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (emphasis in original). . . .
. . . Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 2. . . . Baker , 875 F.3d 444, 460 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .
. . . Express Co. , 460 F.3d 215, 227-28 (2d Cir. 2006) ; Young v. . . .
. . . Rptr. 3d 460, 466-68 (2005). . . .
. . . Heald , 544 U.S. 460, 487, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) ). . . .
. . . Id. at 460-61. In United States v. . . . Musgraves , 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Archer , 878 F.3d at 497. 757 F.3d 460 (2014). Archer , 878 F.3d at 497. Henry Schein , 139 S. . . . Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ("[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts . . .
. . . Sch. , 433 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 2006) ; Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine , 23 . . .
. . . Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994) (filing a complaint with the EEOC is protected activity). 2. . . .
. . . Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213, 103 S.Ct. 1042, 75 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . obliterated serial number, a plastic bag with crack cocaine, a plastic bag containing marijuana, and $460 . . .
. . . App. 3d 563, 307 Ill.Dec. 806, 860 N.E.2d 460 (2006), which holds that "[i]t is the duty to defend that . . . Id. at 570, 307 Ill.Dec. 806, 860 N.E.2d 460 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Home Ins. . . .
. . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (recognizing that sovereign defines itself "[t]hrough the . . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (observing that "[a]s long as it is acting within the powers . . . Ashcroft , 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (stating that courts "must assume Congress does not exercise . . .
. . . Id. at 460, 66 S.Ct. 233 (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Payne undertook a "re-underwriting review" of 460 loans contained in the sample generated by Dr. . . .
. . . Calderón, 570 F.3d 443, 460 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that denials of class certification are reviewed . . . Calderón, 570 F.3d 443, 460 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Tardiff v. . . .
. . . Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 76 Mass.App.Ct. 73, 919 N.E.2d 165, 169 (2009), aff'd, 460 Mass. 500, 952 . . .
. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). . . . the speaker's view.' " Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, quoting Perry Education Ass'n , 460 . . .
. . . Celebrezze , 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), and Burdick v. . . . U.S. 186, 212, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Anderson , 460 . . . Celebrezze , 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), and Burdick v. . . . See Anderson , 460 U.S. at 793-95, 805-06, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (holding that Ohio statute requiring independent . . .
. . . Servs., Inc. , 716 F.3d 451, 460 (8th Cir. 2013), quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary . . .
. . . Chicago Transit Auth. , 162 Ill.2d 70, 204 Ill.Dec. 755, 642 N.E.2d 456, 460 (1994) ). . . . merits would be the quintessential act of exalting form over substance." 204 Ill.Dec. 755, 642 N.E.2d at 460 . . .
. . . Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty. , 991 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1993). . . .
. . . Asel, 460 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Mo. banc 2015). . . . Hodges, 460 S.W.3d at 928 ("By providing that no chronic offender can be released on probation or parole . . .
. . . Fisher , 711 F.3d 460, 465 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit found a defendant's guilty plea invalid . . .
. . . See Paroline , 572 U.S. at 460, 134 S.Ct. 1710. . . .
. . . LaHue , 460 U.S. 325, 330-31, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). . . .
. . . Mady Dev., L.P. , 231 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex. . . .
. . . Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). . . . Inc., 394 F.3d 444, 460 (6th Cir. 2005) ("It is a fundamental precept of contract law that parties may . . .
. . . State, 168 N.H. 460, 130 A.3d 1197, 1211 (2015). . . .
. . . Philadelphia, LLC, 460 B.R. 644, 657-58 (E.D. Pa. 2011). . . .
. . . Stein , 347 U.S. 201, 217, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954) ). . . . Id. at 1011 (citing 347 U.S. at 214, 218-19, 74 S.Ct. 460 ). . . .
. . . Co. , 460 Mich. 696, 597 N.W.2d 506, 510 (1999) (quoting Turner v. Bituminous Cas. . . .
. . . Funds , 568 U.S. 455, 460, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 185 L.Ed.2d 308 (2013). . . .
