The 2023 Florida Statutes
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White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992); accord Chandler v. United States , 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (“To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable .... [T]he issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.'”) ( en banc ) (quoting Burger v. Kemp , 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)); s ee also Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (counsel has no duty to raise a frivolous claim).The federal mail and wire fraud statutes require, as an element, that the perpetrator scheme to obtain money or property. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Virtually identical language exists in the federal securities laws. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 with 15 U.S.C. §77q(a). Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit opinions are best read as saying that, when the underlying statute requires proof that the fraud perpetrator obtained property, Rule 9(b) requires the plaintiff to plead that fact with heightened specificity. Here, Count V does not require, as an element, proof that BOA obtained a benefit. So, the lack of any allegations of benefit does not run afoul of Rule 9(b).The federal mail and wire fraud statutes require, as an element, that the perpetrator scheme to obtain money or property. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Virtually identical language exists in the federal securities laws. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 with 15 U.S.C. §77q(a). Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit opinions are best read as saying that, when the underlying statute requires proof that the fraud perpetrator obtained property, Rule 9(b) requires the plaintiff to plead that fact with heightened specificity. Here, neither Count I nor Count III requires, as an element, proof that BOA obtained a benefit. So, the lack of any allegations of benefit does not run afoul of Rule 9(b).Alvarez-Zarzgoza's psychological and substance abuse issues were fully disclosed and thoroughly discussed at both the change of plea and the sentencing. Alvarez-Zarzgoza complains that his counsel should have done more, but he identifies no significant fact or issue that was omitted from the earlier proceedings. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (“To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable .... [T]he issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.'”) (en banc) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). Because his assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel are unsupported, Alvarez-Zarzgoza is entitled to relief under neither ground two nor ground three.To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).equivalent to an intentional violation of them." Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So.2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1999) (quoting White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So.2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 1984), receded from
That a government agency cannot retaliate against a contractor for exercising its First Amendment rights is clearly established. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 686. But the Supreme Court has "repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality." Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). It must be clear with respect to the facts of this case that Zen Group was exercising its First Amendment rights. Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) ("The relevant question . . . is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful . . . ."). "If it is unclear whether [Zen Group's] complaints were of the kind held to involve a matter of public concern, then [Bennett's] alleged actions did not violate clearly established First Amendment rights and [she] is entitled to qualified immunity." Badia v. City of Miami, 133 F.3d 1443, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). Even when the topic of the speech is "obviously a matter of important social interest," "we must focus on what [the officials] knew" or should have known about the facts and the law. Johnson v… To the extent that the City and the Van Dykes argue, and the trial court implied, that the default judgment could be declared void based on lack of personal jurisdiction over Toll Bridge Company, actions that are in rem or quasi in rem, which would include Marlowe's quiet title action against Toll Bridge Company, do not require the establishment of personal jurisdiction over a defendant landowner. See Hinton v. Gold, 813 So.2d 1057, 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820, 830 (Fla. 1926); T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Wolf v. Indus. Guar. Bancorp., 281 So.2d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. ex rel Bd. of Trs. of the Int. Imp. Trust Fund, 78 So.3d 31, 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). However, a trial court obtains jurisdiction in such actions "only after the plaintiff wishing to bring suit complies with the requirements of due process," which requires "that the defendant be given fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard before a judgment is rendered." Hinton, 813 So.2d at 105960 (citing Ryan's Furniture Exch. v. McNair, 162 So. 483, 487 (Fla. 1935); Wyatt v… request for prospective relief. Ringer, 466 U.S. at 621, 104 S.Ct. 2013. Porzecanski, 943 F.3d at 483. Similarly here, Plaintiff is essentially seeking a right to future payments outside of the appropriate
We review the district court's decision to dismiss Hyde's case for failure to comply with a court order for abuse of discretion. Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006). This means that "we must affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard." United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). Although pro se litigants are generally subject to less stringent standards than represented parties, Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014), they are nevertheless required to conform to procedural rules. Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002).. . . Amos , 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987). . . .
. . . Id. , No. 71, at 483. . . .
. . . Georgia , 6 Pet. 515, 557, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) ; see also McClanahan v. . . .
. . . S. 473, 486, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) ("It is especially unlikely that Congress would have . . .
. . . Corporation Comm'n of Okla ., 278 U.S. 515, 526-527, 49 S.Ct. 235, 73 L.Ed. 483 (1929). . . .
. . . Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. , 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). . . .
. . . Perkins , 116 U.S. 483, 6 S.Ct. 449, 29 L.Ed. 700 (1886), and Morrison v. . . . President to keep these officers accountable-by removing them from office, if necessary." 561 U.S., at 483 . . . Id., at 483, 514, 130 S.Ct. 3138. . . . Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 483, 130 S.Ct. 3138. We decline to do so. . . . Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 483, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (quoting Art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ). . . . Id. , at 483, 130 S.Ct. 3138. . . . Perkins , 116 U.S. 483, 484-485, 6 S.Ct. 449, 29 L.Ed. 700 (1886), had a century earlier allowed Congress . . .
