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Florida Statute 726.102 - Full Text and Legal Analysis
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The 2025 Florida Statutes

Title XLI
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS, AND GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS
Chapter 726
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
View Entire Chapter
726.102 Definitions.As used in ss. 726.101-726.112:
(1) “Affiliate” means:
(a) A person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote.
(b) A corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote.
(c) A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(d) A person who operates the debtor’s business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor’s assets.
(2) “Asset” means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:
(a) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) Property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) An interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) “Charitable contribution” means a charitable contribution as that term is defined in s. 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if that contribution consists of:
(a) A financial instrument as defined in s. 731(c)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(b) Cash.
(4) “Claim” means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(5) “Creditor” means a person who has a claim.
(6) “Debt” means liability on a claim.
(7) “Debtor” means a person who is liable on a claim.
(8) “Insider” includes:
(a) If the debtor is an individual:
1. A relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
2. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
3. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 2.; or
4. A corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(b) If the debtor is a corporation:
1. A director of the debtor;
2. An officer of the debtor;
3. A person in control of the debtor;
4. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
5. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 4.; or
6. A relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.
(c) If the debtor is a partnership:
1. A general partner in the debtor;
2. A relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
3. Another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
4. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 3.; or
5. A person in control of the debtor.
(d) An affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor.
(e) A managing agent of the debtor.
(9) “Lien” means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(10) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(11) “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(12) “Qualified religious or charitable entity or organization” means:
(a) An entity described in s. 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(b) An entity or organization described in s. 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(13) “Relative” means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(14) “Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(15) “Valid lien” means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
History.s. 2, ch. 87-79; s. 1, ch. 2013-189.

F.S. 726.102 on Google Scholar

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Amendments to 726.102


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 726.102

Total Results: 62  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2001).

Cited 73 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 106, 2001 Fla. LEXIS 408, 2001 WL 197031

...(2000). [22] In these instances, the standard of proof and burden of proof are those set forth by the applicable case law and statutes. See, e.g., Ming Properties, Inc. v. Stardust Marine S.A., 741 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that under section 726.102(c), the creditor has the initial burden of proving that a tenancy by the entireties property was obtained with fraudulently acquired funds), review denied, 767 So.2d 459 (Fla.2000); Woodell v....
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Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2003).

Cited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 742, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 808, 2003 Fla. LEXIS 1619, 2003 WL 22208004

...btor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation." § 726.106(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). To utilize the protections of chapter 726, however, a plaintiff must show that he or she has a "claim" which qualifies the party as a "creditor." See § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." § 726.102(3), Fla....
...Therefore, we disapprove the Third District's conclusion that a claimant which does not possess a judgment "is not a creditor," Rosen, 680 So.2d at 1052, and would not be entitled to proceed under the applicable statutory provisions as to putatively fraudulent transactions. As noted by the court below, under section 726.102(3) and (4), a creditor is merely a person who "has a claim," and a "claim" may be "unliquidated, ... contingent, [or] unmatured." Friedman, 806 So.2d at 626 (quoting § 726.102(3)-(4), Fla....
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Bankr. L. Rep. P 77,625, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1025 in Re: Myron Levine, A.K.A. Mike Levine Jacquelyn P. Levine, A.K.A. Jackie Levine, Debtors. Myron Levine, A.K.A. Mike Levine Jacquelyn Levine, A.K.A. Jackie Levine v. Charles Weissing, Tr., 134 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 1998).

Cited 31 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...de, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 15 Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (12)....
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Amjad Munim, Md, Pa v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Cited 30 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 457141

...Blackshear, 88 Fla. 573, 102 So. 749 (1925). In this case, fraudulent intent may be presumed from evidence of numerous "badges of fraud" as delineated in section 726.105(2): the transfer of Munim, P.A. patient files and assets were to an insider as defined by section 726.102(7); Dr....
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Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2004).

Cited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 178598

...btor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation." § 726.106(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). To utilize the protections of chapter 726, however, a plaintiff must show that he or she has a "claim" which qualifies the party as a "creditor." See § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." § 726.102(3), Fla....
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Wiand Ex Rel. Valhalla Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Lee, 753 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2014).

