IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 272 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 2019)

. . . This instruction was adopted in 2013 [122 So.3d 302], and amended in 2019. 3.6(j) ENTRAPMENT § 777.201 . . .

STATE v. HARPER,, 254 So. 3d 479 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). . . . Section 777.201 directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted to the trier of fact. . . .

AYALA, v. STATE, 232 So. 3d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . State, 180 So.3d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); see also § 777.201, Fla. . . .

COFFEY, v. STATE, 228 So. 3d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes (2013), creates a three-pronged test for a finding of subjective . . .

D. BLANCO, v. STATE, 218 So. 3d 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The Florida legislature’codified the elements of the subjective entrapment defense in section 777.201 . . . (“[W]e construe section 777.201 as requiring the question of predisposition to be submitted to a jury . . . Section 777.201 may not, by its express terms, limit its application to subjective entrapment, but the . . . State, 937 So.2d 300, 303-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). .Although section 777.201 arguably requires the issue . . . To construe section 777.201 as mandating that the issue of entrapment is to be submitted to a jury for . . .

THE FLORIDA BAR, v. D. ADAMS, v., 198 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 777.201. Following the events of January 23-25, 2013, the ■Schnitt v. . . .

SENGER, v. STATE, 200 So. 3d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . The defense of subjective entrapment is codified at section 777.201, Florida Statutes (2011), which provides . . . The analysis for subjective entrapment under section 777.201 involves a three-step inqui ry. . . .

HILL, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . State, 629 So.2d 90, 99 (Fla.1993) (addressing statutory entrapment defense under § 777.201, Fla. . . . See § 777.201(1), Fla. . . . See § 777.201(2) (“The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.”); Smith v. . . .

STATE v. LAING,, 182 So. 3d 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section 777.201, • Florida Statutes, provides: (1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. § 777.201, Fla. . . . Regarding the first prong of the test, “the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201 . . . State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla.1985), Hunter, 586 So.2d at 322, but that test was abolished by section 777.201 . . .

RIVERA, v. STATE, 180 So. 3d 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . The defense of subjective entrapment is codified in section 777.201, Florida Statutes (2013). . . .

HARRIMAN, v. STATE, 174 So. 3d 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .”); § 777.201(2), Fla. . . .

MIZNER, v. STATE, 154 So. 3d 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 777.201(1). . . . .

HO YEAON SEO, v. STATE, 143 So. 3d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 777.201(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . On this issue, the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . .

STATE v. MURPHY, v., 124 So. 3d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . recognizes two theories of defense based on entrapment: subjective entrapment, codified in section 777.201 . . . See § 777.201, Fla. Stat.; Jones v. State, 114 So.3d 1123, 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). . . .

E. GENNETTE, v. STATE, 124 So. 3d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Gennette argued that his conduct was the product of entrapment by the government, as defined by section 777.201 . . . As the dissent notes, section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes requires a defendant to prove, “by a preponderance . . . Ramos, 632 So.2d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (although section 777.201(2) provides that issue of entrapment . . . In 1987, the Florida Legislature adopted section 777.201, Florida Statutes, codifying the entrapment . . . The Florida Supreme Court has described the application of section 777.201 thusly: “The first question . . . See § 777.201(1), Fla. . . . See Munoz, 629 So.2d at 100 (construing section 777.201 to require questions to be submitted to a jury . . . the issue of what precipitated Appellant’s unlawful conduct would closely comport with the statute. § 777.201 . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 114 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

MORGAN, v. STATE, 112 So. 3d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . In upholding section 777.201, Florida Statutes, against the argument that it violated due process, the . . . Section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes (2010), specifically provides that the issue of entrapment shall . . .

MONTOYA, v. STATE, 111 So. 3d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 777.201(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2009); Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90, 99 (Fla.1993); State v. . . .

STATE v. SIMMONS,, 80 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 777.201(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

M. BLACK, v. STATE, 41 So. 3d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 777.201(1), Fla. . . .

GREEN, v. STATE, 34 So. 3d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes (2000), states that entrapment occurs when law enforcement or its . . .

