CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 164 Oil & Gas Rep. 863, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 186, 30 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 237
...First, they argue that the affidavits presented by Noblin consist of conclusory and hearsay statements and do not provide information regarding the particular uses of the easement with any specificity. Second, they contend that clay, sand, and limestone are not minerals, and in support of that argument they cite section 689.20, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1959, which provides that “Whenever the word ‘minerals’ is hereafter used in any deed, lease, or other contract in writing, said word or term shall not include any of the following: *787 topsoil, muc...
...Because the easement allows for exploration and extraction, we conclude that when the evidence presented by Noblin is viewed in the proper light, questions of fact exist regarding the use of the property by Huey to explore for minerals on the surface estate. As to the second argument, notwithstanding the provisions of section 689.20, 3 we agree with Harbor Hills and Schell that clay, sand, topsoil, and limestone may not be minerals within the meaning of the 1948 deed from Rainey to Huey....
...r upon and use as much of the surface as may be necessary for the lessee's operations.”) (citation omitted); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.1972). . While Noblin presents a persuasive argument regarding the prospective application of section 689.20, it is not necessary for us to decide that issue because, regardless of whether the statute is applied, material issues of fact exist regarding what other minerals may have been extracted from the surface estate.
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Cited as authorityCastillo (2023)phrase: "rule_authority"
