The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXXIX
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

Chapter 671
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: GENERAL PROVISIONS

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F.S. 671.201

671.201 General definitions.—Unless the context otherwise requires, words or phrases defined in this section, or in the additional definitions contained in other chapters of this code which apply to particular chapters or parts thereof, have the meanings stated. Subject to definitions contained in other chapters of this code which apply to particular chapters or parts thereof, the term:

(1) “Action,” in the sense of a judicial proceeding, includes recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, suit in equity, and any other proceedings in which rights are determined.

(2) “Aggrieved party” means a party entitled to pursue a remedy.

(3) “Agreement,” as distinguished from “contract,” means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance as provided in ss. 671.205 and 672.208.

(4) “Bank” means a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings bank, a savings and loan association, a credit union, and a trust company.

(5) “Bearer” means a person in control of a negotiable electronic document of title or a person in possession of a negotiable instrument, a negotiable tangible document of title, or a certificated security that is payable to bearer or indorsed in blank.

(6) “Bill of lading” means a document of title evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of directly or indirectly transporting or forwarding goods. The term does not include a warehouse receipt.

(7) “Branch” includes a separately incorporated foreign branch of a bank.

(8) “Burden of establishing” a fact means the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence.

(9) “Buyer in ordinary course of business” means a person who, in ordinary course, buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. A person buys goods in ordinary course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the seller’s own usual or customary practices. A person who sells oil, gas, or other minerals at the wellhead or minehead is a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. A buyer in ordinary course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on secured or unsecured credit and may acquire goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract for sale. Only a buyer who takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the seller under chapter 672 may be a buyer in ordinary course of business. “Buyer in ordinary course of business” does not include a person who acquires goods in a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.

(10) “Central bank digital currency” means a digital currency, a digital medium of exchange, or a digital monetary unit of account issued by the United States Federal Reserve System, a federal agency, a foreign government, a foreign central bank, or a foreign reserve system, that is made directly available to a consumer by such entities. The term includes a digital currency, a digital medium of exchange, or a digital monetary unit of account issued by the United States Federal Reserve System, a federal agency, a foreign government, a foreign central bank, or a foreign reserve system, that is processed or validated directly by such entities.

(11) “Conspicuous,” with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is “conspicuous” is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following:

(a) A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and

(b) Language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.

(12) “Consumer” means an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(13) “Contract,” as distinguished from “agreement,” means the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as determined by this code and as supplemented by any other applicable laws.

(14) “Creditor” includes a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor, and any representative of creditors, including an assignee for the benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in equity, and an executor or administrator of an insolvent debtor’s or assignor’s estate.

(15) “Defendant” includes a person in the position of defendant in a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.

(16) “Delivery,” with respect to an electronic document of title, means voluntary transfer of control and “delivery,” with respect to instruments, tangible document of title, chattel paper, or certificated securities, means voluntary transfer of possession.

(17) “Document of title” means a record:

(a) That in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession or control of the record is entitled to receive, control, hold, and dispose of the record and the goods the record covers; and

(b) That purports to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and to cover goods in the bailee’s possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an identified mass. The term includes a bill of lading, transport document, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt, and order for delivery of goods. An electronic document of title means a document of title evidenced by a record consisting of information stored in an electronic medium. A tangible document of title means a document of title evidenced by a record consisting of information that is inscribed on a tangible medium.

(18) “Fault” means a default, breach, or wrongful act or omission.

(19) “Fungible goods” means:

(a) Goods of which any unit, by nature or usage of trade, is the equivalent of any other like unit; or

(b) Goods that, by agreement, are treated as equivalents.

(20) “Genuine” means free of forgery or counterfeiting.

(21) “Good faith,” except as otherwise provided in this code, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.

(22) “Holder” means:

(a) The person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession;

(b) The person in possession of a negotiable tangible document of title if the goods are deliverable either to bearer or to the order of the person in possession; or

(23) “Insolvency proceeding” includes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceeding intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the person involved.

(24) “Insolvent” means:

(a) Having ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business other than as a result of a bona fide dispute;

(b) Being unable to pay debts as they become due; or

(25) “Money” means a medium of exchange that is currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government. The term includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more countries. The term does not include a central bank digital currency.

(26) Subject to subsection (28), a person has “notice” of a fact if the person:

(a) Has actual knowledge of it;

(b) Has received a notice or notification of it; or

(c) From all the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time in question, has reason to know that it exists. A person “knows” or has “knowledge” of a fact when the person has actual knowledge of it. “Discover” or “learn” or a word or phrase of similar import refers to knowledge rather than to reason to know. The time and circumstances under which a notice or notification may cease to be effective are not determined by this section.