. . . Doyle , 650 F.3d 460, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. . . .
. . . Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). . . .
. . . Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), and Burdick v. . . .
. . . Benjamin , 361 F.3d 460, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2004) (reversing portion of judgment dismissing with prejudice . . .
. . . Id. at 460, 96 S.Ct. 3021. . . .
. . . Sykes , 854 F.3d 457, 460-61 (8th Cir. 2017) (credible threat of violence when defendant, while in possession . . .
. . . Neal , 460 U.S. 289, 296, 103 S.Ct. 1089, 75 L.Ed.2d 67 (1983). Pl.'s Opp. [Doc. . . .
. . . Int'l, L.C. , 460 F.3d 1349, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Heald , 544 U.S. 460, 466, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005), who could not, because their businesses . . .
. . . Ct. 1239, 197 L.Ed.2d 460 (2017) (mem.). Accordingly, we decline to reassign the case on remand. V. . . .
. . . Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 468, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted . . . Sch. , 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Shehee v. . . .
. . . (In re Ayele), 490 B.R. 460, 462 (D. Mass. 2013). . . .
. . . Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 472, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (internal quotations and citations . . .
. . . City of Boston, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 460, 883 N.E.2d 316, 323 (2008) ). . . .
. . . plaintiffs reiterated in other evidence and deposition testimony); McMunn , 191 F.Supp.2d at 454, 458, 460 . . .
. . . Forsythe , 194 W.Va. 496, 460 S.E.2d 742, 745-46 (1995). . . .
. . . Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) ; see also Kyles , 514 U.S. at 460, 115 . . .
. . . Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 427, 460-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), and plausibly constituted a claim of abuse of the legal process . . .
. . . Adams, USA, Inc. , 529 U.S. 460, 463, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 146 L.Ed.2d 530 (2000). . . .
. . . Ct. at 2664 ); see also Crawford , 868 F.3d at 460 ; Baird , 266 F.3d at 412-13 ; Alaska Legislative . . . See id. at 456, 59 S.Ct. 972 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 460, 59 S.Ct. 972 (opinion of Frankfurter . . .
. . . California, 460 U.S. 605, 619, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) ("It is clear that res judicata . . .
. . . Id. ; see also Minneapolis Star , 460 U.S. at 580, 103 S.Ct. 1365. . . . See Minneapolis Star , 460 U.S. at 585, 103 S.Ct. 1365. . . . See 460 U.S. at 580, 103 S.Ct. 1365. . . . Perry Educ. , 460 U.S. at 44, 103 S.Ct. 948. . . . See Perry Educ. , 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (collecting cases). . . . Comm'r of Revenue , 460 U.S. 575, 592, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983) ). . . . " in suppressing disfavored expression. 499 U.S. at 446, 111 S.Ct. 1438 (quoting Minneapolis Star , 460 . . .
. . . Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ; then quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. . . .
. . . Ct. 1918, 1924, 198 L.Ed.2d 460 (2017). . . .
. . . Id. at 460, 126 S.Ct. 1991. . . . See Anza , 547 U.S. at 460, 126 S.Ct. 1991. . . . Anza , 547 U.S. at 460, 126 S.Ct. 1991. . . . Anza , 547 U.S. at 460, 126 S.Ct. 1991. In Lukaszuk v. . . . See Anza , 547 U.S. at 460, 126 S.Ct. 1991. . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 460, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Having dismissed the Plaintiff's only federal claim, and given the . . .
. . . Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), "[a] matter should not be sent to arbitration . . .
. . . King , 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Mincey v. . . . United States , 335 U.S. 451, 460, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring), then . . .
. . . May 8, 2015), ECF No. 460. . . .
. . . Summum , 555 U.S. 460, 469-70, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) ; Miller v. . . . Summum , 555 U.S. 460, 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) ; accord Miller v. . . .
. . . Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) ). III. . . .
. . . App'x 459, 460 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding patients who receive uncompensated care through traditional State . . .
. . . Mangos, 134 F.3d 460 (1st Cir. 1998), had relied on its own reasonable construction of the "assault and . . .