HERNANDEZ, v. STATE, 17 So. 3d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . However, in 1987, the Florida Legislature enacted section 777.201 which required courts to apply the . . . that in the absence of egregious law enforcement conduct, the subjective test as set forth in section 777.201 . . . In the present case, Hernandez did not seek relief under section 777.201. . . . Section 777.201, Florida Statutes, provides: § 777.201. . . .

JIMENEZ, v. STATE, 993 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . subjective entrapment defense — the version of the defense relevant here — have been codified in section 777.201 . . . Section 777.201(1) provides in part: A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with . . . Florida Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test to determine if subjective entrapment under section 777.201 . . .

CLINE, v. STATE, 958 So. 2d 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993), the supreme court found that section 777.201, Florida Statutes, eliminated . . . The supreme court, in Munoz, found that although the subjective test set forth in section 777.201 is . . . Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes, provides: (1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation . . .

STATE v. HENDERSON,, 955 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The subjective entrapment theory has been codified at section 777.201, Florida Statutes (2006), and, . . . substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one who is ready to commit it.” § 777.201 . . .

DAVIS, v. STATE, 937 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . The subjective test set forth in section 777.201, Florida Statutes, is the test to be applied on the . . . In section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes, the Legislature has defined inducement as occurring when: A . . . substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one who is ready to commit it. § 777.201 . . . Munoz, 629 So.2d at 100 (“[W]e construe section 777.201 as requiring the question of predisposition to . . .

MURRAY, v. STATE, 937 So. 2d 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See § 777.201(2), Fla. . . .

CAMPBELL, v. STATE, 935 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Munoz, 629 So.2d at 99 (“the subjective test set forth in section 777.201 is the test to be applied on . . .

STATE v. BLANCO,, 896 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 777.201(2), Fla. . . . Const., and § 777.201(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . Munoz explained later that: “section 777.201 neither prohibits the judiciary from objectively reviewing . . . Accordingly, section 777.201 cannot overrule a decision of this Court regarding entrapment in any case . . . Munoz, 629 So.2d at 101 (“section 777.201 neither prohibits the judiciary from ... determining under . . .

CURRY, v. STATE, 876 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . The subjective test is set forth in section 777.201, Florida Statutes, and is applicable in the absence . . .

PEREZ, v. STATE, 856 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . State, 594 So.2d 275, 277 (Fla.1992); see also § 777.201, Fla. . . .

FARLEY, v. STATE, 848 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

KELLEY, v. STATE, 821 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 777.201, Fla. . . .

JACKSON, v. STATE, 810 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . The subjective test for entrapment under section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1997), is set forth in Munoz . . .

DIAL, v. STATE FLORIDA,, 799 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (2000); Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993). . . .

IRSULA, v. STATE, 805 So. 2d 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 789 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . witnesses, but appellant’s evidence was sufficient to suggest the entrapment defense under section 777.201 . . .

STATE v. O. ROKOS,, 771 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . In the face of these factual disputes, the judge was obliged, under section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

STATE v. G. BROWN,, 767 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . On this issue, the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . While section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes (1997), directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted . . .

A. CABRERA, v. STATE, 766 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Florida recognizes both a subjective entrapment defense, codified in section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

STATE v. E. FIGUEREO,, 761 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 777.201, Florida Statutes (1995); Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90, 99 (Fla.1993). . . .

HOLIDAY, v. STATE, 753 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2000)

. . . In that case, the Court analyzed Florida’s entrapment statute, section 777.201, Florida Statutes, the . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . On this issue, the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . Since its creation in 1987, see chapter 87-243, section 42, at 1657, Laws of Florida, section 777.201 . . . Thus, the current version of section 777.201 is substantively the same as the version analyzed in Munoz . . .

AIDONE, v. STATE, 763 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . On this issue, the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . Id. at 99; see § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

SOOHOO, v. STATE, 737 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . In 1987, however, the Florida legislature enacted section 777.201, Florida Statutes, specifically rejecting . . . Subsequently, when called upon to address section 777.201, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the legislature . . . Because the legislature cannot abrogate an accused’s due process rights, section 777.201 is inapplicable . . . Hence, we need not reach appellant’s contention that, pursuant to section 777.201, the State did not . . .

