The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Because Rhodes failed to comply with the requirement of sections 766.203, 776.202(6), and 766.102(5)( . . . The 2012 version of section 766.102 also allowed the trial court to determine whether the expert was . . . Id. § 766.102(14). In Oliveros v. . . . The active clinical practice of, or consulting with respect to, the same specialty ; § 766.102(5), Fla . . . The bill repeals s. 766.102(14), F.S. This appears to have the effect of overturning Oliveros v. . . .
. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . In 2013, the Legislature specifically amended section 766.102(5), regarding the requirements for qualification . . . for the first time on appeal the constitutionality of the "same specialty" requirements of section 766.102 . . . The Florida Supreme Court has recently declined to adopt the "same specialty" amendment to section 766.102 . . . Because the constitutionality of section 766.102(5)(a) is not properly before us, the statute remains . . .
. . . privilege," and declining to adopt chapter 2011-233, section 10, Laws of Florida, creating section 766.102 . . .
. . . removing the second paragraph of instruction 402.4a (Medical Negligence), which is derived from section 766.102 . . . SeeF.S. 766.102. . . . Instruction 402.4a is derived fromF.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition . . . The second bracketed paragraph is derived from F.S. 766.102(2)(a) and should be given only in cases involving . . . This instruction is derived fromF.S. 766.102(3). . . .
. . . Section 766.102 sets forth requirements for testifying experts in medical malpractice actions. . . . . § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . ." § 766.102(5)(a) 1., Fla. Stat. . . . When reviewing the distinct requirements of sections 766.202(6) and 766.102 together, it is clear that . . . Dingler erroneously conflated sections 766.102 and 766.202 by concluding that the present-tense "duly . . . Id. § 766.102(5)(a). Section 766.102(5)(a) 2. does not define "professional time." . . . See §§ 766.102(1) ; 766.203(2). . . . See § 766.102(6). . . . Id. § 766.102(6). . . . Thompson was not a qualified expert under section 766.102(5)(a) 2. or section 766.102(6). . . .
. . . in order to prevail, must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . Townes, 242 So.3d at 311-312 (quoting § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) ). . . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . . § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . . § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2013) ; see Townes, 242 So.3d at 309. . . .
. . . Champion argued that the notice of intent to initiate litigation did not comply with section 766.102( . . . that an ophthalmologist and an infectious disease specialist were too dissimilar to satisfy section 766.102 . . . An expert witness as defined in section 766.102 is, in turn, a "health care provider who holds a valid . . . The parties disagree whether the trial court applied the 2012 or 2013 version of section 766.102(5)(a . . . On appeal, the parties agree that the 2012 version of section 766.102 applies. . . .
. . . . § 766.102. . . . Id. § 766.102(1); see id. § 766.102(5). In Silva v. . . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . See id. § 766.102(1), (5). . . . vicariously liable under the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . .
. . . Because the expert affidavit submitted by Lynch did not satisfy the requirements of section 766.102(5 . . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . In turn, section 766.102 sets forth the requirements for an expert witness as follows: (5) A person may . . . Overley could not meet the requirements of the plain language of section 766.102(5), and the noncomplying . . . Here, Lynch did not raise the constitutionality of sec-tion 766.102(5)(a)(1) in either the trial court . . .
. . . Evidence Committee (Committee), concerning legislative changes to the Florida Evidence Code and to section 766.102 . . . Committee’s recommendation to adopt, to the extent it may be procedural, legislation creating section 766.102 . . . Same Specialty Amendment The Same Specialty Amendment amended section 766.102(5)(a), Florida Statutes . . . Before its repeal, section 766.102(14), Florida Statutes, provided that section 766.102 did “not limit . . . See, e.g., § 766.102(5)(b), Fla. . . .
. . . See id. § 766.102(3)(b) (2016). . . . Id. § 766.102(1); accord id. § 766.102 (3)(b). . . . This instruction is derived from F.S. 766.102(3). . . . (citing § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2016) (defining "expert”)). . . . See § 766.102(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
. . . Thus, we deny the petition without prejudice to raise the issue of noncompliance with section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2015), provides: [T]he claimant shall have the burden of proving . . .
