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Fla. Stat.Title XLV — TortsChapter 766 — Medical Malpractice and Related Matters

Fla. Stat. § 766.102 (2026)

Medical negligence; standards of recovery; expert witness.

Edition and currency
2026 Florida Statutes: through the 2026 Regular Session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENT2026 Florida Statutes: through the 2026 Regular Session cited 1990–2026 223citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 223 opinions since 1990, 39 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (90 cases).

766.102 Medical negligence; standards of recovery; expert witness.—
(1) In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the negligence of a health care provider as defined in s. 766.202(4), the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.
(2)(a) If the injury is claimed to have resulted from the negligent affirmative medical intervention of the health care provider, the claimant must, in order to prove a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care, show that the injury was not within the necessary or reasonably foreseeable results of the surgical, medicinal, or diagnostic procedure constituting the medical intervention, if the intervention from which the injury is alleged to have resulted was carried out in accordance with the prevailing professional standard of care by a reasonably prudent similar health care provider.
(b) The provisions of this subsection shall apply only when the medical intervention was undertaken with the informed consent of the patient in compliance with the provisions of s. 766.103.
(3)(a) As used in this subsection, the term:
1. “Insurer” means any public or private insurer, including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
2. “Reimbursement determination” means an insurer’s determination of the amount that the insurer will reimburse a health care provider for health care services.
3. “Reimbursement policies” means an insurer’s policies and procedures governing its decisions regarding health insurance coverage and method of payment and the data upon which such policies and procedures are based, including, but not limited to, data from national research groups and other patient safety data as defined in s. 766.1016.
(b) The existence of a medical injury does not create any inference or presumption of negligence against a health care provider, and the claimant must maintain the burden of proving that an injury was proximately caused by a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care by the health care provider. Any records, policies, or testimony of an insurer’s reimbursement policies or reimbursement determination regarding the care provided to the plaintiff is not admissible as evidence in any medical negligence action. However, the discovery of the presence of a foreign body, such as a sponge, clamp, forceps, surgical needle, or other paraphernalia commonly used in surgical, examination, or diagnostic procedures, shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the health care provider.
(4) The Legislature is cognizant of the changing trends and techniques for the delivery of health care in this state and the discretion that is inherent in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of patients by different health care providers. The failure of a health care provider to order, perform, or administer supplemental diagnostic tests shall not be actionable if the health care provider acted in good faith and with due regard for the prevailing professional standard of care.
(5) A person may not give expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional standard of care unless the person is a health care provider who holds an active and valid license and conducts a complete review of the pertinent medical records and meets the following criteria:
(a) If the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist, the expert witness must:
1. Specialize in the same specialty as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered; and
2. Have devoted professional time during the 3 years immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the action to:
a. The active clinical practice of, or consulting with respect to, the same specialty;
b. Instruction of students in an accredited health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the same specialty; or
c. A clinical research program that is affiliated with an accredited health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the same specialty.
(b) If the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a general practitioner, the expert witness must have devoted professional time during the 5 years immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the action to:
1. The active clinical practice or consultation as a general practitioner;
2. The instruction of students in an accredited health professional school or accredited residency program in the general practice of medicine; or
3. A clinical research program that is affiliated with an accredited medical school or teaching hospital and that is in the general practice of medicine.
(c) If the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a health care provider other than a specialist or a general practitioner, the expert witness must have devoted professional time during the 3 years immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the action to:
1. The active clinical practice of, or consulting with respect to, the same or similar health profession as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered;
2. The instruction of students in an accredited health professional school or accredited residency program in the same or similar health profession in which the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered; or
3. A clinical research program that is affiliated with an accredited medical school or teaching hospital and that is in the same or similar health profession as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered.
(6) A physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 who qualifies as an expert witness under subsection (5) and who, by reason of active clinical practice or instruction of students, has knowledge of the applicable standard of care for nurses, nurse practitioners, certified registered nurse anesthetists, certified registered nurse midwives, physician assistants, or other medical support staff may give expert testimony in a medical negligence action with respect to the standard of care of such medical support staff.