Cited 23 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 2446084, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10154

...A “creditor” is “a person who has a claim,” and “claim” is broadly defined as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” Fla. Stat. § 726.102(4), (3). A fraudulent transfer must be of an “asset,” which is defined as any “property of a debtor,” excluding certain narrow exceptions. Fla. Stat. § 726.102(2). In determining whether a transfer was made with actual intent to defraud a creditor, courts look to the statutory “badges of fraud,” such as whether, for example, the transfer was to an insider, the debtor retained control...
...The Receiver proceeds under the theory that the receivership entities are creditors of Nadel and that Nadel is a debtor to the entities. Thus, as FUFTA requires, Nadel’s transfers to investors must have been transfers of “property of a debtor.” Fla. Stat. § 726.102(2), (10), (12)....
...harmed the corporations by transferring assets rightfully belonging to the corporations and their investors in breach of his fiduciary duties, and a “claim” under FUFTA includes “any right to payment” including a contingent, legal, or equitable right to payment. Fla. Stat. § 726.102(3)....
...Nadel’s transfers of funds from the receivership entities could not have been transfers of “assets” because assets under FUFTA must be “property of a debtor,” and the funds Nadel transferred were property of the corporations. Fla. Stat. §726.102(2), (12)....
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Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485 (11th Cir. 1997).

Cited 19 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 47 Fed. R. Serv. 670, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22374, 1997 WL 447351

...For a detailed discussion of these provisions, see the text of opinion, infra. . This corporation was formerly Gonzalez Trading. . Under Florida law, an individual is an insider to a debtor corporation if he or she is a director, officer, or person in control of the corporation. Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (7)(b)....
...I; (3) a person in control of GTI; (4) a relative of a general partner, director, officer or person in control of GTI; (5) a partnership in which GTI is a general partner; or, (6) a general partner in a partnership of which GTI is a general partner. § 726.102(7)(b)....
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Meininger v. Miller (In Re Miller), 188 B.R. 302 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).

Cited 16 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 191, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1530, 1995 WL 628054

...ienate his interest in the properties without his wife consent. It is fair to conclude that the Debtor became insolvent as the result of the change of his ownership interest because he was left with no property which he owned individually. Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) provides that an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties is not included as an asset to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant....
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Wiand v. Waxenberg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009).

Cited 16 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22559, 2009 WL 728546

...Index Futures Group, Inc., 130 F.3d 1274, 1277 (7th Cir.1997). [12] On the other hand, FUFTA permits creditors—here, the Receivership LLCs— to recover for transfers by a debtor—here, Mr. Waxenberg—of the debtor's assets to a third party. Fla. Stat. § 726.102(1),(12)....
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NATIONSBANK, NA v. Coastal Utils., Inc., 814 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Cited 15 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 816836

...In re Crawford, 172 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1994). UFTA defines "transfer" as meaning "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset...." § 726.102(12), Fla....
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Lab'y Corp. v. Prof'l Recovery, 813 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

Cited 15 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 4716, 2002 WL 537633

...Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), any transfer made with "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud" any present or future creditor is a fraudulent transfer. § 726.105(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1998). PRN argues that no assets, as that term is defined by section 726.102(2), Florida Statutes, were transferred by DPM to PRN....
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Cook v. Pompano Shopper, Inc., 582 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

Cited 12 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 98034

...of an absolute claim. See, e.g., Money v. Powell, 139 So.2d 702 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (tort claimants fully protected against fraudulent transfers). A "claim" under the Act may be maintained even though "contingent" and not yet reduced to judgment. See § 726.102(3), Fla....
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Weissing v. Levine (In Re Levine), 139 B.R. 551 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).

Cited 12 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 94, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 585, 1992 WL 81936

...§ 726.105 since there was no transferee and the ownership of the property in question never changed. Instead, the Debtors contend that they merely converted nonexempt assets into exempt assets, thus removing the assets from the reach of creditors. A "transfer" is defined in § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code and in Fla.Stat. § 726.102(12) as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditioned, voluntary or involuntary of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, ....
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Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart), 280 B.R. 268 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).

