The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLII
ESTATES AND TRUSTS

Chapter 739
FLORIDA UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT

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CHAPTER 739

FLORIDA UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT

739.101 Short title.

739.102 Definitions.

739.103 Scope.

739.104 Power to disclaim; general requirements; when irrevocable.

739.201 Disclaimer of interest in property.

739.202 Disclaimer of rights of survivorship in jointly held property.

739.203 Disclaimer of property held as tenancy by the entirety.

739.204 Disclaimer of interest by trustee.

739.205 Disclaimer of power of appointment or other power not held in a fiduciary capacity.

739.206 Disclaimer by appointee, object, or taker in default of exercise of power of appointment.

739.207 Disclaimer of power held in fiduciary capacity.

739.301 Delivery or filing.

739.401 When disclaimer is permitted.

739.402 When disclaimer is barred or limited.

739.501 Tax-qualified disclaimer.

739.601 Recording of disclaimer relating to real estate.

739.701 Application to existing relationships.

739.101 Short title.—This chapter may be cited as the “Florida Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act.”

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.102 Definitions.—As used in this chapter, the term:

(1) “Benefactor” means the creator of the interest that is subject to a disclaimer.

(2) “Beneficiary designation” means an instrument, other than an instrument creating or amending a trust, naming the beneficiary of:

(a) An annuity or insurance policy;

(b) An account with a designation for payment on death;

(d) A pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or other employment-related benefit plan; or

(e) Any other nonprobate transfer at death.

(3) “Disclaimant” means the person to whom a disclaimed interest or power would have passed had the disclaimer not been made.

(4) “Disclaimed interest” means the interest that would have passed to the disclaimant had the disclaimer not been made.

(5) “Disclaimer” means the refusal to accept an interest in or power over property. The term includes a renunciation.

(6) “Fiduciary” means a personal representative, trustee, agent acting under a power of attorney, guardian, or other person authorized to act as a fiduciary with respect to the property of another person.

(7) “Future interest” means an interest that takes effect in possession or enjoyment, if at all, later than the time of its creation.

(8) “Insolvent” means, solely for purposes of this chapter, that the sum of a person’s debts is greater than all of the person’s assets at fair valuation and that the person is generally not paying his or her debts as they become due. For purposes of this subsection, the term “assets” has the same meaning as that provided in s. 726.102.

(9) “Jointly held property” means property held in the names of two or more persons under an arrangement in which all holders have concurrent interests and under which the last surviving holder is entitled to the whole of the property. Jointly held property does not include property held as tenants by the entirety.

(10) “Person” includes individuals, ascertained and unascertained, living or not living, whether entitled to an interest by right of intestacy or otherwise; a government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality; and a public corporation.

(11) “Time of distribution” means the time when a disclaimed interest would have taken effect in possession or enjoyment.

(12) “Trust” means:

(a) An express trust (including an honorary trust or a trust under s. 736.0408), charitable or noncharitable, with additions thereto, whenever and however created; and

(b) A trust created pursuant to a statute, judgment, or decree which requires the trust be administered in the manner of an express trust.

As used in this chapter, the term “trust” does not include a constructive trust or a resulting trust.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108; s. 43, ch. 2006-217; s. 13, ch. 2009-115.

739.103 Scope.—This chapter applies to disclaimers of any interest in or power over property, whenever created. Except as provided in s. 739.701, this chapter is the exclusive means by which a disclaimer may be made under Florida law.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.104 Power to disclaim; general requirements; when irrevocable.—

(1) A person may disclaim, in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally, any interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment. A person may disclaim the interest or power even if its creator imposed a spendthrift provision or similar restriction on transfer or a restriction or limitation on the right to disclaim. A disclaimer shall be unconditional unless the disclaimant explicitly provides otherwise in the disclaimer.

(2) With court approval, a fiduciary may disclaim, in whole or part, any interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment, except that a disclaimer of a power arising under s. 739.201(4) does not require court approval. Without court approval, a fiduciary may disclaim, in whole or in part, any interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment, if and to the extent that the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship explicitly grants the fiduciary the right to disclaim. In the absence of a court-appointed guardian, notwithstanding anything in chapter 744 to the contrary, without court approval, a natural guardian under s. 744.301 may disclaim on behalf of a minor child of the natural guardian, in whole or in part, any interest in or power over property, including a power of appointment, which the minor child is to receive solely as a result of another disclaimer, but only if the disclaimed interest or power does not pass to or for the benefit of the natural guardian as a result of the disclaimer.

