The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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Due process requires that a defendant have “fair warning” that his activities may subject him to personal jurisdiction in Florida. Id. at 1516. The litigation must arise from activities that the defendant “purposefully directed” at Florida, and the defendant's conduct and connection with Florida must be such that he would “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985)). The defendant's “substantial connection” with Florida must make it foreseeable that his acts will have some effect in Florida. Id.In response to Crowley's prior motion to compel the examination under oath, Plaintiff claimed that she viewed the examination under oath as attorney work product and it was therefore protected from disclosure. Pl. Resp. Opp. [Crowley's] Mot. Compel Resp. to [Crowley's] First RFP at 7-10, June 28, 2023, ECF No. 72. Even assuming Plaintiff's good faith belief that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the examination under oath was protected by a qualified privilege, Santamaria's whereabouts were not protected by attorney work product privilege. The “protective cloak” of attorney work privilege is a qualified privilege. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508; see also F.T.C. v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 19 (1983). It “does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.Concerning fitness for judicial decision, we ask whether the parties raise an issue that we can decide without further factual development and whether the institutional interests of the court and agency favor immediate review. Harrell v. The Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995). As for “hardship,” litigants must show that they are “forced to choose between foregoing lawful activity and risking substantial legal sanctions.” Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1524 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974)); see also Elend, 471 F.3d at 1211. If a claim is fit for judicial decision, that is end of the inquiry, and the matter is ripe, given that the absence of a “hardship” “cannot tip the balance against judicial review” under those circumstances. See Harrell, 608 F.3d at 1259 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).Plaintiff also asserts that “Congress has not authorized the Southern District of New York to exercise personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff, a Florida resident, and therefore pursuant to § 1391 the venue is improper.” [ECF No. 8, p. 15]. This argument fails because “[p]arties can consent to personal jurisdiction through forum[ ]selection clauses in contractual agreements.” D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964)). Here, the insured agreed to “submit to the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction in the State of New York” [ECF No. 5-1, p. 106], when it agreed to the terms of the Policy.Though the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was premised on a master's ownership of the vehicle and its entrustment to a servant, in subsequent cases over the decades, we found that the doctrine's "underlying theory" applied in the bailment context, when title ownership of the vehicle was removed from its actual control on the road, or when the beneficial owner of the vehicle stood in the shoes of the person with bare title to it. See Aurbach, 753 So.2d at 62-63 (collecting cases); see generally Lynch v. Walker, 31 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1947) (tracing the judicial development of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine), overruled on other grounds by Meister v. Fisher, 462 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1984).Issue X: Death Qualification of Jury. Loyd argues that death qualifying the jury skews it towards guilt and violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Loyd concedes that this Court has rejected this claim before, yet raises it to preserve it for federal review. We have indeed repeatedly rejected this claim. See Wade v. State, 41 So.3d 857, 873 (Fla. 2010); Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1096 (Fla. 2004); San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 467 (Fla. 1998); San Martin v. State, 705 So.2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997). So too has the United States Supreme Court. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) ("[T]he Constitution does not prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in capital cases."). We again deny this claim.Under Ground One, Banks argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an independent act jury instruction. A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to his theory of defense. Lewis, 591 So.2d at 1047 (citing Hansbrough v. State, 509 So.2d 1081, 1085 (Fla. 1987); Smith v. State, 424 So.2d 726, 732 (Fla. 1982); Bryant v. State, 412 So.2d 347, 350 (Fla. 1982); Motley v. State, 20 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1945)). The independent act doctrine applies "when one cofelon, who previously participated in a common plan, does not participate in acts committed by his cofelon, 'which fall outside of, and are foreign to, the common design of the original collaboration.'" Cannon v. State, 18 So.3d 562, 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (quoting Ray v. State, 755 So.2d 604, 609 (Fla. 2000)). The doctrine does not apply when a co-felon's act was a foreseeable consequence of the underlying felony. See Kitt v. State, 260 So.3d 462, 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).To the extent Petitioner argues that the postconviction court and the Second DCA (by its silent affirmance) erred under Florida law by applying the wrong standard of review or by denying this claim without first holding an evidentiary hearing, the state courts, not a federal court on habeas review, is the final arbiter of state law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (recognizing that “a state court's interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus”); Anderson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 462 F.3d 1319, 1330 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he state court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on a petitioner's 3.850 motion is not a basis for federal habeas relief.”). Therefore, an allegation of statelaw error (such as not accepting Plaintiff's Rule 3.850 allegations as true) without a concomitant constitutional error, is not a ground for habeas relief and does not overcome the presumption of correctness afforded a state court's factual findings. See Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile habeas relief is available to address defects in a criminal defendant's conviction and sentence, an alleged defect in a… The Florida Supreme Court used the Blockburger test and arrived “at the conclusion that first degree burglary and sexual battery could be separately and cumulatively punished.” Wicker v. State, 462 So.2d 461, 463 (Fla. 1985). Additionally, the Fifth District has upheld dual convictions for sexual battery and burglary with a battery stemming from the same sexual battery. Young v. State, 762 So.2d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). A conviction for both burglary with a battery and sexual battery does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and Petitioner is entitled to no relief on Claim 2.The neurological evidence similarly supports the ALJ's findings. Plaintiff's neurological exam while in the hospital was essentially normal (Tr. 385). Dr. Martinez found no focal sensorial motor deficits and Plaintiff denied memory loss (Tr. 487). Plaintiff's neurological exams by Dr. Ramani and ARNP Lape were repeatedly within normal limits (Tr. 500, 503, 506, 509, 612, 614, 636, 639, 642, 645, 648). ARNP Lape found Plaintiff's gait to be normal and she had grossly intact cranial nerves and sensation (Tr. 458, 462). Each time she was examined by Dr. Ramani, Plaintiff's gait was normal and she had no motor or sensory deficits (Tr. 745, 748, 752). Dr. Martinez similarly found no neurologic abnormalities (Tr. 480, 482).. . . Chadha , 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). . . .
. . . Mescalero Apache Tribe , 462 U.S. 324, 325, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983) (barring State from . . .
. . . Gannon University , 462 F.3d 294, 304, n. 6, 307 (C.A.3 2006). . . .
. . . categorical ban-"broadly and strictly" prohibiting "any type of aid" to religious schools. 393 Mont. at 462 . . .
. . . Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. , 462 U.S. 416, 440, n. 30, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 . . . Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. , 462 U.S. 416, 440, n. 30, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 . . . Craig , 429 U.S. at 196-197, 97 S.Ct. 451 ; see Akron , 462 U.S. at 440, n. 30, 103 S.Ct. 2481 ; Danforth . . . Both the hospitalization requirement in Akron , 462 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 2481, and the hospital-accreditation . . . Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. , 462 U.S. 416, 452-466, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983 . . . Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. , 462 U.S. 416, 458, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) . . .
. . . Chadha , 462 U.S. 919, 939, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). . . . Chadha , 462 U.S., at 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764. They did not stop there. . . . Marshall , 564 U.S. 462, 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011). . . . .. it is beyond the reach of the Legislative body." 1 Annals of Cong. 464 (1789); see also id. , at 462 . . .
. . . Chadha , 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) ; see also EPA v. . . . Sigmon Coal Co. , 534 U.S. 438, 462, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). . . .
. . . EEOC , 462 U.S. 669, 682-685, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983). . . .
. . . Chadha , 462 U.S. 919, 955, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (noting that the Constitution prescribes . . . Chadha , 462 U.S. 919, 952, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) ). . . .
. . . final order of removal "includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent." 462 . . .
. . . Warren , 192 F. 458, 462 (CA9 1911) (government motion). See Administrative Office of the U.S. . . .
. . . Marshall , 564 U.S. 462, 513, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ; United States v. . . . Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. , 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983), and . . .
. . . Hearst Corp. , 103 F.3d 462, 469 (1997). . . . Circuit acknowledged that its reading conflicted with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hearst , 103 F.3d 462 . . .
. . . . ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 462, 469, 196 L.Ed.2d 373 (2016) ; Salman v. . . .
. . . Stephens , 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) ; Gregg v. . . .
. . . Wallace , 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) ; Bush v. . . . Lucas , 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). . . . Abbasi , 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1857 (quoting Bush , 462 U.S. at 380, 103 S.Ct. 2404 ). . . . Lucas , 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) ; Chappell v. . . . Wallace , 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). United States v. . . .
. . . Bray 461-462. . . . Id. , at 462-464. And the stakes are asymmetric. . . .
. . . BODUM USA, INCORPORATED No. 19-462 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 453, 462 (E.D. Va. 2017). . . . Brown , 462 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006) ). . . .
. . . Apple Inc. , 811 F.3d 455, 462 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Council, Inc. , 462 U.S. 87, 105, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983) ). Mr. . . .
. . . App'x 462, 466 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J.) . . .
