Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2025)

Definitions.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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726.102 Definitions.—As used in ss. 726.101-726.112:

(1) “Affiliate” means:

(a) A person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:

1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or

2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote.

(b) A corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:

1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or

2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote.

(c) A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or

(d) A person who operates the debtor’s business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor’s assets.

(2) “Asset” means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:

(a) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;

(b) Property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or

(c) An interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.

(3) “Charitable contribution” means a charitable contribution as that term is defined in s. 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if that contribution consists of:

(a) A financial instrument as defined in s. 731(c)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

(b) Cash.

(4) “Claim” means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.

(5) “Creditor” means a person who has a claim.

(6) “Debt” means liability on a claim.

(7) “Debtor” means a person who is liable on a claim.

(8) “Insider” includes:

(a) If the debtor is an individual:

1. A relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;

2. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

3. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 2.; or

4. A corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;

(b) If the debtor is a corporation:

1. A director of the debtor;

2. An officer of the debtor;

3. A person in control of the debtor;

4. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

5. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 4.; or

6. A relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.

1. A general partner in the debtor;

2. A relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;

3. Another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

4. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 3.; or

5. A person in control of the debtor.

(d) An affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor.

(e) A managing agent of the debtor.

(9) “Lien” means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.

(10) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.

(11) “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership.

(12) “Qualified religious or charitable entity or organization” means:

(a) An entity described in s. 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

(b) An entity or organization described in s. 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(13) “Relative” means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.

(14) “Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.

(15) “Valid lien” means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.

History.—s. 2, ch. 87-79; s. 1, ch. 2013-189.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 97 cases (20 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case: Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2003).

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Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2003). · cites it 7× “As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”

Amir Isiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 960 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2020). · cites it 3× “” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). While the definition of transfer is broad, the statute plainly requires a plaintiff to show that the debtor either disposed of his asset or relinquished some interest in that asset.”

Wiand Ex Rel. Valhalla Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Lee, 753 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2014). · cites it 5× “” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (4), (3). A fraudulent transfer must be of an “asset,” which is defined as any “property of a debtor,” excluding certain narrow exceptions.”

Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2004). · cites it 5× “As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”

Jensen v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 561 B.R. 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016). · cites it 7× “See Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)(c). . Dzikowski v.”

Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2015). · cites it 5× “Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Bank served merely as a conduit of the funds listed in Exhibit B, subject always to Nadel’s right to call on those funds.”

Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard Sec., LLC), 591 B.R. 895 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2018). · cites it 4× “]" Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). Technically, when one makes a deposit with a bank, the bank becomes the owner of the funds.”

Dzikowski v. Delson (In Re Delson), 247 B.R. 873 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2000). · cites it 8× “The Debtor’s next argument is that the subject transfer is not avoidable under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because it constituted the transfer of “an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties” which was “not subject to process by a creditor holding a…”

Welch v. Regions Bank (In re Mongelluzzi), 591 B.R. 480 (2018). “Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). 11 U.S.C. § 101 (54)(D).”

Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard Sec., LLC), 570 B.R. 859 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2017). · cites it 4× “” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). Technically, when one makes a deposit with a bank, the bank becomes the owner of the funds.”

Nat'l Mar. Servs., Inc. v. Straub, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2013). · cites it 7× “Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (5). The creditor’s “claim” is broadly defined by the *1328 UFTA as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or…”

Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart), 280 B.R. 268 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001). · cites it 3× “See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). Therefore, as between spouses still married, “where the original transfer into entireties status is not fraudulent, a subsequent transfer of exempt entireties property [to one spouse] is not avoidable.”

Show all 97 citing cases →

— 726.102(12) — 10 cases

NATIONSBANK, NA v. Coastal Utils., Inc., 814 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Mason v. E. Speer & Assocs., Inc., 846 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Ford v. Feldman (In Re Florida Bay Trading Co.), 177 B.R. 374 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).

Dzikowski v. Delson (In Re Delson), 247 B.R. 873 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2000). “The Debtor’s next argument is that the subject transfer is not avoidable under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because it constituted the transfer of “an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties” which was “not subject to process by a creditor holding a…”

Levin v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 823 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

— 726.102(14) — 7 cases

Nat'l Auto Serv. Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC, 192 So. 3d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2015). “Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Bank served merely as a conduit of the funds listed in Exhibit B, subject always to Nadel’s right to call on those funds.”

Jensen v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 561 B.R. 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016). “See Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)(c). . Dzikowski v.”

Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (S.D. Fla. 2019).

Furr v. Geragi (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2023).

— 726.102(2) — 8 cases

Lab'y Corp. v. Prof'l Recovery, 813 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

Kapila v. Espirito Santo Bank (In Re Bankest Capital Corp.), 374 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D. Florida 2007).

Ming Props., Inc. v. Stardust Marine S.A., 741 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

Wiand v. Adamek (M.D. Fla. 2023).

— 726.102(2)(a) — 1 case

Kapila v. CTS Equities Ltd. P'ship (Fla. 2d DCA 2025).

— 726.102(2)(b) — 1 case

Mane Fl Corp v. Cale Beckman & Malgorzata Beckman (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

— 726.102(2)(c) — 6 cases

Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart), 280 B.R. 268 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001). “See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). Therefore, as between spouses still married, “where the original transfer into entireties status is not fraudulent, a subsequent transfer of exempt entireties property [to one spouse] is not avoidable.”

Crews v. Lankry (In Re Lankry), 263 B.R. 638 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).

Meininger v. Miller (In Re Miller), 188 B.R. 302 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).

Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Wingate (In Re Wingate), 377 B.R. 687 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).

Ming Props., Inc. v. Stardust Marine S.A., 741 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

— 726.102(3) — 9 cases

Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2003). “As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”

Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2004). “As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”

Cook v. Pompano Shopper, Inc., 582 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 806 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Newman v. William L. Gunlicks Irrevocable Trust, 897 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D. Fla. 2012).

— 726.102(4) — 13 cases

Welch v. Regions Bank (In re Mongelluzzi), 587 B.R. 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018).

Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grusky, 763 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 806 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

— 726.102(7) — 5 cases

Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Amjad Munim, Md, Pa v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Bluestarexpo, Inc. v. Enis (S.D. Fla. 2021).

Maplewood Farms, Inc. v. Baywood Manor Farms, Inc., 624 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

— 726.102(7)(a) — 1 case

Veigle v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 623 (M.D. Fla. 1994).

— 726.102(7)(b) — 1 case

Mansolillo v. Parties by Lynn, Inc., 753 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

— 726.102(8) — 1 case

PLUS 352, S.A v. Licensed Accessories USA LLC (M.D. Fla. 2022).

— 726.102(8)(a) — 1 case

Macro Elec. Corp. v. Biotech Restorations of Florida LLC (M.D. Fla. 2024).

— 726.102(8)(b) — 1 case

Mane Fl Corp v. Cale Beckman & Malgorzata Beckman (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

— 726.102(8)(d) — 1 case

Nat'l Mar. Servs., Inc. v. Straub, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2013). “Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (5). The creditor’s “claim” is broadly defined by the *1328 UFTA as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or…”

— 726.102(c) — 1 case

Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2001).

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