GUERRA- VILLAFANE, v. K. SINGLETARY,, 729 So. 2d 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . After Cruz, the legislature enacted section 777.201, providing that: (1) A law enforcement officer, a . . . With the enactment of section 777.201, the Munoz court stated that the following three areas of inquiry . . . On this issue the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . We conclude that the entrapment instruction given in this case did not adequately satisfy section 777.201 . . .

STATE v. R. BENNETT,, 710 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . that, in the absence of egregious conduct by law enforcement, the subjective test set forth in section 777.201 . . .

WALKER, v. STATE, 701 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . State, 594 So.2d 275, 277-78 (Fla.1992), in upholding the constitutionality of section 777.201(2), Florida . . .

VAZQUEZ, v. STATE, 700 So. 2d 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Subsection 777.201(1) now provides' that lack of predisposition is an element of the defense. . . . Subsection 777.201(2) evidences . the legislature’s intent that the defendant should prove entrapment . . . Turning its attention to section 777.201, the court stated: “The first question to be addressed under . . . Section 777.201 directs that the-issue of entrapment be submitted to the trier of fact. . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.” § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . .

STATE v. DAWSON,, 681 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . The trial court concluded that on these facts, there was entrapment as a matter of law under section 777.201 . . . Since 1987, the defense of entrapment has been set forth by section 777.201, Florida Statutes, which . . . provides: 777.201 Entrapment.— (1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with a . . . court acknowledged that the Cruz legal test for entrapment does not survive the enactment of section 777.201 . . . Where there is no egregious law enforcement conduct, then “section 777.201 is the test to be applied_ . . .

NADEAU, v. STATE, 683 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), was eliminated by the enactment of section 777.201 . . . The accused has the burden of proof pursuant to section 777.201 to establish this factor by a preponderance . . . [W]e construe section 777.201 as requiring the question of predisposition to be submitted to a jury when . . .

ROBICHAUD, v. STATE, 658 So. 2d 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993), and set forth in section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1993), appellant . . .

ORTIZ v. STATE, 654 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . See § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .

STATE v. FINNO,, 643 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Munoz, the supreme court determined that the amendment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes, eliminated . . .

STATE v. CARR,, 642 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . the Florida Supreme Court held that the legislature eliminated the Cruz test when it enacted section 777.201 . . . trial court’s factual findings nevertheless support the dismissal under the subjective test of section 777.201 . . .

SAMPSON, v. STATE, 645 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . State, 594 So.2d 275, 277 (Fla. 1992); see also § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1991) (entrapment creates a substantial . . .

MORALES, v. STATE, 646 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . objective test for entrapment set forth in Cruz had been eliminated by the legislative enactment of section 777.201 . . . We now reevaluate this case under the subjective standard in section 777.201, as interpreted in Munoz . . . Although section 777.201 directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted to the trier of fact, if the . . .

FRUETEL, v. STATE, 638 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . find that the legislature, in establishing a legislatively created entrapment defense through section 777.201 . . . On this issue the accused has the burden of proof and pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . In Munoz, the supreme court said: Section 777.201 directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted to . . . a matter of law because no factual “question of predisposition” is at issue_ [W]e construe section 777.201 . . . trial court’s instructions coincide with the standard for subjective entrapment as codified in section 777.201 . . .

STATE v. ROBINSON,, 635 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . In Munoz, the supreme court determined that section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), abolished the objective . . .

STATE v. RAMOS,, 632 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), was eliminated by the enactment of Section 777.201 . . . stated that the issue of entrapment may be evaluated under the subjective test established by Section 777.201 . . . Section 777.201 provides that the issue of entrapment shall be submitted to the trier of fact. . . . Section 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

SALLOMI, v. STATE, 629 So. 2d 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . In Munoz, the court maintained that the legislature, in enacting section 777.201, did eliminate the objective . . . Thus, section 777.201 is inapplicable wherever a judge determines as a matter of law that officers have . . . In other words, section 777.201 is to be applied regarding the issue of entrapment only in the absence . . . analysis of the legislatively-created entrapment defense and the subjective test codified by section 777.201 . . .

STATE v. HOWELL,, 629 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Florida Supreme Court has recently rejected Cruz, announcing that our legislature, in enacting section 777.201 . . . Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in . . . See § 777.201(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). . . . The supreme court determined that pursuant to the subjective test established in section 777.201, the . . . Assessing the matter before us in the light of Munoz and section 777.201, we are compelled to the conclusion . . .