Cited 9 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2019, 2001 WL 1906183

...The transfer was to an insider. The transfers of the securities in the Debtor's Schwab accounts in 1988 and 1989 were made to Cheryl Stewart. Cheryl Stewart is the Debtor's wife. Consequently, the transfers were made to an insider of the Debtor. See § 726.102(7) of the Florida Statutes, which defines an "insider" of an individual debtor to include a relative of the debtor....
...The Florida fraudulent transfer act specifically excludes from treatment as a recoverable "asset" property held as a tenancy by the entireties to the extent that such property is subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one spouse. See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001)....
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Kapila v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc. (In re Pearlman), 515 B.R. 887 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014).

Cited 7 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 55, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4134, 60 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 32

...Because SunTrust was the end recipient of the Transfers, it certainly was not a mere conduit. . 446 B.R. 564 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2011). . ATM Financial, 446 B.R. at 566 . . Id. . Id. . Id. at 568-71 . . Id. at 570-71 . . 11 U.S.C. § 101 (54); Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (12)....
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Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2015).

Cited 7 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15146, 2015 WL 518826

...365, 367 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1994) (“By relinquishing her trust powers and relinquishing her dominion and control over the trust assets the Defendant partfed] with an ... interest in an asset ... ”) (quotation omitted). The Bank relies on the plain language of § 726.102(14), which provides that a “transfer” occurs only if assets have been “disposed] of or part[ed] with.” 6 According to the Bank, since Nadel was essentially transferring the funds to and from himself, he (and the entities he control...
...onstrained to follow the debtor’s instructions.”). Accordingly, based on the plain language of FUFTA, the Bank could not have been an initial transferee because Nadel never “disposed of’ or “parted with” the funds in question. Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14)....
...Under FUFTA, “transfer” is defined as: every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14) (emphasis added)....
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Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard Sec., LLC), 591 B.R. 895 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2018).

Cited 6 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.

...For this purpose, Florida statutes define the term "transfer" in an essentially identical manner: " 'Transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset[.]" Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14)....
...When a debtor deposits funds into the account of another, or into an account where the debtor's interests are legally transcribed, for example, such a deposit may be a transfer. A debtor's regular deposits into the debtor's own unrestricted bank accounts are not transfers within the meaning of section 101(54) or Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14)....
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Nat'l Auto Serv. Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Cited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 4820, 2016 WL 1238265

...2000)). *505 The savings clause in section 726.110(1) is not ambiguous. The one-year period runs from the date the transfer was discovered or could reasonably have been discovered. As defined by FUFTA, a transfer is- the disposition of an asset. See § 726.102(14) (defining a transfer as “every mode ......
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Dzikowski v. Delson (In Re Delson), 247 B.R. 873 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000).

Cited 6 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 166, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 428

...fer of "property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law" or "an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant." Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(b,c) (defining "asset," as used, in turn, in the definition of "transfer" in Fla.Stat. § 726.102(12))....
...ead. If the Debtor in the instant case had transferred his interest in the homestead to his wife prior to the sale, such transfer would not have been avoidable because an interest in homestead is "generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law." Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)....
...The Debtor's next argument is that the subject transfer is not avoidable under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because it constituted the transfer of "an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties" which was "not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant." Fla.Stat. § 726.102....
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Ford v. Feldman (In Re Florida Bay Trading Co.), 177 B.R. 374 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).

Cited 4 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 277, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 966, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2066, 1994 WL 738999

...01(54) of the Code which provides that "transfer means every mode direct or indirect absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property." The definition of the term in Fla.Stat. § 726.102(12) is basically the same if not broader....
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In re Bos, 561 B.R. 868 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2016).

Cited 4 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Florida | 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 773

...e it received a post-petition payment from Legendary, LLC—an affiliate of Alleged Debtors. . SEPH argues, and it appears likely, that SSI Destín could be deemed a statutory insider under the Bankruptcy Code and Florida Law. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (31); § 726.102, Fla....
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Wiand v. Morgan, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2013).