. . . Relying on Florida case law and section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2008), the Second District reversed . . . (quoting Sweet, 932 So.2d at 368); see also § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . Petitioners assert that the Second District’s application of section 766.102(l)’s standard of care was . . . incorrect because there is a difference between an action in general medical malpractice (to which section 766.102 . . . inpatient duty to prevent suicide does not apply here, there still existed a statutory duty under section 766.102 . . .
. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness' 'as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102, in turn, sets forth the qualifications required of an expert ■ witness providing the . . . , not only because of Appellant’s failure to satisfy the statutory requirements set out in Section' 766.102 . . .
. . . failure, the record did not support a finding that her medical expert was qualified under sections 766.102 . . . The expert must meet the qualifications set forth in sections 766.202(6) and 766.102(5). . . . Subsection (5) of section 766.102 addresses the qualifications for an expert concerning the professional . . . from a university or college and who. meet§ the requirements of an expert witness as set- forth in s. 766.102 . . . Specifically, section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2011), provides: (5) A person may not give expert testimony . . .
. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Furthermore, we have previously recognized that “section 766.102(5) provides a less stringent standard . . . Section 766.102(5)(c)l., Florida Statutes (2011) provides: (c) If the health care provider against whom . . .
. . . See F.S. 766.102. . . . Instruction 402.4a is derived from F.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition . . . This instruction is derived from F.S. 766.102(3). . . .
. . . Instead, the issue to be resolved by us on appeal is how the first and last sentences of section 766.102 . . . In determining the application of the first and last sentences of section 766.102(3)(b), it is important . . . In understanding the application of the first and last sentences of section 766.102(3)(b), it is also . . . The last sentence of section 766.102(3)(b) provides an exception to the general rule established by the . . . I agree with the Dockswells that the last sentence of section 766.102(3)(b) codifies and expands “the . . . The instruction is derived from section 766.102(3), Florida Statutes, which provides that a plaintiff . . . See id. at n. 1; § 766.102(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . ability to present direct evidence of the nurse’s negligence, whereas the word “discovery” in section 766.102 . . . The foreign body instruction is derived from section 766.102(3), which provides in pertinent part: (b . . . (4), then as 766.102(3). . . .
. . . .” § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. Our court said in Broadway v. . . . directly or vicariously hable under the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . clearly ar[o]se from the rendering of, or failure to render, medical services,” determined by section 766.102 . . . directly or vicariously lia-' ble under the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . The statutory standard for medical care is in section 766.102(1), which states that the “prevailing professional . . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.” § 766.102 . . .
. . . constitute substantial professional experience in providing emergency medical services under section 766.102 . . .
. . . the Dumigans would be required to address the medical negligence standard of care found in section 766.102 . . . The medical malpractice standard of care is set forth in section 766.102(1), which provides: In any action . . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers. § 766.102 . . .
. . . the subject of the claim and have prior experience treating similar patients,” as required by section 766.102 . . . The legislature deleted the “similar specialty” alternative from section 766.102(5)(a)l effective July . . .
. . . . § 766.102 (2013) (defining standard of care in medical malpractice action “in light of all relevant . . .
. . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
. . . .; and to section 766.102(12) of the Florida Statutes, see ch.2011-233, § 10, Laws of Fla. . . . Finally, in chapter 2011-233, section 10, Laws of Florida, the Legislature created section 766.102(12 . . . ), Florida Statutes, which provides as follows: 766.102 Medical negligence; standards of recovery; expert . . . possess a valid expert witness certificate issued under s. 458.3175, s. 459.0066, or s. 466.005. § 766.102 . . .
. . . appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.’ ” Sweet, 932 So.2d at 368 (quoting § 766.102 . . .
. . . .” § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
. . . its experts’ affidavits fulfilled the “similar specialty” presuit compliance requirement of section 766.102 . . . dispositive, this Court declines to address the meaning of the phrase “similar specialty” found in section 766.102 . . .