MUNOZ, v. STATE, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993)

. . . Munoz, 586 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in which the district court held that section 777.201, Florida . . . However, the offenses at issue in Hunter occurred before section 777.201’s enactment. . . . Finally, we addressed section 777.201 in Herrera v. State, 594 So.2d 275 (Fla.1992). . . . rather than the jury instruction written to comply with section 777.201. . . . Section 777.201 directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted to the trier of fact. . . .

STATE v. LEWIS,, 629 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1993)

. . . State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993), that section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), abolished the objective . . .

KINSEY, v. STATE, 623 So. 2d 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . abolished the separate defense of objective entrapment when it enacted, effective October 1, 1987, section 777.201 . . . However, this court has determined that section 777.201 neither abolished the defense nor altered the . . . Whether section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1991), placed the burden of proof on the defense also as to . . . Hunter, the court did not address section 777.201, apparently because the effective date of the statute . . .

KRAJEWSKI, v. STATE, 621 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1993)

. . . 586 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA1991), review granted, 598 So.2d 77 (Fla.1992), which held that section 777.201 . . .

STATE v. N. SARGENT,, 617 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Subsequent to Cruz, the legislature enacted section 777.201, effective as to offenses committed on or . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . State, 594 So.2d 275 (Fla.1992), the court upheld the constitutionality of section 777.201(2) and the . . . Because the New Jersey entrapment statute closely parallels the Florida entrapment statute, section 777.201 . . . to be misplaced because apparently the crimes in Hunter occurred prior to the enactment of section 777.201 . . .

STATE v. RAMOS,, 608 So. 2d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . The State contends that Section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1989), has the effect of abolishing the objective . . .

JERALDS, v. STATE, 603 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . In Hunter the Florida Supreme Court, subsequent to the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . . In Herrera, the majority opinion considered the constitutionality of section 777.201(2), Fla.Stat., which . . . Based on Herrera, I concur in the affirmance of Jerald’s conviction. .Section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes . . .

BENNETT, v. STATE, 598 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . necessary for the supreme court to specifically address the constitutionality and applicability of section 777.201 . . . egregious as to violate due process and which no longer constitutes entrapment after the passage of section 777.201 . . . , 473 U.S. 905, 105, S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1985), BEEN ABOLISHED BY THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 777.201 . . .

KRAJEWSKI, v. STATE, 597 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . Its parameters are spelled out in section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes (1989). We affirm. . . .

FUTCH, v. STATE, 596 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . See § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

LEWIS, v. STATE, 597 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . considerations,” Hunter, 586 So.2d at 322—if it indeed amounts to an implied invalidation of section 777.201 . . . of Justice Kogan (which was not referred to by the majority and which also does not mention section 777.201 . . . Finally, it is unclear whether Hunter, which overruled Gonzalez or partially invalidated section 777.201 . . . Florida’s new entrapment statute codifies the subjective test ... § 777.201. . . . The only thing which occurred between Cruz and Hunter was § 777.201. . . . . We are not unaware of the line of cases holding that the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

NAPOLI, v. STATE, 596 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . See § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987); Herrera v. . . .

BEATTIE, v. STATE, 595 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . State, 589 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (objective test not abolished by section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . . types of movies available, film titles, prices, and usual lengths of time from order to delivery. . § 777.201 . . .

HERRERA, v. STATE, 594 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1992)

. . . While I have no quarrel with the result reached by the majority in construing section 777.201, Florida . . . On this last question, I agree with the majority that section 777.201 meets the minimum standards of . . . violated if a defendant must prove subjective entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, as section 777.201 . . . Wheeler, 468 So.2d 978 (Fla.1985), has been legislatively overruled by section 777.201 as Wheeler is . . . importance: Do Instruction 3.04(c)(2), Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, and Section 777.201 . . . The new paragraph in the entrapment instruction is based on section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1989), . . . Subsection 777.201(2) evidences the legislature’s intent that the defendant should prove entrapment instead . . .

DeLEON, v. STATE, 594 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1992)

. . . importance: Do Instruction 3.04(c)(2), Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, and Section 777.201 . . .