Cited 4 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2013 WL 247072, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8995

...Mach 26, 2008) citing S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir.1992). Morgan next argues that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the transfers were property of the debtor under FUFTA. An “asset” is defined as “property of the debtor” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)....
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Mason v. E. Speer & Assocs., Inc., 846 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Cited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 244933

...that Speer should have negotiated for the asset on behalf of ESA Georgia. Speer argues that the trial court erred because the asset was never property of ESA Georgia and therefore its transfer to Speer could not have been a fraudulent transfer under section 726.102(12), Florida Statutes, or 11 U.S.C....
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Kapila v. Covino (In Re Covino), 187 B.R. 773 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).

Cited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 148, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1400

...The only parties entitled to funds were the Debtors. The Court finds that the transfer of a share of the entitlement to the malpractice recovery, by creating an annuity in the name of Todd Covino, constitutes a transfer as defined under Florida Statute Section 726.102(12)....
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Hyman v. Harrold (In Re Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc.), 293 B.R. 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).

Cited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 131, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 533, 2003 WL 21289976

...§ 222.30, which is the statute that provides relief to a party who claims that a debtor fraudulently converted non-exempt assets into exempt assets. The inherent problem with this Count is that Ms. Harrold was not a "debtor" as defined in Fla. Stat. § 726.102(6) of SWS at the time she converted the cash received from Mr. Harrold into the several annuities. Under Fla. Stat. § 726.102(6), a "debtor" is defined as "a person who is liable on a claim." Ms....
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Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Cited 3 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 8334

...Blackshear, 88 Fla. 573 , 102 So. 749 (1925). In this case, fraudulent intent may be presumed from evidence of numerous “badges of fraud” as delineated in section 726.105(2): the transfer of Munim, P.A. patient files and assets were to an insider as defined by section 726.102(7); Dr....
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Tabas v. Maloney (In Re Florida West Gateway, Inc.), 182 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).

Cited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 20, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 743, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 344

...A "creditor" is defined, under Florida law, as a person who has "a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal equitable, secured or unsecured." Fla.Stat. § 726.102(3) & (4)....
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Nat'l Mar. Servs., Inc. v. Straub, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2013).

Cited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2013 WL 5770677, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152869

...Inc., 306 B.R. 377, 387 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2003) (citing Huntsman Packaging Corp. v. Kerry Packaging Corp., 992 F.Supp. 1439 (M.D.Fla.1998); In re Young, 235 B.R. 666 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999)). “Creditor” refers to any person who has a claim. Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (5)....
...The creditor’s “claim” is broadly defined by the *1328 UFTA as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (4)....
...National Maritime emphasizes several badges of fraud establish Burrell had actual fraudulent intent. Having received the testimony and evidence, the Court agrees. The UFTA defines an “insider” as a director, officer, person in control, or relative of the same, see Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (8)(b)(6), as well as an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor, see Fla. Stat. 726.102(8)(d)....
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Edwards v. Airline Support Grp., Inc., 138 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

Cited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2197625, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 8092

...Then, in March of- 2012, ASG filed a third amended complaint. This amended complaint added Edwards as a defendant, and included a count brought solely against Edwards. ASG alleged that Edwards was an “affiliate” and “insider” of DAE1 as defined in section 726.102, Florida Statutes (2013), and that Edwards has *1211 “received or is in the process of receiving distribution of sale proceeds resulting from the transfers of assets of DAE1.” Edwards filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and to dismiss Count IV of ASG’s third amended complaint....
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Mark S. Yaralli, etc. v. Am. Reprographics Co., LLC, 165 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

Cited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 8024, 2015 WL 3387966

...as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after 2 motion, he classified his contributions as loans. Under Chapter 726, a “creditor” is defined as “a person who has a claim.” § 726.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2012). A “claim” is defined as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 726.102(4)....
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Welch v. Regions Bank (In re Mongelluzzi), 587 B.R. 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018).