. . . his employer because she failed to obtain a written opinion from an expert — as defined by section 766.102 . . . The ophthalmologist subsequently filed an Answer, asserting noncompliance with sections 766.102, 766.106 . . . court ruled that the infectious disease doctor’s affidavit was insufficient to comply with section 766.102 . . . Under section 766.102, if the defendant is a specialist, the medical expert must “[sjpecialize in the . . . These doctors do not “[sjpecialize in the same specialty.” § 766.102(5)(a)l. Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . plaintiff failed to obtain an expert opinion that satisfied the “specialization requirement” of section 766.102 . . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Pursuant to section 766.102, if the defendant doctor is a specialist, then the medical expert must “[ . . . condition that is the subject of the claim and have prior experience treating similar patients.” § 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(5)(a)l. now defines the specialization requirement to include only those who “[specialize . . .
. . . See § 766.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
. . . See F.S. 766.102. . . . Instruction 402.4a is derived from F.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition . . . The second bracketed paragraph is derived from F.S. 766.102(2)(a) and should be given only in cases involving . . . This instruction is derived from F.S. 766.102(3). . . .
. . . is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . .
. . . . § 766.102(1): “the prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall . . . Stat. § 766.102(1). . . . Stat. § 766.102(3)(b); see also, Turner ex rel. Turner v. . . . Stat. § 766.102(4), and the relevant provisions of Fla. . . . Stat. § 766.102(5). . . .
. . . recipient’s claim against a blood bank was not considered a claim for medical malpractice under section 766.102 . . .
. . . plaintiff against each named defendant upon receipt of written opinion of an appropriate expert defined by 766.102 . . .
. . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102 . . .
. . . . § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .
. . . is whether a defendant is liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2008), states: (1) In any action for recovery of damages based . . .
. . . not an expert in the field of cardiology, and as a result, Williams had failed to comply with section 766.102 . . . Mary’s Hospital a notice of intent to initiate litigation, pursuant to section 766.102(2), alleging failure . . .
. . . This leads us to section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2003), which governs expert witness testimony in . . . Section 766.102, which sets the standard for an expert witness’s qualifications, has also been the subject . . . In 2003, section 766.102 was amended and the specific provision applicable to emergency room physicians . . . changed from section 766.102(6)(a) to 766.102(9)(a). . . . . This statute is the predecessor of section 766.102(5), Florida Statutes (2003). . . . .
. . . is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . The standard for recovery in a medical negligence case is set forth in section 766.102(1): In any action . . . The language of sections 766.102(1) and 766.202(4) is unambiguous, and our conclusion regarding the Pharmacists . . . but the Estate did not allege that that breach caused the “death or personal injury of any person.” § 766.102 . . . Conclusion The Estate carefully avoided invoking the presuit notice requirements of section 766.102 when . . .
. . . .]” § 766.102(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . parties dispute whether a claimant’s expert was a "licensed health care provider,” as required by section 766.102 . . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . profession as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered.” § 766.102 . . .
. . . The appellees contend that a physician must fall within the requirements of section 766.102(9) in order . . . However, section 766.102(12) provides that “[t]his section does not limit the power of the trial court . . . The appellants argue that section 766.102(12) allowed the trial court to qualify Dr. . . . Sichewski’s qualifications as an emergency medicine expert to the strictures of section 766.102(9). . . . Sichewski did not qualify as an expert in emergency medicine under section 766.102(9), the appel-lees . . .
. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(5), Florida Statutes (2009), as referenced in section 766.202(6), defines the “requirements . . . Although not an issue in this case, we take note that the “licensed provider” referenced in section 766.102 . . . Byrne’s credentials satisfy the substantive requirements, at the least, in section 766.102(5)(c)l. and . . . Third, the person must meet the requirements of an expert witness addressed in section 766.102. . . .
. . . medical expert” as someone who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth under section 766.102 . . . The parties, in their argument before this court, cite the circuit court’s application of section 766.102 . . . The pertinent part of section 766.102(5) provides: A person may not give expert testimony concerning . . . Baker fails to meet the “similar specialty” requirement of an expert witness under section 766.102(5) . . . See § 766.102(9). . We observe that the time for Mr. . . .
. . . of indemnity,” was repealed except to the extent that it is incorporated by reference into section 766.102 . . . In 2003, section 766.102(1) was updated to reference the newly-added definition of “health care provider . . .
. . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102 provides, in pertinent part: (1) In any action for recovery of damages based on the death . . .
. . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1998). . . .