(3) To be effective, a disclaimer must be in writing, declare the writing as a disclaimer, describe the interest or power disclaimed, and be signed by the person making the disclaimer and witnessed and acknowledged in the manner provided for deeds of real estate to be recorded in this state. In addition, for a disclaimer to be effective, an original of the disclaimer must be delivered or filed in the manner provided in s. 739.301.

(4) A partial disclaimer may be expressed as a fraction, percentage, monetary amount, term of years, limitation of a power, or any other interest or estate in the property.

(5) A disclaimer becomes irrevocable when any conditions to which the disclaimant has made the disclaimer subject are satisfied and when the disclaimer is delivered or filed pursuant to s. 739.301 or it becomes effective as provided in ss. 739.201-739.207, whichever occurs later.

(6) A disclaimer made under this chapter is not a transfer, assignment, or release.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108; s. 103, ch. 2006-1; s. 14, ch. 2009-115.

739.201 Disclaimer of interest in property.—Except for a disclaimer governed by s. 739.202, s. 739.203, or s. 739.204, the following rules apply to a disclaimer of an interest in property:

(1) The disclaimer takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the interest becomes irrevocable or, if the interest arose under the law of intestate succession, as of the time of the intestate’s death.

(2) The disclaimed interest passes according to any provision in the instrument creating the interest providing explicitly for the disposition of the interest, should it be disclaimed, or of disclaimed interests in general.

(3) If the instrument does not contain a provision described in subsection (2), the following rules apply:

(a) If the disclaimant is an individual, the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the interest was created, unless under the governing instrument or other applicable law the disclaimed interest is contingent on surviving to the time of distribution, in which case the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the time for distribution. However, if, by law or under the governing instrument, the descendants of the disclaimant would share in the disclaimed interest by any method of representation had the disclaimant died before the time of distribution, the disclaimed interest passes only to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive the time of distribution. For purposes of this subsection, a disclaimed interest is created at the death of the benefactor or such earlier time, if any, that the benefactor’s transfer of the interest is a completed gift for federal gift tax purposes. Also for purposes of this subsection, a disclaimed interest in a trust described in s. 733.707(3) shall pass as if the interest had been created under a will.

(b) If the disclaimant is not an individual, the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant did not exist.

(c) Upon the disclaimer of a preceding interest, a future interest held by a person other than the disclaimant takes effect as if the disclaimant had died or ceased to exist immediately before the time of distribution, but a future interest held by the disclaimant is not accelerated in possession or enjoyment as a result of the disclaimer.

(4) In the case of a disclaimer of property over which the disclaimant has a power, in a fiduciary or nonfiduciary capacity, to direct the beneficial enjoyment of the disclaimed property, unless the disclaimer specifically provides to the contrary with reference to this subsection, the disclaimant shall also be deemed to have disclaimed that power unless the power is limited by an ascertainable standard, as defined in s. 736.0103, as in effect when the disclaimer becomes irrevocable.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108; s. 15, ch. 2009-115.

739.202 Disclaimer of rights of survivorship in jointly held property.—

(1) Upon the death of a holder of jointly held property:

(a) If, during the deceased holder’s lifetime, the deceased holder could have unilaterally regained a portion of the property attributable to the deceased holder’s contributions without the consent of any other holder, another holder may disclaim, in whole or in part, a fractional share of that portion of the property attributable to the deceased holder’s contributions determined by dividing the number one by the number of joint holders alive immediately after the death of the holder to whose death the disclaimer relates.

(b) For all other jointly held property, another holder may disclaim, in whole or in part, a fraction of the whole of the property the numerator of which is one and the denominator of which is the product of the number of joint holders alive immediately before the death of the holder to whose death the disclaimer relates multiplied by the number of joint holders alive immediately after the death of the holder to whose death the disclaimer relates.

(2) A disclaimer under subsection (1) takes effect as of the death of the holder of jointly held property to whose death the disclaimer relates.