. . . , and 1003.23(b)(1), and the Executive always has discretion not to remove, see AAADC , 525 U.S. at 483 . . .
. . . Kansas , supra , at 483, 135 S.Ct. 1042 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting . . .
. . . Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). . . .
. . . Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481, n. 1, 483-484, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). . . .
. . . Zant , 499 U.S. 467, 483, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). . . .
. . . United States , 483 U.S. 350, 358, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987). . . . McNally , 483 U.S. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 2875. This Court declined to go along. . . . McNally , 483 U.S. at 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875 ; see supra, at 1571 - 1572. . . . McNally , 483 U.S. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 2875 ; see supra, at 1571. . . .
. . . first, holding that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was facially overbroad under the First Amendment, 910 F.3d at 483 . . . advice, even a grandmother's plea to her alien grandchild to remain in the United States. 910 F.3d at 483 . . . United Reporting Publishing Corp. , 528 U.S. 32, 39, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999) ). . . .
. . . Burwell , 576 U.S. 473, 493, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015). . . .
. . . Continental Bank Corp. , 494 U.S. 472, 482-483, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) : "Our ordinary . . . United States , 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). . . . Stotts , 467 U.S. 561, 583, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984) (holding case live due to damages caused . . . Continental Bank Corp. , 494 U.S. 472, 482-483, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990), but that decision . . .
. . . Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) ; Smith v. . . . Duvall , 705 F.3d 479, 483, n. 1 (CADC 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., for the court). See, e.g. , Andres v. . . .
. . . Bras , 483 F.3d 103, 113 (C.A.D.C. 2007). . . .
. . . Id. , at 483-485, 132 S.Ct. 1166. See also, e.g. , Stokeling v. . . . Kawashima , 565 U.S. at 483-484, 132 S.Ct. 1166 (the statutory phrase "an offense that ... involves fraud . . .
. . . Stanley , 483 U.S. 669, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ; Chappell v. . . . discipline created by statute and regulation, see Chappell , 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362 ; Stanley , 483 . . . Schweiker , 487 U.S. at 421-422, 108 S.Ct. 2460 ; see also Stanley , 483 U.S. at 683, 107 S.Ct. 3054 . . . Stanley , 483 U.S. 669, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ; Bush v. . . .
. . . No. 19-483 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . CREW II , 922 F.3d at 483. But this time, CREW sued under FOIA. Id. at 485. . . . Id. at 483. However, in so doing, the D.C. . . .
. . . Ct. 2480, 2495-96, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) (quoting Palmer v. . . .
. . . United States , 483 U.S. 171, 173, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) ("A statement is not hearsay . . .
. . . Goode , 483 F.3d 676, 681 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Co. , 483 F.3d 657, 666 (10th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Khabeer , 410 F.3d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 2005). . . .
. . . Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). . . .
. . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (same). . . . Robinson , 902 F.3d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante), revised on petition . . . Hidalgo Cty. , 246 F.3d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 2001) ("threshold issue" on qualified immunity appeal "is . . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ) (cleaned up). . . . Ermel , 483 F.3d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2007). But no one raised the point here. . . . The Supreme Court has enforced immunity where officers acted negligently, Anderson , 483 U.S. at 641, . . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). . . . establish as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed the search to be lawful." 483 . . .
. . . Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561 U.S. 477, 483, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010). . . .
. . . City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 487-88 (8th Cir.) . . .
. . . Ermel , 483 F.3d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Martinez , 921 F.3d 452, 483 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). . . .
. . . Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). . . .
. . . Miller , 483 U.S. 756, 763, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (quoting Doyle , 426 U.S. at 619, 96 . . .
. . . No. 93-483 at 5 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2032, 2035; see NFL I , 116 F. Supp. at 325. . . . No. 93-483 at 4 (1973). . . . No. 93-483 at 5 (1973). . . . No. 93-483 at 4 (1973). . . .
. . . Stanley , 483 U.S. 669, 683-84, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ; a First Amendment suit against . . .
. . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). . . . reasonable, or whether he was "reasonably unreasonable" for purposes of qualified immunity, see Anderson , 483 . . .
. . . Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284, 107 S.Ct. 2829, 97 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987). . . .
. . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. . . . Anderson , 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S. . . .
. . . Holder , 565 U.S. 478, 483, 132 S.Ct. 1166, 182 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) ). Id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. . . .
. . . Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (quoting Stachura , 477 U.S. at . . .
. . . Davis , 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). . . .
. . . Linde , 882 F.3d at 329 (citing Halberstam , 705 F.2d at 483-84 ). . . .
. . . App'x 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Franks v. . . .
. . . Jones , 872 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). . . .
. . . Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. , 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987). . . .
. . . (R. 483). . . .
