Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 776.05 (2025)
Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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776.05 Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest.—A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer has summoned or directed to assist him or her, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The officer is justified in the use of any force:
(1) Which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest;
(2) When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped; or
(3) When necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice. However, this subsection shall not constitute a defense in any civil action for damages brought for the wrongful use of deadly force unless the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by such flight and, when feasible, some warning had been given, and:
(a) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon poses a threat of death or serious physical harm to the officer or others; or
(b) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm to another person.
History.—s. 13, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 75-64; s. 1, ch. 87-147; s. 54, ch. 88-381; s. 1191, ch. 97-102.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 52
cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: State of Florida v. Peter Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 2018).
State of Florida v. Peter Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 2018). “05, may overlap in some cases with the defense created in section 776.012 ("[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if .”
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). “§ 53a-22 (1972); Fla. Stat. § 776.05 (1983); Idaho Code § 19-610 (1979); Ind.”
City of Winter Haven v. Allen, 541 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). “We find we must reverse and remand for a new trial on the ground that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against appellant on the issue of comparative negligence and by failing to give appellant's requested jury instruction regarding the justifiable use of force…”
City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). “" § 776.05(1), Fla.Stat. (1995). The critical factor here, is that Sanders pleaded a cause of action for "negligent" use of excessive force in making the arrest.”
Joseph Todd Eric Brown v. City of Clewiston & Luis Perez, 848 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1988). “Among those statutes identified by the Court as an embodiment of the common law rule was section 776.05, Florida Statutes, which authorized a police officer to use "any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another .”
Brown v. City of Clewiston, 644 F. Supp. 1417 (S.D. Fla. 1986). “Clearly Established Law In 1979, the Florida Statutes provided, in pertinent part, that a law enforcement officer was justified in the use of any force “necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice.”
Brown v. City of Clewiston, 644 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D. Fla. 1986). “39) (referring to Florida’s “Fleeing Felon” Statute, Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979)), although, upon further questioning, he did say that the regulations and the statute closely paralleled one another (D.”
In Re Stan. Jury Instr. in Crim. Cases, 543 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1989). “Chapter 87-147, Laws of Florida, amends Section 776.05, Florida Statutes, to redefine justifiable use of force by an officer.”
State v. Caamano, 105 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). “Caamano moved to dismiss the charge, alleging immunity pursuant to section 776.05, Florida Statutes (2010), which provides qualified immunity for a law enforcement officer’s use of force in making an arrest.”
William D. Cobb v. Louie L. Wainwright, Sec'y, Dep't of Offender Rehab., 666 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1982). “Under the relevant justifiable homicide provisions, petitioner would have been justified in using any force which he reasonably believed necessary to defend himself, Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1975), 11 or to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody, Fla.”
City of St. Petersburg v. Reed, 330 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). “This rule has recently been codified in Fla. Stat. § 776.05 , as amended by Ch. 75-64.”
Lozano v. State, 584 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). “See § 776.05, Fla. Stat. (1989). Standard jury instructions in criminal cases are: (1) intended to assist the trial court in charging the jury on the applicable law; (2) intended only as a guide; and (3) not intended to relieve the trial court of its responsibility to charge the…”
— 776.05(1) — 9 cases
City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). “" § 776.05(1), Fla.Stat. (1995). The critical factor here, is that Sanders pleaded a cause of action for "negligent" use of excessive force in making the arrest.”
State of Florida v. Peter Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 2018). “05, may overlap in some cases with the defense created in section 776.012 ("[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if .”
Ermini v. Scott, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2017).
State of Florida v. Peter Peraza, 226 So. 3d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
Light v. State, 796 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
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