Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...2d at 983. The first step in this statutory scheme requires a claimant to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that someone acted negligently in the claimant's care or treatment and that this negligence caused the claimant's injury. Section 766.104(1) provides that no medical negligence action shall be filed "unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that...

...here has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant." It also provides that "good faith" may be shown if the claimant or his counsel has received a written opinion of an expert "that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence." Section 766.104(2) provides for a ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations "to allow the reasonable investigation required by subsection (1)." Section 766.201(2)(a)1....

...The expert corroborative opinion, on the other hand, is designed to prevent the filing of baseless litigation. As stated by the appellants in their brief: The expert opinion to be supplied is not one which delineates how the defendants were negligent. Section 766.104 refers to a written medical opinion "that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence." Section 766.203(2) provides that the medical expert opinion is for "corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence liti...

...e certified question. However, there appears to be disagreement in the courts with respect to how the computation should be made. Chapter 766 provides two provisions for tolling the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions. The first is section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1991), formerly section 768.495(2), which states: (2) Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief jud...

...ere aware of the stillbirth on April 1, 1988. On February 12, 1990, 47 days prior to the running of the limitations period, the appellants tolled the statute 90 days by filing a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to section 766.104, Florida Statutes....

...ullary thyroid carcinoma. Whether these allegations are supported by the statutorily required expert medical authority will have to be determined as the action progresses. We do note, however, that the plaintiffs have pled good-faith compliance with section 766.104, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...We have also recognized that a duty may arise from: (1) legislative enactments or administrative regulations; (2) judicial interpretations of such enactments or regulations; and (3) other judicial precedent. McCain, 593 So.2d at 503 n. 2 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 (1965)). [4] Section 766.104, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in part: (1) No action shall be filed for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence, whether in tort or contract, unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable...

...The expert corroborative opinion, on the other hand, is designed to prevent the filing of baseless litigation. As stated by the appellants in their brief: The expert opinion to be supplied is not one which delineates how the defendants were negligent. Section 766.104 refers to a written medical opinion "that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence." Section 766.203(2) provides that the medical expert opinion is for "corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence liti...

...pect of a settlement, and which affect the running of the limitations period. First, a claimant must conduct a reasonable investigation to determine if there are grounds for a good faith belief that there was negligence in his care or treatment. See § 766.104(1), Fla....

...eriod of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. [2] Finally, by filing a petition to the clerk of the circuit court, a claimant is entitled to an automatic ninety-day extension to the statute of limitations. See § 766.104(2), Fla....

...n the limited circumstances set out in the statute where less than sixty days remain to file suit at the time the claimant files the notice of intent. See Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177, 183 (Fla.1993). Those circumstances are not present here. *98 SECTION 766.104(2) Finally, in addition to the two scenarios involved in section 766.106(4) discussed above, a claimant can also automatically secure an additional ninety-day extension under section 766.104(2) that will be added to the end of both periods described above. Section 766.104(2) provides: Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee not to exceed $25.00, ... an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted.... Section 766.104(2) specifically provides that this ninety-day period "shall be in addition to other tolling provisions." Again, we agree with the Fourth District that the "extension" provided for under section 766.104(2) is a genuine extension of time to be added to the limitations period, rather than a tolling (suspension) as provided for under section 766.106(4). In fact, we approved this interpretation of section 766.104(2) in Tanner....

...06(4). Therefore, when the limitations period began running again on July 18, it was set to expire on April 6, 1997. [7] *100 However, as noted, the Hankeys had filed a petition with the clerk of the court for an automatic ninety-day extension under section 766.104(2) on November 20, 1996; thus, the Hankeys had until July 5, 1997, to file suit....

...On the other hand, any additional times added under section 766.106(4) if the notice of intent is filed by the claimant with less than sixty days remaining in the original statute of limitations, or under the automatic ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), are actually statutorily granted additions to the initial two years allotted by the statute....

...ere aware of the stillbirth on April 1, 1988. On February 12, 1990, 47 days prior to the running of the limitations period, the appellants tolled the statute 90 days by filing a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to section 766.104, Florida Statutes....

...ain). This calculation reflects the suspension of the limitations period under section 766.106(4) and provides the claimants with the entire two-year period in which to file suit. [8] Two of the three respondents allege that the ninety-day period in section 766.104(2) is only intended to allow further time for the reasonable investigation prescribed in section 766.104(1), and the reasonable investigation must occur before the notice of intent is filed....

...As a result of the doctor's alleged negligence, Boyd received an unexpected scar on his neck. Exactly two years *483 after the operation, on June 2, 1990, Boyd applied for and received an automatic ninety-day extension to the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...We have for review the decision in Parham v. Balis, 704 So.2d 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We accepted jurisdiction to answer the following question certified to be of great public importance: DO THE EXTENSIONS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALLOWED BY SECTIONS 766.104(2) AND 766.106(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), ALSO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF REPOSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 95.11(4)( [b]), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? Id....

...We rephrase the certified question as follows: WHETHER A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION IS "COMMENCED" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN SECTION 95.11(4)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), WHEN THE PLAINTIFF PETITIONS FOR AN AUTOMATIC 90-DAY EXTENSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 766.104(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), IN ORDER TO *947 CONDUCT THE "REASONABLE INVESTIGATION" REQUIRED BY SECTION 766.104(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), OR SERVES A NOTICE OF INTENT TO INITIATE LITIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 766.106(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? For the reasons expressed below, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision on review under the reasoning contained herein. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW In the case below, the Second District considered whether the extensions of the medical malpractice statute of limitations provided for in sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1989), likewise extend the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose residing in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The surgical procedures took place on December 18, 1990, and January 29, 1991. Parham alleged that he discovered the negligence on December 17, 1993, when he was alerted to the hazards of pedicle screws by a television news documentary. On December 16, 1994, Parham filed a petition, pursuant to section 766.104(2), for an automatic 90-day extension of the two-year statute of limitations....

...1989); University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1991); and, Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1992). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' contention that the repose time period was extended or tolled by their petition pursuant to Florida Statutes § 766.104 or their service of a "Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation" as required by Florida Statute § 766.106, cannot be sustained....

...itigation because "[t]he `statute of repose' is subsumed in the general term `statute of limitations' of section 95.11(4)." Parham, 704 So.2d at 625. Using that same rationale, the Second District then concluded that "the 90-day extension allowed by section 766.104(2) extends both the statute of limitation and the statute of repose." Id....

...Judge Fulmer concurred specially in result only. While agreeing with the majority that the trial court was bound by the district precedent in Moore, Judge Fulmer disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the medical malpractice statute of repose was extended by the relevant provisions in section 766.104 and 766.106....

...her reading of this Court's caselaw for the proposition that the time periods of each operate in isolation and independent of the other. Id. LAW AND ANALYSIS Resolution of this case will be determined by the interplay among sections 95.11(4)(b); [1] 766.104(2); [2] and 766.106(2), [3] Florida Statutes (1989), and the application of our prior caselaw construing various provisions of chapter 766....