(3) An interest in jointly held property disclaimed by a surviving holder of the property passes as if the disclaimant predeceased the holder to whose death the disclaimer relates.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.203 Disclaimer of property held as tenancy by the entirety.—

(1) The survivorship interest in property held as a tenancy by the entirety to which the survivor succeeds by operation of law upon the death of the cotenant may be disclaimed as provided in this chapter. For purposes of this chapter only, the deceased tenant’s interest in property held as a tenancy by the entirety shall be deemed to be an undivided one-half interest.

(2) A disclaimer under subsection (1) takes effect as of the death of the deceased tenant to whose death the disclaimer relates.

(3) The survivorship interest in property held as a tenancy by the entirety disclaimed by the surviving tenant passes as if the disclaimant had predeceased the tenant to whose death the disclaimer relates.

(4) A disclaimer of an interest in real property held as tenants by the entirety does not cause the disclaimed interest to be homestead property for purposes of descent and distribution under ss. 732.401 and 732.4015.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.204 Disclaimer of interest by trustee.—If a trustee having the power to disclaim under the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship or pursuant to court order disclaims an interest in property that otherwise would have become trust property, the interest does not become trust property.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.205 Disclaimer of power of appointment or other power not held in a fiduciary capacity.—If a holder disclaims a power of appointment or other power not held in a fiduciary capacity, the following rules apply:

(1) If the holder has not exercised the power, the disclaimer takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the power becomes irrevocable.

(2) If the holder has exercised the power and the disclaimer is of a power other than a presently exercisable general power of appointment, the disclaimer takes effect immediately after the last exercise of the power.

(3) The instrument creating the power is construed as if the power expired when the disclaimer became effective.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.206 Disclaimer by appointee, object, or taker in default of exercise of power of appointment.—

(1) A disclaimer of an interest in property by an appointee of a power of appointment takes effect as of the time the instrument by which the holder exercises the power becomes irrevocable.

(2) A disclaimer of an interest in property by an object, or taker in default of an exercise of a power of appointment, takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the power becomes irrevocable.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.207 Disclaimer of power held in fiduciary capacity.—

(1) If a fiduciary disclaims a power held in a fiduciary capacity which has not been exercised, the disclaimer takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the power becomes irrevocable.

(2) If a fiduciary disclaims a power held in a fiduciary capacity which has been exercised, the disclaimer takes effect immediately after the last exercise of the power.

(3) A disclaimer under this section is effective as to another fiduciary if the disclaimer so provides and the fiduciary disclaiming has the authority to bind the estate, trust, or other person for whom the fiduciary is acting, except that a disclaimer of a fiduciary power arising under s. 739.201(4) shall bind only the disclaiming fiduciary.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108; s. 16, ch. 2009-115.

739.301 Delivery or filing.—

(1) Subject to subsections (2) through (12), delivery of a disclaimer may be effected by personal delivery, first-class mail, or any other method that results in its receipt. A disclaimer sent by first-class mail shall be deemed to have been delivered on the date it is postmarked. Delivery by any other method shall be effective upon receipt by the person to whom the disclaimer is to be delivered under this section.

(2) In the case of a disclaimer of an interest created under the law of intestate succession or an interest created by will, other than an interest in a testamentary trust:

(a) The disclaimer must be delivered to the personal representative of the decedent’s estate; or

(b) If no personal representative is serving when the disclaimer is sought to be delivered, the disclaimer must be filed with the clerk of the court in any county where venue of administration would be proper.

(3) In the case of a disclaimer of an interest in a testamentary trust:

(a) The disclaimer must be delivered to the trustee serving when the disclaimer is delivered or, if no trustee is then serving, to the personal representative of the decedent’s estate; or

(4) In the case of a disclaimer of an interest in an inter vivos trust:

(a) The disclaimer must be delivered to the trustee serving when the disclaimer is delivered;

(b) If no trustee is then serving, it must be filed with the clerk of the court in any county where the filing of a notice of trust would be proper; or

(c) If the disclaimer is made before the time the instrument creating the trust becomes irrevocable, the disclaimer must be delivered to the grantor of the revocable trust or the transferor of the interest or to such person’s legal representative.

(5) In the case of a disclaimer of an interest created by a beneficiary designation made before the time the designation becomes irrevocable, the disclaimer must be delivered to the person making the beneficiary designation or to such person’s legal representative.

(6) In the case of a disclaimer of an interest created by a beneficiary designation made after the time the designation becomes irrevocable, the disclaimer must be delivered to the person obligated to distribute the interest.