. . . See § 766.102. The field is heavily regulated both by case law and statutory law. . . .
. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(5) provides, “A person may not give expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional . . . Thus, under sections 766.203(2), 766.202(6), and 766.102(5), the written expert opinion that accompanies . . . licensed health care provider, and (4) satisfies the expert witness requirements set forth in section 766.102 . . . opinion under section 766.203(2) regardless of whether she meets the additional requirements of section 766.102 . . .
. . . See F.S. 766.102. . . . Instruction 402.4a is derived from F.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition . . . The second bracketed paragraph is derived from F.S. 766.102(2)(a) and should be given only in cases involving . . . This instruction is derived from F.S. 766.102(3). . . .
. . . . § 766.102(1). . . .
. . . . § 766.102(1). . . . Stat. § 766.102(5), there is an exception to this requirement in situations where “only the exercise . . .
. . . Foster meets the qualifications as an expert witness pursuant to section 766.102. . . . In 2008, the Florida Legislature amended section 766.102 with respect to the requirements that must be . . . Prior to the 2003 amendment, section 766.102(2)(b) and (c) stated in pertinent part: (b) If the health . . . Thus, to corroborate respondent’s claim under section 766.102(5)(a)(l), Florida Statutes, respondent’ . . . When the Legislature altered the language of section 766.102, it replaced the phrase “similar health . . . take issue with the majority opinion’s assertion about the public policy behind the intent of section 766.102 . . . Oken and has extensive related experience in the field under review as specified by section 766.102(5 . . . in a similar specialty and is not qualified to testify and meet pre-suit requirements under section 766.102 . . .
. . . On October 2, 2006, pursuant to section 766.102, Gonzalez served Dr. . . . Lazzarin’s affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of sections 766.102, 766.202, and 766.203, Florida . . . Lazzarin’s affidavits do not satisfy section 766.102(5)(a)2 because his affidavit dated July 11, 2007 . . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(5), Florida Statutes (2006), provides in relevant part: (5) A person may not give expert . . .
. . . Section 458.331(l)(t) further provides, “The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(3), Florida Statutes (2007), provides, “The existence of a medical injury shall not create . . .
. . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102 . . .
. . . Section 766.202(6) requires an expert to meet the requirements contained in section 766.102. . . . 5 years while assigned to provide emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department.” § 766.102 . . . We held that the affiant on which the Marajs relied did not constitute a medical expert under § 766.102 . . .
. . . actions of a health care provider under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . amended complaint, which is identical to the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . .
. . . The requested instruction was patterned after section 766.102(4), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides . . . Section 766.102(4) has been renumbered, and currently appears in section 766.102(3), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . The hospital argues that Shorr was not qualified to testify under section 766.102(7), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . The second issue involves section 766.102(3), Florida Statutes (2007). . . . The appellants moved for directed verdict, in which counsel argued that section 766.102(3) shifted the . . . Section 766.102(3) provides that “the discovery of the presence of a foreign body, such as a sponge . . . . parties have not cited, nor has our own research revealed any Florida case law interpreting section 766.102 . . . question as to whether the defense met their burden in overcoming the presumption created by section 766.102 . . .
. . . In addition, in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2003), entitled “Medical negligence; standards . . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes, now provides: In any action for recovery of damages based on the . . .
. . . The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 766.102 when enforcing this paragraph. . . .
. . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers,” § 766.102 . . .
. . . . § 766.102. . . .
. . . where the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(1) provides that the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight . . . Section 766.102(1) refers to the definition of health care provider in section 766.202(4), which includes . . .
. . . Serratore prove [a deviation] from an accepted standard of medical care, which is required under section 766.102 . . .
. . . Allen’s demise is not determined under the medical negligence standard of care established in section 766.102 . . .
. . . that before serving a notice of intent to initiate medical negligence litigation pursuant to section 766.102 . . .
. . . Allowing qualified experts to testify as to the prevailing professional standard of care under section 766.102 . . . See 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . that they consulted with unidentified individuals who may or may not meet the requirements of section 766.102 . . . The very definition of standard of care in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2005), requires proof . . . According to section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes, the prevailing standard of care for a health care . . .
. . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102 . . .
