The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Empire's proposed amended negligence claim is futile because it "would still be subject to dismissal." See Patel, 485 F. App'x 982 at 982-83. The proposed counterclaim's negligence count alleges that Dreke "owed a nondelegable duty to Empire" and that his duty was breached due to "insufficient and improper supervision." (ECF No. 71-1 ¶¶ 42, 47.) The Florida Supreme Court held that although "a qualifying agent for a corporation has a duty to supervise a corporation's construction projects" under §§ 489.119, 489.1195, Florida Statutes, the failure to meet that duty "does not give rise to a private cause of action against a corporation's qualifying agent." Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994). In other words, merely breaching the statutory duty to supervise the construction project cannot give rise to a negligence claim. Only if Empire alleged that it suffered some injury independent of the alleged statutory violations, i.e. an injury not resulting from Dreke's failure to supervise, can it sufficiently state a claim. See Hucke v. Kubra Date Transfer Ltd., Corp., 160 F. Supp. 3d 1320, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (Rosenberg, J.) ("nothing in Murthy stands for… Plaintiff's position and interpretation of its policies is fully consistent with Florida law. Florida Statutes define the term "contractor," in part, as "the person who is qualified for, and is only responsible for, the project contracted for and . . . the person who, for compensation, undertakes to, submits a bid to, or does himself or herself or by others construct, repair, alter remodel, add to, demolish, subtract from, or improve any building or structure." Fla. Stat. § 489.105. Florida's statutory scheme reflects the legislative intent that qualifying agents supervise the project entered into under their name and by use of their contractor's license. Alles v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 423 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The only way a company may be a contractor, under Florida's statutory framework, is by obtaining an individual licensed as a contractor as its "qualifying agent." See Fla. Stat. § 489.119. "The obvious purpose of these statutes allowing a company to act as a contractor through a licensed contractor is to insure that projects undertaken by a company are to be supervised by one certified and licensed by the board." Alles, 423 So. 2d at 626… We affirm the order of the Construction Industry Licensing Board ("CILB") denying Christopher Nathanial Johnson's application to be a qualifying agent for his employer, Fort Pierce Utility Authority, a municipal corporation. Pursuant to section 489.119(2), Florida Statutes (2015), an individual who seeks "to engage in contracting as a business organization, including any partnership, corporation, business trust, or other legal entity, ... must apply for registration or certification as the qualifying agent of the business organization." However, employees of municipalities such as Mr. Johnson are expressly excluded from the requirements of part I of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes (2015), which encompasses section 489.119. See § 489.103(3), Fla. Stat. (2015) (providing that the part does not apply to "[a]n authorized employee of ... any municipality ... or any other municipal or political subdivision ...."). Consequently, the CILB did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the term "legal entity," as it is used in section 489.119, to exclude municipalities and in denying Mr. Johnson's application.Although the plain language of sections 489.128(1) and 489.105(4) and (5) is sufficient to establish this proposition, other portions of chapter 489, part I, read in pari materia with these dispositive provisions confirm our understanding of the circumstances under which a business organization can be said to have a qualifying agent. Section 489.119( 2) requires a business organization proposing to engage in contracting to “apply for a certificate of authority through a qualifying agent.” Section 489.119( 3)(a) requires a qualifying agent to be registered or certified in order for his or her business organization to be “issued a certificate of authority in the category of the business conducted for which the qualifying agent is certified or registered.” The same subsection goes on to require a qualifying agent to inform the Department if he or she ceases to be affiliated with a business organization. Further, it requires the business organization to notify the Department if its only qualifying agent ceases to be affiliated with the organization. § 489.119( 3)(a). With an exception not pertinent to this discussion, the business organization must then… § 489.119(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). In the event a qualifying agent ceases his involvement with a business organization, the business organization "shall have 60 days from the termination of the qualifying agent's affiliation with the business organization in which to employ another qualifying agent." § 489.119(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). Most importantly, section 489.119 clearly states that in such a situation, "the business organization may not engage in contracting until a qualifying agent is employed. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).Building construction standards are established by chapter 553, which adopts the building codes that govern most construction in Florida. Qualifying agents, on the other hand, are a product of chapter 489, Florida Statutes (2002), which regulates the construction industry as a matter of "public health, safety, and welfare." § 489.101. Any business entity that seeks a certificate of authority to engage in contracting must name a qualifying agent. § 489.119(2). The Construction Industry Licensing Board then investigates the "financial responsibility, credit, and business reputation of the qualifying agent and the new business organization" before the Department of Business and Professional Regulation issues a certificate of authority to the business. § 489.119(3)(c). As defined in section 489.105(4):Pursuant to the Florida statutes regulating contractors, in order to engage in contracting in the state, Weddle was required to "apply for a certificate of authority through a qualifying agent." Fla. Stat. § 489.119(2).Thus, a qualifying agent, according to the statute, had to be certified under Part 1 of Chapter 489 in order for a business organization to be issued a certificate of authority. See § 489.119(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002).In Lake Eola Builders, the Court was faced with a similar, though not precisely analogous, set of facts. There, Lake Eola Builders (LEB) sued Metro on a construction contract. Defending, Metro claimed that LEB was not properly licensed pursuant to § 489.119 and accordingly, pursuant to § 489.128, was precluded from recovering on the contract. In synthesizing the import of these sections, the court provided:The Court finds further support for this proposition in Section 489.119(3)(a), which governs, among other things, the requirements for a business organization when its sole qualifying agent ends his or her affiliation with it. The statute provides the business organization with 60 days "in which to employ another qualifying agent." § 489.119(3)(a). Further, the business organization "may not engage in contracting until a qualifying agent is employed," unless one of its principals personally obtains a certificate or registration. § 489.119(3)(a). Once the business organization has employed another qualifying agent, the statute does not require additional paperwork before it may engage in contracting. In other words, the focus is on the qualifications of the individual(s) working for the organization rather than the paperwork. Although the situation of a departing qualifying agent is not perfectly analogous to that of the instant case, it is sufficiently similar to suggest that a similar result is warranted.. . . Pursuant to section 489.119(2), Florida Statutes (2016), an individual who seeks “to engage in contracting . . . from the requirements of part I of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes (2015), which encompasses section 489.119 . . . CILB did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the term “legal entity,” as it is used in section 489.119 . . .
. . . Section 489.119(2) requires a business organization proposing to engage in contracting to “apply for . . . Section 489.119(3)(a) requires a qualifying agent to be registered or certified in order for his or her . . . notify the Department if its only qualifying agent ceases to be affiliated with the organization. § 489.119 . . . discussion, the business organization must then cease contracting until it employs a new qualifying agent. § 489.119 . . .
. . . At the time the Prime Contract was executed on March 29, 2005, ACLP was qualified under section 489.119 . . . See § 489.119, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . Most importantly, section 489.119 clearly states that in such a situation, “the business organization . . . See § 489.119(7)(a)l-3, Fla. Stat. (2009). These exceptions, however, are inapplicable here. . . . . See § 489.119(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . .
. . . . § 489.119(2). . . . . § 489.119(3)(c). . . .
. . . Boyd Construction never had either a primary or secondary qualifying agent, as required by section 489.119 . . . At the time of the contract in the present case, section 489.119(2), Florida Statutes, which addresses . . . See.§ 489.119(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .
. . . Section 489.119(2). . . . Section 489.119(3)(a). . . . Section 489.119(2)(a)(l). . . . The Court finds further support for this proposition in Section 489.119(3)(a), which governs, among other . . . agent is employed,” unless one of its principals personally obtains a certificate or registration. § 489.119 . . .
. . . Boyd Construction had never had either a primary or secondary qualifying agent, as required by section 489.119 . . . Section 489.119(2), Florida Statutes (2004), which addresses the necessity for obtaining a certificate . . . See § 489.119(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). . . .