...discourage costly and time-consuming medical malpractice litigation, to promote the culling of meritless claims, and to encourage settlement of meritorious claims"). In conjunction with section 766.106, the "reasonable investigation" requirement of section 766.104 is another component of the statutory scheme which "obviously attempts to ensure good faith and limit frivolous filings." Nowling v. Walton Regional Hosp., 711 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 719 So.2d 892 (Fla.), and review denied, 719 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1998). Operating with obvious unity of purpose, sections 766.104 and 766.106 are concerned with deterring meritless claims and promoting early and fair settlements of meritorious claims....

...ntract, unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant." § 766.104(1), Fla....

...itations is tolled as to all potential defendants. § 766.106(4), Fla. Stat. (1989). Therefore, under these statutory predicates, commencing an action in the circuit court is inextricably linked to the performance of a reasonable investigation under section 766.104(1) and other provisions of chapter 766, [6] the notification of prospective defendants under the provisions of section 766.106, and the accompanying tolling of the statute of the limitations so the prospective defendants may investigate the basis of the claim against them....

...e of repose per se nor our construction of that statute in isolation. Rather, we are obligated to construe the statute of repose in conjunction with the statutory presuit requirements of chapter *952 766. The present issue arises because subsections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4) provide, respectively, an extension to and tolling of the statute of limitations within the statutory presuit and investigation framework, but are silent as to the statute of repose....

...We therefore hold that solely for the purpose of the statute of repose, an action for medical malpractice is commenced with the service of a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106 or on petition to the clerk of the court filed pursuant to section 766.104(2) and that the tolling provisions of these statutes and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d) applicable to the statute of limitations are equally applicable to the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b)....

...Department of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1087-90 (Fla. 1987) (invalidating portion of statute capping all noneconomic damages as violative of article I, section 21, while upholding remaining portions of act). We are also mindful of our obligation to construe section 95.11(4)(b) and sections 766.104(2) and 106(4) in such a manner to give effect to each statute....

..."). Accordingly, we hold that a medical malpractice action is "commenced" for the purposes of the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b) when the prospective claimant files for the automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations under section 766.104(2) in order to comply with the requirement to conduct a "reasonable investigation" of possible medical malpractice under section 766.106(1), or serves a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106(4)....

...ncident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued. [2] Section 766.104(2) provides: Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief judge, an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations...

...er would do so after the claimant's uninsured motorist claim is finally resolved. But it does not impose the latter as a condition precedent to the former, nor employ language to the effect that no action for subrogation may be filed until then. Cf. § 766.104(1), Fla....

...gful presuit settlement negotiations. None of the cases cited by the parties are on point, but they do give some indication of the legislative intent behind the statutory scheme for presuit investigation and evaluation of medical malpractice claims. Section 766.104(1) provides that no medical negligence action shall be filed "unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that...

...and costs are awardable against the claimant's counsel if the court finds that the attorney did not act in good faith and "that no justiciable issue was presented against a health care provider that fully cooperated in providing informal discovery." Section 766.104(2) provides for a 90-day extension of the statute of limitations "to allow the reasonable investigation required by subsection (1)." Section 766.106(2) requires the claimant, after completing the presuit investigation pursuant to sect...

...expert" as defined in section 766.202(5), Florida Statutes (1991). Following extensive briefing of the issues by the parties and a hearing, the trial court denied the petitioners various motions, citing Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278 (Fla.1996). II Section 766.104(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that "[n]o action shall be filed for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence ......

...766.102 that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence." Section 766.102, Florida Statutes (1991), among other things, sets forth the qualifications of the "health care provider" who may testify as an expert in a medical negligence action, and who, pursuant to section 766.104(1), may provide an opinion supporting the attorney's good faith presuit belief that there has been medical negligence....

...*580 Our task here is made more complex because chapter 766 appears to adopt two different standards for the qualifications of a "medical expert" who may issue an opinion corroborating a claimant's presuit investigation—the standard set forth in section 766.102(2)(c)2, as allowed by section 766.104(1), and that the standard set forth in section 766.202(5)....

...f limitations period so that it would have expired on or about January 5, 1998. See Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93, 97 (Fla.2000) ("[W]e hold the two-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(4)(b) is suspended ("tolled") for ninety days under section 766.104(4)....")....

...his negligence caused the claimant's injury." Kukral, 679 So.2d at 280. This requires both investigation and corroboration of the results of the investigation by "a verified written medical expert opinion." § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2002); see also § 766.104(1), Fla....

...e the claim was not to notify the defendants as to how they were negligent, but to demonstrate that the claim is legitimate. In Davis, the court stated: The expert opinion to be supplied is not one which delineates how the defendants were negligent. Section 766.104 refers to a written medical opinion "that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence." Section 766.203(2) provides that the medical expert opinion is for "corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence liti...

...[4] Chapter 768, Florida Statutes (1987), was divided into parts. Sections 768.40-66 comprised part II of this chapter, which was entitled "Medical Malpractice and Related Matters." These sections have been transferred to Chapter 766, Florida Statutes in the 1988 Supplement. [5] Transferred to section 766.104, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.)....

how the defendants were negligent. Section 766.104 refers to a written medical opinion "that there

...ourts. Patry v. Capps, 633 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1994). This court previously addressed the purpose of the pre-suit notice and expert corroborative opinion: The expert opinion to be supplied is not one which delineates how the defendants were negligent. Section 766.104 refers to a written medical opinion "that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence." Section 766.203(2) provides that the medical expert opinion is for "corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical negligence liti...

...Among other things, the chapter 766 presuit screening procedures for medical negligence require the attorney who is filing the action to make a reasonable investigation to ensure that there are "grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence," and to include a certificate to that effect in the complaint. § 766.104(1), Fla....

...with § 766.203, Florida Statutes. We conclude that the statements in paragraph fourteen of Suarez's complaint, together with the other allegations of the complaint and Dr. Lehrer's written opinion, attached as Exhibit B, adequately comply with the section 766.104(1) requirements that the attorney certify that a reasonable investigation has been made to ensure grounds for a good faith belief that there is evidence of medical negligence....

...Under section 766.106(4), the statute of limitations is tolled for ninety days for the purpose of investigation, and a suit cannot be filed during this period. On October 30, 1995, the appellant filed a petition *953 for an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations, pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...e remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. § 766.106(4)(emphasis added). In this case, the parties miscalculated the remaining amount of days in the statutory period. In addition, under section 766.104(2), a claimant can essentially "buy" a ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations by petition to the circuit court and payment of a fee of $25....

...However, on July 7th, the statute was tolled for 90 days until October 7, 1995. On October 7, 1995, the statute began to run again, and 161 days still remained until the expiration of the statute of limitations period. On October 30, 1995, the appellant "purchased" a ninety-day extension under section 766.104(2)....

...In the instant case, the remaining period of the statute of limitations, as of the service of the notice of termination on November 17, 1995, exceeded the sixty-day period. Therefore, the appellant's filing of the malpractice suit on February 6, 1996, was timely. In fact, even without the extended period provided for in section 766.104(2), the suit was timely filed....

...er would do so after the claimant's uninsured motorist claim is finally resolved. But it does not impose the latter as a condition precedent to the former, nor employ language to the effect that no action for subrogation may be filed until then. Cf. § 766.104(1), Fla....

...[5] This letter is not in the record, but Dr. Hards referred to it in his motion for summary judgment. [6] See Rhoades v. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center, 554 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). [7] Section 768.495, Florida Statutes (1987) was transferred to section 766.104, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...where there is an allegation that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented discovery of the negligent conduct. The issue raised in this appeal is whether the extensions of the statute of limitations allowed by sections 766.104(2) [2] and 766.106(4), [3] Florida Statutes (1989), also extend the statute of repose....

...The surgical procedures took place on December 18, 1990, and January 29, 1991. Parham alleged that he discovered the negligence on December 17,1993, when he was alerted to the hazards of pedicle screws by a television news documentary. On December 16, 1994, Parham filed a petition, pursuant to section 766.104(2), for an automatic 90-day extension of the two-year statute of limitations....

...Broward County, 541 So.2d 92 (Fla.1989); University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000 (Fla.1991); and, Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' contention that the repose time period was extended or tolled by their petition pursuant to Florida Statutes *625 § 766.104 or their service of a "Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation" as required by Florida Statute § 766.106, cannot be sustained....

...[now transferred to 766.106(4)] because "[t]he `statute of repose' is subsumed in the general term `statute of limitations' of section 95.11(4)." Applying the same reasoning that we applied in Moore, we conclude that the 90-day extension allowed by section 766.104(2) extends both the statute of limitation and the statute of repose....

...ent with this opinion. Because our holding in this case will potentially impact many medical malpractice claims, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: DO THE EXTENSIONS OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALLOWED BY SECTIONS 766.104(2) AND 766.106(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), ALSO EXTEND THE STATUTE OFREPOSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 95.11(4)(B), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? THREADGILL, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur....

...is conclusion. Therefore, I would have taken this opportunity to recede from Moore and would have affirmed the trial court's ruling. It is my view that the statute of repose in 95.11(4)(b) is neither extended nor tolled by the provisions of sections 766.104 and 766.106....

...Courts are *626 without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would modify its express terms. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984). Section 95.11(4)(b) was originally enacted as part of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975. See Ch. 75-9, Laws of Fla. The provisions contained in sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4) were originally enacted as part of the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985. See Ch. 85-175, Laws of Fla. Therefore, at the time the legislature drafted the language in sections 766.104 and 766.106, respectively granting "an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations" and providing that "the statute of limitations is tolled" during the 90-day period following service of the notice of intent, section 95.11 had b...

...ncident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued. [2] Section 766.104(2) provides: Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief judge, an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations...

...As noted, the statute of limitations commenced running when the appellants were aware of the stillbirth on April 1, 1988. On February 12, 1990, 47 days prior to the running of the limitations period, the appellants tolled the statute 90 days by filing a notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation pursuant to section 766.104, Florida Statutes....

...She said that she understood her condition to be serious because of her previous heart attack, and that prior to her second heart attack her condition was deteriorating, and the tightness in her chest was worsening. Mrs. Rodriguez filed a petition to extend the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (2001), on January 17, 2001....

...Prior to issuing a notice of intent to initiate a medical malpractice lawsuit, the claimant must conduct an investigation to ascertain there are reasonable grounds to believe that any named defendant in the litigation was negligent and that such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. §§ 766.104(1), 766.203(2)....

...claim so long as compliance is accomplished within the statute of limitations period. Kukral. The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is two years. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. However, chapter 766 provides numerous extensions. See § 766.104(2); § 766.106(3)(a); § 766.106(4)....

...Hoeler of Burton, Schulte, Weekley, Hoeler, Robbins & Beytin, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Petitioners. No Appearance, for Respondent. QUINCE, J. We have for review a decision on the following question certified by the Second District Court of Appeal as one of great public importance: IS A 90-DAY EXTENSION PURCHASED UNDER SECTION 766.104(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1995), INCLUDED IN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD WHEN CALCULATING WHETHER A PLAINTIFF IS *863 ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL 60 DAYS UNDER SECTION 766.106(4) FOR FILING SUIT? See Coffaro v....

...by the statute of limitations because she was entitled to the benefit of both the sixty-day tolling period provided for in section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1995), and the ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations purchased pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1995). [1] In addition, the district court certified the question stated above. We approve the decision of the district court and hold that the ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations purchased under section 766.104(2) is not added to what remains of the original statute of limitations but is added after the sixty-day extension period under section 766.106(4)....

...pect of a settlement, and which affect the running of the limitations period. First, a claimant must conduct a reasonable investigation to determine if there are grounds for a good faith belief that there was negligence in his care or treatment. See § 766.104(1), Fla....

...od of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit [n. 2]. Finally, by filing a petition to the clerk of the circuit court, a claimant is entitled to an automatic ninety-day extension to the statute of limitations. See § 766.104(2), Fla....

...2d DCA 1989), wherein the court held that the sixty days or the remainder of the statute of limitations applies to the ninety-day tolling provision, even when no extension has been agreed to. We approved this interpretation in Tanner. Hankey, 755 So.2d at 95. [2] The instant case involves the interplay between section 766.104(2) and section 766.106(4). As the Second District noted, these provisions of the medical malpractice statute must be liberally construed in favor of access to courts. See Coffaro, 752 So.2d at 714; see also Patry v. Capps, 633 So.2d 9 (Fla.1994). Section 766.104(2) provides: Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief judge, an automatic 90 day extension of the statute of limitations...

...shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit. (Emphasis added.) The certified question can only be answered by determining when the ninety-day extension pursuant to 766.104(2) (purchased extension) goes into effect and under what circumstances a plaintiff is entitled to the sixty-day period provided for in section 766.106(4)....

...atute of limitations period. Under this interpretation, she would only have thirty days left of the original limitations period and would be entitled to both the sixty-day period under section 766.106(4), and the ninety-day purchased extension under section 766.104(2). We agree with Coffaro. Although not directly at issue in that case, we discussed section 766.104(2) and the ramifications of the purchased extension in Hankey and said: Section 766.104(2) specifically provides that this ninety-day period "shall be in addition to other tolling provisions." Again, we agree with the Fourth District that the "extension" provided for under section 766.104(2) is a genuine extension of time to be added to the limitations period, rather than a tolling (suspension) as provided for under section 766.106(4). In fact, we approved this interpretation of section 766.104(2) in Tanner....