(7) Notwithstanding subsection (5), in a medical negligence action against a hospital, a health care facility, or medical facility, a person may give expert testimony on the appropriate standard of care as to administrative and other nonclinical issues if the person has substantial knowledge, by virtue of his or her training and experience, concerning the standard of care among hospitals, health care facilities, or medical facilities of the same type as the hospital, health care facility, or medical facility whose acts or omissions are the subject of the testimony and which are located in the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.
(8) If a health care provider described in subsection (5), subsection (6), or subsection (7) is providing evaluation, treatment, or diagnosis for a condition that is not within his or her specialty, a specialist trained in the evaluation, treatment, or diagnosis for that condition shall be considered a similar health care provider.
(9)(a) In any action for damages involving a claim of negligence against a physician licensed under chapter 458, osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459, podiatric physician licensed under chapter 461, or chiropractic physician licensed under chapter 460 providing emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department, the court shall admit expert medical testimony only from physicians, osteopathic physicians, podiatric physicians, and chiropractic physicians who have had substantial professional experience within the preceding 5 years while assigned to provide emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department.
(b) For the purposes of this subsection:
1. The term “emergency medical services” means those medical services required for the immediate diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions which, if not immediately diagnosed and treated, could lead to serious physical or mental disability or death.
2. “Substantial professional experience” shall be determined by the custom and practice of the manner in which emergency medical coverage is provided in hospital emergency departments in the same or similar localities where the alleged negligence occurred.
(10) In any action alleging medical negligence, an expert witness may not testify on a contingency fee basis.
(11) Any attorney who proffers a person as an expert witness pursuant to this section must certify that such person has not been found guilty of fraud or perjury in any jurisdiction.
(12) If a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 or a dentist licensed under chapter 466 is the party against whom, or on whose behalf, expert testimony about the prevailing professional standard of care is offered, the expert witness must be licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, or chapter 466 or possess a valid expert witness certificate issued under s. 458.3175, s. 459.0066, or s. 466.005.
(13) A health care provider’s failure to comply with or breach of any federal requirement is not admissible as evidence in any medical negligence case in this state.
History.—s. 12, ch. 76-260; s. 8, ch. 77-64; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 10, ch. 85-175; s. 78, ch. 88-1; s. 30, ch. 91-110; s. 1149, ch. 97-102; ss. 229, 296, ch. 98-166; s. 48, ch. 2003-416; s. 153, ch. 2004-5; s. 10, ch. 2011-233; s. 2, ch. 2013-108.
Note.—Former s. 768.45.
The 20 cases that cite Fla. Stat. § 766.102 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSimon Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2017).
cites § 766.102 110×subsections: (3)(b) 66× (3) 19× (4) 8× (1) 2×cited by 8 cases
The case’s holding
The statutory presumption of negligence applies whenever a foreign body is discovered in a patient regardless of whether direct evidence of negligence exists.
Later courts cite it for
“restricts plaintiffs' ability to bring medical malpractice claims.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENTuyuana L. Morris v. Orlando S. Muniz, 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018).
cites § 766.102 63×subsections: (5)(a) 16× (5) 13× (6) 12× (1) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“202(6) refers to and incorporates the requirements of section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2011), which - 16 - governs the qualifications of expert witnesses in all medical malpractice cases.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must find prejudice to a defendant before dismissing a medical malpractice action for failure to comply with informal presuit discovery requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“must construe the medical malpractice presuit screening requirements 'in a manner that favors access to courts.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENCatron v. Roger Bohn, Dc, Pa, 580 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
cites § 766.102 43×subsections: (2)(b) 13× (2)(c) 9× (2) 5× (2)(a) 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“I also agree that the legislature has not made our task easy by its choice of language in section 766.102, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988).”
The case’s holding
A specialist qualifies as a similar health care provider when the standard of care requires a practitioner to refer a patient to that specialist.
4
GREENMichael Clare v. Lynch, 220 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
cites § 766.102 12×subsections: (5)(a) 3× (5) 2× (5)(a)(1) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“) In turn, section 766.102 sets forth the requirements for an expert witness as follows: (5) A person may not give expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional standard of care unless the person is a health care provider who holds an active and valid license and…”
The case’s holding
A corroborating expert must specialize in the same specialty as the health care provider against whom medical negligence testimony is offered.