Cited 2 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida

...claim as disputed. The Court notes that Debtors' bankruptcy schedules were prepared and signed by Angela Welch, the trustee in Mr. Mongelluzzi's individual Chapter 7 case, and that it was she who listed the IRS's claims as disputed. 44 In any event, § 726.102(4) specifically defines "claim" as including disputed claims....
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Crews v. Lankry (In Re Lankry), 263 B.R. 638 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).

Cited 2 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 927, 2001 WL 715650

...On May 16, 2001, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no "transfer" of the non-entireties properties occurred and because the entireties properties were not "assets" attachable by Plaintiff under § 726.102. Specifically, Defendant argues that the non-entireties properties never belonged to Debtor, and therefore that Debtor could not have transferred them. Defendant further asserts that the entireties properties could not qualify as "assets" under § 726.102 because property held as a tenancy by the entireties is specifically exempt from treatment as an "asset" by § 726.102(2)(c)....
...es properties weeks later. Therefore, Trustee asserts, the entireties properties were held by Defendant and Debtor as a tenancy in common at the *642 time of the transfer and are not excepted from treatment as fraudulently transferred "assets" under 726.102(2)(c)....
...The Florida fraudulent transfer act specifically excludes from treatment as a recoverable "asset" property held as a tenancy by the entireties to the extent that such property is subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one spouse. See FLA. STAT. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001)....
...nverts into a tenancy in common, which may be attached by a creditor holding a claim against either spouse. See FLA.STAT. § 689.15 (2001). Therefore, upon dissolution any property formerly held as a tenancy by the entireties loses the protection of § 726.102(2)(c) and constitutes an "asset" that may be recovered on fraudulent transfer grounds should a post-dissolution transfer take place....
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Welch v. Regions Bank (In re Mongelluzzi), 591 B.R. 480 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018).

Cited 2 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida

...1994). Id. at 1409 . Doc. No. 494, p. 10. Fla. Stat. § 726.104 . 11 U.S.C. § 548 (d)(2)(A). In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd. , 319 B.R. 245 , 254 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). Fla. Stat. § 726.110 . 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1). Doc. No. 156, Exh. 10. Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14)....
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Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 806 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Cited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 345

...dicial resources. In order to proceed under the Fraudulent Transfer Act it is not necessary that the creditor have a judgment. Cook v. Pompano Shopper, Inc., 582 So.2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). A "creditor" under the Act is a "person who has a claim." § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). A "claim" on which a creditor can proceed can be "unliquidated, ... contingent, ... unmatured." § 726.102(3), Fla....
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Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grusky, 763 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

Cited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 4562, 2000 WL 390221

...elease of the personal liability of the debtor. See also Kathy B. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir.1986). We emphasize that the present action is brought against Lawrence and not Elliot, the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding. Section 726.102(4), Florida Statutes (1995), defines "creditor" as "a person who has a claim." Section 726.102(3) defines "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Even though N...
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Newman v. William L. Gunlicks Irrevocable Trust, 897 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D. Fla. 2012).

Cited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2012 WL 4369602, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136962

...e insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.” § 726.106(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). To utilize the protections of chapter 726, however, a plaintiff must show that he or she has a “claim” which qualifies the party as a “creditor.” See § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). As defined in section 726.102, a “claim” is broadly constructed and “means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 726.102(3), Fla....
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Bedwell v. Rucks, 127 So. 3d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Cited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 5349381, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 18963

...A “claim” under the Fraudulent Transfer Act “means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 726.102(3), Fla....
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Cafaro v. Zois, 693 F. App'x 810 (11th Cir. 2017).

Cited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...a creditor, (2) the debtor intended fraud, and (3) the creditor conveyed an “asset” “which is applicable by law to the payment- of the debt due.” Wiand v. Lee, 753 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Section 726.102, Florida Statutes, FUFTA defines asset as “property of a debtor” but excludes from the definition “[property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien.” The IRS had a valid lien on the property at the time the Zoises granted the second mortgage....
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Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Wingate (In Re Wingate), 377 B.R. 687 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).

