The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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For support, Manago cited our decision in Williams, where we held-following Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000), and its progeny-that a defendant sentenced under section 775.082(1)(b) has a right to have a jury determine whether the defendant "actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim." 242 So.3d at 294. So Manago requested that the trial court resentence him under 775.082(1)(b)2., which carries a lesser penalty.“On August 6, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit granted [Baptiste's] application for leave to file a second or successive Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), finding that Movant had made a prima facie showing that his § 924(o) firearm conspiracy conviction in Count 4 and his § 924(c) firearm conviction in Count 5 were predicated on the Hobbs Act conspiracy in Count 1, and therefore may be unconstitutional following [United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019)].” Baptiste v. United States, 2021 WL 328069, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2021) (Matthewman, Mag. J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 327507 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2021) (Moreno, J.). The Government conceded-and U.S. Magistrate Judge William Matthewman agreed-that Baptiste's “conviction and sentence as to Counts 4 and 5 should be set aside and [Baptiste] should be resentenced on Counts 1 and 6.” Id. at *3. Magistrate Judge Matthewman also concluded that Baptiste deserved a de novo resentencing because “Movant is entitled to present evidence of his rehabilitation to the District Court before it imposes a new sentence.” Id. at *4 (citing Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 491 (2011)).Putting these pieces together, the traditional Section 2 vote dilution case challenges the operative boundaries of an electoral system and seeks to redraw those boundaries so that the minority population's voting strength is no longer diluted across the aggregated voting population. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46-47. Often, these cases challenge multi-member, at-large districts used by governmental subunits within a state-such as city councils, county commissions, or school boards-and allege vote dilution because white voters get to vote for every board member which, in turn, drowns out the preferences of minority voters. See generally United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984) (county commission and school board); Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1489-90 (10th Cir. 1989) (county commission); Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1992) (city council); Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1385 (8th Cir. 1995) (school board); McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 938 (7th Cir. 1988) (school board and park district); Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 808 (6th Cir. 1994) (city council); Washington v… Our review of a trial court's order on a motion for leave to amend a complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages is de novo. Werner Enters., Inc. v. Mendez, 362 So.3d 278, 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (citing Grove Isle Ass'n v. Lindzon, 350 So.3d 826, 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)); Fed. Ins. v. Perlmutter, 48 Fla.L.Weekly D1903 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 27, 2023) ("Because the trial court properly did not consider live witness testimony in ruling on the motion [to amend the complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages], our review is de novo." (citing Cleveland Clinic Fla. Health Sys. Nonprofit Corp. v. Oriolo, 357 So.3d 703, 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023))). In conducting our de novo review, we consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Est. of Blakely by and through Wilson v. Stetson Univ., Inc., 355 So.3d 476, 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing Est. of Despain v. Avante Grp., Inc., 900 So.2d 637, 644 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)).Following a traffic stop, an officer's investigation “must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he duration of the traffic stop must be limited to the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). A Fourth Amendment violation occurs when police uncover contraband “during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop.” See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). However, an officer may prolong a traffic stop if he has an “articulable suspicion of other illegal activity.” United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2003) (footnote call number and quotation marks omitted). Once an officer develops reasonable suspicion, he has a duty to investigate further. United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). A variety of factors may contribute to the formation of an objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, including “shaking” and “extreme[] nervous[ness].” United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991).Issue X: Death Qualification of Jury. Loyd argues that death qualifying the jury skews it towards guilt and violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Loyd concedes that this Court has rejected this claim before, yet raises it to preserve it for federal review. We have indeed repeatedly rejected this claim. See Wade v. State, 41 So.3d 857, 873 (Fla. 2010); Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1096 (Fla. 2004); San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 467 (Fla. 1998); San Martin v. State, 705 So.2d 1337, 1343 (Fla. 1997). So too has the United States Supreme Court. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) ("[T]he Constitution does not prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in capital cases."). We again deny this claim.