(27) A person “notifies” or “gives” a notice or notification to another person by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other person in ordinary course, whether or not the other person actually comes to know of it. Subject to subsection (28), a person “receives” a notice or notification when:

(a) It comes to that person’s attention; or

(b) It is duly delivered in a form reasonable under the circumstances at the place of business through which the contract was made or at another location held out by that person as the place for receipt of such communications.

(28) Notice, knowledge, or a notice or notification received by an organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and, in any event, from the time when it would have been brought to the individual’s attention if the organization had exercised due diligence. An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the person conducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an individual acting for the organization to communicate information unless such communication is part of the individual’s regular duties or the individual has reason to know of the transaction and that the transaction would be materially affected by the information.

(29) “Organization” means a person other than an individual.

(30) “Party,” as distinguished from “third party,” means a person who has engaged in a transaction or made an agreement subject to this code.

(31) “Person” means an individual; corporation; business trust; estate; trust; partnership; limited liability company; association; joint venture; government; governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; public corporation; or any other legal or commercial entity.

(32) “Present value” means the amount as of a date certain of one or more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain by use of either an interest rate specified by the parties if that rate is not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction is entered into or, if an interest rate is not so specified, a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the facts and circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into.

(33) “Purchase” means taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.

(34) “Purchaser” means a person who takes by purchase.

(35) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(36) “Remedy” means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal.

(37) “Representative” means a person empowered to act for another, including an agent, an officer of a corporation or association, and a trustee, executor, or administrator of an estate.

(38) “Right” includes “remedy.”

(39) “Security interest” means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. “Security interest” includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to chapter 679. “Security interest” does not include the special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of those goods to a contract for sale under s. 672.401, but a buyer may also acquire a security interest by complying with chapter 679. Except as otherwise provided in s. 672.505, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under chapter 672 or chapter 680 to retain or acquire possession of the goods is not a security interest, but a seller or lessor may also acquire a security interest by complying with chapter 679. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods, notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer under s. 672.401, is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest. Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest is determined by the facts of each case; however:

(a) A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if the consideration that the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee and:

1. The original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods;

2. The lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods;

3. The lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement; or

4. The lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement.

(b) A transaction does not create a security interest merely because:

1. The present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is substantially equal to or is greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time the lease is entered into;

2. The lessee assumes the risk of loss of the goods;

3. The lessee agrees to pay, with respect to the goods, taxes; insurance; filing, recording, or registration fees; or service or maintenance costs;

4. The lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the goods;

5. The lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal at the time the option is to be performed; or

6. The lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for a fixed price that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed.

(c) Additional consideration is nominal if it is less than the lessee’s reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease agreement if the option is not exercised. Additional consideration is not nominal if:

1. When the option to renew the lease is granted to the lessee, the rent is stated to be the fair market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal determined at the time the option is to be performed; or

2. When the option to become the owner of the goods is granted to the lessee, the price is stated to be the fair market value of the goods determined at the time the option is to be performed.

(d) The “remaining economic life of the goods” and “reasonably predictable” fair market rent, fair market value, or cost of performing under the lease agreement must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into.

(40) “Send,” in connection with a writing, record, or notice, means:

(a) To deposit in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other usual means of communication with postage or cost of transmission provided for and properly addressed and, in the case of an instrument, to an address specified thereon or otherwise agreed or, if there be none, to any address reasonable under the circumstances; or

(b) In any other way to cause to be received any record or notice within the time it would have arrived if properly sent.

(41) “Signed” means bearing any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to adopt or accept a writing.

(42) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(43) “Surety” includes a guarantor or other secondary obligor.

(44) “Term” means a portion of an agreement which relates to a particular matter.

(45) “Unauthorized signature” means a signature made without actual, implied, or apparent authority. The term includes a forgery.

(46) “Warehouse receipt” means a document of title issued by a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.

(47) “Writing” includes printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible form. “Written” has a corresponding meaning.

History.—s. 1, ch. 65-254; s. 1, ch. 78-222; s. 2, ch. 79-398; s. 2, ch. 87-275; s. 4, ch. 90-278; s. 3, ch. 92-82; s. 552, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 2000-112; s. 10, ch. 2001-198; s. 8, ch. 2007-134; s. 3, ch. 2010-131; s. 1, ch. 2023-80.