(7) In the case of a disclaimer by a surviving holder of jointly held property, or by the surviving tenant in property held as a tenancy by the entirety, the disclaimer must be delivered to the person to whom the disclaimed interest passes or, if such person cannot reasonably be located by the disclaimant, the disclaimer must be delivered as provided in subsection (2).

(8) In the case of a disclaimer by an object, or taker in default of exercise, of a power of appointment at any time after the power was created:

(a) The disclaimer must be delivered to the holder of the power or to the fiduciary acting under the instrument that created the power; or

(b) If no fiduciary is serving when the disclaimer is sought to be delivered, the disclaimer must be filed with a court having authority to appoint the fiduciary.

(9) In the case of a disclaimer by an appointee of a nonfiduciary power of appointment:

(a) The disclaimer must be delivered to the holder, the personal representative of the holder’s estate, or the fiduciary under the instrument that created the power; or

(b) If no fiduciary is serving when the disclaimer is sought to be delivered, the disclaimer must be filed with a court having authority to appoint the fiduciary.

(10) In the case of a disclaimer by a fiduciary of a power over a trust or estate, the disclaimer must be delivered as provided in subsection (2), subsection (3), or subsection (4) as if the power disclaimed were an interest in property.

(11) In the case of a disclaimer of a power exercisable by an agent, other than a power exercisable by a fiduciary over a trust or estate, the disclaimer must be delivered to the principal or the principal’s representative.

(12) Notwithstanding subsection (1), delivery of a disclaimer of an interest in or relating to real estate shall be presumed upon the recording of the disclaimer in the office of the clerk of the court of the county or counties where the real estate is located.

(13) A fiduciary or other person having custody of the disclaimed interest is not liable for any otherwise proper distribution or other disposition made without actual notice of the disclaimer or, if the disclaimer is barred under s. 739.402, for any otherwise proper distribution or other disposition made in reliance on the disclaimer, if the distribution or disposition is made without actual knowledge of the facts constituting the bar of the right to disclaim.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.401 When disclaimer is permitted.—A disclaimer may be made at any time unless barred under s. 739.402.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.402 When disclaimer is barred or limited.—

(1) A disclaimer is barred by a written waiver of the right to disclaim.

(2) A disclaimer of an interest in property is barred if any of the following events occur before the disclaimer becomes effective:

(a) The disclaimant accepts the interest sought to be disclaimed;

(b) The disclaimant voluntarily assigns, conveys, encumbers, pledges, or transfers the interest sought to be disclaimed or contracts to do so;

(d) The disclaimant is insolvent when the disclaimer becomes irrevocable.

(3) A disclaimer, in whole or in part, of the future exercise of a power held in a fiduciary capacity is not barred by its previous exercise.

(4) A disclaimer, in whole or in part, of the future exercise of a power not held in a fiduciary capacity is not barred by its previous exercise unless the power is exercisable in favor of the disclaimant.

(5) A disclaimer of an interest in, or a power over, property which is barred by this section is ineffective.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108; s. 17, ch. 2009-115.

739.501 Tax-qualified disclaimer.—Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter other than s. 739.402, if, as a result of a disclaimer or transfer, the disclaimed or transferred interest is treated pursuant to the provisions of s. 2518 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as never having been transferred to the disclaimant, the disclaimer or transfer is effective as a disclaimer under this chapter.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108; s. 18, ch. 2009-115.

739.601 Recording of disclaimer relating to real estate.—

(1) A disclaimer of an interest in or relating to real estate does not provide constructive notice to all persons unless the disclaimer contains a legal description of the real estate to which the disclaimer relates and unless the disclaimer is filed for recording in the office of the clerk of the court in the county or counties where the real estate is located.

(2) An effective disclaimer meeting the requirements of subsection (1) constitutes constructive notice to all persons from the time of filing. Failure to record the disclaimer does not affect its validity as between the disclaimant and persons to whom the property interest or power passes by reason of the disclaimer.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

739.701 Application to existing relationships.—Except as otherwise provided in s. 739.402, an interest in or power over property existing on July 1, 2005, as to which the time for delivering or filing a disclaimer under laws superseded by this chapter has not expired, may be disclaimed after July 1, 2005.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2005-108.