“An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause violates the Constitution and can underpin a [section] 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). “For probable cause to exist, . . . an arrest must be objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “[a]n officer has probable cause when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1243-44 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). More recently, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “the correct legal standard to evaluate whether an officer had probable cause to seize a suspect is to ‘ask whether a reasonable officer would conclude . . . that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.'” Washington v… Under the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by a jury whose members were selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86. Of import, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor from striking potential jurors solely on account of their race.” United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 86). Indeed, “[t]he Constitution forbids striking even a single juror for a discriminatory purpose.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 2244 (2019)."The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from th[at] evidence." Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985). The law affords counsel "wide latitude" in completing this task. Merck v. State, 975 So.2d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 2007). Thus, "an attorney is allowed to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence and to argue [the] credibility of witnesses or any other relevant issue so long as the argument is based on the evidence." Miller v. State, 926 So.2d 1243, 1254-55 (Fla. 2006).Thomas's conclusory allegations that he was "not subject to" the levy on his wages and that the levy was "unlawful" were insufficient to state a plausible claim for unlawful tax collection practices. See 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As we have explained, his allegation that the underlying tax assessment was invalid could not support a claim in federal district court. See Redeker-Barry, 476 F.3d at 1190-91. And his allegation that the IRS failed to provide him with a "statutory notice of deficiency" could not support his improper-levy claim because he did not allege facts showing that such notice was required.. . . already suggested-that the reservation in question was not diminished or disestablished. 465 U.S. at 475-476 . . .
. . . Roy , 476 U.S. 693, 699-701, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), enforce child-labor protections, . . .
. . . Roy , 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), is instructive in this regard. . . . Roy , 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986). . . .
. . . State Crime Victims Bd. , 502 U.S. 105, 116, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) ; Arkansas Writers . . .
. . . Charles , 476 U.S. 54, 66, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986). . . . American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists , 476 U.S. 747, 785-797, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d . . .
. . . Id. , at 476. . . . The Federalist No. 70, at 473, 476 (A. Hamilton). . . .
. . . After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the nationwide injunction in Regents , see 908 F.3d 476 (2018), but . . . American Hospital Assn. , 476 U.S. 610, 643, 106 S.Ct. 2101, 90 L.Ed.2d 584 (1986), by ensuring that . . . courts to evaluate respondents' pleadings below held that they cleared this modest threshold. 908 F.3d 476 . . . FCC , 476 U.S. 355, 374, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) ). . . . United States Dept. of Homeland Security , 908 F.3d 476, 521-523 (CA9 2018) (Owens, J., concurring in . . .
. . . Aereo, Inc. , 573 U.S. 431, 463, 134 S.Ct. 2498, 189 L.Ed.2d 476 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting), I respectfully . . .
. . . Holder , 565 U.S. 42, 45, 132 S.Ct. 476, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011). . . . previously labeled "excludable" are now labeled " 'inadmissible.' " Judulang, 565 U.S. at 46, 132 S.Ct. 476 . . .
. . . And it would be "confined," i.e. , held within bounds, see Webster's Third 476; Random House 308, if . . .
. . . Michigan Academy of Family Physicians , 476 U.S. 667, 671, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (quoting . . . Bowen , 476 U.S. at 671, 106 S.Ct. 2133. . . .
. . . Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ; Garcia v. . . . See 476 U.S. at 85-89, 91, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court therefore overruled a prior decision, Swain v. . . . See Ring , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428 ; Batson , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712. . . . Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ); DeStefano v. . . . American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists , 476 U.S. 747, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986 . . .
. . . United States , 562 U.S. 476, 491, 493, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011). . . .
. . . . ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2090, 2100, 195 L.Ed.2d 476 (2016) ("Absent clearly expressed congressional intent . . . European Community , 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2090, 2100, 195 L.Ed.2d 476 (2016). . . .
. . . Cuebas y Arredondo , 223 U.S. 376, 390, 32 S.Ct. 277, 56 L.Ed. 476 (1912). . . .
. . . No. 19-476 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 908 F.3d 476, 511 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted , --- U.S. ----, 139 S. . . . (quoting Regents , 908 F.3d 476 at 512 ). IV. . . .
. . . Ramirez , 476 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65-66 [106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48] (1986). . . .
. . . (quoting John Salmond, Jurisprudence 476 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)). . . .
. . . United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (White, J., dissenting))). . . .
. . . Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) ("[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal . . .
. . . Treesh , 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Illinois , 476 U.S. 530, 549-50, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (concluding . . . Lee , 476 U.S. at 550, 106 S.Ct. 2056 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). . . .
. . . State Liquor Auth. , 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986). . . .
. . . Mobil Oil Corp. , 335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2003) ("As a general rule, we do not use certification . . .
. . . Russell & Co. , 288 U.S. 476, 53 S.Ct. 447, 77 L.Ed. 903 (1933), the Court considered the citizenship . . .
. . . New York State Liquor Auth. , 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986) (evaluating the . . .
. . . Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. , 872 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) ). . . .
. . . Bohannon , 476 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a finding of intent for clear error); United . . .
. . . In re Grubin , 476 B.R. 699, 712-13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012). . . .
. . . Ross, 476 F.3d 719, 722 (9th Cir.) . . .
. . . Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986) (plurality opinion)). . . . Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at. 903. . . .
. . . App'x at 476. . . .
. . . United States , 562 U.S. 476, 507, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011), quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Id. at 476. But Tesch is easily distinguishable. . . . Id . at 476. . . .
. . . "precisely track[ed] the language of" the subsection that satisfied the ACCA force clause. 631 F.3d 476 . . .
. . . Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd. , 502 U.S. 105, 116, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991 . . .
. . . Volkswagenwerk, A.G. , 96 N.J. 336, 476 A.2d 250, 253 (1984), but that equitable notion is a two-way . . .
. . . Taylor , 848 F.3d 476, 491 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting "[t]he government admits that kidnapping" under § . . . Wills , 346 F.3d 476, 493 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Weinschneider , 322 F.3d 468, 476 (7th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . United States , 476 U.S. 227, 237, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) ). . . .
. . . Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. , 872 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Miller , 645 F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981). . . . Id. at 476 n.3 (quoting United States v. Hibbs , 568 F.2d 347, 352 (3d Cir. 1977) ). . . . Miller , 645 F.2d at 476. The jury could have found that they were such a factor here. C. . . . Wells Fargo Bank (Texas), N.A. , 788 F.3d 463, 476 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 813 N.E.2d 476, 488 (2004) (emphasis added); see Edlow v. . . . Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 813 N.E.2d 476, 488 (2004). . . .
. . . Co ., 559 So. 2d 467, 476 (La. 1990). . . .
. . . United States , 391 U.S. 123, 139-40, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). . . .
. . . (Trial Tr. at 476-77 (Munsell).) . . .
. . . Willis , 476 F.3d 1121, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). . . . Batson , 476 U.S. at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ("We decline, however, to formulate particular procedures to . . .
. . . Raymond, 476 F.3d 565, 568 (8th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Ct. 2090, 2093, 195 L.Ed.2d 476 (2016). . . .
. . . Lubelan , 476 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Forest River, Inc. , 476 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 2007). . . . (quoting Custom Vehicles, 476 F.3d at 483. . . .
. . . Taylor, 848 F.3d 476, 491 (1st Cir. 2017). . . . Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2007) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Potter , 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (CCPA 1973), the Board determined that Hylete's mark would likely . . .
. . . Supp. 476, 478-82 (E.D. La. 1968), cited in Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. . . . Favalora , 476 S.W.3d 579, 598 (Tex. App. . . .
. . . NLRB , 297 F.3d 468, 476, 478 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) ). . . . Op. at 476-77 (quoting Tri-Cast, Inc. , 274 NLRB 377, 377 (1985) ).) . . .
. . . Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), challenging the use of peremptory strikes . . . Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), that those three strikes were racially . . . it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded." 476 . . . Ct. at 2246, quoting Batson , 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. . . .
. . . United States , 562 U.S. 476, 481, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011). . . .
. . . United States , 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). United States v. . . .
. . . United States , 512 U.S. 594, 600-01, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (holding that Rule 804(b . . .
. . . Ct. 2090, 2100, 195 L.Ed.2d 476 (2016). . . .
. . . Mine Safety & Health Admin. , 476 F.3d 946, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Cal. 2012) ; In re Renz , 476 B.R. 382, 392 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012). . . . See also In re Sweitzer , 476 B.R. 468 (Bankr. D. Md. 2012). . . .
