The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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Because the school district granted all of Hall-Gordon's reasonable accommodation requests, she cannot show she was discriminated against under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Holly, 492 F.3d at 155 56.
We review a ruling on a motion for a new trial under the abuse of discretion standard. See Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa v. Farber, 230 So.3d 146, 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). "A trial court's discretion, while broad, is not unbridled." Ashcroft v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 492 So.2d 1309, 1314 (Fla. 1986).
From this final summary judgment, Polo Holdings takes this appeal. A trial court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Blind Monk, LLC v. USO Norge Whitney, LLC, 368 So.3d 980, 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). "Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows no genuine disputes as to any material facts remain and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)). A trial court's interpretation of a contract is also reviewed de novo. Inlet Colony, LLC v. Martindale, 340 So.3d 492, 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
First, the Servinskys' proffered evidence is not directly related to the allegation that Ebsary was grossly negligent in hiring Pool. See HRB Tax Grp., Inc. v. Fla. Investigation Bureau, Inc., 360 So.3d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) ("[T]he trial court improperly considered allegations and evidence not relevant to the claim for which punitive damages were sought"). The Florida Traffic Crash Report-detailing the officer's narrative of the accident finding Pool at fault and smelling of alcohol-occurred after Pool was hired. Servinsky's observation that Pool reeked of alcohol at the accident scene, occurred after Pool was hired. The handwritten notes about Pool's termination, including the presence of beer bottles in his company vehicle, occurred after Pool's hiring. Finally, another employee's handwritten note also referred to information after Pool was hired. See Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So.2d 435, 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (explaining that facts relating to negligent hiring occur prior to the time the employee is hired, whereas facts relating to negligent retention occur after the employee has been hired and during the course of employment).
“[F]ederal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law” when deciding state law claims. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)); see also Royalty Network, Inc. v. Harris, 756 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, when federal courts are sitting in diversity jurisdiction as here, “only substantive state law must be applied” to state law claims, while “federal law governs matters of procedure.” Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 605 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp. v. Brad's Mach. Prods., Inc., 666 F.2d 492, 494-95 (11th Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, Florida law applies with respect to Plaintiff s state law claims (Counts 1-6; 910), and federal law applies to Plaintiff s RICO and declaratory judgment claims (Counts 7 and 8).
A determination as to whether Plaintiff has a right to a jury trial begins with the Seventh Amendment, which preserves the “right of trial by jury” in “[s]uits at common law.” U.S. Const. amend. VII. The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test that courts use to determine whether the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial applies to a plaintiff's particular claim. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). “Under that test, a court must first ‘compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.' It must then ‘examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.'” Hughes v. Priderock Cap. Partners, LLC, 812 Fed.Appx. 828, 831 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42). The second factor is “more important than the first.” Id.
"Since these cases, the [Supreme] Court has not implied additional causes of action under the Constitution." Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491 (2022). Instead, the Court has described "expanding the Bivens remedy" as "a disfavored judicial activity." Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Recently, the Court clarified that the inquiry into whether a Bivens remedy is available "often resolve[s] to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy." Boule, 596 U.S. at 492. And when a case "involves a new category of defendants, . . . a court is not undoubtedly better positioned than Congress to create a damages action." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
District courts are afforded considerable discretion to reconsider prior decisions. See Harper v. Lawrence Cnty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing reconsideration of interlocutory orders); Lamar Advert. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 189 F.R.D. 480, 488-89, 492 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (discussing reconsideration generally and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)); Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (discussing reconsideration under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)). Courts in this District recognize “three grounds justifying reconsideration of an order: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” McGuire v. Ryland Grp., Inc., 497 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (quotation omitted); Montgomery v. Fla. First Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 6:06-cv-1639-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 2096975, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2007). “Reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary measure and should be applied sparingly.” Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Servs., Inc., 89 F.Supp.2d 1311, 1320 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). "A trial court's interpretation of a contract is [also] reviewed de novo." Inlet Colony, LLC v. Martindale, 340 So.3d 492, 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citation omitted). However, "[t]he decision whether to grant or withhold a judgment for specific performance is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court[,] which will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Muniz v. Crystal Lake Project, LLC, 947 So.2d 464, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). A mixed standard thus applies.