. . . Rose , 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999) (ADA Title II's incorporation of § 2000e-5 ). . . . Rose , 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999). . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). . . . Aljabari , 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010) ; see generally Gates , 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. . . . Gates , 462 U.S. at 245 n.13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 ("probable cause requires only a probability or substantial . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). * * * The judgment of the district . . .
. . . Id. at 462. The trial judge wondered, "[w]hat do you mean by the word 'relationship?' . . . " Id. at 462-63. Defense counsel explained, I mean, drug relationship. . . .
. . . Tregre , 913 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson v. . . .
. . . Goldfield Deep Mines Co. of Nev. , 758 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1985) (recounting the district court's . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). . . . Gates , 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; Glover , 755 F.3d at 816. . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 243, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). . . .
. . . Armstrong , 517 U.S. 456, 462, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). . . .
. . . Lucas , 462 U.S. 367, 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) ; and a race-discrimination suit against . . . Wallace , 462 U.S. 296, 297, 304-05, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). . . .
. . . Achim , 468 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2006) ). Id . 468 F.3d at 469. 648 F.3d at 1106. Id. at 1102. . . . Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Nowhere does § 1158 purport to prohibit the Attorney General . . .
. . . Potamkin Chevrolet , 94 N.J. 1, 462 A.2d 133, 134 (1983) )). DiTrolio v. . . .
. . . Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC) , 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007 . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). . . .
. . . Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec ), 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983) . . .
. . . Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec ), 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983) . . . See id. at 129 (citing Bancec , 462 U.S. at 629, 103 S.Ct. 2591 ). . . . generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when to do so would work fraud or injustice." 462 . . . instrumentality's separate legal status would work a 'fraud or injustice.' " Id. at 128 (quoting Bancec , 462 . . . See 462 U.S. at 632, 103 S.Ct. 2591. . . .
. . . Providence Dane LLC , 462 F. . . . to collect from plaintiff personally was irrelevant to the nature of the debt); see also Boosahda , 462 . . . See also Boosahda , 462 F. . . .
. . . Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006) (" Earley I"), reh'g denied, 462 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2006) (" Earley . . .
. . . Ayers , 782 F.3d 425, 462 (9th Cir. 2015) ; see also Williams , 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (discussing . . .
. . . Villamonte-Marquez , 462 U.S. 579, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983), the defendants were convicted . . . Sarmiento-Rozo provided some support for the defendants' argument, but nonetheless rejected that argument. 462 . . .
. . . Co. , 128 F.3d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1997). That is especially true in this case. . . .
. . . Parker , 462 U.S. 345, 354, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). In Giovanniello v. . . .
. . . Blackwell , 462 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The first step under the Anderson / Burdick framework . . .
. . . Grinnell Corp. , 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974). . . .
. . . Wallace , 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), the Supreme Court rejected a Fifth Amendment . . .
. . . Dupre , 462 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2006). United States v. . . .
. . . . & Local 382 , 462 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Bd. of Educ. , 462 F.3d 762, 777 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 192, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983) ; see also City of El Paso v. . . . See Exxon Corp., 462 U.S. at 191-92, 103 S.Ct. 2296 (distinguishing a permissible law "impos[ing] a generally . . . Because the "sole effect" of SB 2289 is not "to alter contractual duties[,]" Exxon Corp., 462 U.S. at . . . Eagerton , 462 U.S. 176, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983), where a state law prohibited oil and . . .
. . . Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 839 (8th Cir. 2006) ). . . .
. . . Swan , 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884) ). . . . Prosise , 462 U.S. 306, 320, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983) ). . . . Haring , 462 U.S. at 321, 103 S.Ct. 2368. . . . Haring , 462 U.S. at 321, 103 S.Ct. 2368. . . . Haring , 462 U.S. at 321, 103 S.Ct. 2368 ; accord Class , 138 S. Ct. at 805. . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). . . . Gates , 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317. . . . Gates , 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Gates , 462 U.S. at 231-32, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting United States v. . . . Gates , 462 U.S. at 264, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (White, J., concurring) (italics omitted). . . . Gates , 462 U.S. 231, 238 (1983). . . . Gates , 462 U.S. at 232, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. . . .
. . . Cunningham , 462 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Seeman , 462 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Republic of Congo , 462 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Angel , 355 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), that exception is a narrow one; as a general . . .
. . . Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), that this Court does not have the authority . . .
. . . Ct. 462, 467, 196 L.Ed.2d 373 (2016) (quoting and endorsing Rowe , 56 F.2d at 749 ). . . . Follette , 462 F.2d 1041, 1045-50 (2d Cir. 1972) ; State v. . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (emphasis in United States v. . . .