. . . Lewis , 476 F.3d 369, 383 (5th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . ."); Moussaoui , 382 F.3d at 476 (concluding that excluded witnesses' testimony was material and noting . . .
. . . FCC , 476 U.S. 355, 368-69, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) (explaining that state regulations . . .
. . . Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (emphasis added). . . . Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . See Lewis , 581 F.3d at 476 (once the court has determined that the force applied was more than de minimis . . .
. . . Acad. of Family Physicians , 476 U.S. 667, 670, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) ("begin[ning]" . . .
. . . Allen , 476 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). . . . Council , 476 F.3d at 1038 (vacating ITS where BiOp noted that species survey data was out-of-date and . . .
. . . United States , 562 U.S. 476, 502 n.15, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011) (" Rule 35(b) departures . . .
. . . Id. at 154, 190-91 (Trial Tr. at 476, 512-13). . . . App'x 475, 476 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (noting the process to attain retroactive application of . . . Griffin , 476 F. App'x 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Madigan , 697 F.3d 464, 476 (7th Cir. 2012). . . .
. . . Jones , 476 F.3d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted)). " '[F]inality' in the context of issue . . . Robinette , 476 F.3d at 589 (quoting John Morrell & Co. v. . . .
. . . Lopez-Vasquez , 227 F.3d 476, 486 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that it was unnecessary to address the constitutionality . . .
. . . Labor Relations Auth. , 476 U.S. 19, 23, 106 S.Ct. 1678, 90 L.Ed.2d 19 (1986) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Lubelan , 476 F.3d 397, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding the denial of governmental immunity for state-law . . .
. . . United States , 391 U.S. 123, 135-37, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (concluding there is a Confrontation . . .
. . . App'x at 476. . . .
. . . Roe , 432 U.S. 464, 476, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977) ). . . . (quoting Maher , 432 U.S. at 476, 97 S.Ct. 2376 ). . . .
. . . Cruz-Escoto , 476 F.3d 1081, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2007) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Holder , 565 U.S. 42, 64, 132 S.Ct. 476, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011) ); see also S.J. Amoroso Const. . . . Altera Corp. , 926 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Judulang , 565 U.S. at 64, 132 S.Ct. 476 ). . . . Ass'n , 476 U.S. 610, 643, 106 S.Ct. 2101, 90 L.Ed.2d 584 (1986) (quoting State Farm , 463 U.S. at 50 . . .
. . . United States , 562 U.S. 476, 481, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011) ; Simons , 375 F. . . .
. . . knowing about the high return rates [Doc. 223 ¶¶ 109, 243, 467-80] and the legal scrutiny [Doc. 223¶¶ 476 . . .
. . . Jones, 476 F.3d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Ct. 467, 476, 892 N.E.2d 805, 814 (2008) ; accord Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818, 965 N.E.2d at 798. . . .
. . . Holder , 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7, 132 S.Ct. 476, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011) ). . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 470, 476 (W.D. . . .
. . . Scansteel Service Center, Inc. , 807 S.W.2d 476, 486 (Ky. 1991) ). . . .
. . . Sessions , 865 F.3d 476, 487 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Mitchell , 476 F.3d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Margulies (In re Margulies) , 476 B.R. 393, 402 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Bickerton v. . . .
. . . Lynch , 815 F.3d 469, 476 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Descamps , 570 U.S. at 264, 133 S.Ct. 2276 . . . Id. at 476-77 (quoting Descamps , 570 U.S. at 265, 133 S.Ct. 2276 ). . . .
. . . Holder , 565 U.S. 42, 48, 132 S.Ct. 476, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011) (citing INS v. St. . . .
. . . Ct. 2090, 2101, 195 L.Ed.2d 476 (2016). . . . Ct. 1958, 1967, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017). . . .
. . . Dist., 832 F.3d at 476 (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693 ). . . . See Freedom From Religion Found., 832 F.3d at 476 (quoting Cook v. . . . Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 170, 184-85, 120 S.Ct . . .
. . . Charles , 476 U.S. 54, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986), to argue that the real party in interest . . .