Trial courts have “broad discretion” to give an Allen charge, or to “instruct a deadlocked jury to keep deliberating.” United States v. Davis, 779 F.3d 1305, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896)). The charge “must not coerce any juror to give up an honest belief.” Id. (citations omitted). In the Eleventh Circuit, several non-exhaustive factors help analyze whether an Allen charge is improperly coercive:
. . . Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation , 492 U.S. 408, 448, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 343 ( . . .
. . . Lessee of Dudley , 2 Pet. 492, 526, 7 L.Ed. 496 (1829) ; see also Dorchy v. . . .
. . . Reproductive Health Services , 492 U.S. 490, 532-537, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989) (Scalia, . . .
. . . Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S., at 492, 130 S.Ct. 3138. . . . Enterprise Fund , we returned to the principles set out in the "landmark case of Myers ." 561 U.S., at 492 . . . Id. , at 492, 130 S.Ct. 3138. . . .
. . . Reed , 500 U.S. 478, 489-492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). . . . Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Court held that an officer acts " 'under . . .
. . . Murphy , 103 F.2d 492, 493 (CA10 1939) (sua sponte alteration deemed void on appeal); Tiberg v. . . .
. . . Central Bank of Nigeria , 461 U.S. 480, 492, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) ). . . .
. . . American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter , 492 U.S. 573, 668, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed . . .
. . . State , 31 Ind. 492, 507-508 (1869) ; State v. Felter , 25 Iowa 67, 82-83 (1868) ; Hopps v. . . . Crenshaw , 98 Wash.2d 789, 794-795, 659 P.2d 488, 492-493 (1983) ; Ark. . . .
. . . Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 329-330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). . . .
. . . BARR, Attorney General No. 19-492 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Ct. 640, 202 L.Ed.2d 492 (2018) ; Hajro v. U.S. . . . Tax Analysts , 492 U.S. 136, 153 n.13, 109 S.Ct. 2841, 106 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989) ("[O]nce an agency has . . . fail[ing] to comply with one of FOIA's 'mandatory disclosure requirements' " (quoting Tax Analysts , 492 . . .
. . . Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 528, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989) (where testing . . .
. . . Ct. 473, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). . . . Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), which converted an 1871 statute covering constitutional . . .
. . . confers on the President 'the general administrative control of those executing the laws.' " Id. at 492 . . .
. . . Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ("[P]risoners seeking judicial relief . . .
. . . Dist. , 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012). . . . Co. of Chicago , 110 Ill.App.3d 492, 66 Ill.Dec. 160, 442 N.E.2d 586, 591 (1982) ). . . .
. . . McIntosh , 492 F.3d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). . . .
. . . Clairson Indus., L.L.C. , 492 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007) ). . . . Clairson Indus., L.L.C. , 492 F.3d 1247, 1285 (11th Cir. 2007) ). . . . Clairson Indus., L.L.C. , 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n employer's failure to reasonably . . .
. . . Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 706, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). . . .
. . . The annual percentage rate ("APR") on these loans varied from 259 percent to 492 percent. . . .
. . . Gonzales , 492 F.3d 156, 164-67 (2d Cir. 2007) ; Peters v. . . .
. . . Alphapharm Pty. , Ltd. , 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . United States , 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) (holding that a trial court may encourage . . .
. . . City of Brunswick , 287 F.3d 492, 510-12 (6th Cir. 2002). . . .
. . . Supp. 490, 492 (W.D. Pa. 1938). The Pirates sued to enjoin the unauthorized broadcasts. Id. . . .
. . . First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. , 522 U.S. 479, 492, 118 S.Ct. 927, 140 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998) (quoting Ass'n . . .
. . . Poindexter , 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Jernigan , 492 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). . . .
. . . Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) ("In order to ensure reliability . . . Penry , 492 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934. . . .
. . . Corp. , 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J. ) (listing factors, including actual confusion . . .
. . . ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter , 492 U.S. 573, 670, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, . . .
. . . agreed to drop under the plea agreement) would have increased the applicable guidelines range to 471-492 . . .
. . . Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 706-07, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). . . .
. . . AGS Computers, Inc. , 74 N.Y.2d 487, 492, 549 N.Y.S.2d 365, 548 N.E.2d 903 (1989). . . . See Hooper Assocs. , Ltd. , 74 N.Y.2d at 492, 549 N.Y.S.2d 365, 548 N.E.2d 903. . . .
. . . (Trial Tr. at 197-201 (Taylor); Trial Tr. at 492-94 (Munsell); Trial Tr. at 768, 855-56 (Vamvakas); see . . .
. . . Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 497-502 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating defendant's conviction on a plea of guilty to conspiracy . . .
. . . Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1974) ). . . .
. . . See 492 F. Supp. 464, 469 (E.D. . . .
. . . J.A. 117, 492. . . . J.A. 77, 492. . . . J.A. 77, 492. . . . J.A. 117, 492-93. . . . J.A. 77, 492 (emphases added). . . .
. . . Eagan , 492 U.S. 195, 198, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) ). . . . giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court ." 492 . . . See Duckworth , 492 U.S. at 204-05, 109 S.Ct. 2875. . . . to court" language "accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana," 492 . . . the accused of his right to have an attorney present if he chose to answer questions," Duckworth , 492 . . .
. . . Kallas , 895 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2018) ("An absence of treatment is equally actionable whether the . . .
. . . Co. , 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) ("It is this factor of continuity plus . . . Inc. , 492 U.S. at 241-42, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (holding that the continuity prong can be met by showing that . . .
. . . Berryhill , 923 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2019). . . .
. . . Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (citations omitted). . . .
. . . Malaier (In re Free) , 542 B.R. 492, 497 (9th Cir. BAP 2015). . . .
. . . Catron , 1915-NMSC-021, ¶ 7, 20 N.M. 168, 148 P. 490, 492. . . .
. . . State , 166 Ga.App. 137, 303 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1983) (stating that an indictment "must specify the location . . .
. . . Cooley , 91 N.C.App. 209, 371 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1988) ("We question the continuing validity of this rule . . .
. . . State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment protected publication . . . Jean, 492 F.3d at 31 (holding that the First Amendment protected an individual who posted a recording . . . Jean, 492 F.3d at 31 ; Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal. . . . Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). . . . Inc., 492 U.S. at 242, 109 S.Ct. 2893. In the Second Circuit, two years is generally required. . . .
. . . district court's quashing of subpoenas to CIA officials for abuse of discretion); Soriano-Jarquin , 492 . . . United States , 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). See United States v. . . . Soriano-Jarquin , 492 F.3d 495, 504 (4th Cir. 2007), but criminal defendants may seek such agency employees . . .
. . . No. 105) 492:10-12; July 21, 2017 Cease and Desist Letter (Dkt. . . . Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) : "(1) the strength of the [movant's] mark; (2) the similarity of . . .
. . . Ct. 1609, 1614-15, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). . . .
. . . Unizan Bank , 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011) ("The 'filed under' language shows that it is the time . . . Unizan Bank , 649 F.3d 492, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2011) ; Buetow v. A.L.S. . . .
. . . A.B. , 234 W.Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751, 762 (2014) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . M-I, LLC , 853 F.3d 492, 499 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . City of Austin , 851 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Illinois , 504 U.S. 719, 729-32, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). . . .
. . . Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 319-28, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by . . .
. . . Oscar , 496 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir. 1974). . . . Oscar , 496 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted). . . . Oscar , 496 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir. 1974). . . .
. . . Agency , 846 F.3d 492, 521 (2d Cir. 2017) ). " State Farm review for arbitrariness focuses on the rationality . . . ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 668, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, . . .
. . . Harbor Hills Dev., L.P., 179 So. 3d 489, 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. . . .
. . . Talley, 546 S.W.3d 492, 497 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018) ; Broadway Health & Rehab, LLC v. . . .
. . . Patterson , 492 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1974) ). . . .
. . . Rosenhagen, 492 So. 2d 1086, 1089-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) ). . . .
. . . Airlines Co. , 903 F.3d 487, 492 (5th Cir. 2018) ("[W]hat matters is not whether [the employer] was objectively . . . City of Shreveport , 492 F.3d 551, 562 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[O]nce the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory . . . See DeVoss , 903 F.3d at 492 ("[An employee] cannot establish pretext solely by relying on her subjective . . .
. . . Ct. 1609, 1612, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), and that the sniff was not supported by reasonable suspicion. . . .
. . . Airlines Co. , 903 F.3d 487, 492 (5th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . See id. at 492 (discussing Herb's Welding , 470 U.S. at 422 n.6, 105 S.Ct. 1421 ; Rodrigue v. . . .
. . . Tax Analysts , 492 U.S. 136, 151, 109 S.Ct. 2841, 106 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989) ), and "doubts as to the applicability . . .
. . . [Doc. 492]. The Motion remains pending. . . .