...("This automatic extension is separate and additional to any other tolling period.") ( citing Novitsky v. Hards, 589 So.2d 404 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)); Rothschild, 707 So.2d at 953; Kalbach v. Day, 589 So.2d 448, 449-50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). 755 So.2d at 98 (emphasis added). This interpretation of section 766.104(2) is in keeping with the purpose of the medical malpractice statute and the principle that its provisions should be liberally construed to allow the parties access to courts. Thus, we hold the ninety-day extension purchased pursuant to 766.104(2) is to be tacked on to the end of the statute of limitations period and we answer the certified question in the negative. With this interpretation of section 766.104(2), it follows that all other applicable provisions of the medical malpractice statute which toll or extend the statute of limitations period under the particular circumstances must be taken into consideration *866 before applying the ninety-day purchased extension. In this case, at the time that the negotiations were terminated the plaintiff had one month left on the original two-year statute of limitations period. Because only one month remained and because the ninety-day purchased period from section 766.104(2) is not added to the month, she was entitled to the benefit of the sixty-day period of section 766.106(4)....

...This fact is significant for future calculations pursuant to section 766.106(4). Finally, on August 11, 1997, while the statute of limitations was tolled for ninety days, Coffaro purchased a ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2)....

...WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, Senior Justice, concurs. PARIENTE, J., concurring. I write to explain why I concur in the majority opinion. This case involves the interplay of the various tolling and extension periods of the medical malpractice statute of limitations, in particular, sections 766.104 and 766.106. Although I agree with the dissent that these provisions are separate statutory provisions, I also cannot ignore the language of section 766.104(2), which states that the extension "shall be in addition to other tolling periods." In attempting to decipher what the Legislature intended, I wholeheartedly agree with the Second District that the interplay of the provisions is "complex and confusing." Coffaro v....

...March 18, 1998, for the various defendants. Obviously the plaintiff calculated the time left according to the interpretation *868 given by the majority and the Second District. The interpretation given by the majority that the purchased extension of section 766.104(2) is added on the end of the periods of time calculated by sections 766.106(3)(a) and (4) is both reasonable and consistent with the statutory language and also entirely consistent with what we stated in Hankey v....

...In Hankey we explained that the determination of whether the plaintiff is entitled to an additional sixty days under section 766.106(4) is determined "at the time the claimant filed the notice of intent to initiate litigation." Id. at 97. Further, in discussing section 766.104(2), we stated that the plaintiff can "also automatically secure an additional ninety-day extension under section 766.104(2) that will be added to the end of both periods described " in sections 766.106(3) and (4). See id. at 98. The Second District interpreted the interplay consistently with this reasoning: Because a plaintiff can apply for this purchased extension [of section 766.104(2)] at any time before the statute of limitations has expired, and because the extension is in addition to other tolling periods, we conclude that the purchased extension under section 766.104(2) is not included when computing the time remaining under section 766.106(4) for filing suit....

...provisions and bring a modicum of certainty to these calculations on which everyone can safely rely. ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. WELLS, J., dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority because I do not believe that the majority properly applies sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1995). Moreover, I believe the majority's decision leads to an inconsistent application of the statutes, depending on when the purchase of the extension to the statute of limitations authorized by section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1995), is made....

...of Appeal's decision in Rothschild v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 707 So.2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), authored by Judge Warner. The essence of what the district court recognized in Rothschild is that the extension of the statute of limitations authorized by section 766.104(2) and the tolling period of section 766.106(4) need to be understood to be separate statutory provisions: In addition, under section 766.104(2), a claimant can essentially "buy" a ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations by petition to the circuit court and payment of a fee of $25....

...This construction is in accord with this Court's analysis in Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93, 97 (Fla.2000), in which we cited Rothschild with approval. The normal statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims is two years. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). Accepting that the section 766.104(2) purchased extension of the two-year statute of limitations is added to the end of the normal limitations period, see Hankey, 755 So.2d at 98 (approving Rothschild ), it must follow that, if the extension is purchased, the statute of limitations becomes two years plus ninety days....

...This is simply and plainly what the statute says: Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief judge, an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted .... § 766.104(2) (emphasis added)....

...[8] To do this calculation: 1. Determine the date the statute of limitations expires without regard to tolling provisions: A. Two years from accrual of the cause of action. See § 95.11(4)(b). *870 B. Add ninety days if an extension is purchased. See § 766.104(2)....

...to file suit (which is the date calculated in step 3). What must be understood under this statutory scheme is that the statute of limitations is a fixed date and is extended automatically and immediately upon the payment to the clerk of the $25. See § 766.104(2), Fla....

...The straightforward computation according to the steps is: Step 1. The cause of action accrued on September 2, 1995, and therefore the statute of limitations was set to run on September 2, 1997. Prior to expiration of the statute of limitations, Coffaro purchased a ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104(2)....

...more than sixty days prior to the expiration of the original two-year statute of limitations. Assume that Coffaro purchased the extension on June 11, 1997, and not on August 11, 1997. Then, once again, upon the purchase of the extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), the statute of limitations would automatically and at that time be extended ninety days and would *872 expire on December 1, 1997....

...We know that the claimant would have had until March 1, 1998, before the statute of limitations period expired, which is more than sixty days from the date the tolling period ended. Thus, we know that the sixty-day alternative grace period has no bearing on this hypothetical situation. I conclude that the plain language of section 766.104(2) means that on the date of purchase of the ninety-day extension, the statute of limitations automatically is increased by ninety days, and the date when the claimant makes that purchase has no bearing on this as long as the statute of limitations has not expired....

...[4] The computation for each health care provider is as follows: November 5(SJH) plus 150 days = April 4, 1998; November 7 (Pidala, Tulsiak, and EMA) plus 150 days = April 6, 1998; November 14(MHC) plus 150 days = April 13, 1998; and November 26 (HCHA) plus 150 days = April 25, 1998. [5] Sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Florida Statutes, were enacted as part of the same bill in 1985....

...Further, another section of the Staff Analysis discussing the provision which would ultimately become section 766.106 states: "The purpose of this section is to encourage prompt settlement of meritorious claims." However, there is no Staff Analysis discussion concerning the provision of the bill that ultimately became section 766.104(2)....

...2. [8] I believe part of the confusion in the application of these two statutes is that both statutes refer to ninety days. But these are entirely different ninety-day periods: the first being an extension of the statute of limitations period, see § 766.104(2); and the second being a tolling of the statute of limitations period....

...was "normal," and that "the dents that existed" on her face "would go away." According to Cohen, not until September 1998 did she realize that Cooper had "somehow erred in the procedure on [her] face." Cohen filed a ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104, Florida Statutes, on October 27, 1999....