F.S. 739 on Google Scholar

F.S. 739 on Casetext

Amendments to 739

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 739

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 739.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

MCGIRT, v. OKLAHOMA, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 738-739, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Bolton , 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973), it did so only in dicta, id., at 188-189, . . . 93 S.Ct. 739. . . . Id. , at 188, 93 S.Ct. 739. . . . sufficiently direct injury under the Court's then-existing standing doctrine, id., at 188-189, 93 S.Ct. 739 . . . Doe , supra , at 186, 93 S.Ct. 739 ; see also Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. . . . Bolton , 410 U.S. 179, 188-189, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973). . . . rights of young men to challenge sex-based restriction on beer sales); Doe , 410 U.S. at 188, 93 S.Ct. 739 . . . n. 30, 103 S.Ct. 2481 ; Danforth , 428 U.S. at 62, 96 S.Ct. 2831 ; Doe , 410 U.S. at 188, 93 S.Ct. 739 . . . 435, 103 S.Ct. 2481, and the hospital-accreditation requirement in Doe , 410 U.S. at 195, 93 S.Ct. 739 . . . Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ). True, but beside the point. . . . Bolton , 410 U.S. 179, 221-223, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Akron v. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. THURAISSIGIAM, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . McAleenan , 435 F.Supp.3d 731, 734 - 735, 738 - 739 (ND Tex., Jan. 22, 2020) (declining to follow the . . .

J. THOLE, v. U. S. BANK N. A, 140 S. Ct. 1615 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id. , at 737, 739, 104 S.Ct. 1387. . . .

UNITED STATES, v. SINENENG- SMITH, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). . . .

BARBOUR, v. HALLIBURTON COMPANY,, 140 S. Ct. 2704 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-739. Supreme Court of the United States. April 20, 2020 Motion of Patrick A. . . .

THOMPSON, v. HEBDON,, 140 S. Ct. 348 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Leake , 660 F.3d 726, 739-740 (C.A.4 2011) ; Zimmerman v. . . .

DYROFF, v. ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP, INC., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Twitter, Inc. , 881 F.3d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 2018). . . .

ANDERSON, AS TRUSTEE FOR NEXT- OF- KIN OF ANDERSON v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS Dr. M. D. HCMC D. J. A. F. HCMC M. D. s J. L. L. T. D. M. T., 934 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Baer , 28 F.3d 895, 902 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1084, 115 S.Ct. 739, 130 L.Ed.2d 641 . . .

WOLFINGTON, v. RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES II PC, a k a, 935 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Gould, Inc. , 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984) (concluding that Rule 15(a) standard governs motion to . . .

SAM K. v. SAUL,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Colvin , 739 F.3d 1046, 1050 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .

PASSARO, Jr. v. VIRGINIA, 935 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Aldridge , 900 F.2d 736, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing transactional approach). . . .

A. VAN BUSKIRK A. v. UNITED GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. DCG LLC, DCG UGOC II, LLC, J. F. MCM LLC, LLC, F. F. W. Jr., 935 F.3d 49 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Bank of Am., N.A. , 626 F.3d 699, 739 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that de novo review is required . . .

BOXILL, v. P. O GRADY E. E. T., 935 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Comm'n , 739 F.3d 914, 917-18 (6th Cir. 2014). . . .

UNITED STATES v. VALQUIER, 934 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gomez-Perez, 452 F.3d 739, 742-43 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming the denial of safety valve relief where . . .

HAWKINS v. I- TV DIGITALIS TAVKOZLESI ZRT. f k a DMCC Rt. DIGI RCS RDS S. A. RCS S. A. DIGI N. V. v. i- TV f k a DMCC Rt. DIGI RCS RDS S. A. RCS S. A. DIGI N. V., 935 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C. , 385 F.3d 737, 739-43 (7th Cir. 2004). . . .

UNITED STATES v. G. WAGUESPACK,, 935 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Smith , 739 F.3d 843, 846 (5th Cir. 2014). . . . Smith , 739 F.3d 843, 847 (5th Cir. 2014). . . . Martinez , 739 F. App'x 245, 247 (5th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (citing United States v. . . . See Martinez , 739 F. App'x at 246-47. . . .

IN RE JOHNSON, v., 935 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . In re Morris , 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bennett v. . . .

LATURNER, v. UNITED STATES,, 933 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 915 F.3d 733, 739 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. . . .

SMITH, OSF v. OSF HEALTHCARE SYSTEM,, 933 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 733, 739-40 (S.D. Ill. 2018). . . .