. . . Astrue , 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008) ; Sienkiewicz v. . . . See, e.g., Jones , 623 F.3d at 1161 (Symptom exaggeration) ; Getch , 539 F.3d at 483 (same); Hall v. . . .
. . . Tjader , 927 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. , 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) ; Osarczuk v. . . .
. . . Town of Hyde Park , 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995). . . .
. . . United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). . . .
. . . Co. , 898 F.3d 461, 483 & n.87 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). The D.C. . . .
. . . Gwinnett , 483 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Batista, 483 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding that district court did not clearly err in finding . . . See Batista, 483 F.3d at 195-96 (affirming district court's feigned incompetency finding when defendant . . . Bonnett, 872 F.3d 1045, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Batista, 483 F.3d at 197-98 ; Patti, 337 . . . App'x at 909 ; Batista, 483 F.3d at 197 ; United States v. Binion, 132 F. . . . See Batista, 483 F.3d at 197 ; Patti, 337 F.3d at 1325. . . .
. . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). . . .
. . . Co. , 483 Mich. 18, 762 N.W.2d 911, 913-14 (Mich. 2009). . . .
. . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). IV. . . .
. . . Forest River, Inc. , 476 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 2007). . . . (quoting Custom Vehicles, 476 F.3d at 483. . . .
. . . United States , 401 U.S. 481, 483 n.*, 91 S.Ct. 858, 28 L.Ed.2d 200 (1971), overruled on other grounds . . .
. . . Gore , 483 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gonzales , 249 F.3d at 411 ). . . .
. . . Motors Corp. , 407 B.R. 463, 479-80, 483 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). . . .
. . . Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) ("[O]ftentimes the meaning -- or ambiguity -- of certain words . . .
. . . United States , 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). . . .
. . . App'x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that a four-level error in calculating the defendant's base offense . . .
. . . App'x 483, 484-85 (4th Cir. 2005). III. . . .
. . . Davis , 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018) (also holding that § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague). . . . Davis , 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018) ; United States v. Salas , 889 F.3d 681, 685 (10th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . No. 105) 483:20-22) Defendants have been aware of Plaintiffs' sale of WOODSTOCK-branded recreational . . .
. . . Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 496, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 186 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation . . .
. . . Brown , 391 U.S. 471, 483, 88 S.Ct. 1759, 20 L.Ed.2d 751 (1968). . . . See Reading Co. , 391 U.S. at 483, 88 S.Ct. 1759 ("It is of course obvious that proper insurance premiums . . .
. . . Kimble , 305 F.3d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 2002) ; United States v. Price , 30 F. . . .
. . . Duffy , 446 F.3d 483, 500 (3d Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Moussaoui , 483 F.3d 220, 234 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) ). . . .
. . . McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) ; Murray , 745 F.3d at 1002. . . .
. . . Astrue , 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008) ("... although an ALJ may not ignore a claimant's subjective . . .
. . . Harrington, 909 F.3d 483, 490 n.8 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. . . .
. . . Ct. 2480, 2492, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) (quotation marks omitted); see also F.D.A. v. . . .
. . . Davis , 199 W.Va. 84, 483 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1996). . . .
. . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). . . .
. . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). . . .
. . . Fields , 483 F.3d 313, 327-28 (5th Cir. 2007). . . . See Fields , 483 F.3d at 337-38. . . .
. . . Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) ). . . .
. . . Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). . . .
. . . Co., 483 F.3d 1265, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding, in light of response to certified question from . . .
. . . . § 525.150 ; see Majority Op. at 483. . . .
. . . Sandoval , 990 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ); see also . . .
. . . McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1603, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). . . .
. . . Id. at 483 & n.1, 100 S.Ct. 1254. . . .
. . . Roberts (In re Allison), 960 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1992) ; RecoverEdge L.P. v. . . . July 26, 2007) ; In re Allison, 960 F.2d at 483 ; RecoverEdge L.P., 44 F.3d at 1292-93 ; Pasagui v. . . .
. . . . ----, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. . . .
. . . Potter , 553 U.S. 474, 483, 128 S.Ct. 1931, 170 L.Ed.2d 887 (2008) (cautioning against "improperly conflat . . .
. . . Rutherford , 605 F.3d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 2010) ("undermines"); Miller v. . . .
. . . Dec. at 483, the BIA observed that examples of appropriate safeguards include, but are not limited to . . .
. . . Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S. . . . Anderson , 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S. Ct. at 3039-40. . . .
. . . Woods , 917 F.3d 471, 483 (6th Cir. 2019) ; id. at 485 n.2 (Nalbandian, J., concurring). Dr. . . .
. . . Baker Leasing Corp. , 293 Ark. 166, 732 S.W.2d 480, 483 (1987) ). . . .
. . . Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 483-85 (2016). . . .
. . . Bd. of Licensure for Prof'l Eng'rs & Surveyors , 916 F.3d 483, 493 n.18 (5th Cir. 2019) ("We do not reach . . .