The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
|
||||||
|
But Gingles involved Section 2 of the VRA, and its holding does not apply to diminishment claims. The United States Supreme Court recognized this important distinction in stating, "We have, however, 'consistently understood' § 2 to 'combat different evils and, accordingly, to impose very different duties upon the States.'" Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003) (quoting Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. at 471, 477). The Court in Ashcroft recognized that Gingles did not apply to a diminishment claim:As Carnival correctly points out, because the Plaintiffs' complaint attaches and specifically incorporates their cruise ticket contract (see Compl. ¶ 26, ECF No. 1-2), the contract itself is properly referenced and considered in ruling on Carnival's motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Bickley v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1329 n.7 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those documents are central to the plaintiff's claim, then the Court may consider the documents part of the pleading for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal[.]” (quotation omitted)).In submitting a request for attorney's fees, fee applicants are required to exercise “billing judgment.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). If fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment by excluding “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours, which are hours “that would be unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one's adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel,” the court must exercise billing judgment for them. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301 (emphasis in original)).Nevertheless, under the EAJA, attorneys are only entitled to an award of “reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Id. (emphasis in original; internal quotations omitted). Thus, fee applicants “must exercise what the Supreme Court has termed ‘billing judgment'” and must “exclude from their fee applications ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary [hours].'” Am. C.L. Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). The Eleventh Circuit further instructs that “[i]f fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them.” Id.; see also Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[W]here the time or fees claimed seem expanded or there is a lack of documentation or testimonial… Our interpretation of the first Gingles precondition has attracted support in other circuits. See Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The inquiries into remedy and liability, therefore, cannot be separated: A district court must determine as part of the Gingles threshold inquiry whether it can fashion a permissible remedy in the particular context of the challenged system."(quoting Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1530-31)); Bone Shirt v Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1025 (8th Cir. 2006) (Gruender, J. concurring) (same). Even circuits that do not assess the viability of the proposed remedy as part of the first precondition inquiry recognize that proper remedies are critical in Section 2 vote dilution cases. See generally Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 831 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Therefore, even if we found that plaintiffs' showing met the Gingles pre-conditions or satisfied the totality of the circumstances test, we would not approve the imposition of such a remedy."). Thus, especially in a case like this one, where plaintiffs offer only a single, dramatic remedy-transforming a cumulative voting statewide system into a single-member districted plan-it makes no… Additionally, “the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “This amount is ordinarily referred to as the lodestar.” Thornton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 312 Fed.Appx. 161, 163-64 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The resulting fee carries a presumption that it is reasonable. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). This lodestar amount may then be adjusted upward or downward based upon other considerations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-37. The “fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.” A.C.L.U. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988)).Once the movant shows there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to prove that a genuine factual dispute exists which would preclude entry of summary judgment. Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006). To survive summary judgment, the non-moving party “must go beyond the pleadings, and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. The non-movant must support its position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, interrogatories, or other materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). If the non-moving party fails to identify specific record evidence supporting its position, the court must enter summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).Additionally, “the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “This amount is ordinarily referred to as the lodestar.” Thornton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 312 Fed.Appx. 161, 163-64 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The resulting fee carries a presumption that it is reasonable. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). This lodestar amount may then be adjusted upward or downward based upon other considerations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-37. The “fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.” A.C.L.U. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988)).The statutory provisions relating to short-term lessors and owners were "added by the Legislature in 1999 as part of a tort reform package" known as the Tort Reform Act. Vargas v. Enter. Leasing Co., 60 So.3d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 2011); see generally George N. Meros, Jr. & Chanta Hundley, Florida's Tort Reform Act: Keeping Faith with the Promise of Hoffman v. Jones, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 461, 483-85 (2000) (discussing vicarious liability of automobile owners and lessors under the Tort Reform Act). Congress would later further limit vicarious liability under the doctrine for those "engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles" through the Graves Amendment. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) (2006); see Vargas, 60 So.3d at 1041-42.The Florida Supreme Court used the Blockburger test and arrived “at the conclusion that first degree burglary and sexual battery could be separately and cumulatively punished.” Wicker v. State, 462 So.2d 461, 463 (Fla. 1985). Additionally, the Fifth District has upheld dual convictions for sexual battery and burglary with a battery stemming from the same sexual battery. Young v. State, 762 So.2d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). A conviction for both burglary with a battery and sexual battery does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and Petitioner is entitled to no relief on Claim 2.. . . In re District Attorney of Suffolk Cty. , 58 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 461 N.Y.S.2d 773, 448 N.E.2d 440, 443-444 . . .