Note.—s. 1-201, U.C.C.; supersedes ss. 614.02, 673.01, 674.01, 674.07, 674.28, 674.29, 674.30, 678.54.

F.S. 671.201 on Google Scholar

F.S. 671.201 on Casetext

Amendments to 671.201

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 671.201

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 671.201.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

HANNA, v. PENNYMAC HOLDINGS, LLC T. n k a s n k a n k a By, s To Be An As, 270 So. 3d 403 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Florida Statutes, the "holder of the instrument" may enforce an instrument, and that pursuant to section 671.201 . . .

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, AS TRUSTEE FOR RESIDENTIAL ACCREDIT LOANS, INC. v. HARRIS a k a E., 264 So. 3d 186 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession. " § 671.201 . . . See § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphases added). . . .

UNITED STATES v. VICO,, 360 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . . § 671.201 (" 'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment . . .

PETER E. SHAPIRO, P. A. v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 352 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 671.201(27) ; see also § 671.201(25). . . . First, the due diligence requirement from section 671.201(27) applies only to "the "individual conducting . . . Stat. § 671.201(27). Here, no individual conducted the transaction; it was automated. . . .

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE ASSETS TRUST v. F. NOLL, III,, 261 So. 3d 656 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

PMT NPL FINANCING v. CENTURION SYSTEMS, LLC,, 257 So. 3d 516 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See generally § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. . . .

WELLS FARGO BANK N. A. v. DIZ,, 253 So. 3d 705 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . ." § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, N. A. v. JOHNSON a k a L. a k a a k a n k a, 250 So. 3d 808 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. . . .

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f k a CWALT, v. BURGIEL, s At LLC,, 248 So. 3d 237 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 671.201(21)(a). . . .

D. FIELDING, v. PNC BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,, 239 So. 3d 140 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 671.201. . . .

SABIDO v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f k a JP L N. A., 241 So. 3d 865 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

. . . . § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

GREEN, v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, USA N. A. f k a CACV LLC,, 230 So. 3d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 671.201(21), Fla. . . .

HSBC BANK USA, v. HESS a k a H. a k a a k a III,, 228 So. 3d 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. . . .

MOLINA, v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, LLC,, 710 F. App'x 837 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . §§ 671.201 & 671.203 (count 2); violations of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and the Age Discrimination . . . Stat. §§ 671.201, 671.203. As the district court correctly pointed out, UCC § 5-102(a)(7) and Fla. . . . . § 671.201 set out general definitions and do not provide an independent cause of action. . . .

IN RE S. JACK M., 579 B.R. 627 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . Florida Statutes, a rental-purchase agreement is not construed to be a security interest as defined in § 671.201 . . .

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, v. RAFAELI PNC N. A., 225 So. 3d 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

A. FORERO L. v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC,, 223 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .; see also §§ 671.201(21), 673.3011, Fla. Stat. . . .

KUMAR v. U. S. BANK, N. A. NA, NA,, 225 So. 3d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 671.201(5), (21), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, v. UNITED CAPITAL FUNDING CORP., 219 So. 3d 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 671.201(30), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, f k a ON BEHALF OF REGISTERED HOLDERS OF ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST v. HEATH,, 219 So. 3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. . . .

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, v. M. APPLEWHITE O., 213 So. 3d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 671.201(21), Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added). . . .

PENNYMAC CORP. v. T. FROST a k a, 214 So. 3d 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

A. HOUK, v. PENNYMAC CORP., 210 So. 3d 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

U. S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, J. P. v. S. BECKER D., 211 So. 3d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

A. TRUDEL, v. SUNTRUST BANK,, 223 F. Supp. 3d 71 (D.D.C. 2016)

. . . Id,, § 671.201(26); accord id., § 671.209(4). . . . Id, § 671.201(26)(b); accord icl, § 671.209(5)(b). . . . . Stat. § 671.201(26)(b). . . .

D. FRANKLIN, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. N. A., 202 So. 3d 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 671.201(21), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

M. POWERS L. v. HSBC BANK USA, N. A. C,, 202 So. 3d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

BRITTANY S PLACE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. v. U. S. BANK, N. A., 205 So. 3d 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

LUIZ, v. LYNX ASSET SERVICES, LLC,, 198 So. 3d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, v. L. HAGSTROM R., 203 So. 3d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section 671.201, Florida Statutes (2011), defines “holder” as “[t]he person in possession of a [note] . . . that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” § 671.201 . . .