Cited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 67, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4458, 2006 WL 4927306

...*696 The Florida fraudulent transfer act specifically excludes from treatment as a recoverable "asset" property held as a tenancy by the entireties to the extent that such property is subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one spouse. See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001)....
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Allen v. Crawford (In Re Crawford), 172 B.R. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).

Cited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 219, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1475, 1994 WL 519020

...d her claimed confused state of mind. These are the undisputed facts which, according to the Trustee, would warrant a determination by this Court that the execution of the Trust Amendment was a fraudulent transfer thus voidable pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 726.102(12)....
...Based on the broad definition of the term both by the Statute relied on by the Trustee as well as the definition of the Code, this Court is satisfied that the execution of the Trust Amendment was a transfer within the meaning of that term used in Florida Statute 726.102(12)....
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Smith v. Effective Teleservices, Inc., 133 So. 3d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

Cited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 51686, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 144

...creditor. 1 Under Chapter 726, it is the “creditor” who may “obtain” the remedies provided by the statute against a transferee. § 726.108(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). Chapter 726 broadly defines a “creditor” as “a person who has a claim.” § 726.102(4), Fla....
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Wachsmuth Ex Rel. Gussen v. Cohen (In Re Wachsmuth Ex Rel. Gussen), 272 B.R. 766 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).

Cited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 68, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1752, 2001 WL 1755369

...claims asserted against them in Counts I, II, III, IV, V, X and XI. First, it is contended that the Plaintiff has no standing to assert any claims either pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code or pursuant to the fraudulent transfer of the State of Florida, § 726.102(3 — 4)(Definition of Creditor and Claim) and § 725.016, et seq....
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Levin v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 823 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Cited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 561378

...The Levins argue that Georgetown was the creditor, not Ethan Allen. We disagree. A creditor is a person who has a claim, and a claim is very liberally defined as "a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment ... contingent... unmatured, disputed ... or unsecured." § 726.102(3) and (4)....
...nt at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. In the present case, the transfer occurred when Georgetown executed the third mortgage on the property in favor of GGL without receiving value in exchange. See § 726.102(12), Fla....
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Jensen v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 561 B.R. 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016).

Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida

...be avoided as transfers because dominion and control of the accounts were never relinquished. Because the assets have not been disposed of or parted with, the intra-Trust transfers do not themselves constitute fraudulent transfers as contemplated by § 726.102(14), 62 This does not mean that the Trustee cannot trace funds that were originally the subject of an avoidable transfer to an account owned by the Karen Trust to a different account owned by the Karen Trust....
...Docktor, 185 B.R. 378, 381 (S.D. Fla. 1995)). . See Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271 , 184 So. 865 (1938); see also In re Goldberg, 229 B.R. 877, 882-83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998). . .In re Short, 188 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). . See Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)(c). . Dzikowski v. Delson (In re Delson), 247 B.R. 873, 876 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000). . Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 86 F.Supp.3d 1316, 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (quoting § 726.105(l)(a), Florida Statutes). . See Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14)....
...For purposes of summary judgment, Defendants concede that the accounts owned by the Alex Trust and the Karen Trust are not held as tenants by the entireties, but rather, as tenants in common. . Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 86 F.Supp.3d at 1325 . . See Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)(c)....
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Maplewood Farms, Inc. v. Baywood Manor Farms, Inc., 624 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 10313, 1993 WL 406603

...We affirm the judgment because, in our view, the appellee’s claim was entitled to priority. We strike, as unnecessary to the adjudication, so much of the order as states that the assignment is void. Because the issue may recur, we note that the assignee attorney is not an insider. See § 726.102(7), Fla.Stat....
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Repub. Credit Corp. I v. Upshaw, 10 So. 3d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2475, 2009 WL 763546

...4th DCA 2004) ("The proceeds from the sale or rental of tenancy by the entireties property are also held as tenancy by the entireties and are owned in total by both the husband and the wife."). Therefore, we conclude that the home sale proceeds are assets subject to attachment by a judgment creditor. See § 726.102(2)(c), Fla....
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Mansolillo v. Parties by Lynn, Inc., 753 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 2004, 2000 WL 227938