Later courts cite it for
“while both doctors' practices focus primarily on foot and ankle surgery, these two doctors have different training and practice in different specialties.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENNat'l Deaf Academy, LLC v. Denise Townes, 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018).
cites § 766.102 8×subsections: (1) 4× (3)(b) 2× (5)cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“§ 766.102. Just last year, we concluded that through chapter 766, the Legislature "has restricted plaintiffs' *309 ability to bring medical malpractice claims.”
The case’s holding
A claim sounds in medical malpractice only if the act arises from the rendering of medical care or services requiring the use of professional judgment or skill.
Later courts cite it for
“for a claim to sound in medical malpractice, the act from which the claim arises must be directly related to medical care or services, which require the use of professional judgment or skill.” · 11 citing courts
6
GREENBaptist Med. Ctr. of the Beaches, Inc. v. Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
cites § 766.102 18×subsections: (5) 4× (5)(c) 4× (5)(e) 4× (2)(a) 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“202, Florida Statutes (2009), which defines “medical expert” in subsection (6) and cross-references the requirements of section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2009).”
The case’s holding
A nurse engaged in academic instruction and consulting is duly and regularly engaged in the practice of nursing for presuit expert qualification purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“chapter 766 requires a potential plaintiff to perform an investigation of the merits of the claim and prepare a notice of intent to litigate before filing suit.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENSimon Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 177 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
cites § 766.102 46×subsections: (3)(b) 32× (3) 6× (4) 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“The trial court ultimately denied the requested instruction, explaining that the Dockswells had the ability to present direct evidence of the nurse’s negligence, whereas the word “discovery” in section 766.102 (and thus the instruction) suggests a situation where a patient is…”
The case’s holding
The statutory presumption of negligence is inapplicable when the plaintiff presents direct evidence of the negligent act and the identity of the responsible party is known.
Later courts cite it for
“the statute is a codification of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the medical negligence context.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENIn re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).
cites § 766.102 37×subsections: (5)(a) 6× (12) 6× (5)(b) 2× (6) 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“We have for consideration the regular-cycle report 1 of The Florida Bar’s Code and Rules of Evidence Committee (Committee), concerning legislative changes to the Florida Evidence Code and to section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2012).”
The case’s holding
The Florida Supreme Court may decline to adopt legislative amendments to the Evidence Code when grave constitutional concerns are raised, leaving those issues for resolution in a proper case or controversy.
Later courts cite it for
“grave constitutional concerns.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENJoseph S. Chirillo, Jr. v. Robert Granicz, 199 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 2016).
cites § 766.102 7×subsections: (1) 4×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“102(l)’s standard of care was incorrect because there is a difference between an action in general medical malpractice (to which section 766.102 would apply) and one for a duty to prevent suicide (for which foreseeability of the suicide is the relevant consideration).”
The case’s holding
The determination of duty is a question of law subject to de novo review, and a physician's duty is defined by the applicable professional standard of care.
Later courts cite it for
“the determination of duty, as an element of negligence, is a question of law . . . and is therefore subject to de novo review.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENOken v. Williams, 23 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
cites § 766.102 48×subsections: (5) 12× (5)(a) 6× (2)(c)(2) 4× (2)(b) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“Foster's corroborating affidavit was legally insufficient to satisfy the presuit requirement outlined in section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2007).”
The case’s holding
Certiorari review is available to challenge a failure to comply with statutory medical malpractice presuit notice requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“the courts of this state have uniformly recognized the availability of certiorari review in cases where the presuit notice requirements of chapter 766 have not been met.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENRuby Saunders v. Willis Dickens, 151 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2014).
cites § 766.102 8×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2013). The standard of professional care is a level of care, skill, and treatment that, in consideration of all surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by similar and reasonably prudent health care providers.”
The case’s holding
The harmless error test applies to determine whether a trial error requires reversal (applying the harmless error test under these circumstances).
Later courts cite it for
“(1) a duty by the physician, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) causation.” · 8 citing courts
12
GREENLinn v. Fossum, 946 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2006).
cites § 766.102 7×subsections: (1) 6× (5)cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“[6] Allowing qualified experts to testify as to the prevailing professional standard of care under section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2005), does not permit experts to conduct a survey of a myriad of other experts or colleagues to derive a consensus on the standard of care.”
The case’s holding
An expert may not testify on direct examination that they relied on consultations with colleagues or other experts to reach their opinion to avoid serving as a conduit for hearsay.