T. FROST a k a v. CHRISTIANA TRUST, a FSB, JP s, 193 So. 3d 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . HSBC Bank USA, 157 So.3d 355, 358 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2009)). . . .

S. MAGALDI, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, As WAMU, 199 So. 3d 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . See § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2013). Murray v. . . .

CRUZ M. v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, F. A., 199 So. 3d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

IN RE ELOWITZ s, 550 B.R. 603 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 671.201(21). . . . Stat. § 671.201(5). .The “holder” of an instrument qualifies as • a "holder in due course” if it meets . . .

McCONNELL, v. CHASE,, 190 So. 3d 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .]” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, v. A. McFADYEN,, 194 So. 3d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. . . . See § 671.201(5), Fla. . . .

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, v. ALAQUA PROPERTY,, 190 So. 3d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014); see also Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. . . .

M. RIVERA J. v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. FDIC, 189 So. 3d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . otherwise agreed, a person having control of a transferable record is the holder, as defined in s. 671.201 . . . bank was Fannie Mae’s designated custodian, the bank is the e-note’s holder, as defined in section 671.201 . . .

D. RINCON, v. HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,, 196 So. 3d 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section 671.201(21), Florida Statutes (2012), defines “holder” as “[t]he person in possession of a negotiable . . . See § 671.201(21); Gorel, 165 So.3d at 46. . . .

T. PHAN, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, FIRST FRANKLIN MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, 198 So. 3d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. . . .

CARACCIA, v. U. S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,, 185 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. . . .

CARTWRIGHT, v. LJL MORTGAGE POOL, LLC, Y. a k a a k a, 185 So. 3d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .’ § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

LEADER GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, v. TRADECO INFRAESTRUCTURA, S. A. DE C. V., 155 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 671.201. . . . .

IN RE RUST- OLEUM RESTORE MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, 155 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill. 2016)

. . . . § 671.201 (b)(l 0); Ga. . . .

ELSMAN, v. HSBC BANK USA MLMI, 182 So. 3d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 671.201(21), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

MORRIS, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY HSI LLC,, 182 So. 3d 680 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

GONZALEZ v. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, L. P., 180 So. 3d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession -” § 671.201 . . .

A. RODRIGUEZ v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. d b a s, 178 So. 3d 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in , possession,” § 671.201 . . . ownership, assignment, or transfer of the note must prove the plain-, tiff has the rights of a .holder. §§ 671.201 . . .

L. KENNEY a k a v. HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, As A N. a k a Ju o, 175 So. 3d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

J. ASSIL n k a v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, s, 171 So. 3d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

SCHMIDT v. DEUTSCHE BANK,, 170 So. 3d 938 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 671.201(21), Fla. Stat.; see also Eagles Master Ass’n Inc. v. . . .

S. SNYDER v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,, 169 So. 3d 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession^]” § 671.201 . . .

ANDERSON, v. BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, LLC,, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . Stat. § 671.209(5) (mirroring § 671.201(26)). . . . Stat. § 671.201(26); Fla. Stat. § 671.209(5). . . . Stat. §§ 671.201(26) and 671.209(5). . . . Stat. §§ 671.201(26) and 671.209(5). . . . Stat. §§ 671.201(26) and 671.209(5). . . . .

ST. CLAIR, v. U. S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,, 173 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

HSBC BANK USA, N. A. v. PEREZ, G. N. A. U. S. N. A. N. A. N. A. WMALT, 165 So. 3d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . (2008), and the written assignment constitutes the “security agreement,” see §§ 679.1021(l)(ttt), 671.201 . . .

SEFFAR, v. RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC., 160 So. 3d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . See § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

MURRAY v. HSBC BANK USA,, 157 So. 3d 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . See § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2013). HSBC did not qualify under section 673.3011(1) or (3). . . .

JAFFER v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC,, 155 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Also relevant to the analysis is section 671.201(21), Florida Statutes (2013), which defines who is considered . . . mortgage note depends on possession of the note, not an oumership interest in the note, and section 671.201 . . . consistent with the allegation that the plaintiff was the holder of the note as defined in section 671.201 . . . by definition requires possession of the instrument, possession is assumed when one is a holder. § 671.201 . . .

MADURA, v. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, f. k. a. LP, NA,, 593 F. App'x 834 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 671.201(5)). . . .

DEPENDABLE COMPONENT SUPPLY, INC. v. CARREFOUR INFORMATIQUE TREMBLANT, INC. LLC, LC. d. b. a., 572 F. App'x 796 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 671.201(1). . . .