...Frei, the appellee in this case, Kalbach served notice of intent to pursue litigation on December 2, 1988. On the same day on which notice to Dr. Frei was filed, Kalbach filed for a 90-day extension of the statutory limitations period as provided for in section 766.104(2)....

...Section 766.106(4) further provides: The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in section 95.11. However, during the 90-day period, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants. In addition, section 766.104(2) provides for an additional 90-day extension of the limitations period if requested by the claimant: Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25, e...

...The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. Appellant claims that she was entitled to two (2) consecutive tolling periods of 90 days each under the provisions of sections 766.104(2) and 766.106(4) for a total of 180 days in which to file suit against Dr....

...was filed against Dr. Frei. This issue was not raised in the trial court but we consider it here for reasons of judicial economy. Implicitly, this court has maintained that the two 90-day periods, of toll and extension, under sections 766.106(4) and 766.104(2), do not run simultaneously....

...Other courts have expressly held that the two periods run consecutively. DeYoung v. Bierfield, 581 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Angrand v. Fox, D.O., 552 So.2d 1113, n. 7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), rev. denied 563 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1990). More importantly, section 766.104(2) specifically states that the 90-day extension is "in addition to other tolling periods." In our view, the plain meaning of this provision contemplates that the extension begins after the "other" tolling period of 90 days mandated by section 766.106....

...confidentiality of their medical files. Before a medical malpractice lawsuit can be filed, the plaintiff's attorney must make a "reasonable investigation ... to determine ... that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant." § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). This belief can be based upon a written opinion of an expert who is a "similar health care provider" as the defendant/health care provider. §§ 766.104(1), 766.102(2), Fla....

...Southern argued this would not be correct because the limitation period had already run, as was evident from the face of the complaint. Reciting many of the above facts, petitioner contended that inasmuch as the Corbins had obtained an automatic ninety-day extension of the limitation period under then section 768.495, now section 766.104, the limitation period had run October 23, 1990....

...the claimant. " § 766.203(2)(a),(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). A claimant under the Act is defined as "any person who has a cause of action arising from medical negligence." § 766.202(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). The Act further provides in section 766.104(1), Florida Statutes, that: No action shall be filed for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence, whether in tort or contract, unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as pe...

...tended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred. [2] Transferred to section 766.104, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.)....

...ho files a notice of intent soon after the malpractice is discovered. Tanner, 618 So.2d at 184. Pergrem actually filed suit against Horan in this case on November 2, 1994, past the running of the statute of limitations but for *1152 the operation of section 766.104(2). Pergrem filed a petition for an automatic extension of the statute of limitations, pursuant to that section, on May 20, 1994. Section 766.104(2) provides: Upon petition to the clerk of court where the suit will be filed, and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25.00,......

...tional ninety days to file suit: October 7, 1994 plus 90 days = January 1995. Since her complaint was filed November 2, 1994, her lawsuit against Horan was timely. REVERSED. HARRIS and ANTOON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 95.11, Fla.Stat. (1991). [2] §§ 766.104(2) and 766.106(4), Fla.Stat....

...4 Park Place moved to dismiss Pierrot’s wrongful death claim, arguing that the claim was one for medical malpractice and that Pierrot had failed to comply with the presuit requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act. These requirements include investigation by the parties and notice to the prospective defendant. See §§ 766.104, .106, .203, Fla....

...Because the Act contains several definitions of health care provider, the definition that applies depends on which section of the Act is at issue. See Sova Drugs, Inc. v. Barnes, 661 So.2d 393, 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The presuit requirements are set forth in sections 766.104, .106, and .203. Sections 766.104 and .106 do not contain a definition of health care provider....

...(2008). . See § 394.459. .Chapter 766. . Although the Supreme Court limited its holding to claims under section 400.022, id. at 980 n. 9, we conclude that the same rule applies to claims under other statutory standards of care. . Subsection (3) of section 766.104 references section 456.00 l’s definition of "health care practitioner.” However, subsection (3) references that definition not for the purpose of defining the types of defendants to which the plaintiff's presuit requirements apply...

...Ginsberg, P.A., and Ratiner & Glinn, P.A. and Todd R. Schwartz, Miami, for appellant. Robert A. Kanziger, Miami, for appellee. Before JORGENSON, GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ. GREEN, Judge. This is an appeal from an award of attorney's fees pursuant to sections 766.104(1) and 766.206(2), Florida Statutes (1993) of the "Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act" after Larkin Hospital Operating Co....

...no strict liability claim against the physician who performed the implant surgery. The appellants in this case never challenged the entry of summary judgment on appeal. Thereafter, L.H.O.C. moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to sections 766.104(1) and 766.206(2). An award of attorney's fees is permitted under section 766.104(1) where the court determines that counsel's certificate attesting to a reasonable basis for the medical malpractice allegations was made in bad faith....

...Mental Health Servs., 544 So.2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). We believe that this action can no more be characterized as a *903 medical negligence action than if appellants had alleged that the hospital had sold them an unreasonably defective wheelchair. Thus, neither section 766.104(1) or section 766.206(2) provides a basis for an attorney's fee award in this case....

...and consortium of his wife, the Plaintiff, SUSAN KURZWEIL, and has become obligated for the necessary medical expenses for the treatment of his wife's medical care and treatment, and will be obligated to incur such expenses in the future. * * * [2] Section 766.104(1) reads: No action shall be filed for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence, whether in tort or in contract, unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the...

...ve induced labor much earlier. Almost nine months later, on December 31, 2003, Mrs. Thomas was appointed to serve as Tammy's plenary guardian. Thereafter, no record activity occurred until March 2, 2005, when Mrs. Thomas filed a petition pursuant to section 766.104, Florida Statutes (2003), for an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations and repose as to all the health care providers who had rendered treatment to Tammy....

...Before filing any claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising from medical malpractice, Florida law requires the claimant to conduct an investigation of the claim and send *1303 the defendant notice of intent to sue, along with a corroborating opinion by a medical expert. Fla. Stat. § 766.104 ....

...ause of the loss for which Virginia Insurance had compensated the Aumons. Because the contribution claim was based on a claim of medical malpractice, Virginia Insurance complied with the medical malpractice presuit screening requirements of sections 766.104 [1] and 766.203, [2] Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ontract, unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. § 766.104(1), Fla....

...d to be applied preliminary to a determination of liability. Where there has been a determination of liability on the professional negligence claim, an action for contribution is not properly deemed to be within the statutory definitions of sections 766.104 and 766.106." Id....

...ts in chapter 766. Accordingly, we approve the decision in Virginia Insurance Reciprocal and disapprove the decision in Wendel. It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., and SHAW and HARDING, Senior Justices, concur. NOTES [1] Section 766.104(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that no medical negligence action can be filed unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation to determine a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant....

...Prior to Samantha’s eighth birthday, on April 30, 2013, the Garcias petitioned to extend by ninety days the statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice action against the hospitals, clinics, and doctors involved in Samantha’s birth. See § 766.104(2), Fla....