. . . contractor, agreed with Thomson Homes, Inc., that he would serve as its qualifying agent under section 489.119 . . .
. . . organization, through a qualifying agent and under the fictitious name, if any, as required by section 489.119 . . .
. . . not be considered unlicensed for failing to have a certificate of authority as required by sections 489.119 . . .
. . . shall not be considered unlicensed for failing to have a certificate of authority as required by ss. 489.119 . . . not considered unlicensed if it does not have the certificate of authority required under sections 489.119 . . . shall not be considered unlicensed for failing to have a certificate of authority as required by ss. 489.119 . . .
. . . . § 489.119(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . conduct the type of contracting business for which the qualifying agent is certified or registered. § 489.119 . . .
. . . See § 489.119(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . construction company must apply for a certificate of authority (i.e., a license) through a qualifying agent. § 489.119 . . . qualifying agent is employed unless the company has been granted a temporary nonrenewable certificate. § 489.119 . . .
. . . See § 489.119, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .
. . . Loeffler Building and Design, Inc., was not “qualified” by the licensee as that term is used in Sections 489.119 . . .
. . . court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims because it determined that sections 489.119 . . . In particular, they claim that sections 489.119 and 489.1195, Florida Statutes (1991), impose a duty . . . seeking to become a contractor to procure an individual licensed contractor as its qualifying agent. § 489.119 . . . See § 489.119, Fla.Stat. (1991); Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Hunt v. . . . See §§ 489.119, .127, .129, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . . .
. . . However, this court has determined that neither sections 489.119 nor 489.129, the regulatory and penal . . . Id. at § 489.119. . . .
. . . See § 489.119, Fla.Stat. (1983); Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); v. . . . case law which specifically holds that qualifying agents have a duty to supervise pursuant to section 489.119 . . . president of G & R Builders, as well as the qualifying contractor for the company pursuant to section 489.119 . . . based solely upon an alleged breach of appellee Edge’s statutory duty to supervise pursuant to section 489.119 . . .
. . . complied with all the prerequisites, there was no showing that the required certificate under section 489.119 . . . appellee made a showing to the court that it had complied with all of the prerequisites from section 489.119 . . .
. . . statutory construction, and the court, agreeing with the Board, construed sections 489.105, 489.113, and 489.119 . . .
. . . We agree with the trial court that neither sections 489.119 nor 489.129, Florida Statutes (1989), regulatory . . . A "qualifying agent” is defined in sections 489.119(2) & (3), Florida Statutes (1989), as one who must . . .
. . . Fernandez was qualified and certified pursuant to section 489.119, Florida Statutes (1981), as the qualifying . . . The purpose of section 489.119 is set forth in Alies as follows: The obvious purpose of these statutes . . .
. . . . § 489.119, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . .
. . . . § 489.119(5)(b); Broward County Code § 9 — 23(b). . . .
. . . of Chapter 489; 3) Section 489.129(l)(j), Florida Statutes (1983), through the violation of Section 489.119 . . . Chapter 489; violated Section 489.129(l)(j), Florida Statutes (1983), through a violation of Section 489.119 . . . nor KMK were entitled to engage in contracting or act as a contractor under Sections 489.113(1), (2), 489.119 . . . The Department has shown that Norris violated Section 489.119, by failing to qualify a business through . . . Section 489.119(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1983), requires a legal entity which proposes to engage . . .
. . . Section 489.119, Florida Statutes (1979). . . . Under Section 489.119, the applicant proposing to engage in contracting as a corporation or other business . . .
. . . The supervisory duty in Alies was based on the statute in question, Section 489.119, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . finding that as a matter of law all qualifiers of a corporation are responsible under the terms of § 489.119 . . .
. . . .” § 489.119, Fla.Stat. (1981). . . . . § 489.119(4), Fla.Stat. (1979). . . . Subsection (2) of section 489.119 indicates that the application for a contractor to become a qualifying . . .