BRUNETTI, v. STATE, 594 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1992)

. . . importance: Do Instruction 3.04(c)(2), Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, and Section 777.201 . . .

STATE v. THINH THIEN PHAM Vu,, 595 So. 2d 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . In Munoz, a prior panel of this court held that section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), effectively . . . concerning the continuing viability of the objective entrapment test following enactment of section 777.201 . . . DENIED, 473 U.S. 905 [105 S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed.2d 652] (1985), BEEN ABOLISHED BY THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 777.201 . . . Munoz, 586 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), that is, whether enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

RICARDO, v. STATE, 591 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See § 777.201(2), Fla.Stat. (1989). The test to be applied at this stage is a subjective one. . . .

WILSON, Jr. v. STATE, 589 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . We reiterate that in this court’s view that objective test was not abolished by section 777.201, Florida . . .

SIMMONS, v. STATE, 590 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), quashed on other grounds, 589 So.2d 254 (Fla.1991), holding that section 777.201 . . . 319 (Fla.1991), where the court applied Cruz in a due process analysis, but did not address section 777.201 . . . DCA intends to recede from its holding in Krajewski, the 3rd DCA still expressly holds that section 777.201 . . . The Fifth District Court of Appeal has applied Cruz since the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . . alive and well for purposes of due process analy sis, it has failed to address the effect of section 777.201 . . .

STRICKLAND, v. STATE, 588 So. 2d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . violated by placing upon him the burden of proof on the defense of entrapment as required by section 777.201 . . . court erred in initially concluding that the law of Cruz was superceded by the enactment of section 777.201 . . . motion to dismiss hearing, and found the appellant’s claim deficient: * * * He * * 2.However, if F.S. 777.201 . . .

STATE v. MUNOZ,, 586 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . The state asserts that the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), abolished the objective . . .

HERRERA, v. STATE, 580 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See also § 777.201(2), Fla.Stat. (1987); In re Standard Jury Instr. in Criminal Cases, 543 So.2d 1205 . . . question: Do Instruction 3.04(c)(2), Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, and Section 777.201 . . .

KRAJEWSKI, v. STATE, 587 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . The Entrapment Defense Prior to the enactment in 1987 of the entrapment statute, section 777.201, Florida . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

STATE v. W. SMITH S., 575 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . (codified at § 777.201(2), Fla.Stat. (1989)). . . .

STATE v. C. PITTS,, 574 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Further, we decline to address whether section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987) removes the defense of . . .

GONZALEZ, v. STATE, 571 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . . § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . Before section 777.201 was enacted, the judicially created defense of entrapment consisted of two independent . . . Before section 777.201 was enacted, the defendant merely had the burden of adducing evidence of entrapment . . . pre-ponderance of the evidence that “his criminal conduct occurred as a result of an entrapment.” § 777.201 . . . are in conflict over whether the Cruz objective entrapment test has survived the enactment of section 777.201 . . .

BOWSER, v. STATE, 555 So. 2d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Neither party has addressed the application to this case, if any, of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . . our colleagues of the third district that the objective test of Cruz has been abolished by section 777.201 . . . There is nothing express or implied in the wording of section 777.201 which, to us, can be seized upon . . .

HUFF, v. STATE, 544 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . See § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

STATE OF FLORIDA v. MOORE, 35 Fla. Supp. 2d 180 (Fla. Cty. Ct. 1989)

. . . Section 777.201 (1987) which provides as follows: (1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, 543 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1989)

. . . Chapter ST-243, Section 42, Laws of Florida, creates Section 777.201, Florida Statutes, which redefines . . . concern over the constitutionality of chapter 87-243, section 42, Laws of Florida, creating section 777.201 . . .

STATE v. BURCH, STATE v. BROWN,, 545 So. 2d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Section 777.201, Florida Statute (1987) states: Entrapment.— (1) A law enforcement officer, a person . . .

GONZALEZ, v. STATE, 525 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . We note that the Cruz objective test of entrapment has been abolished by Section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

BAUER, v. STATE, 528 So. 2d 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . We are not called upon in this case to interpret or otherwise consider section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

STATE v. LOPEZ,, 522 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . We note that the Cruz objective test has been abolished by the Florida Legislature in section 777.201 . . .