The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Fla. Stat. § 668.50(7)(a-d). Florida's UETA only applies to transactions between consenting parties; "[w]hether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ conduct." Fla. Stat. § 668.50(5)(b). Finally, Florida's UETA also accounts for electronic signatures and electronic records:
Defendant next argues that there is no genuine issue of material of fact as to whether Plaintiff signed the UM form. Under Florida law, an electronic signature “means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.” § 668.50(2)(h) F.S. “An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if the record or signature was the act of the person.” § 668.50(9)(a) F.S. “The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable[.]” Id.
“Florida law recognizes an electronic signature like it does a written signature.” Bannister v. Sally Beauty Supply, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-143-J-20JRK, 2020 WL 8223534, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2020) (discussing Fla. Stat. § 668.50(7)). Here, Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of her signature merely because it is in electronic form. Indeed, in response to the motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff agrees that she “signed an E-Signature Consent statement which allowed her to electronically sign various documents presented by Defendant in the application and hiring process.” Doc. No. 12, at 2 ¶ 4.
Under Florida law, an electronic signature "means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record." Fla. Stat. § 668.50(2)(h) (2020). "An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if the record or signature was the act of the person." § 668.50(9)(a) "The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable," and the effect of such a signature is "determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise provided by law." § 668.50(9) (emphasis added). Florida law also provides that "[w]hether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties' conduct." § 668.50(5)(b).
In Count I, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, alleging that she has no obligation to Defendants based on their noncompliance with Florida law and the Electronic Signatures Act. See §§ 725.01; 673.3011; 559.715; 668.50, F.S.; 15 U.S.C. § 7021. Even when seeking declaratory relief, a plaintiff "must still establish a valid waiver of sovereign immunity ..." Kigh v. U.S. District Court, N. Dist. Of Georgia, 681 F. App'x 882, 883 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934)). Congress has not waived the United States' sovereign immunity under Florida statutory law or the Electronic Signatures Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq. Accordingly, Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim against the United States is barred by sovereign immunity.
A person having control of a transferable record is the holder of the transferable record and has the same rights and defenses as a holder of an equivalent record or writing under the Uniform Commercial Code. Fla. Stat. § 668.50(16)(a). "A person has control of a transferable record if a system employed for evidencing the transfer of interests in the transferable record reliably establishes that person as the person to which the transferable record was issued or transferred." Fla. Stat. § 668.50(16)(b). A system satisfies this requirement if the Note was created and stored in a manner that a single authoritative copy exists, and it identifies the person asserting control as the person to which the transferable record was issued. Fla. Stat. § 668.50(16)(c).
Here, based upon the documentary evidence produced by Verizon, only plaintiff signed the Retail Installment Contracts (Doc. #21-2.) Only plaintiff's signature is at the end of the agreements (Doc. #21-2) and Verizon has pointed the Court to no other provision(s) of the agreements that could suffice as Verizon's (or Best Buy's) electronic signature. See Fla. Stat. § 668.50 (An electronic signature may be used to sign a writing and has the same force and effect as a written signature.). Thus, the Court cannot find on this record that there is a valid agreement to arbitrate. It may well be that a signed copy exists or was otherwise delivered or made available to plaintiff, but based upon the documentary proof provided by Verizon the Court cannot make such a determination at this time. Therefore, the Court will deny the Motion without prejudice.
To determine whether an enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists, the Court notes that the Agreement was executed and plaintiff's claims arose in Florida. Under Florida law, a contract requires offer, acceptance, consideration, and sufficient specification of essential terms. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Florida law). "In Florida, '[a] party has a duty to learn and know the contents of a proposed contract before he signs and delivers it and is presumed to know and understand its contents, terms and conditions.'" Williams v. Eddie Acardi Motor Co., 3:07-cv-782-J- 32JRK, 2008 WL 686222, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008). An electronic signature may be used to sign a writing and has the same force and effect as a written signature. See Fla. Stat. § 668.50.