Later courts cite it for
“florida courts have routinely recognized that an expert's testimony 'may not merely be used as a conduit for the introduction of the otherwise inadmissible evidence.” · 5 citing courts
13
GREENIntegrated Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002).
cites § 766.102 10×subsections: (1) 9×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“2d DCA 1991), which held "although a nursing home is not a health care provider as defined under chapter 766, the notice provisions of the Act apply to a negligence action against a nursing home if the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102…”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff alleging only violations of nursing home resident rights under section 400.022 need not comply with the presuit requirements of chapter 766.
14
GREENEdwards v. Sunrise Ophthalmology ASC, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
cites § 766.102 16×subsections: (5)(a) 6×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“The plaintiff appeals an order dismissing her medical negligence action against an ophthalmologist and his employer 1 because she failed to obtain a written opinion from an expert — as defined by section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2009) — to support the negligence claim.”
The case’s holding
An infectious disease specialist does not possess a similar specialty to an ophthalmologist for the purpose of establishing the standard of care in a medical negligence claim.
15
GREENOliveros v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 45 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
cites § 766.102 11×subsections: (9) 4× (12) 3× (9)(a) (9)(b)(2)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“202(6) provides that a medical expert must meet the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in section 766.102. See Holden, 39 So.3d at 399 .”
The case’s holding
Failure to specifically plead noncompliance with presuit requirements before the statute of limitations expires waives the defense of noncompliance with a condition precedent.
Later courts cite it for
“the facts concerning the expert's background and experience are unrefuted, the question of his or her qualifications as an expert turns on the application of the relevant statutes, which is an issue of law,” · 1 citing court
16
GREENWeinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
cites § 766.102 8×subsections: (1) 7×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“In McCullough, the Second District held that although a nursing home is not a health care provider as defined under chapter 766, the notice provisions of the Act apply to a negligence action against a nursing home if the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth…”
The case’s holding
Statutory presuit notice requirements apply only to health care providers defined in chapter 766 or those vicariously liable for their acts, and restrictions on court access favor plaintiffs.
Later courts cite it for
“the purpose of the chapter 766 pre-suit requirements is to alleviate the high cost of medical negligence litigation through early determination and prompt resolution of claims, not to deny access to the courts to plaintiffs.” · 10 citing courts
17
GREENRiggenbach v. Rhodes, 267 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
cites § 766.102 9×subsections: (5) 2× (5)(a) 2× (12)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“The 2012 version of section 766.102 also allowed the trial court to determine whether the expert was qualified on grounds other than those specified in the statute.”
The case’s holding
The statutory requirement for a same specialty expert is interpreted literally and is not satisfied by physicians of different specialties providing similar treatment to the same body area.
Later courts cite it for
“florida courts have previously decided that 'same specialty' is to be taken literally and is not synonymous with physicians with different specialties providing similar treatment to the same areas of the body.” · 7 citing courts
18
GREENAuster v. Strax Breast Cancer Inst., 649 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
cites § 766.102 11×subsections: (3) 6× (1) 3× (3)(a) 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“45(1), Florida Statutes, (1985), is currently codified at section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (1993).”
The case’s holding
A delay in cancer diagnosis constitutes a concurrent cause that may give rise to liability for the aggravation of a preexisting condition.
Later courts cite it for
“level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENIn re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 144 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 2014).
cites § 766.102 10×subsections: (12) 10×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“§ 766.102(12), Fla. Stat. (2012). The Committee voted 14-13 to recommend that the statutory provision be adopted as a rule of procedure to the extent that it is procedural.”
The case’s holding
A hearsay statement is admissible against a party that wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability with the intent to do so.
Later courts cite it for
“fiduciary lawyer-client privilege.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENSilva v. Sw. Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1992).
cites § 766.102 7×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 766.102
“As the Second District noted, section 766.102, Florida Statutes (1989), defines the standards of recovery in medical malpractice actions.”
The case’s holding
A blood bank that merely supplies products without providing diagnosis, treatment, or care is not a healthcare provider subject to the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
Later courts cite it for
“in ordinary, common parlance, the average person would understand 'diagnosis, treatment, or care' to mean ascertaining a patient's medical condition through examination and testing, prescribing and administering a course of action to effect a cure, and meeting the patient's daily needs during the illness.” · 3 citing courts

Show all 223 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199020082026

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 1995. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.156Fla.24M.D. Fla.1911th Cir.8N.D. Fla.6S.D. Fla.3Tex. App.2Ga. Ct. App.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 12 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)90 cases
Linn v. Fossum, 946 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2006).“[6] Allowing qualified experts to testify as to the prevailing professional standard of care under section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2005), does not permit experts to conduct a survey of a myriad of other experts or colleagues to derive a consensus on the standard of care.”
