Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...was not before the court. [2] We note that although the Florida Legislature has declared that a provision in the will of a married person that pertains to that person's spouse becomes void upon the annulment or dissolution of the parties' marriage, § 732.507, Fla....

...See In re Estate of Rock, 612 N.W.2d 891 (Minn.Ct.App.2000); East v. PaineWebber, Inc., 131 Md.App. 302, 748 A.2d 1082 (Md.2000); Graves v. Summit Bank, 541 N.E.2d 974 (Ind.Ct.App.1989). [4] We note that the former husband would not be able to receive such an asset through a will provision. Section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (1997), states: Any provisions of a will executed by a married person, which provision affects the spouse of that person, shall become void upon the divorce of that person or upon the dissolution or annulment of the marriage....

...n, the final judgment controls over the beneficiary designation unless expressly provided otherwise. In today's opinion, however, this court reaches a contrary conclusion. Thus, the legislature may wish to consider enacting a law similar to sections 732.507 and 737.106 to cover assets passing outside an estate or trust.

...was for the individual as a surviving spouse. Neither of these statutes requires such a construction, and the substance of sections 11 and 15 has not been changed since the Probate Act of 1933. These sections are now codified as sections 732.301 and 732.507 of our current law....

...Parker, Page on the Law of Wills §§ 21.86-.103, at 496-526 (rev. treatise 1960). [2] See cases collected at Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1026 (1964). [3] Id. [4] See also sections 5457(1) 5541(159), Compiled General Laws (1927) (Supp. V 1936). [5] See supra note 1. Section 732.507(1) provides: "Neither subsequent marriage nor subsequent marriage and birth or adoption of lineal descendants shall revoke the prior will of any person, but the pretermitted child or spouse shall inherit as set forth in ss....

...marriage contract, or unless the spouse is provided for in the will, or in such way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such provision... . Although the means are somewhat different, section 70 achieves the same effect as sections 732.507(1) and 732.301....

...." (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 245 (1958); Huttig v. Huffman, 9 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. 1942); First Nat'l Bank of Hollywood v. Broward Nat'l Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 265 So. 2d 377, 378 (Fla. testator's spouse upon the dissolution of marriage, § 732.507(2), Fla....

...cedent's estate to the trust in the event that Pamela Hansen predeceased the decedent. The decedent and Hansen subsequently divorced, and the decedent died seven days later on March 22, 2006, making the bequest to Hansen in the will void pursuant to section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2005)....

See Fla. R. App. P. 9.170(b)(5). Because section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2015), does not apply

...Committee Notes revised. Statutory References § 393.12, Fla. Stat. Capacity; appointment of guardian advocate. § 732.201-732.2155, Fla. Stat. Elective share of surviving spouse. § 732.301, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted spouse. § 732.302, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted children. § 732.507, Fla....

...akes as a named beneficiary and the word "husband" is merely descriptive. Under the Kuehmsted rationale a divorce subsequent to a will does not affect a devise to a specifically named spouse. This rule has been effectively done away with by statute. Section 732.507, Florida Statutes (1979), formerly Section 731.101, Florida Statutes (1973), provides that dissolution of marriage voids a prior will as to the divorced spouse....

...son, BRAXTON D. BABCOCK, if he shall be living at the time of my death. At the time of his death, he was divorced from Tara and married to Tawn Babcock, from whom he was separated. Because of the divorce, those provisions affecting Tara became void. § 732.507(2), Fla....

...Exercising vigorous legal gymnastics, the circuit court permitted the placement of the decedent’s residuary assets into twin, newly-created irrevocable trusts for the benefit of the *241 former wife’s niece and. nephew. We reverse the order of the circuit court because it was contrary to section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...d later entered the will into probate. The Mother responded with a petition to determine beneficiaries, requesting that the trial court “enter an order determining that the devise to [Wendy’s] revocable trust is void pursuant to the [MSA] and” Section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2012), so that “the residue of [the] decedent’s estate should pass [to her] by intestacy.” The Mother asserted that since Wendy is not actually dead, though the Will is to be construed that way, the funds p...

...ed and unable to be modified.” The circuit court made two rulings at issue in this appeal. First, Wendy could not personally benefit from the estate, since she had waived such rights in the MSA and was deemed to have predeceased Thomas pursuant to section 732.507(2)....

...However, with all the stress of divorce litigation, it is not uncommon for people to resist the idea of their own mortality and procrastinate their post-divorce estate planning. And then they die with a *243 will in place that provides for the former spouse. Section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2012), protects divorced persons from their inattention to estate planning details....

...t held hereunder with any other trusts [she] created” and to alter the terms of the “Wendy Family Trust.” Thus, on the date of the dissolution, Wendy was very much “affected” by Article 4 of the will, so that provision was rendered void by section 732.507(2). The appellees contend that the second sentence of section 732.507(2) allowed the circuit court to treat Wendy as if she died, so that her family’s inheritance would proceed through her trust....

...This application of the statute would nullify the provision of the first sentence that, “upon divorce,” renders “void” those will provisions that affect a former spouse. The circuit court used the fiction of Wendy’s death to green light the rewriting of Wendy’s trust documents after Thomas’s death. However, section 732.507(2) becomes operative on the date of dissolution, so it does not allow for such post-death legal gymnastics to manipulate the issue of whether a will provision “affects” the former spouse....