Applying the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act here, the bank presented competent, substantial evidence proving that Fannie Mae owned the e-note and authorized the bank to pursue the foreclosure. The e-note, on its face, is a “transferable record” because it is an electronic record that would be a note under chapter 673 if it were in writing, and its issuer expressly agreed on its face that it was a transferable record. § 668.50( 16)(a). The bank's evidence proved that Fannie Mae had control of the e-note by showing that the bank, as Fannie Mae's servicer, employed a system reliably establishing Fannie Mae as the entity to which the e-note was transferred. § 668.50( 16)(b). According to the bank's evidence, the bank's system stored the e-note in such a manner that a single authoritative copy of the e-note exists which is unique, identifiable, and unalterable. § 668.50( 16)(c) 1. That authoritative copy, introduced into evidence by the bank as Fannie Mae's designated custodian, identified Fannie Mae as the entity to which the transferable record was most recently transferred. § 668.50( 16)(c) 2., 3. That authoritative copy was supplemented by…
(b) Delegated Claim for Relief.If a claimant has been delegated the authority to institute a mortgage foreclosure action on behalf of the person entitled to enforce the note, the claim for relief shall describe the authority of the claimant and identify with specificity the document that grants the claimant the authority to act on behalf of the person entitled to enforce the note. The term “original note” or “original promissory note” means the signed or executed promissory note rather than a copy of it. The term includes any renewal, replacement, consolidation, or amended and restated note or instrument given in renewal, replacement, or substitution for a previous promissory note. The term also includes a transferrable record, as defined by the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act in section 668.50(16), Florida Statutes.
. . . . § 668.50 ). . . . reside to provide that distance-education or correspondence-course program, id. at 92,263 ( 34 C.F.R. § 668.50 . . . state where its enrolled distance-education or correspondence-course students reside, id. ( 34 C.F.R. § 668.50 . . . defrauding students or an accrediting agency's revoking the institution's accreditation), id. ( 34 C.F.R. § 668.50 . . . for teaching certificates), and whether the program satisfies those requirements, id. ( 34 C.F.R. § 668.50 . . .
. . . Section 668.50 of the regulations (the "Disclosure Rule") required the institutions to issue certain . . .
. . . We base this conclusion on: (a)our examination of section 668.50, Florida Statutes (2010), otherwise . . . it were in writing, and its issuer expressly agreed on its face that it was a transferable record. § 668.50 . . . a single authoritative copy of the e-note exists which is unique, identifiable, and unalterable. § 668.50 . . . the same rights as a holder of an equivalent record or writing under the Uniform Commercial Code. § 668.50 . . . .. includes a transferable record, as defined by the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in section 668.50 . . .
. . . also includes a transferable record, as defined by the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act in section 668.50 . . .
. . . He further alleges that, on December 4, his “accumulated leave account ... stood ... at 668.50 hours . . .
. . . Likewise, section 668.50, Florida Statutes (2009), the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act, does not help . . . See § 668.50(3)(b)(4) (noting that the statute "does not apply to a transaction to the extent the transaction . . .
. . . . § 7001; and (2) the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, section 668.50 of the Florida Statutes) support . . .
. . . . § 668.50, Fla. Stat.; Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence (2004). See Tillman v. . . .
. . . Since Orenstein placed sixteen ads, 750 actual agate lines by ruler, the alleged overcharge was $668.50 . . .
. . . the classification and contended that the imported merchandise is properly classifiable under item 668.50 . . .
. . . , aluminum photo-polymer plates used in printing presses were held properly classifiable under item 668.50 . . .
. . . 208, aluminum photopolymer plates used in printing presses were held properly classifiable under item 668.50 . . .
. . . Counsel for alleged Debtors established expenses of $406.90 and fees of $12,-668.50, for a total award . . .
. . . On December 18, 1972, the fund was distributed, in equal amounts of $668.50, to eligible Indians, including . . .
. . . maintains that as parts of line printers the articles should properly have been classified under item 668.50 . . . including printing presses, 25% ad val offset duplicating machines, (Column 2) and stencil copy machines. 668.50 . . .
. . . maintains that as parts of line printers the articles should properly have been classified under item 668.50 . . . (Column 2) 668.50 Other parts of printing machinery ... . . .
. . . that the imports are unfinished printing plates, and are properly dutiable under the provision in item 668.50 . . . half-tone plates, * * * and plates of other materials, engraved or otherwise prepared for printing_ * * * 668.50 . . . Hence, by virtue of rule 10(h), the provision for parts of printing machinery in item 668.50, TSUS, covers . . . Tariff Information (1969), schedule 6, volume 8, p. 277: The Bureau of Customs has also held that item 668.50 . . . imports are unfinished printing plates, they are classifiable as parts of printing machinery under item 668.50 . . .
. . . classified the plates as parts of printing machinery dutiable at 6 per centum ad valorem under item 668.50 . . . requests judgment over-ruling plaintiff’s claim and' sustaining the customs classification upder TSUS item 668.50 . . .
. . . See paragraph 372, Tariff Act of 1930, and items 668.50 and 670.74 of the Tariff Schedules of the United . . .
. . . $1,050.00 on July 19, 1956 300.00 on Nov. 30, 1956 600.00 on April 12, 1957 1,026.37 on July 9, 1958 668.50 . . .
. . . depletion it would have further reduced income tax payable by said Plaintiff in the amount of $17,-668.50 . . .
. . . The United States of America is seeking to obtain from the defendant $29,-668.50. . . .