Integrated Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002).“2d DCA 1991), which held "although a nursing home is not a health care provider as defined under chapter 766, the notice provisions of the Act apply to a negligence action against a nursing home if the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102…”
Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).“In McCullough, the Second District held that although a nursing home is not a health care provider as defined under chapter 766, the notice provisions of the Act apply to a negligence action against a nursing home if the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth…”
Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC v. Denise Townes, 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018).“§ 766.102. Just last year, we concluded that through chapter 766, the Legislature "has restricted plaintiffs' *309 ability to bring medical malpractice claims.”
Joseph S. Chirillo, Jr. v. Robert Granicz, 199 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 2016).“102(l)’s standard of care was incorrect because there is a difference between an action in general medical malpractice (to which section 766.102 would apply) and one for a duty to prevent suicide (for which foreseeability of the suicide is the relevant consideration).”
Showing the top 5 of 90. More in the list view →
(2)9 cases
Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 2011).
Tuyuana L. Morris v. Orlando S. Muniz, 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018).“202(6) refers to and incorporates the requirements of section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2011), which - 16 - governs the qualifications of expert witnesses in all medical malpractice cases.”
Catron v. Roger Bohn, Dc, Pa, 580 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).“I also agree that the legislature has not made our task easy by its choice of language in section 766.102, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988).”
Alford v. G. Pierce Woods Mem'l Hosp., 621 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Bratt ex rel. Bratt v. Laskas, 845 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(2)(a)10 cases
Baptist Med. Ctr. of the Beaches, Inc. v. Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).“202, Florida Statutes (2009), which defines “medical expert” in subsection (6) and cross-references the requirements of section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2009).”
Catron v. Roger Bohn, Dc, Pa, 580 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
Alford v. G. Pierce Woods Mem'l Hosp., 621 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
Padgett v. Sims, 701 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(2)(b)10 cases
Catron v. Roger Bohn, Dc, Pa, 580 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
Stewart v. Price, 718 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
Meyer v. Caruso, 731 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Hughes v. Slomka, 807 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
Bratt ex rel. Bratt v. Laskas, 845 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(2)(c)11 cases
Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr. v. Dingler, 697 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Catron v. Roger Bohn, Dc, Pa, 580 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
Alford v. G. Pierce Woods Mem'l Hosp., 621 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
MYRON ex rel. BROCK v. South Broward Hosp. Dist., 703 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
Bratt ex rel. Bratt v. Laskas, 845 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Showing the top 5 of 11. More in the list view →
(2)(c)(2)5 cases
Oken v. Williams, 23 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).“Foster's corroborating affidavit was legally insufficient to satisfy the presuit requirement outlined in section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2007).”
Meyer v. Caruso, 731 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Loadholtz v. Andrews, 855 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
Charlonne v. Rosenthal, 642 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
Green v. Goldberg, 630 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
(2)(e)1 case
Padgett v. Sims, 701 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
(3)9 cases
Simon Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2017).
Auster v. Strax Breast Cancer Inst., 649 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).“45(1), Florida Statutes, (1985), is currently codified at section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (1993).”
Castillo v. Visual Health & Surgical Ctr., 972 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
Simon Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 177 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).“The trial court ultimately denied the requested instruction, explaining that the Dockswells had the ability to present direct evidence of the nurse’s negligence, whereas the word “discovery” in section 766.102 (and thus the instruction) suggests a situation where a patient is…”
Olsten Health Servs., Inc. v. Cody, 979 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(3)(a)1 case
Auster v. Strax Breast Cancer Inst., 649 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
(3)(b)5 cases
Simon Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2017).
Simon Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 177 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC v. Denise Townes, 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018).
Simon Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., No. 4D13-2936 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 18, 2015).
Jackson v. United States, No. 5:18-cv-00053 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020).
(4)12 cases
Simon Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2017).
Kenyon v. Miller, 756 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
Olsten Health Servs., Inc. v. Cody, 979 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Archer v. Maddux, 645 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Jackson v. Oklahoma Mem'l Hosp., 909 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1995).