OLIVERA, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. BAC L. P., 141 So. 3d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“ ‘Holder’ means ... . . .

E. FOCHT, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. In, 124 So. 3d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. . . .

COMERICA BANK, v. H. MANN, III,, 13 F. Supp. 3d 1262 (N.D. Ga. 2013)

. . . Ann § 671.201(25), which provides that a person has “notice” of a fact if the person: (a) Has actual . . . Second, Comerica’s reliance on § 671.201 is misplaced. . . .

K. LINDSEY, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. s, 139 So. 3d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . submit evidence of an assignment of the note from the payee or an affidavit of ownership); see also § 671.201 . . .

WANE v. LOAN CORPORATION,, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . of consideration; (16) Bank United, N.A. is not a holder of the note pursuant to Florida Statute § 671.201 . . .

W. HENDERSON, v. LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP,, 92 So. 3d 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . .” § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). See also Riggs v. . . .

In BALDERRAMA, P. v., 473 B.R. 823 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 671.201(21). . . . . Stat. § 671.201(5). . Harvey v. . . .

U. S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, v. L. KNIGHT, L. n k a A. N. A. S. M. D. P. A. LLC LLLP d b a LLC N. A. N. A., 90 So. 3d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . .” § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). In Riggs v. . . .

TAYLOR v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC,, 74 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 671.201(20), Fla. . . .

B. PAUL, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 68 So. 3d 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Redner, 652 So.2d 394, 395-96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (citing § 671.201(20), Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . .

HARVEY, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,, 69 So. 3d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . .” § 671.201(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). In Riggs v. . . .

R. ISAAC R. v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, As, 74 So. 3d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . .” § 671.201(21)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

CITIBANK, N. A. v. DALESSIO, v., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2010)

. . . . § 671.201(21) (2010); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. . . .

RAYFIELD INVESTMENT COMPANY, v. KREPS,, 35 So. 3d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .” § 671.201(35), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

JAFFE, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

. . . Stat. 671.201(1). Thus, BoA claims it is entitled to attorneys’ fees under this statute. . . .

BUILDING MATERIALS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a d b a GAF v. PRESIDENTIAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION,, 972 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . With respect to notice to an organization, section 671.201(27), Florida Statutes (2002), provides as . . . An organization includes a corporation. § 671.201(28). . . .

MILLENNIUM PARTNERS, L. P. f. u. b. o. AIG f. u. b. o. Co. v. COLMAR STORAGE, LLC, USA, 494 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007)

. . . . § 671.201(15) (West 2007). . . .

In ALLIED PRINTING, INC., 344 B.R. 153 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . creates a lease or a security interest is determined by the facts of each case in accordance with § 671.201 . . . not terminable by the lessee during the term of the lease and any one of the factors set forth in § 671.201 . . . As 671.201(37)(e) specifically provides that “additional consideration is not nominal if, when the option . . . As 671.201(37)(e) also specifically provides that “additional consideration is not nominal if, when the . . . Although a court is free to consider the factors set forth in 671.201(37)(b) to guide its determination . . .

In G. SHORES E. v. G. E. L., 332 B.R. 31 (M.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . In pertinent part, Florida Statute § 671.201(37), provides: Whether a transaction creates a lease or . . . However, Appellant argues the Bankruptcy Court erred in its application of section 671.201(37) as the . . . Appellant asserts section 671.201(37)(a) creates a security interest “if the consideration the lessee . . . Appellant initially argues that the court in Canaveral Seafoods did not apply Florida Statute § 671.201 . . . U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(2) and Florida Statute § 671.201(37)(a) mirror each other. . . . .

In AQUAMARINE USA, INC., 330 B.R. 280 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . Sections 671.201(25), (26). and (27) of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code set forth the definition . . . Ahn. § 671.201(25) (West 2004). SunTrust claims it was not advised of the consignment. . . . SunTrust had notice of the consignment of the Boat pursuant to § 671.201(25)(c) and by providing information . . . Akn. § 671.201(9) (West 2004). . . . Koetter qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of the Debt- or’s business as defined by § 671.201 . . .

In GRUBBS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,, 319 B.R. 698 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . . § 1301.01(KK)(2004)(see also section 671.201(37)(2001), Fla. Stat.) . . . Stat. § 671.201(37).” . . .

SCADIF, S. A. a v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL, a, 344 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2003)

. . . Stat. ch. 671.201(3). . . .