. . . Quality Mills, Inc. , 462 F.2d 1324, 1327 (5th Cir. 1972) . . . . June 14, 2006) (citing Brumbelow , 462 F.2d at 1327, and finding that the defendant's assertion of the . . .
. . . McKenzie-Gude , 671 F.3d 452, 462 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that a mere contradiction of a warrant application . . .
. . . Bancec , 462 U.S. at 613, 103 S.Ct. 2591. . . . Bancec , 462 U.S. at 629, 103 S.Ct. 2591 (citing NLRB v. . . . Bancec , 462 U.S. at 633, 103 S.Ct. 2591. 2. . . . Bancec , 462 U.S. at 613, 103 S.Ct. 2591. . . . Bancec , 462 U.S. at 629, 103 S.Ct. 2591. . . .
. . . Oct. 3, 2016), ECF No. 462. . . . Ragen , 340 U.S. 462, 71 S.Ct. 416, 95 L.Ed. 417 (1951). . . .
. . . Mississippi , 379 U.S. 443, 462, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also . . . See Henry , 379 U.S. at 448, 85 S.Ct. 564 (majority op.); id. at 462-63, 85 S.Ct. 564 (Harlan, J., dissenting . . .
. . . Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Indiana Youth Center , 950 F.2d 462, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1991) (gun-shot). . . .
. . . (In re Ayele), 490 B.R. 460, 462 (D. Mass. 2013). . . .
. . . establish" a proposition of law "which would mean that [agency] orders are wrong or invalid." 700 F.3d at 462 . . . [agency's] response in the court of appeals," Mais , 768 F.3d at 1121 ; see also Self , 700 F.3d at 462 . . .
. . . Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv. , 707 F.3d 462, 473 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that, where agency's data . . .
. . . Jenson , 462 F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 2006). . . . Jenson , 462 F.3d at 406 (citation omitted). . . .
. . . App'x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016) ; Francis v. Pellegrino , 224 F. . . .
. . . Sears Roebuck & Co. , 138 N.J. 2, 647 A.2d 454, 462-65 (1994) ). . . . (quoting Cox , 647 A.2d at 462 ). . . .
. . . plaintiffs reiterated in other evidence and deposition testimony); McMunn , 191 F.Supp.2d at 454, 458, 460, 462 . . .
. . . Chadha , 462 U.S. 919, 923-24, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). . . .
. . . Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). . . . Place , 462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). . . .
. . . Co. , 462 F.3d 437, 453 (5th Cir. 2006) (Owen, J., dissenting). . . .
. . . Stephens , 462 U.S. 862, 878-79, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (requiring an individualized determination . . . See Zant , 462 U.S. at 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733. . . .
. . . Grolier Inc. , 462 U.S. 19, 25, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (stating that "the literal language . . .
. . . United States , 358 U.S. 498, 513, 79 S.Ct. 524, 3 L.Ed.2d 462 (1959) ); cf. Perry v. . . . United States , 358 U.S. 498, 513, 79 S.Ct. 524, 3 L.Ed.2d 462 (1959) ). . . .
. . . Dep't of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ; Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. . . .
. . . See 563 U.S. at 462, 131 S.Ct. 1849 ("[T]he answer to the question before us is that the exigent circumstances . . . exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment." 563 U.S. at 462 . . .
. . . Gonzales , 549 U.S. 47, 58, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006) ; Kahn v. . . .
. . . Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) ). III. . . .
. . . Martin, 732 F.3d at 462. . . . Id. at 462. . . .
. . . Capwill , 462 F.3d 543, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The inability of a receivership estate to meet all of . . . Liberte Capital Grp. , 462 F.3d at 551 ("The receiver's role, and the district court's purpose in the . . . See Schauss , 757 F.2d at 653 ; Byers , 609 F.3d at 93 ; Liberte Capital Grp., 462 F.3d at 551-52. . . .
. . . John Doe Corp. , 493 U.S. 146, 148, 110 S.Ct. 471, 107 L.Ed.2d 462 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted . . .
. . . Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), this Court is required to determine whether . . .
. . . Rash , 840 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609, 617-19, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). Compl. ¶ 13. See Dunbar v. . . .
. . . Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). . . .
. . . Daniels , 427 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2005). . . .
. . . Louisville Ladder, Inc., 462 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) ; Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. . . .
. . . Ewing, 221 Neb. 462, 378 N.W.2d 158, 162 (1985). . . .
. . . Thomson , 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983). . . .
. . . Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). . . .