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(5)36 cases
Tuyuana L. Morris v. Orlando S. Muniz, 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018).
Baptist Med. Ctr. of the Beaches, Inc. v. Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Oken v. Williams, 23 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Michael Clare v. Lynch, 220 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).“) In turn, section 766.102 sets forth the requirements for an expert witness as follows: (5) A person may not give expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional standard of care unless the person is a health care provider who holds an active and valid license and…”
Riggenbach v. Rhodes, 267 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).“The 2012 version of section 766.102 also allowed the trial court to determine whether the expert was qualified on grounds other than those specified in the statute.”
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(5)(a)25 cases
Tuyuana L. Morris v. Orlando S. Muniz, 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018).
Michael Clare v. Lynch, 220 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
Edwards v. Sunrise Ophthalmology ASC, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).“The plaintiff appeals an order dismissing her medical negligence action against an ophthalmologist and his employer 1 because she failed to obtain a written opinion from an expert — as defined by section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2009) — to support the negligence claim.”
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).“We have for consideration the regular-cycle report 1 of The Florida Bar’s Code and Rules of Evidence Committee (Committee), concerning legislative changes to the Florida Evidence Code and to section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2012).”
Davis v. Karr, 264 So. 3d 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
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(5)(a)(1)5 cases
Michael Clare v. Lynch, 220 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
Gelsthorpe v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Oken v. Williams, 23 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Weiss v. Pratt, 53 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
(5)(b)3 cases
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).
(5)(c)4 cases
Baptist Med. Ctr. of the Beaches, Inc. v. Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Wirth, 49 So. 3d 802 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Long, 189 So. 3d 335 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
(5)(e)1 case
Baptist Med. Ctr. of the Beaches, Inc. v. Rhodin, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
(6)9 cases
Tuyuana L. Morris v. Orlando S. Muniz, 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018).
Apostolico v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 871 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
Maldonado v. EMSA Ltd. P'ship, 645 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).
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(6)(a)9 cases
Cenatus v. Naples Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 689 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
Franklin v. Pub. Health Trust, 759 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
Barrio v. Wilson, 779 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Goss v. Permenter, 827 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
Maldonado v. EMSA Ltd. P'ship, 645 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
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(6)(b)1 case
Fuentes v. Spirer, 766 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
(6)(c)1 case
Pevsner v. Frederick, 656 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
(7)5 cases
Holmes Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dumigan, 151 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).
Angel Tomas v. Dmitry Sandler, DPM, 406 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).
Columbia/jfk Med. Ctr. v. Sangounchitte, 977 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
(9)6 cases
Oliveros v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 45 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).“202(6) provides that a medical expert must meet the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in section 766.102. See Holden, 39 So.3d at 399 .”
Tuyuana L. Morris v. Orlando S. Muniz, 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018).
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).
Plantz v. John, 170 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
Holden v. Bober, 39 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(9)(a)3 cases
Maraj v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 989 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
Oliveros v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 45 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
Paley v. Maraj, 910 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
(9)(b)(2)1 case
Oliveros v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 45 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
(12)9 cases
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 144 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 2014).“§ 766.102(12), Fla. Stat. (2012). The Committee voted 14-13 to recommend that the statutory provision be adopted as a rule of procedure to the extent that it is procedural.”
Richard DeLisle v. Crane Co., 258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018).
Oliveros v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 45 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).
Riggenbach v. Rhodes, 267 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
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Show all 223 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
History.—s. 12, ch. 76-260; s. 8, ch. 77-64; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 10, ch. 85-175; s. 78, ch. 88-1; s. 30, ch. 91-110; s. 1149, ch. 97-102; ss. 229, 296, ch. 98-166; s. 48, ch. 2003-416; s. 153, ch. 2004-5; s. 10, ch. 2011-233; s. 2, ch. 2013-108.
Versions

Edition shown: 2026 Florida Statutes: through the 2026 Regular Session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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This Florida statute resource is curated by the lawyer who curates this resource, a Jacksonville, Florida personal injury and workers' compensation attorney (Florida Bar No. 39104). Attorney Syfert regularly handles Chapter 766 matters in the context of medical malpractice litigation and represents clients throughout Northeast Florida. For legal consultation, call 904-383-7448.