...nt for the North Broward Hospital District. FARMER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The notice of intent was timely filed because on August 27, 2003, the plaintiffs secured an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to § 766.104(2), Fla....

...Essex further argued that the three presuit affidavits submitted gave her counsel sufficient grounds for a good faith belief that Dr. Karr had negligently provided orthopaedic surgical care, thus complying with counsel's statutory presuit duty to reasonably investigate the claim. See § 766.104(1), Fla....

...As a result of her injuries, the Masons employed an attorney to sue Dr. Bisogno and others. This appeal only concerns Dr. Bisogno. The Masons' attorney sent a notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice to Dr. Bisogno on 13 November 1990, pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...s under section 95.11(3)(a). While shortening the limitations period for medical malpractice claims, the legislature enacted provisions that toll or extend the limitations period. This case involves the interplay of three such provisions in sections 766.104 and 766.106, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...[1] We note that these provisions are complex and confusing. We are guided in this case by the supreme court's instruction *714 that the provisions of the medical malpractice statutes "should be construed in a manner that favors access to courts." Patry v. Capps, 633 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1994). Section 766.104(2) allows a 90-day extension of the limitations period upon application to the clerk of court....

...The dispositive issue involves the application of a purchased extension. It is undisputed that the two-year statute of limitations began to run on September 2, 1995. Coffaro purchased an extension of the limitations period by filing a petition with the clerk. Pursuant to section 766.104(2), "[t]his period shall be in addition to other tolling periods." Both the Fourth and Fifth Districts have held that "[t]his ninety-day period ......

...more than 60 days remaining when she received the notices of termination. If the 60 days provided in section 766.106(4) is a tolling period, there is no question that Coffaro is entitled to the 60 days in addition to the purchased extension because section 766.104(2) provides that the purchased 90-day extension is in addition to other tolling periods. If not a tolling period, we conclude that section 766.104(2) would allow the purchased extension to be obtained during the 60-day period, again giving Coffaro the advantage of the 60 days and the purchased extension if she had waited until after she received the notices of termination to purchase the extension. Section 766.104(2) does not limit the time at which a plaintiff may *715 purchase this extension, other than providing that it "shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run." Because a plaintiff can apply for this purchased extension at any time before the statute of limitations has expired, and because the extension is in addition to other tolling periods, we conclude that the purchased extension under section 766.104(2) is not included when computing the time remaining under section 766.106(4) for filing suit....

...ve attempted to clarify the calculation of time in which suit must be filed. Recognizing the importance of this issue for these parties and others, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: IS A 90-DAY EXTENSION PURCHASED UNDER SECTION 766.104(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1995), INCLUDED IN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD WHEN CALCULATING WHETHER A PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL 60 DAYS UNDER SECTION 766.106(4) FOR FILING SUIT? Reversed and remanded for further proceedings; question certified. FULMER and WHATLEY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 766.104, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in part: (2) Upon petition to the clerk of court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief judge, an automatic 90-day extensio...

the 90-day automatic extension permitted by section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes, Trisha Fuerst was nowhere

...They argued, among other things, that the respondents' failure to timely initiate the claim *57 within the applicable two-year statute of limitations period required dismissal of the Amended Complaint. Petitioners argued that, even if you were to assume that they had sought the 90-day automatic extension permitted by section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes, Trisha Fuerst was nowhere close to timely initiating pre-suit in November of 2007....

...The settlement was paid by Physicians Protective Trust Fund ("PPTF") on behalf of itself, appellant, North Broward Radiologists, Hauser, Coastal, and North Broward Hospital. On May 31, 1994, appellant petitioned for an automatic ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1993), to allow reasonable investigation of a medical malpractice claim against Hauser, Coastal, and North Broward Hospital....

...has within 1 year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced his action for contribution. Here, the agreement settling the case was signed on June 11, 1993. On May 31, 1994, appellant filed a petition for a ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes, but he did not file his complaint *380 until December 2, 1994....

...Mere inaction for a period of less than 1 year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for failure to prosecute. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(e). [3] In filing the lawsuit, the lawyer complied with the presuit requirements of chapter 766 by filing the following certificate of good faith: Pursuant to § 766.104(1), Florida Statutes, the undersigned attorney for the plaintiffs hereby certifies that she has made a reasonable investigation of this claim as permitted by the circumstances and that such investigation has given rise to a good faith beli...

...The statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action runs for two years from the time the injury is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). Two statutory extensions to this two-year period are discussed below. II. Section 766.104(2) On December 7, 1998, the Porumbescus filed a petition for an automatic extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2), which provides: Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief judge, an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to allow the reasonable investigation required by subsection (1). This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods. § 766.104(2), Fla....

...mitations. IV. Conclusion We hold that the trial court erred by not providing the Porumbescus with the 90-day tolling period following their notice of intent under section 766.106(4) in addition to the automatic 90-day extension petitioned for under section 766.104(2)....

...Therefore, we hold that the Porumbescus' *1278 suit is not barred by the statute of limitations. REVERSED and REMANDED. BROWNING, C.J., PADOVANO, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Dr. Thompson argues on appeal that the Porumbescus should not be credited with the automatic ninety-day extension under section 766.104(2) in part because their petition did not name Dr. Thompson or Urology Associates of North Central Florida as a potential defendant. We agree with the Fourth District's analysis in Kagan v. Pollock, 638 So.2d 151, 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), where after carefully considering the language in section 766.104(2), the court held that "[t]here is no requirement in this statutory section that a defendant must be specifically named in the petition; and we will not read such a requirement, limiting the resolution of claims on the merits, into the statute." Id....

repose. If an extension has been granted under section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes, or by agreement of the

...On September 23, 1996, the plaintiff petitioned the Clerk of *294 Circuit Court for the additional ninety-day extension. As noted by the court in Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93 (Fla.2000), the ninety-day period is tacked onto the end of the statute of limitations. With the ninety-day extension authorized by Florida Statute section 766.104(2), the statute of limitations, in the absence of the other tolling provisions, would have run on February 18, 1997....

...to serve her notices of intent to initiate litigation on Dr. Perez Ortiz and Perez Eye Center. See § 95.11(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015); see also § 766.106(4). Prior to that time, Ms. Martinez obtained an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2), giving Ms....

...Appellant argues that the 180-day period after filing with the commission operates to *1152 toll the four year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3), so that he timely commenced this action. The above statute has a logical counterpart in sections 766.104 and 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989). Section 766.104(2) expressly authorizes an extension of the statute of limitations to allow reasonable investigation of an incipient medical malpractice claim by a simple filing with the clerk....

...medical negligence" or "claim for medical malpractice" as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." In addition, the medical negligence or malpractice must have resulted in personal injury or death to the claimant. § 766.104(1) ("No action shall be filed for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence ....

