726.102
Definitions.
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726.102 Definitions.—As used in ss. 726.101-726.112:
(1) “Affiliate” means:
(a) A person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote.
(b) A corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote.
(c) A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(d) A person who operates the debtor’s business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor’s assets.
(2) “Asset” means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:
(a) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) Property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) An interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) “Charitable contribution” means a charitable contribution as that term is defined in s. 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if that contribution consists of:
(a) A financial instrument as defined in s. 731(c)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(b) Cash.
(4) “Claim” means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(5) “Creditor” means a person who has a claim.
(6) “Debt” means liability on a claim.
(7) “Debtor” means a person who is liable on a claim.
(8) “Insider” includes:
(a) If the debtor is an individual:
1. A relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
2. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
3. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 2.; or
4. A corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(b) If the debtor is a corporation:
1. A director of the debtor;
2. An officer of the debtor;
3. A person in control of the debtor;
4. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
5. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 4.; or
6. A relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.
(c) If the debtor is a partnership:
1. A general partner in the debtor;
2. A relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
3. Another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
4. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 3.; or
5. A person in control of the debtor.
(d) An affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor.
(e) A managing agent of the debtor.
(9) “Lien” means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(10) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(11) “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(12) “Qualified religious or charitable entity or organization” means:
(a) An entity described in s. 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(b) An entity or organization described in s. 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(13) “Relative” means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(14) “Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(15) “Valid lien” means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
History.—s. 2, ch. 87-79; s. 1, ch. 2013-189.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 97
cases (20 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case: Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc.
Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc. (2003)
“As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
Amir Isiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2020)
“” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). While the definition of transfer is broad, the statute plainly requires a plaintiff to show that the debtor either disposed of his asset or relinquished some interest in that asset.”
Wiand Ex Rel. Valhalla Investment Partners, L.P. v. Lee (2014)
“” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (4), (3). A fraudulent transfer must be of an “asset,” which is defined as any “property of a debtor,” excluding certain narrow exceptions.”
Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank (2004)
“As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
Jensen v. Anderson (In re Anderson) (2016)
“See Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)(c). . Dzikowski v.”
Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015)
“Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Bank served merely as a conduit of the funds listed in Exhibit B, subject always to Nadel’s right to call on those funds.”
Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard Sec., LLC) (2018)
“]" Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). Technically, when one makes a deposit with a bank, the bank becomes the owner of the funds.”
Dzikowski v. Delson (In Re Delson) (2000)
“The Debtor’s next argument is that the subject transfer is not avoidable under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because it constituted the transfer of “an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties” which was “not subject to process by a creditor holding a…”
Welch v. Regions Bank (In re Mongelluzzi) (2018)
“Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). 11 U.S.C. § 101 (54)(D).”
Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard Security, LLC) (2017)
“” Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). Technically, when one makes a deposit with a bank, the bank becomes the owner of the funds.”
National Maritime Services, Inc. v. Straub (2013)
“Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (5). The creditor’s “claim” is broadly defined by the *1328 UFTA as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or…”
Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart) (2001)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). Therefore, as between spouses still married, “where the original transfer into entireties status is not fraudulent, a subsequent transfer of exempt entireties property [to one spouse] is not avoidable.”
— 726.102(12) — 10 cases
Dzikowski v. Delson (In Re Delson) (2000)
“The Debtor’s next argument is that the subject transfer is not avoidable under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because it constituted the transfer of “an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties” which was “not subject to process by a creditor holding a…”
Levin v. Ethan Allen, Inc. (2002)
— 726.102(14) — 7 cases
Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015)
“Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (14). The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Bank served merely as a conduit of the funds listed in Exhibit B, subject always to Nadel’s right to call on those funds.”
Jensen v. Anderson (In re Anderson) (2016)
“See Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (2)(c). . Dzikowski v.”
Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (2019)
Furr v. Geragi (2023)
— 726.102(2) — 8 cases
Dzikowski v. Delson (In Re Delson) (2000)
“The Debtor’s next argument is that the subject transfer is not avoidable under the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because it constituted the transfer of “an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties” which was “not subject to process by a creditor holding a…”
Wiand v. Adamek (2023)
— 726.102(2)(a) — 1 case
— 726.102(2)(b) — 1 case
— 726.102(2)(c) — 6 cases
Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart) (2001)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). Therefore, as between spouses still married, “where the original transfer into entireties status is not fraudulent, a subsequent transfer of exempt entireties property [to one spouse] is not avoidable.”
— 726.102(3) — 9 cases
Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc. (2003)
“As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank (2004)
“As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
— 726.102(4) — 13 cases
Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc. (2003)
“As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank (2004)
“As defined in section 726.102, a "claim" is broadly constructed and "means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
— 726.102(7) — 5 cases
Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart) (2001)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). Therefore, as between spouses still married, “where the original transfer into entireties status is not fraudulent, a subsequent transfer of exempt entireties property [to one spouse] is not avoidable.”
AMJAD MUNIM, MD, PA v. Azar (1994)
BLUESTAREXPO, INC. v. Enis (2021)
— 726.102(7)(a) — 1 case
Veigle v. United States (1994)
— 726.102(7)(b) — 1 case
— 726.102(8) — 1 case
— 726.102(8)(a) — 1 case
— 726.102(8)(b) — 1 case
— 726.102(8)(d) — 1 case
National Maritime Services, Inc. v. Straub (2013)
“Fla. Stat. § 726.102 (5). The creditor’s “claim” is broadly defined by the *1328 UFTA as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or…”
— 726.102(c) — 1 case
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