Cases from cite.case.law:

B. SCHWARTZ F. v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. BAC LP, f k a L. P. At, 267 So. 3d 414 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . The appellee relied on section 673.3081, Florida Statutes (2012), to establish its standing, which provides . . .

BARSAN, v. TRINITY FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC,, 258 So. 3d 516 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 673.3081(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; Bennett v. Deutsche Bank Nat. . . . Trust Co., 124 So.3d 320, 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (noting that the term "presumed" in section 673.3081 . . . unauthorized, the plaintiff was not required to prove that it is valid (citing UCC comment 1 to section 673.3081 . . .

PMT NPL FINANCING v. CENTURION SYSTEMS, LLC,, 257 So. 3d 516 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 673.3081(1). The Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") . . . holding bank could rely on statutory presumption of validity of signatures on allonge, based on section 673.3081 . . . Comment in interpreting section 673.3081). . . .

REY a k a I. a k a M. v. U. S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, CSMC, 244 So. 3d 409 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . holding bank could rely on statutory presumption of validity of signatures on allonge, based on section 673.3081 . . .

HSBC BANK USA, v. HESS a k a H. a k a a k a III,, 228 So. 3d 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 673.3081(1), Fla. . . . Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 36 So.3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing section 673.3081 and holding that . . .

N. PETERS a k a N. n k a v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, f k a, 227 So. 3d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . If that proof is made, s. 673.3081 applies to the case as if the person seeking enforcement had produced . . .

PENNYMAC CORP. v. T. FROST a k a, 214 So. 3d 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 673.3081(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

U. S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR BAFC v. ROSEMAN, H., 214 So. 3d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The defendants’ first affirmative defense stated: Pursuant to 673.3081, Florida Statutes, Defendants . . .

A. HOUK, v. PENNYMAC CORP., 210 So. 3d 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . terms of the instrument and the person’s right to enforce the instrument, If that proof is made, s. 673.3081 . . .

POLONSKY, v. HSBC BANK USA, N. A., 207 So.3d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 673.3081(1), Fla. . . . Nichols, 245 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (construing prior version of section 673.3081, Florida . . . See § 673.3081(1), Fla. . . .

SANABRIA v. PENNYMAC MORTGAGE INVESTMENT TRUST HOLDINGS I, LLC,, 197 So. 3d 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . I write only to note that the majority’s discussion of the constitutionality of section 673.3081(1) has . . . . § 673.3081 (2011), assuming, without conceding, that such endorsement exists. . . . parties and the circuit court have framed the sufficiency of the homeowners’ defense in terms of section 673.3081 . . . Section 673.3081(1) reads, in relevant part: In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity . . . measure, the homeowners, as well — appeared to accept Pennymac Trust’s underlying premise that section 673.3081 . . . Indeed, the few Florida decisions to address the pleading requirement that section 673.3081(1) appears . . .

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, v. A. McFADYEN,, 194 So. 3d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . If that proof is made, s. 673.3081 applies to the case as if the person seeking enforcement had produced . . .

M. RIVERA J. v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. FDIC, 189 So. 3d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . authenticity and/or validity of any signatures or indorsements on the Note ... pursuant to Florida Statute 673.3081 . . . On the borrowers’ second argument, section 673.3081(1), Florida Statutes (2010), Uniform Commercial Code . . .

A. RODRIGUEZ v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. d b a s, 178 So. 3d 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . 'Section 673.3081(2), Florida Statutes (2010), provides (2) If the validity of signatures is admitted . . . enforce the instnment under ⅜. m.mu, unless the defendant proves a defense or claim in recoupment. § 673.3081 . . .

BOUMARATE v. HSBC BANK USA, N. A., 172 So. 3d 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . If that proof is made, s. 673.3081 applies to the case as if the person seeking enforcement had produced . . .

MADURA, v. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, f. k. a. LP, NA,, 593 F. App'x 834 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 673.3081(1). . . .

DELIA, v. GMAC MORTGAGE CORPORATION,, 161 So. 3d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . If that proof is made, s. 673.3081 [proof of signatures and status as holder in due course] applies to . . .

WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A. v. M. RUTLEDGE s, 148 So. 3d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . There is a presumption that Mary Dias’s signature is authentic under section 673.3081, Florida Statutes . . .

M. BENNETT C. v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,, 124 So. 3d 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . affirmed the final summary judgment of foreclosure relying on the statutory presumption in section 673.3081 . . . the signer is dead or incompetent at the time of trial of the issue of validity of the signature. § 673.3081 . . . Crucial to this case is the language in section 673.3081(1) that the “signature is presumed to be authentic . . . Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1 to section 673.3081 explains the operation of this presumption as follows . . . In this case, the effect of the section 673.3081(1) presumption was to require the Bennetts to make some . . .

GUERRERO v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC., 83 So. 3d 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . If that proof is made, s. 673.3081 applies to the case as if the person seeking enforcement had produced . . .

A. RIGGS, Sr. v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC,, 36 So. 3d 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Subsection 673.3081(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that “[i]n an action with respect to an instrument . . .

ANY KIND CHECKS CASHED, INC. a v. G. TALCOTT, Jr. GUARINO,, 830 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 673.3081(2), Fla. Stat. (2001); Seinfeld v. . . .

HOBLEY, v. METZ,, 630 So. 2d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Section 673.3081(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), provides in part: ... a plaintiff producing the instrument . . .