95.11(4)(b); Fla. Stat. § 766.106; Fla. Stat. § 766.104(2). Comment on 3.8g This instruction is intended

...Cohen’s affidavit was served outside the two-year statute of limitations, which expired by Petitioners’ reckoning no later than June 17, 2019 (as tolled ninety days pursuant to section 766.106(4) and extended an additional ninety days by Ms. Machalek pursuant to section 766.104(2))....

...states that the presuit requirements have a jurisdictional purpose. 48 Fla. L. Weekly S150 at *7. If a non-compliant case is filed pursuant to the MMA, the Carmody court observed that “no action shall be filed” and “the court shall dismiss the claim.” Id. (quoting §§ 766.104(1), .206(2), Fla....

...We further adopt form 1.977, which is patterned after Florida Small Claims Form 7.343. Rule 1.650(d)(3) is amended to implement the Court’s holding in Musculoskele-tal Institute Chartered v. Parham, 745 So.2d 946 (Fla.1999), that the tolling provisions of section 766.104(2) and section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes (1989), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(a), applicable to the statute of limitations, are equally applicable to the statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

year statutory limitation period, pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes. On June 19, 1997, the

...The date inserted in the instruction will ordinarily be two years before the date on which either the notice of intent was served or the petition to extend the statute of limitations was filed. Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (4)(b); Fla. Stat. § 766.106 ; Fla. Stat. § 766.104 (2)....

...No medical negligence action shall be filed "unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant." § 766.104(1) (emphasis added)....

...Petitioners now petition this Court for a writ of certiorari. Chapter 766, Florida’s Medical Malpractice Act, sets out the procedure each claimant must comply with prior to filing a medical malpractice action, including presuit notice and screening. See § 766.104, 766.106, 766.201- .212, Fla....

...3d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). One of the requirements is that plaintiff must conduct a reasonable investigation “to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.” § 766.104(1), Fla....

statute of limitations. We conclude that the section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes, extension to the limitations

...the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence”). Before filing a medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff must conduct a reasonable investigation to determine whether there are grounds for suit. See § 766.104(1), Fla....

..... and payment to the clerk of a filing fee ... an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to allow the reasonable investigation required by subsection (1). This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods. § 766.104(2), Fla....

...at 865 . The court ruled: [A]t the time that the negotiations were terminated the plaintiff had one month left on the original two-year statute of limitations period. Because only one month remained and because the ninety-day purchased period from section 766.104(2) is not added to the month, she was entitled to the benefit of the sixty-day period of section 766.106(4)....

...ling period ended) because, in her case, it was already clear that the “remainder of the period of the statute of limitations” was only one month, so that 60 days constituted the “greater” period. § 766.106(4), Fla. Stat. (2006). Given that section 766.104(2) authorized a 90-day extension, our supreme court concluded, the payment Ms....

...mber 13, 2001. On appeal, we rejected the defendant’s argument that a purchased extension cannot extend the original two-year limitations period for purposes of filing a notice of intent to initiate litigation as "contrary to the plain language of section 766.104(2) and the supreme court’s holding in [Hillsbor- *45 ough County Hospital Authority v.] Coffaro [, 829 So.2d 862 (Fla.2002)].” Id....

...The court also opined that "any additional times added under section 766.106(4) if the notice of intent is filed by the claimant with less than sixty days remaining in the original statute of limitations, or under the automatic ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), are actually statutorily granted additions to the initial two years allotted by the statute.” Id....

...Here, the trial court found that the notice was sufficient given the limited information available,3 and concluded that Jones complied with the pre-suit notice 2 Chapter 766 contains several prerequisites to filing a medical malpractice action. See, e.g., § 766.104(1), Fla....

circuit court for an extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (2000); again when a notice

...limitations that had lapsed prior to filing the action. Similar to the trial court’s holding in Mobley, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Baptist finding that the statute of limitations began to run in 2008 when Garcia filed the petition for extension pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (2008), and not from the 2012 doctor’s visit....

...e of limitations begins to run in a medical malpractice case; that is, when the plaintiff possesses knowledge of a reasonable possibility of medical malpractice. Id. The same stands true in the present case within the context of a section 766.104(2) petition....

...3d DCA 2010) (quoting Corbo v. Garcia, 949 So.2d 366, 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). LEGAL ANALYSIS The Legislature has set forth procedures with which each claimant must comply prior to filing medical malpractice suits. See, e.g., §§ 766.104, 766.106, 766.201–.212, Fla. Stat. Among these requirements is that the claimant must perform a reasonable investigation “to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.” Id. at § 766.104(1)....

...Frances and Murray Kagan appeal the lower court’s order granting a final summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action had expired. We reverse, as the Kagans were granted an extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...al malpractice to various potential defendants. A notice of intent was not mailed to the appellee, Dr. Irvin Besman, at this time. On May 3,1991, the Kagans filed and were granted a ninety (90) day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...cation of the statute of limitations would result in the, determination that it expired as to the defendant no later than February 20, 1992. However, since the Kagans were granted a ninety (90) day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 766.104(2), it did not expire until May 20, 1992, which effectively vitiates Dr....

...On May 19, 2010, before the temporary guardianship expired, Chad was determined to be incompetent, and appellant was appointed Chad’s plenary guardian of his person and property. 2  On July 19, 2012, after having received the ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations under section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes, appellant served notices of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice on appellees....

...On May 19, 2010, before the temporary guardianship expired, Chad was determined to be incompetent, and appellant was appointed Chad’s plenary guardian of his person and property. On July 19, 2012, after having received the ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations under section 766.104(2), Flori *188 da Statutes, appellant served notices of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice on appellees....

...The hospital paid the entire judgment and then filed a claim for contribution against Abaunza and his professional association pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989). Insofar as pertinent here, Abaunza moved to dismiss for Baptist’s failure to comply with section 766.104, Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action with leave to refile after the expiration of ninety days. It appears that the trial court invoked section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1989), as well as section 766.104....

...See Walt Disney World Co. v. Memorial Hospital, 363 So.2d 598 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Where there has been a determination of liability on the professional negligence claim, an action for contribution is not properly deemed to be within the statutory definition of sections 766.104 and 766.106....

...requirements have served a jurisdictional purpose, for “no action shall be filed . . . unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation . . . to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence . . . .” § 766.104(1), Fla....

...ember 30, 2001. Realizing that she would be unable to complete the required pre-suit investigation within the two-year limitations period, on September 12, 2001, respondent filed a petition for an extension of the statute of limitations, pursuant to section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes....

...This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods. No court order is required for the extension to be effective. The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run. § 766.104(2), Fla....

...Under the statute, once the extension is purchased, the statute of limitations becomes two years plus ninety days. See Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So.2d 93 (Fla.2000); Burbank v. Kero, 813 So.2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Rothschild v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 707 So.2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). With the extension purchased pursuant to section 766.104(2), the statute of limitations would have run December 29, 2001....

...tal Authority v. Coffaro, 829 So.2d 862 (Fla.2002), the purchased extension does not extend the original two-year limitations period for purposes of filing a notice of intent to initiate litigation. This argument is contrary to the plain language of section 766.104(2) and the supreme court’s holding in Coffa-ro. Under the plain language of the statute, the ninety-day extension applies to the end of the two-year limitation period. See § 766.104(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) (“This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods.”). The statute’s only restriction is that the extension be purchased within the original limitations period. See id. Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes, a timely purchased extension adds ninety days to the end of the two-year limitations period, including any other tolling periods. The holding in Coffaro does not alter this result. Coffaro deals with the interplay between section 766.104(2) and section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes, in determining when a medical malpractice *636 complaint must be filed after a notice of intent is served....

...hased extension. Here, the ninety-day purchased extension should be added to the two-year limitations period. See Burbank, 813 So.2d at 294 . Supportive of respondent’s position, Cojfaro holds that “the ninety-day extension purchased pursuant to 766.104(2) is to be tacked on to the end of the statute of limitations period.” Cojfaro, 829 So.2d at 865 ....

...(2016) (“An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence . . . .”); § 766.104(2), Fla....

Julie, M.D., supporting her allegations. See id. § 766.104(1). Dr. Julie is board certified in internal

...ery *458 process. As the Youngs investigated the circumstances of Mrs. Young’s hospitalization and treatment, their attorney filed for an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations in medical negligence actions as provided for by section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...4 The trial court denied the motions of NCH and Naples Radiologists but granted the joint motion of Nighthawk and Dr. Gren-nan. In its order, the trial court determined that the Youngs were required to file their notice of intent by May 8, 2008, that the attempt to obtain a ninety-day extension pursuant to section 766.104(2) was ineffective, and that the Youngs’ June 17, 2008, notice to Nighthawk and Dr....

...The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Nighthawk and Dr. Grennan but denied the motions for summary judgment filed by Naples Community Hospital and Naples Radiologists. That litigation remained pending at the time this appeal was initiated. . Section 766.104(2) provides in pertinent part as follows: "Upon petition to the clerk of court where the suit will be filed and payment to the clerk of a filing fee, not to exceed $37.50, an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations sh...

...tion "unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.” § 766.104(1), Fla....

...Essex further argued that the three presuit affidavits submitted gave her counsel sufficient grounds for a good faith belief that Dr. Karr had negligently provided orthopaedic surgical care, thus complying with counsel's statutory presuit duty to reasonably investigate the claim. See § 766.104(1), Fla....

repose. If an extension has been granted under section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes, or by agreement of the

...laimant.” § 766.203(2)(a),(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). A claimant under the Act is defined as “any person who has a cause of action arising from medical negligence.” § 766.202(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). The Act further provides in section 766.104(1), Florida Statutes, that: No action shall be filed for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence, whether in tort or contract, unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as pe...

...ts to frame this issue as procedural. It asserts that Falcon failed to comply with presuit requirements. Specifically, it claimed no “reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against” it. § 766.104(1), Fla....

....Chapter 768, Florida Statutes (1987), was divided into parts. Sections 768.40-66 comprised part II of this chapter, which was entitled "Medical Malpractice and Related Matters.” These sections have been transferred to Chapter 766, Florida Statutes in the 1988 Supplement. . Transferred to section 766.104, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.)....

...days until October 7, 1995. On October 7, 1995, the statute began to run again, and 161 days still remained until the expiration of the statute of limitations period. On October 30, 1995, the appellant “purchased” a ninety- day extension under section 766.104(2)....

...Following the surgery, she became aware that her injury might have been the result of medical malpractice.2 On August 10, 2009, less than two weeks prior to the running of the two-year statute of limitations, she obtained an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to subsection 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...efendant.” The use of the differing terms gives rise to the question of whether the terms are interchangeable or whether the Legislature intended them to have different meanings. After extensive review of the Florida Statutes and the history of Section 766.104 we are unable to conclude that the Florida Legislature intended the different terms to carry different meanings in the context of Chapter 766. Consequently, we hold that subsection 766.106(4) means what it says and that the statute of limitations on Salazar’s claims as to any defendant was tolled for a period of ninety days from October 22, 2009 and that Salazar’s notices to Appellees were timely as they were sent within the statute of limitations as properly calculated under all of the terms of Section 766.104 and Hankey, 755 So. 2d at, 99-100 n.7 (Fla....

...4th DCA 1995) involve attempted multiple notices to the same medical practitioner and thus do not apply to the facts here. 12 statute of limitations for Burbank’s claim would have expired on November 19, 1996 but under Hankey, the ninety-day extension of subsection 766.104(2) “is tacked onto the end of the statute of limitations” and that “in the absence of any other tolling, Burbank’s statute of limitations would have expired on February 18, 1997.” On January 12, 1997, notices of intent to sue were sent to Dr....

...The subsequent medical malpractice suit was based on a scar resulting from the operation. On June 4, 1990, the two year statutory limitation for medical malpractice action expired. However, on that date, Boyd timely requested and received a ninety day extension of the limitation period per section 766.104(2), Florida Statutes (1989). 1 On August 30, 1990, Boyd mailed a notice of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.104, which was apparently received by the doctor on September 3, 1990....

...HERSEY, J., and ALDERMAN, JAMES E., Senior Justice, concur. . The request for extension would normally have been due by June 3, 1990, two years after the alleged malpractice. However, June 3rd was on a Sunday, whereby June 4th became the relevant date for section 766.104(2)....

...’s later decision in - 14 - Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Coffaro, 829 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2002). There, this Court held that “the ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations purchased under section 766.104(2) is not added to what remains of the original statute of limitations but is added after the sixty-day extension period under section 766.106(4).” Id....

...care providers’ respective] notices of termination to file suit,” id., or Coffaro’s conclusion that the claims at issue were all timely filed, id. at 867. Indeed, because the presuit notices in Coffaro were all 2. The 90-day purchased extension under section 766.104(2) is not the same as “the 90-day period” in section 766.106(4). - 15 - mailed and received within the limitations period, but with “fewer than sixty days remain[ing] in [the] limitations period,” id....

...2011) (citation omitted)). Chapter 766 contains several prerequisites for the filing of a medical malpractice action, including that the claimant must conduct a reasonable, good faith investigation 1 and then provide the prospective defendant with a 1 See § 766.104(1), Fla....

...ract, unless the attorney filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.” § 766.104(1), Fla....

...received by a defendant convinces us that it is the date of receipt that begins the tolling period. -7- limitations expired, and Mrs. Bove could not revive it by filing a petition for extension of the limitations period. See § 766.104(2) (permitting the extension of statute of limitations period upon petition, but providing that "[t]he provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run"). Mrs....