. . . that Morrissey-Berru and Biel had less formal religious schooling than Perich. 769 Fed.Appx. at 460-461 . . . United States , 461 U.S. 574, 603-605, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), require applicants for . . . did ask her to attend a catechist course on the history of the Catholic Church. 769 Fed.Appx. 460, 461 . . . also "led her students in daily prayer" and assisted with planning a monthly mass. 769 Fed.Appx. at 461 . . . for a trial on that issue but instead held that the exception did not apply. 769 Fed.Appx. 460, 460-461 . . .
. . . Taxation With Representation of Wash. , 461 U.S. 540, 549, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983). . . . No. 71, Champaign Cty. , 333 U.S. 203, 231, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring . . . Taxation With Representation of Wash. , 461 U.S. 540, 549, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) ; see . . .
. . . AOSI I , 570 U.S. at 215, 133 S.Ct. 2321 (citing Regan , 461 U.S. at 544, 103 S.Ct. 1997 ). . . . AOSI I , 570 U.S. at 215, 133 S.Ct. 2321 (citing Regan , 461 U.S. at 544, 103 S.Ct. 1997 ). . . . See, e.g. , App. 370-371, 391, 460-461. . . . See 461 U.S. at 544, 103 S.Ct. 1997. . . . Regan , 461 U.S. at 545, n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 1997. . . . Taxation With Representation of Wash. , 461 U.S. 540, 544-545, and n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 . . .
. . . Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. , 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). . . .
. . . Jamieson , 182 U.S. 461, 480, 21 S.Ct. 845, 45 L.Ed. 1183 (1901) (describing an accounting as involving . . .
. . . State Bd. of Ed. , 1 Cal.3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal.Rptr. 175 (1969). . . .
. . . Jamieson , 182 U.S. 461, 480-481, 21 S.Ct. 845, 45 L.Ed. 1183 (1901). . . .
. . . The Federalist No. 77, p. 461 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. . . . In re Duncan , 139 U.S. 449, 461, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219 (1891) (discussing the republican governments . . . Duncan , 139 U.S. at 461, 11 S.Ct. 573. . . .
. . . Central Bank of Nigeria , 461 U.S. 480, 487, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983). . . . Verlinden , 461 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962. . . .
. . . Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 482, n. 22, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) ), or involve a "common nucleus . . .
. . . the invited amici 's arguments, that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad. 910 F.3d 461 . . . EEOC , 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 461, 196 L.Ed.2d 339 (2016) ; Green v. . . .
. . . Wade , 461 U.S. 30, 38-51, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Morissette v. . . .
. . . Central Bank of Nigeria , 461 U.S. 480, 492, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) ). . . .
. . . Zeisel, The American Jury 461 (1966); Diamond, Rose, & Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: . . .
. . . State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n , 461 U.S. 190, 203, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed . . .
. . . Curry , 461 F.3d 452, 459 (C.A.4 2006) ; United States v. . . . Torres-Duenas , 461 F.3d 1178, 1183 (C.A.10 2006) ; United States v. . . .
. . . United States , 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) ; Callanan v. . . .
. . . Bray 461-462. . . . Id ., at 457-461. The risk of winning conflicting nationwide injunctions is real too. . . .
. . . See Black's Law Dictionary 461 (1891) (defining "expensæ litis " to mean "generally allowed" costs); . . . Rodgers , 461 U.S. 677, 716, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983). . . .
. . . No. 19-461 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . App. 1983), (2) the use of "fighting words" to attack an officer, id. at 461, and (3) the refusal to . . .
. . . Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ). . . .
. . . United States , 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (internal citations omitted) . . .
. . . Ct. 504, 506, 202 L.Ed.2d 461 (2019) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). . . . Lytle, 461 F.3d 1303, 1313 (10th Cir. 2006). . . . Torres, 461 F.3d at 1313 (quotation omitted). . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 461, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir.1996) ). . . .
. . . Ct. 504, 508, 202 L.Ed.2d 461 (2019) ("While Atkins noted that standard definitions of mental retardation . . .
. . . Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 292, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) ; see also Gonzalez v. . . .
. . . Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 461 (9th Cir. 1991). . . . Leasure, 122 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1997); Hill, 953 F.2d at 461, United States v. . . .
. . . Robbins , 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (holding that courts should generally . . .
. . . United States , 520 U.S. 461, 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) ); see also United States v . . . Lopez-Medina , 461 F.3d 724, 745 (6th Cir. 2006) ("We conclude that permitting police officers to testify . . . Lopez-Medina , 461 F.3d 724, 745 (6th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Id. at 461. Scrimo's counsel tried again: [I]t's just not credibility. . . .
. . . Auer , 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robertson v. . . .
. . . Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010). . . . Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 109-10, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (recognizing a plaintiff's standing . . .
. . . Wade , 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) ; Hardeman v. . . .
. . . Rev. 417, 461 (2017). They "deprive" other parties of "the right to litigate in other forums." . . .
. . . United States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). . . .
. . . Robbins , 519 U.S. 452, 461-62, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997). . . .
. . . Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 466-78, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). . . .
. . . Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). . . . well-settled that allegations of sexual harassment[ ] ... are matters of public concern."); Connick , 461 . . .
. . . Ct. 504, 202 L.Ed.2d 461 (2019) (per curiam), the Court "consider[ed] what was clearly established regarding . . .
. . . Haworth , 300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937) ). . . .
. . . Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). . . . See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186 ; see also Hensley , 461 U.S. at 429-30, 103 S.Ct. 1933. 487 F.2d 161 . . . Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186 n.3 (citing Johnson , 488 F.2d at 717-19 ). 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, . . . (citing Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434 n.9, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. . . . See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ("The district court also may consider [the] factors . . .
. . . Haworth , 300 U.S. 227, 239-40, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). . . .
. . . Ct. 504, 507-08, 202 L.Ed.2d 461 (2019) (per curiam)." . . .
. . . Comm'n , 461 U.S. 190, 203, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983) ; Frank Bros., Inc. v. . . .
. . . McAdory , 325 U.S. 450, 461, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945), I see no reason to engage in an unnecessary . . . Lawson , 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) ; accord United States v. . . . Lawson , 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (reviewing vagueness challenge with reference to whether "ordinary . . .
. . . Bank of Nigeria , 461 U.S. 480, 487-88, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983). . . .
. . . App'x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding § 354.45 preempted). . . . Bank of Nigeria , 461 U.S. 480, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) ("[E]very action against a . . .
. . . Exxon Corp. , 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002). . . .
. . . Wakinekona , 461 U.S. 238, 250, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). . . .
. . . Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). . . . district court should exclude "hours that were not 'reasonably expended' " from its calculations, Hensley, 461 . . .
. . . Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). . . .
. . . Charles Gherardi, Inc., 88 A.D.2d 461, 453 N.Y.S.2d 750, 755 (1982) (explaining that under the out-of-pocket . . .
. . . Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). . . .
. . . Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Brady v. . . .
. . . Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Ottawa , 101 Ill.2d 246, 78 Ill.Dec. 125, 461 N.E.2d 959, 963 (1984). . . . Auth. for La Salle Cty., 78 Ill.Dec. 125, 461 N.E.2d at 963. . . .
. . . Co. , 898 F.3d 461, 483 & n.87 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). The D.C. . . .
. . . Vasquez , 560 F.3d 461, 473 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). . . .
. . . Paroline , 572 U.S. at 461, 134 S.Ct. 1710. Cf. United States v. . . .
. . . Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ). . . .
. . . United States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). . . .
. . . Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). . . . Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. . . .
. . . McCloskey , 461 Pa. 267, 336 A.2d 279, 280 (1975) ). . . .
. . . Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010). . . .
. . . Tex. 2014) ; In re Houston Reg'l Sports Network, L.P. , 593 B.R. 461 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2018). . . .
. . . Gonzales , 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights were . . . Gonzales , 461 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . United States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). . . . Lopez-Medina , 461 F.3d 724, 745 (6th Cir. 2006), when law-enforcement officers testify both as to the . . . Appellant Br. at 26 (quoting Lopez-Medina , 461 F.3d at 745 ). . . . See 461 F.3d at 745 ("We discuss the issue of prejudice as it pertains to all of the evidentiary issues . . .
. . . Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), and only where the plaintiff can "demonstrate . . . See City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660. * * * As the passage of time can skunk a beer . . .
. . . Belice (In re Belice) , 461 B.R. 564, 572-73 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (citations omitted). . . .
. . . Id. at 461-63. . . .
. . . United States , 500 U.S. 453, 461-62, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) ; United States v. . . .
. . . United States , 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). . . .
. . . Adams , 345 U.S. 461, 468, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953) ). . . .
. . . Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983). B. . . .
. . . Bellsouth Mobility, Inc. , 700 F.3d 453, 461 (11th Cir. 2012). But see PDR Network, LLC v. . . . Id. at 461. Later, in Mais v. . . . , or to determine the validity of" such orders, see Mais , 768 F.3d at 1120-21 ; Self , 700 F.3d at 461 . . . Self , 700 F.3d at 461-64. . . .
. . . EPA , 540 U.S. 461, 496-97, 124 S.Ct. 983, 157 L.Ed.2d 967 (2004) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ); see . . .
. . . Hasting , 461 U.S. 499, 501, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (citation omitted); see also Benton . . .
. . . United States , 520 U.S. 461, 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (skipping over prong three . . .
. . . Slappy , 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (quoting Ungar , 376 U.S. at 589, 84 . . . Morris , 461 U.S. at 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610 (quoting Ungar , 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. 841 ). . . .
. . . Ashcroft , 362 F.3d 461, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2004) ). . . .
. . . Corp. , 456 U.S. 461, 481 n. 22, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) ). . . .
. . . Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). . . . (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). . . . See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ("We reemphasize that the district court has discretion . . . Hensley , 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. . . . See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 429-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933. . . .
. . . Tiffany & Co. , 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ) . . . district courts should "exclude excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours"); see also Hensley , 461 . . .
. . . King , 563 U.S. 452, 461, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). 1. . . .
. . . United States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (alteration and quotation . . .
. . . Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (citation omitted). . . . Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. . . . Binta B. , 710 F.3d at 628 (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). . . . Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. . . . Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. . . .
. . . Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. . . . Feemster , 572 F.3d at 461 (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Massa , 399 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) ; see also Mo. R. Civ. . . .
. . . Sturmoski , 971 F.2d 452, 461 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[C]onsecutive sentences may be imposed for multiple . . . arise from essentially identical facts" if the convictions do not violate double jeopardy. 971 F.2d at 461 . . .
. . . Taxation With Representation of Washington , 461 U.S. 540, 549, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) . . . invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'aim[ ] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.' " Regan , 461 . . . path of a person's exercise of freedom of speech, it need not remove those not of its own creation." 461 . . . exemptions and deductions as "a form of subsidy" administered through the tax system (quoting Regan , 461 . . . Taxation With Rep. of Wash. , 461 U.S. 540, 549, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) ) (upholding conditions . . . See Regan , 461 U.S. at 548, 103 S.Ct. 1997 (finding no Free Speech Clause violation, but cautioning . . . of dangerous ideas[.]' " 524 U.S. 569, 587, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (quoting Regan , 461 . . .
. . . Johanns , 450 F.3d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 2006) ). . . .
. . . Grace , 461 U.S. 171, 180, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (finding sidewalk next to the Supreme . . .
. . . Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (invalidating a stop-and-identify statute . . .
. . . United States , 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quotation marks and citations . . .
. . . Robbins , 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997). . . .
. . . Anderson , 461 Mass. 616, 963 N.E. 2d 704, 718 (2012) ). . . . Eberhart , 461 Mass. 809, 965 N.E. 2d 791, 798 (2012) ); see also Commonwealth v. . . .
. . . Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 818, 965 N.E.2d 791, 798 (2012) ; Burke, 390 Mass. at 482, 457 N.E.2d at 624 . . . Ct. 467, 476, 892 N.E.2d 805, 814 (2008) ; accord Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818, 965 N.E.2d at 798. . . . Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818, 965 N.E.2d at 798. . . . See Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818, 965 N.E.2d at 798-99. . . . See Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818, 965 N.E.2d at 798-99. . . .
. . . DOWCP (Martin) , 732 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2013). . . . Id. at 461. . . . the buildings [including underground transport tunnels] a part of the unloading process." 732 F.3d at 461 . . .
. . . Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. . . .