...cedent's estate to the trust in the event that Pamela Hansen predeceased the decedent. The decedent and Hansen subsequently divorced, and the decedent died seven days later on March 22, 2006, making the bequest to Hansen in the will void pursuant to section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Change in (b)(4) clarifies on whom the petitioner must serve *504 formal notice. Editorial change in (d)(2) and (d)(5). Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. Statutory References F.S. 731.107 Adversary proceedings. F.S. 732.301 Pretermitted spouse. F.S. 732.507 Effect of subsequent marriage, birth, or dissolution of marriage....

...Change in (b)(4) clarifies on whom the petitioner niust serve formal notice. Editorial change in (d)(2) and (d)(5). Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. Statutory References F.S. 731.107 Adversary proceedings. F.S. 732.301 Pretermitted spouse. F.S. 732.507 Effect of subsequent marriage, birth, or dissolution of marriage....

732.302, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted children. § 732.507, Fla. Stat. Effect of subsequent marriage, birth

...1977 Revision: Editorial changes to (a)(1). 1984 Revision: Extensive changes, committee notes revised and expanded. Statutory References F.S. 731.107 Adversary proceedings. F.S. 732.201 — 732.215 Elective share of surviving spouse. F.S. 732.301 Pretermitted spouse. F.S. 732.507 Effect of subsequent marriage, birth, or dissolution of marriage....

spouse. § 732.301, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted spouse. § 732.507, Fla. Stat. Effect of subsequent marriage, birth

...2003 Revision: Committee notes revised. Statutory References § 731.107,-Fla. Stat. Adversary proceed-ingSr §§ 732.201-732.2155, Fla. Stat. Elective share of surviving spouse. § 732.301, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted spouse. § 732.302, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted children. § 732.507, Fla....

...Capacity; appointment of guardian advocate. -6-  §§ 732.201–732.2155, Fla. Stat. Elective share of surviving spouse. § 732.301, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted spouse. § 732.302, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted children. § 732.507, Fla....

...Statutory References § 393.12, Fla. Stat. Capacity; appointment of guardian advocate. *580 §§ 732.201-732.2155, Fla. Stat. Elective share of surviving spouse. § 732.301, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted spouse. § 732.302, Fla. Stat. Pretermitted children. § 732.507, Fla....

...Exercising vigorous legal gymnastics, the circuit court permitted the placement of the decedent’s residuary assets into twin, newly-created irrevocable trusts for the benefit of the former wife’s niece and nephew. We reverse the order of the circuit court because it was contrary to section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2012). The Wills and Trusts  Thomas Carroll was married to Wendy Israelson Carroll for eighteen years....

...d later entered the will into probate. The Mother responded with a petition to determine beneficiaries, requesting that the trial court “enter an order determining that the devise to [Wendy’s] revocable trust is void pursuant to the [MSA] and” Section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2012), so that “the residue of [the] decedent’s estate should pass [to her] by intestacy.” The Mother asserted that since Wendy is not actually dead, though the Will is to be construed that way, the funds p...

...“would be irrevocably created and unable to be modified.” The circuit court made two rulings at issue in this appeal. First, Wendy could not personally benefit from the estate, since she had waived such rights in the MSA and was deemed to have predeceased Thomas pursuant to section 732.507(2)....

...However, with all the stress of divorce litigation, it is not uncommon for people to resist the idea of their own mortality and procrastinate their post-divorce estate planning. And then they die with a will in place that provides for the former spouse. Section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2012), protects divorced persons from their inattention to estate planning details....

...authority to “merge any trust held hereunder with any other trusts [she] created” and to alter the terms of the “Wendy Family Trust.” Thus, on the date of the dissolution, Wendy was very much “affected” by Article 4 of the will, so that provision was rendered void by section 732.507(2). The appellees contend that the second sentence of section 732.507(2) allowed the circuit court to treat Wendy as if she died, so that her family’s inheritance would proceed through her trust....

...This application of the statute would nullify the provision of the first sentence that, “upon divorce,” renders “void” those will provisions that affect a former spouse. The circuit court used the fiction of Wendy’s death to green light the rewriting of Wendy’s trust documents after Thomas’s death. However, section 732.507(2) becomes operative on the date of dissolution, so it does not allow for such post-death legal gymnastics to manipulate the issue of whether a will provision “affects” the former spouse. Reversed and remanded for further proce...

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 732.507(2), Fla....

...L.T. Case No. 502014CP003941XXXXNB. Diana Waterous Centorino of Diana Waterous Centorino, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants. Stuart B. Klein of The Wagner Law Group, Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 732.507(2), Fla....

...No appearance for remaining Appellees. LaROSE, Chief Judge. Silvia Gordon challenges the trial court's order determining beneficiaries and order denying motion for rehearing and to vacate. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.170(b)(5). Because section 732.507(2), Florida Statutes (2015), does not apply to the facts of this case, we reverse and remand. I....

...The trial court granted the petition and appointed Mr. Fishman as personal representative of the estate. In August 2015, Ms. Gordon filed the decedent's original will with the trial court. Mr. Fishman moved for entry of an order determining beneficiaries. He argued that, under section 732.507(2), the will was to be construed as if Ms. Gordon had predeceased the decedent. Ms. Gordon objected, arguing that section 732.507(2) did not apply because she was not married to the decedent when he executed the will. The trial court found "that as a matter of law, [section 732.507(2)], provides that upon the dissolution of their marriage, the will is to be construed as if the former spouse, Silvia Gordon, had died and she is not entitled to any share of the estate." Accordingly, the trial court entered an order finding Ms....

...and Bernard Priever to be the estate's beneficiaries. Ms. Gordon filed an unsuccessful motion for rehearing. This timely appeal follows. II. Analysis Ms. Gordon argues that the trial court erred in applying section 732.507(2) because the statute's plain language makes it applicable only when the testator was married at the time he executed the will....

...will shall be administered and construed as if the former spouse had died at the time of the dissolution, divorce, or annulment of the marriage, unless the will or the dissolution or divorce judgment expressly provides otherwise. § 732.507(2) (emphasis added). The legislature's use of the adjective "married" to modify "person" is a clear indication that it intended the "person" executing the will to be "married" at the time of execution.2 Thus, section 732.507(2) applies only when the marriage 2Notably, the legislature's use of the adjective "married" in section 732.507(2) differs from the statutes in other states—where the courts have determined the sequence of the execution of the will and the marriage was irrelevant—as the statutes in those states did not include the adjective "married" or any other language -4- predates the will. The decedent did not marry Ms. Gordon until about fifteen months after he executed his will. Section 732.507(2) does not apply here. Mr....

...pouse to take as in intestacy] is clearly distinguishable from that of [the statute prohibiting a divorced spouse from taking under the other spouse's will], and these statutes are to be independently construed."). Also noteworthy, section 732.507(2) does not include "in contemplation of marriage," or any similar language. We decline Mr. Fishman's invitation to add language to, or otherwise alter, section 732.507(2)....

...itself has not used in drafting that statute" and "a matter that is not covered by a statute is to be treated as intentionally not covered" (citations omitted)). B. Carroll Next, Mr. Fishman argues that "the entire purpose of [section 732.507(2)] is to protect divorced persons from their inattention to estate planning details." See Carroll, 169 So....

...'inattention,' not 'intention.' " (quoting Statement of the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Probate Code, 17 Am. C. Tr. & Est. Couns. 184 (1991))). Further, Mr. Fishman claims that "it is the parties' status on the date of the divorce that controls" because Carroll held that section 732.507(2) "is triggered by the entry of a final judgment of dissolution or annulment." See Carroll, 169 So....

...resist the idea of their own mortality and procrastinate their post-divorce estate planning. And then they die with a will in place that provides for the former spouse. Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added). Our adherence to section 732.507(2)'s plain language does not lead to an unreasonable result contrary to legislature's intent....

...The Carroll testator was married at the time he executed his will; unlike here, the sequence of the parties' status and the execution of the will was never at issue in Carroll. Id. at 241. We must conclude that Carroll's holding has no bearing on the application of section 732.507(2) in this case. C. Conascenta Now, we turn to Conascenta, 143 So. 2d 682. At first blush, Conascenta appears to support Mr. Fishman's contention that the legislature intended that section -7- 732.507(2) preclude any ex-spouse from claiming an inheritance under the will of their deceased ex-spouse, regardless of whether the two were married at the time the decedent executed the will. In Conascenta, the testator executed a will devising property to Ms. Conascenta....

...Gordon attempts to distinguish Conascenta, claiming that the parties in that case had a common law marriage at the time of execution. Conascenta noted that the parties "were living and co-habiting together as husband and wife" at the time of 3Section 731.101 was the previous version of section 732.507(2)....

...the deceased would be contrary to the purpose and intent of the legislature in enacting [section] 731.101." Conascenta, 143 So. 2d at 684. The court did not address whether section 731.101 required the testator to be a husband or wife at will execution, as section 732.507(2) now provides....

...n was an issue. The parties and courts focused on Ms. Conascenta's argument that she was never legally married to the testator. We hew to the statute's language. Reading the statute as urged by Mr. Fishman would extend the reach of section 732.507(2) beyond its express language. We would have to ignore the term "married" and interpret section 732.507(2) to revoke provisions of a will "executed by a person" or provisions "executed by a person before or after marriage." "To construe the statute in a way that would extend or modify its express terms would be an inappropriate abrogation of legislative power." State v. Burris, 875 So....

...9- so. A court's function is to interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in the statute." (footnote omitted)). III. Conclusion The plain and unambiguous language of section 732.507(2) revokes provisions of a will executed by a "married person." We have no occasion to search for an intent other than that expressed in the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, especially where the decedent executed the will over a year before the marriage. Cf. Carroll, 169 So. 3d at 242-43 (discussing the purpose of section 732.507(2) and noting that "animosities arise in divorce proceedings which are inconsistent with wills executed when everything was rosy in the marriage"). Section 732.507(2) does not apply in this case....