. . . Alicea (In re Alicea), 230 B.R. 492, 501 (Bankr. . . .
. . . Rodgers , 492 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007). . . . Ball , 492 F.3d at 1105. . . . See Blessing , 520 U.S. at 347-48, 117 S.Ct. 1353 ; Ball , 492 F.3d at 1117. . . . Ball , 492 F.3d at 1116 ; see also Gomez-Perez v. . . . Ball , 492 F.3d at 1104 n.15. . . .
. . . DEA , 492 F.3d 428, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ; Pigg v. . . . City of Marlborough , 492 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) ("undermined"); United States v. . . .
. . . Tax Analysts , 492 U.S. 136, 142, 109 S.Ct. 2841, 106 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989) ), aff'd , 753 F.3d 210 (D.C . . . Main St. , 811 F.3d at 566-67 (citing Tax Analysts , 492 U.S. at 142, 109 S.Ct. 2841 (discussing "jurisdiction . . . materials sought are not 'agency records' or have not been 'improperly' 'withheld.' " Tax Analysts , 492 . . . Sims , 471 U.S. 159, 182, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985) ; see also Tax Analysts , 492 U.S. at . . . Supp. 2d at 185 (quoting Tax Analysts , 492 U.S. at 142, 109 S.Ct. 2841 (internal quotation marks omitted . . .
. . . White , 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938 (1922) ). . . .
. . . Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), and its progeny, which hold that a state or . . . Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), which was overruled in part not relevant . . . Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) ]. 494 U.S. at 138, 110 S.Ct. 975 (emphasis . . . , 57 L.Ed. 510 ], or to be actionable under § 1983, Monroe [, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 . . . Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 172, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), which held that the statute offers . . . Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) ). . . .
. . . Sam's East, Inc. , 754 F.3d 492, 498 (8th Cir. 2014) ) is no longer good law in light of the Supreme . . . Co. , 163 F.3d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1998) ). . . .
. . . Fox , 492 U.S. 469, 477, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (internal alterations, citations, and . . . Discovery Network , 507 U.S. at 416 n.12, 113 S.Ct. 1505 (quoting Fox , 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028 . . . Fox , 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). i. . . . Fox , 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028. . . . . at 508, 101 S.Ct. 2882 ; see also Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. at 817, 104 S.Ct. 2118 ; Fox , 492 . . .
. . . See id . at 492, 130 S.Ct. 2499 ; Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood , 272 F.3d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001). . . .
. . . Dist. , 672 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2012) ( ADT I ); ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. . . .
. . . Dist. , 672 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2012) ( ADT I ); ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. . . .
. . . Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) ). . . .
. . . Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 498 n.9 (4th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728, 733, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). . . .
. . . . ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). . . . United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015)-Gurule argues the officers also unconstitutionally . . .
. . . See Stephens , 524 F.3d at 492 (acknowledging that a "willing speaker" exists, for purposes of a plaintiff's . . .
. . . Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 705-06, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). . . .
. . . Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). . . . Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) -Gurule argues the officers also unconstitutionally extended the traffic . . .
. . . AR 492, 522, 816. . . .
. . . Earth Island Inst. , 555 U.S. 488, 492-93, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (cleaned up). . . . See Summers , 555 U.S. at 492-93, 129 S.Ct. 1142. . . .
. . . Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 510 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding seizure where "no reasonable child would have believed . . .
. . . Arita-Campos, 607 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2010) ; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). . . . See Arita-Campos, 607 F.3d at 492 ("[I]f an alien can demonstrate that he was never notified of the proceeding . . .
. . . Unizan Bank , 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that "denial of class certification does not . . .
. . . Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263 n.3, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) (stating that the . . .
. . . DEA , 492 F.3d 428, 437 (D.C. . . . Sheriff's Office , 657 F.3d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Thompson , 492 F.3d at 437 ). . . .
. . . Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between Colombia and the United States , 27 Int'l Legal Materials 492 . . .
. . . Co. , 171 Wis.2d 485, 492 N.W.2d 147, 151 (1992) (quoting Landwehr v. . . .
. . . Unizan Bank , 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011) ("The 'filed under' language shows that it is the time . . . Unizan Bank , 649 F.3d 492, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2011) ; Buetow v. A.L.S. . . .
. . . Id. at 492, 109 S.Ct. 1923 ; see also Tinder v. . . . Maleng , 490 U.S. at 492, 109 S.Ct. 1923. I conclude Mr. . . .