. . . . § 766.102(1) (1999) (amended 2003). . . .
. . . . § 766.102(1). . . .
. . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2004), codifies this duty, stating that a health care provider . . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.” § 766.102 . . .
. . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2002), codifies the prevailing professional standards of care. . . .
. . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes. . . .
. . . See § 766.102(6), Fla. . . . Stat. (2004)(defining a medical expert as one who meets the requirements of section 766.102). . . .
. . . contained in section 766.202(6) is one who meets the requirement of a trial expert witness under section 766.102 . . . Where the malpractice claim is against emergency room physicians, as in this case, section 766.102(9) . . . trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss because the court erroneously concluded that section 766.102 . . .
. . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . See § 766.102(5)(a)(l), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 766.102(2), Fla. Stat. (2003); § 768.81(3)(6), Fla. Stat. (1991); Osler v. . . .
. . . According to section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes, the prevailing standard of care for a health care . . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Dr. . . .
. . . misinterpreting the significance of section 393.13(4)(c) to establish a standard of care outside section 766.102 . . . whether the plaintiff must rely on the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . where the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . can be proved by showing a breach of a standard of care other than medical malpractice under section 766.102 . . .
. . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2003); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 4.2(a). . . .
. . . allegations of the complaint do not seek to state a cause of action for medical negligence under section 766.102 . . . whether the defendant is liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Mary’s employee deviated from an accepted standard of medical care, which is required under section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(1) states: In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury . . .
. . . See also § 766.102(1), Fla. . . . does not require a corroborating opinion from a medical expert as more narrowly defined by section 766.102 . . . ” followed by the noun “one,” which can only, grammatically and logically in the context of section 766.102 . . . See §§ 766.102, 766.203, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . The 2002 version of section 766.102(6), Florida Statutes, does not delineate the requisite qualifications . . .
. . . that the defendant failed to meet the “medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . According to section 766.102(1), a plaintiff must carry such a burden to recover only if “death or injury . . . resulted from the negligence of,a health care provider as defined in s. 768.50(2)(b).” § 766.102(1), . . .
. . . Section 768.50(2)(b) was repealed except to the extent that it is incorporated by reference into section 766.102 . . .
. . . On appeal, they argue that the ruling that their medical expert was unqualified under section 766.102 . . . Specifically at issue in the present appeal is the proper application of section 766.102(2)(c)(2), Florida . . . Section 766.102(2)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (2002), permits a physician to testify as an expert against . . . to testify in judgment of another health care provider’s actions or inactions are defined by section 766.102 . . . involvement in the prae-tice or teaching of medicine” within the five years preceding the incident. § 766.102 . . .
. . . May is not a “similar health care provider” within the meaning of section 766.102(2), Florida Statutes . . . the same specialty; and (2)[i]s certified by the appropriate American board in the same specialty.” § 766.102 . . . practice or teaching of medicine within the 5-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim. § 766.102 . . .
. . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (citing § 768.50(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985)). . . . actions of a health care provider under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Such a nurse is a “health care provider” for the purposes of section 766.102(1), and we continue to believe . . . Lang-Redway’s cause of action arose in 1997 and is governed by section 766.102(1), which for the purpose . . . Specifically, section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (1997), defines this standard as follows: In any action . . .
. . . Section 766.102(6)(a) provides that in malpractice actions against emergency room physicians, the court . . .
. . . ." § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . .
. . . excluded Odyniec’s testimony because he was not a "similar health care provider," as defined in section 766.102 . . .
. . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (1995); Cohen v. . . .
. . . Section 766.102 sets the standard for recovery in all medical malpractice claims. See Silva v. . . . adopt would be far more broad than intended, essentially circumventing the requirements of section 766.102 . . . the section 766.111 does not establish a cause of action independent of the requirements of section 766.102 . . .
. . . against a nursing home if the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . .
. . . Stat. (1997), with § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (citing § 768.60(2)0»), Fla. Stat. (1985)). . . . actions of a health care provider under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Such a nurse is a “health care provider” for the purposes of section 766.102(1), and we continue to believe . . . within the Florida Statutes, it survives by virtue of the reference to this defunct statute in section 766.102 . . .
. . . . § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .