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Florida Statute 777.201 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 777.201 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 777
PRINCIPAL; ACCESSORY; ATTEMPT; SOLICITATION; CONSPIRACY
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 777.201
777.201 Entrapment.
(1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with a law enforcement officer, or a person acting as an agent of a law enforcement officer perpetrates an entrapment if, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of a crime, he or she induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such crime by employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one who is ready to commit it.
(2) A person prosecuted for a crime shall be acquitted if the person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her criminal conduct occurred as a result of an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.
History.s. 42, ch. 87-243; s. 1196, ch. 97-102.

F.S. 777.201 on Google Scholar

F.S. 777.201 on Casetext

Amendments to 777.201


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 777.201
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 777.201.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All
  1. Appellant was convicted following a jury trial of trafficking in heroin. Subjective entrapment was his trial defense. See § 777.201(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) ("A person prosecuted for a crime shall be acquitted if the person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her criminal conduct occurred as a result of an entrapment."). "Subjective entrapment … 'is applied in the absence of egregious law enforcement conduct and focuses on inducement of the accused based on an apparent lack of predisposition to commit the offense.'" State v. Laing, 182 So.3d 812, 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting State v. Henderson, 955 So.2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)).
    PAGE 2
  2. Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes (2020), provides:
    PAGE 3
  3. i. McWhorter's Claim of Entrapment under Section 777.201, Fla. Stat., and the United States Supreme Court's Decisions in Sorrells and Sherman, Does Not Raise a Question of Constitutional Dimension
    PAGE 21
  4. "Entrapment" is defined as "employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other that one who is ready to commit it." 777.201(1) Fla. Stat. (2012). The defense is meant to stop the government from "originate[ing] a criminal design, implant[ing] in an innocent persons mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then inducting] commission of the crime so that the government may prosecute." Jacobson v. U.S.. 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992). In Florida, the Supreme Court has delineated two types of entrapment defenses: subjective and objective entrapment. Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1993). Florida codified the subjective entrapment defense as laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court, in Florida Statute section 777.201. See Munoz.
    PAGE 18
  5. Hall v. State

    326 So. 3d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)
    The defense of subjective entrapment, as codified at section 777.201, Florida Statutes, requires a defendant prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her criminal conduct occurred as a result of an entrapment." § 777.201(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). Unlike objective entrapment and its focus on law enforcement's conduct, subjective entrapment "focuses on inducement of the accused based on an apparent lack of predisposition to commit the offense." Davis v. State , 937 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
  6. State v. Sullivan

    324 So. 3d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)
    Subjective entrapment is codified at section 777.201, Florida Statutes (2017). This statute provides:
    PAGE 612
  7. In fact, when the state appellate court reversed the initial denial of Green's claim, the state court determined that, "[b]y [the] definition" of entrapment contained in § 777.201(1), Fla. Stat., "to present an entrapment defense, one would have to admit that he or she committed the crime but did so only because of the actions of law enforcement." Green, 34 So.3d at 784.
    PAGE 16
  8. Thomas v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

    substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one who is ready to commit it. § 777.201(1), Fla. Stat. Florida recognizes two theories of entrapment, one being "'objective entrapment,'

  9. Florida courts have recognized two different theories of entrapment: objective entrapment and subjective entrapment. See Jiminez v. State, 993 So. 2d 553, 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Objective entrapment is a defense where law enforcement conduct is so egregious that it amounts to a denial of due process. Id. Subjective entrapment, as codified by § 777.201, Florida Statutes, involves a three-part test: (1) whether the government agent induced the accused to commit the charged crime; (2) whether the accused was predisposed to commit the offense without persuasion; and (3) whether the entrapment evaluation should be submitted to the jury. Id. (citing Beattie v. State, 636 So. 2d 744, 746 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)). With regard to the accused's predisposition, the State is permitted to make "'an appropriate and searching inquiry' into conduct of the accused and present evidence of the accused's prior criminal history, even though such evidence is normally inadmissible." Beattie, 636 So. 2d at 746.
    PAGE 16
  10. DeMare v. State

    298 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 1 times
    § 777.201(1), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; see also Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90, 99 (Fla. 1993). The defendant must prove this subjective entrapment defense by a preponderance of the evidence. § 777.201(2).
    PAGE 1273

    Cases from cite.case.law:

    IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 272 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 2019)

    . . . This instruction was adopted in 2013 [122 So.3d 302], and amended in 2019. 3.6(j) ENTRAPMENT § 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. HARPER,, 254 So. 3d 479 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . . § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). . . . Section 777.201 directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted to the trier of fact. . . .

    AYALA, v. STATE, 232 So. 3d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . State, 180 So.3d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); see also § 777.201, Fla. . . .

    COFFEY, v. STATE, 228 So. 3d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes (2013), creates a three-pronged test for a finding of subjective . . .

    D. BLANCO, v. STATE, 218 So. 3d 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . The Florida legislature’codified the elements of the subjective entrapment defense in section 777.201 . . . (“[W]e construe section 777.201 as requiring the question of predisposition to be submitted to a jury . . . Section 777.201 may not, by its express terms, limit its application to subjective entrapment, but the . . . State, 937 So.2d 300, 303-04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). .Although section 777.201 arguably requires the issue . . . To construe section 777.201 as mandating that the issue of entrapment is to be submitted to a jury for . . .

    THE FLORIDA BAR, v. D. ADAMS, v., 198 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2016)

    . . . . § 777.201. Following the events of January 23-25, 2013, the ■Schnitt v. . . .

    SENGER, v. STATE, 200 So. 3d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . The defense of subjective entrapment is codified at section 777.201, Florida Statutes (2011), which provides . . . The analysis for subjective entrapment under section 777.201 involves a three-step inqui ry. . . .

    HILL, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . State, 629 So.2d 90, 99 (Fla.1993) (addressing statutory entrapment defense under § 777.201, Fla. . . . See § 777.201(1), Fla. . . . See § 777.201(2) (“The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.”); Smith v. . . .

    STATE v. LAING,, 182 So. 3d 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . Section 777.201, • Florida Statutes, provides: (1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. § 777.201, Fla. . . . Regarding the first prong of the test, “the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201 . . . State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla.1985), Hunter, 586 So.2d at 322, but that test was abolished by section 777.201 . . .

    RIVERA, v. STATE, 180 So. 3d 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

    . . . The defense of subjective entrapment is codified in section 777.201, Florida Statutes (2013). . . .

    HARRIMAN, v. STATE, 174 So. 3d 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

    . . . .”); § 777.201(2), Fla. . . .

    MIZNER, v. STATE, 154 So. 3d 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

    . . . . § 777.201(1). . . . .

    HO YEAON SEO, v. STATE, 143 So. 3d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

    . . . . § 777.201(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . On this issue, the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . .

    STATE v. MURPHY, v., 124 So. 3d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

    . . . recognizes two theories of defense based on entrapment: subjective entrapment, codified in section 777.201 . . . See § 777.201, Fla. Stat.; Jones v. State, 114 So.3d 1123, 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). . . .

    E. GENNETTE, v. STATE, 124 So. 3d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

    . . . Gennette argued that his conduct was the product of entrapment by the government, as defined by section 777.201 . . . As the dissent notes, section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes requires a defendant to prove, “by a preponderance . . . Ramos, 632 So.2d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (although section 777.201(2) provides that issue of entrapment . . . In 1987, the Florida Legislature adopted section 777.201, Florida Statutes, codifying the entrapment . . . The Florida Supreme Court has described the application of section 777.201 thusly: “The first question . . . See § 777.201(1), Fla. . . . See Munoz, 629 So.2d at 100 (construing section 777.201 to require questions to be submitted to a jury . . . the issue of what precipitated Appellant’s unlawful conduct would closely comport with the statute. § 777.201 . . .

    JONES, v. STATE, 114 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

    . . . . § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

    MORGAN, v. STATE, 112 So. 3d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

    . . . In upholding section 777.201, Florida Statutes, against the argument that it violated due process, the . . . Section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes (2010), specifically provides that the issue of entrapment shall . . .

    MONTOYA, v. STATE, 111 So. 3d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

    . . . See § 777.201(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2009); Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90, 99 (Fla.1993); State v. . . .

    STATE v. SIMMONS,, 80 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

    . . . . § 777.201(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

    M. BLACK, v. STATE, 41 So. 3d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

    . . . See § 777.201(1), Fla. . . .

    GREEN, v. STATE, 34 So. 3d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

    . . . Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes (2000), states that entrapment occurs when law enforcement or its . . .

    HERNANDEZ, v. STATE, 17 So. 3d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

    . . . However, in 1987, the Florida Legislature enacted section 777.201 which required courts to apply the . . . that in the absence of egregious law enforcement conduct, the subjective test as set forth in section 777.201 . . . In the present case, Hernandez did not seek relief under section 777.201. . . . Section 777.201, Florida Statutes, provides: § 777.201. . . .

    JIMENEZ, v. STATE, 993 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

    . . . subjective entrapment defense — the version of the defense relevant here — have been codified in section 777.201 . . . Section 777.201(1) provides in part: A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with . . . Florida Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test to determine if subjective entrapment under section 777.201 . . .

    CLINE, v. STATE, 958 So. 2d 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

    . . . State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993), the supreme court found that section 777.201, Florida Statutes, eliminated . . . The supreme court, in Munoz, found that although the subjective test set forth in section 777.201 is . . . Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes, provides: (1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation . . .

    STATE v. HENDERSON,, 955 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

    . . . The subjective entrapment theory has been codified at section 777.201, Florida Statutes (2006), and, . . . substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one who is ready to commit it.” § 777.201 . . .

    DAVIS, v. STATE, 937 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

    . . . The subjective test set forth in section 777.201, Florida Statutes, is the test to be applied on the . . . In section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes, the Legislature has defined inducement as occurring when: A . . . substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than one who is ready to commit it. § 777.201 . . . Munoz, 629 So.2d at 100 (“[W]e construe section 777.201 as requiring the question of predisposition to . . .

    MURRAY, v. STATE, 937 So. 2d 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

    . . . See § 777.201(2), Fla. . . .

    CAMPBELL, v. STATE, 935 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

    . . . Munoz, 629 So.2d at 99 (“the subjective test set forth in section 777.201 is the test to be applied on . . .

    STATE v. BLANCO,, 896 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

    . . . See § 777.201(2), Fla. . . . Const., and § 777.201(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . Munoz explained later that: “section 777.201 neither prohibits the judiciary from objectively reviewing . . . Accordingly, section 777.201 cannot overrule a decision of this Court regarding entrapment in any case . . . Munoz, 629 So.2d at 101 (“section 777.201 neither prohibits the judiciary from ... determining under . . .

    CURRY, v. STATE, 876 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

    . . . The subjective test is set forth in section 777.201, Florida Statutes, and is applicable in the absence . . .

    PEREZ, v. STATE, 856 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

    . . . State, 594 So.2d 275, 277 (Fla.1992); see also § 777.201, Fla. . . .

    FARLEY, v. STATE, 848 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

    . . . See § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

    KELLEY, v. STATE, 821 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

    . . . See § 777.201, Fla. . . .

    JACKSON, v. STATE, 810 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

    . . . The subjective test for entrapment under section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1997), is set forth in Munoz . . .

    DIAL, v. STATE FLORIDA,, 799 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

    . . . See § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (2000); Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993). . . .

    IRSULA, v. STATE, 805 So. 2d 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

    . . . See § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

    JOHNSON, v. STATE, 789 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

    . . . witnesses, but appellant’s evidence was sufficient to suggest the entrapment defense under section 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. O. ROKOS,, 771 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    . . . In the face of these factual disputes, the judge was obliged, under section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

    STATE v. G. BROWN,, 767 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    . . . On this issue, the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . While section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes (1997), directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted . . .

    A. CABRERA, v. STATE, 766 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    . . . Florida recognizes both a subjective entrapment defense, codified in section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

    STATE v. E. FIGUEREO,, 761 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

    . . . See § 777.201, Florida Statutes (1995); Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90, 99 (Fla.1993). . . .

    HOLIDAY, v. STATE, 753 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2000)

    . . . In that case, the Court analyzed Florida’s entrapment statute, section 777.201, Florida Statutes, the . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . On this issue, the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . Since its creation in 1987, see chapter 87-243, section 42, at 1657, Laws of Florida, section 777.201 . . . Thus, the current version of section 777.201 is substantively the same as the version analyzed in Munoz . . .

    AIDONE, v. STATE, 763 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

    . . . On this issue, the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . Id. at 99; see § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

    SOOHOO, v. STATE, 737 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

    . . . In 1987, however, the Florida legislature enacted section 777.201, Florida Statutes, specifically rejecting . . . Subsequently, when called upon to address section 777.201, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the legislature . . . Because the legislature cannot abrogate an accused’s due process rights, section 777.201 is inapplicable . . . Hence, we need not reach appellant’s contention that, pursuant to section 777.201, the State did not . . .

    GUERRA- VILLAFANE, v. K. SINGLETARY,, 729 So. 2d 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

    . . . After Cruz, the legislature enacted section 777.201, providing that: (1) A law enforcement officer, a . . . With the enactment of section 777.201, the Munoz court stated that the following three areas of inquiry . . . On this issue the accused has the burden of proof and, pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . We conclude that the entrapment instruction given in this case did not adequately satisfy section 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. R. BENNETT,, 710 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

    . . . that, in the absence of egregious conduct by law enforcement, the subjective test set forth in section 777.201 . . .

    WALKER, v. STATE, 701 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . State, 594 So.2d 275, 277-78 (Fla.1992), in upholding the constitutionality of section 777.201(2), Florida . . .

    VAZQUEZ, v. STATE, 700 So. 2d 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    . . . Subsection 777.201(1) now provides' that lack of predisposition is an element of the defense. . . . Subsection 777.201(2) evidences . the legislature’s intent that the defendant should prove entrapment . . . Turning its attention to section 777.201, the court stated: “The first question to be addressed under . . . Section 777.201 directs that the-issue of entrapment be submitted to the trier of fact. . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.” § 777.201, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . .

    STATE v. DAWSON,, 681 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    . . . The trial court concluded that on these facts, there was entrapment as a matter of law under section 777.201 . . . Since 1987, the defense of entrapment has been set forth by section 777.201, Florida Statutes, which . . . provides: 777.201 Entrapment.— (1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with a . . . court acknowledged that the Cruz legal test for entrapment does not survive the enactment of section 777.201 . . . Where there is no egregious law enforcement conduct, then “section 777.201 is the test to be applied_ . . .

    NADEAU, v. STATE, 683 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), was eliminated by the enactment of section 777.201 . . . The accused has the burden of proof pursuant to section 777.201 to establish this factor by a preponderance . . . [W]e construe section 777.201 as requiring the question of predisposition to be submitted to a jury when . . .

    ROBICHAUD, v. STATE, 658 So. 2d 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993), and set forth in section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1993), appellant . . .

    ORTIZ v. STATE, 654 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

    . . . See § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .

    STATE v. FINNO,, 643 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . Munoz, the supreme court determined that the amendment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes, eliminated . . .

    STATE v. CARR,, 642 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . the Florida Supreme Court held that the legislature eliminated the Cruz test when it enacted section 777.201 . . . trial court’s factual findings nevertheless support the dismissal under the subjective test of section 777.201 . . .

    SAMPSON, v. STATE, 645 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . State, 594 So.2d 275, 277 (Fla. 1992); see also § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1991) (entrapment creates a substantial . . .

    MORALES, v. STATE, 646 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . objective test for entrapment set forth in Cruz had been eliminated by the legislative enactment of section 777.201 . . . We now reevaluate this case under the subjective standard in section 777.201, as interpreted in Munoz . . . Although section 777.201 directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted to the trier of fact, if the . . .

    FRUETEL, v. STATE, 638 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . find that the legislature, in establishing a legislatively created entrapment defense through section 777.201 . . . On this issue the accused has the burden of proof and pursuant to section 777.201, must establish this . . . In Munoz, the supreme court said: Section 777.201 directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted to . . . a matter of law because no factual “question of predisposition” is at issue_ [W]e construe section 777.201 . . . trial court’s instructions coincide with the standard for subjective entrapment as codified in section 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. ROBINSON,, 635 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . In Munoz, the supreme court determined that section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), abolished the objective . . .

    STATE v. RAMOS,, 632 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

    . . . denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), was eliminated by the enactment of Section 777.201 . . . stated that the issue of entrapment may be evaluated under the subjective test established by Section 777.201 . . . Section 777.201 provides that the issue of entrapment shall be submitted to the trier of fact. . . . Section 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

    SALLOMI, v. STATE, 629 So. 2d 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . In Munoz, the court maintained that the legislature, in enacting section 777.201, did eliminate the objective . . . Thus, section 777.201 is inapplicable wherever a judge determines as a matter of law that officers have . . . In other words, section 777.201 is to be applied regarding the issue of entrapment only in the absence . . . analysis of the legislatively-created entrapment defense and the subjective test codified by section 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. HOWELL,, 629 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . Florida Supreme Court has recently rejected Cruz, announcing that our legislature, in enacting section 777.201 . . . Section 777.201(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in . . . See § 777.201(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). . . . The supreme court determined that pursuant to the subjective test established in section 777.201, the . . . Assessing the matter before us in the light of Munoz and section 777.201, we are compelled to the conclusion . . .

    MUNOZ, v. STATE, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1993)

    . . . Munoz, 586 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in which the district court held that section 777.201, Florida . . . However, the offenses at issue in Hunter occurred before section 777.201’s enactment. . . . Finally, we addressed section 777.201 in Herrera v. State, 594 So.2d 275 (Fla.1992). . . . rather than the jury instruction written to comply with section 777.201. . . . Section 777.201 directs that the issue of entrapment be submitted to the trier of fact. . . .

    STATE v. LEWIS,, 629 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1993)

    . . . State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993), that section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), abolished the objective . . .

    KINSEY, v. STATE, 623 So. 2d 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . abolished the separate defense of objective entrapment when it enacted, effective October 1, 1987, section 777.201 . . . However, this court has determined that section 777.201 neither abolished the defense nor altered the . . . Whether section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1991), placed the burden of proof on the defense also as to . . . Hunter, the court did not address section 777.201, apparently because the effective date of the statute . . .

    KRAJEWSKI, v. STATE, 621 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1993)

    . . . 586 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA1991), review granted, 598 So.2d 77 (Fla.1992), which held that section 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. N. SARGENT,, 617 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

    . . . Subsequent to Cruz, the legislature enacted section 777.201, effective as to offenses committed on or . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . State, 594 So.2d 275 (Fla.1992), the court upheld the constitutionality of section 777.201(2) and the . . . Because the New Jersey entrapment statute closely parallels the Florida entrapment statute, section 777.201 . . . to be misplaced because apparently the crimes in Hunter occurred prior to the enactment of section 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. RAMOS,, 608 So. 2d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . The State contends that Section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1989), has the effect of abolishing the objective . . .

    JERALDS, v. STATE, 603 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . In Hunter the Florida Supreme Court, subsequent to the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . . In Herrera, the majority opinion considered the constitutionality of section 777.201(2), Fla.Stat., which . . . Based on Herrera, I concur in the affirmance of Jerald’s conviction. .Section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes . . .

    BENNETT, v. STATE, 598 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . necessary for the supreme court to specifically address the constitutionality and applicability of section 777.201 . . . egregious as to violate due process and which no longer constitutes entrapment after the passage of section 777.201 . . . , 473 U.S. 905, 105, S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed. 2d 652 (1985), BEEN ABOLISHED BY THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 777.201 . . .

    KRAJEWSKI, v. STATE, 597 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . Its parameters are spelled out in section 777.201(2), Florida Statutes (1989). We affirm. . . .

    FUTCH, v. STATE, 596 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . See § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

    LEWIS, v. STATE, 597 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . considerations,” Hunter, 586 So.2d at 322—if it indeed amounts to an implied invalidation of section 777.201 . . . of Justice Kogan (which was not referred to by the majority and which also does not mention section 777.201 . . . Finally, it is unclear whether Hunter, which overruled Gonzalez or partially invalidated section 777.201 . . . Florida’s new entrapment statute codifies the subjective test ... § 777.201. . . . The only thing which occurred between Cruz and Hunter was § 777.201. . . . . We are not unaware of the line of cases holding that the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

    NAPOLI, v. STATE, 596 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . See § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987); Herrera v. . . .

    BEATTIE, v. STATE, 595 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . State, 589 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (objective test not abolished by section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . . types of movies available, film titles, prices, and usual lengths of time from order to delivery. . § 777.201 . . .