MUHAMMAD, v. MAYFIELD,, 933 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . must exhaust are the "procedural means" to relief and "not the particular relief" itself. 532 U.S. at 739 . . .

STUDDARD, v. SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, J. I., 934 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . which granted officers qualified immunity for using lethal force against a knife-wielding suspect. 739 . . .

IN RE TOLIVER,, 603 B.R. 420 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2019)

. . . . § 1329 ; see In re Witkowski , 16 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[ Section] 1329 is clear and unambiguous . . .

DUMONT, v. REILY FOODS COMPANY, 934 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1984). . . .

CONSTANCE S. v. SAUL,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 583 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Colvin , 739 F.3d 1046, 1050 (7th Cir. 2014) ; Myles v. Astrue , 582 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009). . . .

LUXOTTICA GROUP, S. P. A. a v. AIRPORT MINI MALL, LLC, a d. b. a. LLC, a a. k. a. C. C., 932 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). . . . See Sapuppo , 739 F.3d at 681. . . .

UNITED STATES v. P. MAZZULLA, 932 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pennington, 287 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2002), we held that "[w]hen a warrant 'specifically mentions' certain . . .

ASSOCIATION OF EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS AGCO CNH LLC v. BURGUM, s, 932 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Epstein, supra , at 739. . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. RIVERA- CARRASQUILLO, a k a KX, a k a a k a a k a n V a k a, 933 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 739 F.2d 1322, 1329 (8th Cir. 1984) ). . . .

BRAKEBILL v. JAEGER,, 932 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BUCHANAN,, 933 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Currie , 739 F.3d 960, 966 (7th Cir. 2014) ). . . . Currie , 739 F.3d at 966. . . .

CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, a v. WELLS FARGO CO. N. A., 931 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). . . .

HEISLER, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 931 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Health & Senior Servs. , 421 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2005) ); see also Montgomery v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. JACKSON, v. D., 932 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Cureton, 739 F.3d 1032, 1045 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a district court's sentencing determination . . .

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 934 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.3 ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. DEL CARPIO FRESCAS,, 932 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Shepperson , 739 F.3d 176, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2014) (refusing to apply Johnson v. . . . See id. at 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770. . . .

IN RE SCHATZ, v., 602 B.R. 411 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2019)

. . . (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 739-40 & 734 n.16 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000). Mass. Gen. . . .

UNITED STATES v. VARGAS- MOLINA,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 809 (E.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . United States , 62 F.2d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 1933) ); see also 28 U.S.C. § 453 (codifying the judicial . . .

CALIFORNIA v. ABBVIE INC., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Corp. , 672 F.3d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lucent , 642 F.3d at 739 )). . . .

MCADAMS, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS DISTRICT, INC, THE,, 931 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dist., 739 F.3d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 2014). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HADLEY, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1043 (M.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Currie , 739 F.3d 960, 966 (7th Cir. 2014), then citing Peugh , 569 U.S. at 541-44, 133 S.Ct. 2072 ). . . .

W. EATON, v. PACHECO,, 931 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Christy , 739 F.3d 534, 539 (10th Cir. 2014) ); see also Servants of Paraclete v. . . .

TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC v. PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR ACRES, PERMANENT OVERLAY EASEMENT FOR ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR ACRES IN MILFORD AND WESTFALL TOWNSHIPS, PIKE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBERS a c o L. P., 931 F.3d 237 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . See Kimbell Foods , 440 U.S. at 739, 99 S.Ct. 1448 ("Thus, the prudent course is to adopt the ready[- . . . (citing, inter alia , Kimbell Foods , 440 U.S. at 728-29, 739-40, 99 S.Ct. 1448 )). . . .

KERR, V. M. E. K. W. B. C. Ph. D. A. L. M. D. L. Re- E. a k a J. L. a k a L. P. W. Re- K. C. Re- J. Re- IJ G. v. POLIS,, 930 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. , 893 F.3d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Lexmark to construe prudential . . .

UNITED STATES v. MCKOWN,, 930 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("In our society liberty is the norm . . .

IN RE LICKING RIVER MINING, LLC, v. LLC,, 603 B.R. 336 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2019)

. . . Corp.) , 872 F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). . . .

BERNAL, v. NRA GROUP, LLC,, 930 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . the same of a contract that allowed for "costs of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 739 . . .