ERNIE PASSEOS, INC. d b a v. O HALLORAN,, 855 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . .’” § 671.201(9), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

ANY KIND CHECKS CASHED, INC. a v. G. TALCOTT, Jr. GUARINO,, 830 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Prior to 1992, section 671.201(19), Florida Statutes (1991), defined “good faith” as “honesty in fact . . .

SCADIF, S. A. a v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK, a, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . .” § 671.201(3), Fla. Stat. . . .

In ESTATE OF BARSANTI, v. A. Ad, 773 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 671.201(20), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

WESTSHIP, INC. v. TRIDENT SHIPWORKS, INC., 247 B.R. 856 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000)

. . . . § 671.201(37) (1999). . . . No. 95-989; see also Fla.Stat. § 671.201(37) (whether a transaction creates a lease calls for case-by-case . . . See Fla.Stat. § 671.201(37)(a); All American Mfg., 172 B.R. at 398. . . . No. 95-989; Fla.Stat. § 671.201(37). . . .

FIRST BANK OF IMMOKALEE, n k a v. FARM WORKER S CHECK CASHING, INC., 745 So. 2d 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Section 671.201, Florida Statutes (1993), contains the general definitions of the Uniform Commercial . . . Section 671.201(38) states that: “ ‘Send’ in connection with any writing or notice means to deposit in . . .

FOX, v. McCAW CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS OF FLORIDA, d b a s d b a, 745 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See § 671.201(19), Fla.Stat. (1997) (“ ‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction . . .

In AFFILIATED OF FLORIDA, INC. v., 237 B.R. 495 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998)

. . . . § 671.201(32). . . .

In MICHELLE S HALLMARK CARDS GIFTS, INC. K. CREWS, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA, N. A., 219 B.R. 316 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998)

. . . . § 671.201(37) (West 1998). . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION n k a v. CTL DISTRIBUTION, INC. f k a Co., 715 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See section 671.201(6), Florida Statutes (1995). . . .

SYKES CORPORATION, f k a v. EASTERN METAL SUPPLY, INC. A. Jr. Jr. N. A., 659 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . . § 671.201(43), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

V. A. GIBSON, H. F. E. A. M. C. d b a P. A. L. v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, A a N. A. a a V. A. GIBSON, H. F. E. A. M. C. d b a P. A. L. v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, A a N. A. a a, 51 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1995)

. . . . § 671.201(37) (West 1995). . . .

In ALLIED RESPIRATORY CARE SERVICES, INC. S. FELTMAN, v. BANKATLANTIC, 182 B.R. 589 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)

. . . Section 679.306(4)(b) only deals with proceeds in the form of money, which is defined at section 671.201 . . . The general definitions provided in section 671.201 of the Florida Statutes (Article 1, Part II of the . . .

TROUPE, v. REDNER,, 652 So. 2d 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . .” § 671.201(20), Fla.Stat. (1998). . . .

In GRAPHIC PRODUCTIONS CORPORATION, f k a GRAPHIC PRODUCTIONS CORPORATION, f k a v. WWF PAPER CORPORATION WWF, 176 B.R. 65 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . Section 671.201(26), Florida Statutes, provides that A person “notifies” or “gives” notice or notification . . .

In ALL AMERICAN MANUFACTURING CORP. ALL AMERICAN MANUFACTURING CORP. a v. QUALITY TEXTILE SCREEN PRINTS, INC. a Co. a, 172 B.R. 394 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . Thus, the first prong of § 671.201(37)(a) is satisfied. . . . The second prong of § 671.201(37)(a) also is satisfied since, as stipulated to by Quality Textile in . . . See Fla.Stat. § 671.201(37)(a)(2) (a transaction creates a security interest if “[t]he lessee is bound . . . Stat. § 671.201(37)(c)(l). . . . Although § 671.201(37)(b) by its terms states that a transaction does not create a security interest . . .

In DE PASQUALE, BANCFLORIDA, v. DE PASQUALE,, 166 B.R. 663 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994)

. . . Also pertinent to this matter is section 671.201(26) which provides: A person “notifies” or “gives” a . . . Fla.Stat. ch. 671.201(26) (1991) (emphasis added). . . . Subsection (38) of section 671.201, also of further relevance states: “Send” in connection with any writing . . . Fla.Stat. ch. 671.201(38) (1991). . . .

GRAF, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 636 So. 2d 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . See also section 671.201(10), Florida Statutes, which defines "conspicuous” under Florida's version of . . .