...The idea here is that the insider cannot accept payment for an antecedent debt when the debtor is insolvent, unless other creditors are paid first. There is no dispute that the plaintiffs qualified as a “creditor” under this subsection, see id. § 726.102(4); that, as an officer, director, and relative of an officer and director, Ms. Mansolillo was an “insider,” see id. § 726.102(7)(b)l.,2.,6.; and that Ms....
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RREF SNV-FL SSL, LLC v. Shamrock Storage, LLC, 250 So. 3d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal

...til three or four months later. But regardless of whether McAlpin was in default in January 2010, there is no question that RREF (or its predecessor in interest) had a "claim" against him-as the term is statutorily defined-at the pertinent time. See § 726.102(4), Fla....
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Puleo v. Golan, 201 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2756524, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 9219

...Yali Golan’s actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Puleo regarding' the collection of h'is judgment (section 726.105(l)(a), (2)(a)-(k)) may also be determined following a consideration of the so-called “badges of fraud,” whether: (a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider. [In the present case, and under section 726.102, “insider” includes Yali’s wife Leslie]....
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Amir Isiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (11th Cir. 2020).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...Lee, 753 F.3d 1194, 1199–1200 (11th Cir. 2014).2 The FUFTA defines a “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset.” Fla. Stat. § 726.102(14)....
...de several purchases, and initiated wire and other transfers at will. They did not “dispos[e] of or part[] with an asset or an interest in an asset” when they deposited money into the Receivership Entities’ own bank accounts. See Fla. Stat. § 726.102(14)....
...slightly different inquiries. To establish that a FUFTA transfer occurred, a plaintiff must show that the debtor relinquished control over the property such that he can be said to have disposed of or parted with an interest in it. See Fla. Stat. § 726.102(14). For a defendant to avail itself of the mere conduit defense, it must show that it did not gain sufficient legal control over the property disposed of by the debtor such that it should be held liable as a recipient of that fraudulently transferred property. See, e.g., Harwell, 628 F.3d at 1323....
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Ming Props., Inc. v. Stardust Marine S.A., 741 So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 10098, 1999 WL 543278

it was not an asset within the meaning of section 726.102(2), Florida Statutes (1993), which excludes
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Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard Sec., LLC), 570 B.R. 859 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017).

Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.

...an interest in property.” For this purpose, Florida statutes define the term “transfer” in an essentially identical manner: “ ‘Transfer’ means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset .... ” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14)....
...e the debtor’s interests are legally transcribed, for example, such a deposit may be a transfer. A debtor’s regular deposits into the debtor’s own unrestricted bank accounts are not transfers within the meaning of section 101(54) or Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14)....
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Mane Fl Corp v. Cale Beckman & Malgorzata Beckman (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal

...east seven badges of fraud. Badge #1: Whether the Transfer was to an Insider Under Florida law, an “‘Insider’ includes” a “relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.” § 726.102(8)(b)6., Fla....
... “A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a fair valuation.” § 726.103(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). The term “asset” does not include property that “is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law.” § 726.102(2)(b), Fla....
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Wiand v. Dancing $, LLC, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2013).

Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2013 WL 246731, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8969

...FUFTA defines a "transfer” as "every mode direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of dis *1315 posing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (12). An "asset” is defined as "property of the debtor” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)....
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Recovery Agents, LLC v. Est. of Peter Tutko, Tutko (Fla. 2d DCA 2025).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal

...726.105 codifies that it's specifically required that there be a determination that if a transfer is fraudulent, that it's -- 726.105(1)(a), that it's made with the actual intent to hinder, a judgment creditor against Mark. See § 726.102(4) (" 'Claim' means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured."), (5) (" 'Creditor' m...
...r to be defrauded, (2) a debtor intending fraud, and (3) a conveyance—i.e., a 'transfer'—of property which could have been applicable to the payment of the debt due." Isaiah v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2020); see also § 726.102(14) (" 'Transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of...
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Levine v. Weissing, 134 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 1998).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 216 B.R. 1046, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1677, 1998 WL 39164

...r indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. Fla. Stat. § 726.102(12)....
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Levine v. Weissing (11th Cir. 1998).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...tary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. Fla. Stat. § 726.102(12)....
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Kapila v. Beahm (In Re Beahm), 179 B.R. 329 (S.D. Fla. 1995).

Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2368, 1995 WL 86589

...Debtor therefore had control of the non-exempt asset (the personal injury claim) and through its mechanization transferred that claim into an exempt asset (Annuity). Trustee claims there was a "transfer" in this case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) [4] and Florida Statute § 726.102(12)....
...solute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." [5] Florida Statute 726.102(12) defines "transfer" as: "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of...
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Balsamo v. Gruppo Ceramiche Ricchetti, S.P.A., 862 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 18367, 2003 WL 22849984

...We conclude, however, that summary judgment was improperly entered against Appellants as individuals, in the absence of an order piercing the corporate veil, as the judgment debtor, Building, transferred its assets to BMI Tile and not to Appellants. We recognize the broad scope allowed in an action under sections 59.29 and 726.102, Florida Statutes. Section 726.102(12) defines “transfer” as, “[e]very mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset....” Here, no matter how broadly the term is defined, no transfer was made to Appellants, individually....
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Kapila v. CTS Equities Ltd. P'ship (Fla. 2d DCA 2025).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal

...2 CTS filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that at the time of transfer, the funds were encumbered by a valid lien under the loan documents and therefore could not be considered fraudulent transfers under subsections 726.102(14) and 726.102(2)(a)....
...Ctrs., Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498, 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Under UFTA, " '[t]ransfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset." § 726.102(14) (emphasis added). The UFTA further defines "[a]sset" as "property of a debtor," but it does not include "[p]roperty to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien." § 726.102(2)(a)....
...3d at 620 (holding that because the evidence showed that when the defendant transferred the subject property to a third party, a bank "had a valid lien encumbering the property" and that the plaintiff therefore "failed to prove by competent, substantial evidence that the property qualified as [defendant's] 'asset' [under section 726.102(2)] because the property was earnings, profits, or other Proceeds from time to time representing, evidencing, deposited into, or held in Deposit Accounts and Stock Rights and Proceeds (the "Collateral') now owne...
...interest before the debtor transferred the payment to the defendant bank because the "definition of 'asset' requires determining whether the property at issue is encumbered before transfer, when it is property of the debtor" (citing Minn. Stat. § 513.41(2)(i)). Section 726.102(2)(a) requires the asset to be "property of a debtor" that is not "encumbered by a valid lien." At the time that the funds were property of Holdco, the debtor, they were encumbered by TCB's valid lien....
...2d 625, 626-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002))); Nat'l Auto Serv. Ctrs., Inc., 192 So. 3d at 514 (Villanti, J., concurring) (noting that "the remedial purpose" of UFTA "favors granting a judgment creditor broad relief from fraud"). However, as the language of section 726.102(2)(a) is unambiguous, the remedial purpose of UFTA does not empower this court to rewrite the statute....
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William J. Kardash, Sr. v. Comm'r of IRS, 866 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2017).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2017 WL 3326802, 120 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2017, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14389

transferee in a § 6901 proceeding. Id. at § 726,102(5), (10).. Stated another way, the existence
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SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Neverve LLC (11th Cir. 2023).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Argued: Nov 18, 2022

...2d at 85 (“By failing to permit self-insured motorist policy exclusions in the list of author- ized exclusions, the Legislature has further indicated its intent in 6Under FUFTA, a “[c]laim” is a “right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment.” Fla. Stat. § 726.102(4). USCA11 Case: 21-11736 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 17 of 30 21-11736 Opinion of the Court 17 [the statute] not to permit self-insured motorist...
...“levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.” We also note that it appears that punitive damages are una- vailable to creditors with regards to those money judgments that FUFTA expressly authorizes. Florida Statute § 726.102(4) defines “claim” as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or...

This Florida statute resource is curated by Graham W. Syfert, Esq., a Jacksonville, Florida personal injury and workers' compensation attorney. For legal consultation, call 904-383-7448.