VASSEUR, v. F. SOWELL L. III, TEI, 930 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . BJC Health Sys. , 452 F.3d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . BJC Health Sys. , 452 F.3d at 739. . . .

MANNING v. CALDWELL, s FOR CITY OF ROANOKE s, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Picardi , 739 F.3d 1118, 1126 (8th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. . . . Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), and that, to achieve this goal, Congress . . .

GRAVES, I. Y. M. Y. A. Y. v. A. LIOI L. Jr. I. Y. M. Y. A. Y. v. A. L. Jr., 930 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN,, 929 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Stanley , 739 F.3d 633, 644 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that "[a]pproaches to this question differ . . . Stanley , 739 F.3d 633, 645 (11th Cir. 2014) ). . . . (quoting Stanley , 739 F.3d at 645 ). . . .

RIOS, v. JENKINS,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 714 (W.D. Va. 2019)

. . . Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. GREEN,, 929 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bertine , 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. PETRUK, v., 929 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Picardi, 739 F.3d 1118, 1123 n.3 (8th Cir. 2014). . . .

AUTOMOTIVE BODY PARTS ASSOCIATION, v. FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,, 930 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Malibu Boats, LLC , 739 F.3d 694, 702 (Fed. . . .

UNITED STATES v. WHYTE, a. k. a., 928 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) ("We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when . . . Hunt , 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). . . .

CIVIL BEAT LAW CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INC. v. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION,, 929 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . . & Urban Dev. , 739 F.3d 424, 432 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Animal . . .

CORBITT, SDC, a v. VICKERS,, 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 739, 122 S. . . .

UNITED STATES v. PAYANO,, 930 F.3d 186 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 734, 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770. . . . Currie , 739 F.3d 960, 965 (7th Cir. 2014). . . . court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the [erroneous statutory maximum]," Currie , 739 . . . 730 F.3d at 601-02 (FSA lowered applicable statutory range from 5-40 years to 0-20 years); Currie , 739 . . .

GN NETCOM, INC. v. PLANTRONICS, INC., 930 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 354 F.3d 739, 750 (8th Cir. 2004). . . . Co. , 354 F.3d 739, 750 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that without relevant evidence related to missing information . . .

TWUM, v. P. BARR,, 930 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Lynch, 793 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2015) (as to timeliness waiver); Guzman-Munoz v. U.S. . . .

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS,, 930 F.3d 44 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Bertine , 479 U.S. 367, 381, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); . . . than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity ." 479 U.S. 367, 374-75, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 . . .

REID v. DONELAN,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), the Government must only prove a defendant's . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLEAU, J., 930 F.3d 35 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Turchen , 187 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[S]adistic and masochistic conduct includes sexual gratification . . .

W. WEINSTEIN, v. C. KRUMPTER, E. P. B. I- IV,, 386 F. Supp. 3d 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Vill. of Patchogue , 739 F. . . .

FOX v. AMAZON. COM, INC., 930 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Storey , 640 F.3d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). . . .

KHAN, v. UNITED STATES, 928 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 739 F.3d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 2014). . . .

GAMERO, v. P. BARR,, 929 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Holder , 739 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CERVANTES,, 929 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gomez-Perez, 452 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 2006). . . .

R. OBERDORF A. v. AMAZON. COM INC. a, 930 F.3d 136 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Gibsonia Truck Corp. , 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736, 739 (1977). . . . Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 320 Pa.Super. 444, 467 A.2d 615, 618 (1983) (retailer); Francioni , 372 A.2d at 739 . . . Gibsonia Truck Corp. , 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736, 739 (1977). . . . Id. at 739. . . . Id. at 739-40. . . . Gibsonia Truck Corp. , 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736, 739 (1977). . . .

DIAZ, Jr. v. BERRYHILL,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 382 (M.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Heckler, 739 F.2d 1334 at 1341 (8th Cir.1984) ; Smith v. . . .

COLBRUNO, v. KESSLER, a, 928 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (" '[S]ubstantive due process' prevents . . .

UNITED STATES v. SORIANO NUNEZ,, 928 F.3d 240 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742-43, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). . . .

CTIA THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA, 928 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Superior Ct. , 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). . . .

PADILLA, v. U. S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (W.D. Wash. 2019)

. . . Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). . . .

IN RE FRANTZ,, 602 B.R. 687 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2019)

. . . as commencing litigation that resulted in a judgment on which the creditor later sought collection. 739 . . .

AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Defense , 847 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2017). . . .

IN RE VALEZ, s s v. EZ a s, 601 B.R. 351 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Pa. 2017), subsequently aff'd , 739 F. App'x 165 (3d Cir. 2018). . . . Pa. 2017), subsequently aff'd , 739 F. App'x 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). . . .

IN RE BRESSLER,, 601 B.R. 318 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . See In re Bressler , 600 B.R. 739 (Bankr. . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. BLAUSER, S., 928 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . EpiCept Corp., 883 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (applying same standard in civil context . . .

CLAIBORNE, v. BLAUSER, S., 934 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . EpiCept Corp. , 883 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (applying same standard in civil context . . .

GEFFNER v. COCA- COLA COMPANY,, 928 F.3d 198 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Time Warner Cable , 714 F.3d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2013). . . .

GREEN, v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 68 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . and a conventional background expectation that the government will enforce the law.' " 825 F.3d at 739 . . . United States Telecom , 825 F.3d at 739. That conventional background expectation exists here. . . .

IN RE DEEPWATER HORIZON LFBP L. L. C. GW L. L. C. L. L. C. J. v. BP BP BP, P. L. C., 928 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . See In re Deepwater Horizon , 739 F.3d 790, 796, 821 (5th Cir. 2014). . . .

J. GRESS L. v. FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION,, 386 F. Supp. 3d 455 (M.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Co. , 739 A.2d 180, 191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLASER,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1306 (D. Kan. 2019)

. . . Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), Judge Melgren found no fundamental liberty . . .

J. BEASON, v. MARSKE,, 926 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Spencer , 739 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2014), Beason argued that neither of his two Wisconsin drug offenses . . . See 739 F.3d at 1028. . . .

UCB, INC. UCB UCB GMBH, LTS AG, v. WATSON LABORATORIES INC. UT,, 927 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . remaining figure showed-a windshield with four holes in the corner post-and colorable imitations thereof." 739 . . .

UNITED STATES v. RAZZ,, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1397 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 539 (11th Cir. 2014) ; Wilchombe v. . . .

HARRIS v. BLUE RIDGE HEALTH SERVICES, INC., 388 F. Supp. 3d 633 (M.D.N.C. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 739, 752 (E.D. Va. 2017). . . .

UNITED STATES v. EMERY,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1023 (D. S.D. 2019)

. . . Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 543 n.5 (10th Cir. 2014) ; Tejada, 524 F.3d at 813. . . . Tejada, 524 F.3d at 813 ; see also Christy, 739 F.3d at 541-42 (explaining that inevitable discovery . . . warrants where warrants are required without punishing harmless mistakes excessively."); see also Christy, 739 . . .

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, v. THE KIMBERLEY RICE KAESTNER FAMILY TRUST, 139 S. Ct. 2213 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Trefry , 253 U.S. 12, 16-17, 40 S.Ct. 417, 64 L.Ed. 739 (1920). . . . Trefry , 253 U.S. 12, 40 S.Ct. 417, 64 L.Ed. 739 (1920), and Guaranty Trust Co. v. . . .

GIGUERE, Zu- v. PORT RESOURCES INC., 927 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) (internal . . .

CARLTON, v. C. O. PEARSON,, 384 F. Supp. 3d 382 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . City of Chicago , No. 10-CV-739, 2013 WL 3388745, at *1 (N.D. Ill. . . .

LAWRENCE, v. STATE, 274 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . State, 576 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) ); see also Ibar v. . . .

MARTINEZ, v. L. RYAN,, 926 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Younger , 739 F.2d 1464, 1466 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[I]f the district court's order is construed as a denial . . .

SILBERMAN, v. MIAMI DADE TRANSIT,, 927 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dist. , 739 F.3d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. . . .

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, v. BETHUNE- HILL,, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (U.S. 2019)

. . . E. 2d 739 (2018) -does not bear the weight the House would place upon it. . . .

MARTINEZ, v. K. MCALEENAN, U. S. DHS US D. U. S. P., 385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ; Foucha , 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct . . .

ENLOW v. E. C. SCOTT WRIGHT, P. A. P. A., 274 So. 3d 1192 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . City of Port Orange, 33 So.3d 739, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ; Lopez-Infante v. Union Cent. Life Ins. . . .