    HERRERA, v. STATE, 594 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1992)

    . . . While I have no quarrel with the result reached by the majority in construing section 777.201, Florida . . . On this last question, I agree with the majority that section 777.201 meets the minimum standards of . . . violated if a defendant must prove subjective entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, as section 777.201 . . . Wheeler, 468 So.2d 978 (Fla.1985), has been legislatively overruled by section 777.201 as Wheeler is . . . importance: Do Instruction 3.04(c)(2), Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, and Section 777.201 . . . The new paragraph in the entrapment instruction is based on section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1989), . . . Subsection 777.201(2) evidences the legislature’s intent that the defendant should prove entrapment instead . . .

    DeLEON, v. STATE, 594 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1992)

    . . . importance: Do Instruction 3.04(c)(2), Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, and Section 777.201 . . .

    BRUNETTI, v. STATE, 594 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1992)

    . . . importance: Do Instruction 3.04(c)(2), Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, and Section 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. THINH THIEN PHAM Vu,, 595 So. 2d 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    . . . In Munoz, a prior panel of this court held that section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), effectively . . . concerning the continuing viability of the objective entrapment test following enactment of section 777.201 . . . DENIED, 473 U.S. 905 [105 S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed.2d 652] (1985), BEEN ABOLISHED BY THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 777.201 . . . Munoz, 586 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), that is, whether enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

    RICARDO, v. STATE, 591 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . See § 777.201(2), Fla.Stat. (1989). The test to be applied at this stage is a subjective one. . . .

    WILSON, Jr. v. STATE, 589 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . We reiterate that in this court’s view that objective test was not abolished by section 777.201, Florida . . .

    SIMMONS, v. STATE, 590 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), quashed on other grounds, 589 So.2d 254 (Fla.1991), holding that section 777.201 . . . 319 (Fla.1991), where the court applied Cruz in a due process analysis, but did not address section 777.201 . . . DCA intends to recede from its holding in Krajewski, the 3rd DCA still expressly holds that section 777.201 . . . The Fifth District Court of Appeal has applied Cruz since the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . . alive and well for purposes of due process analy sis, it has failed to address the effect of section 777.201 . . .

    STRICKLAND, v. STATE, 588 So. 2d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . violated by placing upon him the burden of proof on the defense of entrapment as required by section 777.201 . . . court erred in initially concluding that the law of Cruz was superceded by the enactment of section 777.201 . . . motion to dismiss hearing, and found the appellant’s claim deficient: * * * He * * 2.However, if F.S. 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. MUNOZ,, 586 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . The state asserts that the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), abolished the objective . . .

    HERRERA, v. STATE, 580 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . See also § 777.201(2), Fla.Stat. (1987); In re Standard Jury Instr. in Criminal Cases, 543 So.2d 1205 . . . question: Do Instruction 3.04(c)(2), Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, and Section 777.201 . . .

    KRAJEWSKI, v. STATE, 587 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . The Entrapment Defense Prior to the enactment in 1987 of the entrapment statute, section 777.201, Florida . . . The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

    STATE v. W. SMITH S., 575 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . (codified at § 777.201(2), Fla.Stat. (1989)). . . .

    STATE v. C. PITTS,, 574 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    . . . Further, we decline to address whether section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987) removes the defense of . . .

    GONZALEZ, v. STATE, 571 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

    . . . . § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . Before section 777.201 was enacted, the judicially created defense of entrapment consisted of two independent . . . Before section 777.201 was enacted, the defendant merely had the burden of adducing evidence of entrapment . . . pre-ponderance of the evidence that “his criminal conduct occurred as a result of an entrapment.” § 777.201 . . . are in conflict over whether the Cruz objective entrapment test has survived the enactment of section 777.201 . . .

    BOWSER, v. STATE, 555 So. 2d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

    . . . Neither party has addressed the application to this case, if any, of section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . . our colleagues of the third district that the objective test of Cruz has been abolished by section 777.201 . . . There is nothing express or implied in the wording of section 777.201 which, to us, can be seized upon . . .

    HUFF, v. STATE, 544 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

    . . . See § 777.201, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

    STATE OF FLORIDA v. MOORE, 35 Fla. Supp. 2d 180 (Fla. Cty. Ct. 1989)

    . . . Section 777.201 (1987) which provides as follows: (1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in . . .

    In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, 543 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1989)

    . . . Chapter ST-243, Section 42, Laws of Florida, creates Section 777.201, Florida Statutes, which redefines . . . concern over the constitutionality of chapter 87-243, section 42, Laws of Florida, creating section 777.201 . . .

    STATE v. BURCH, STATE v. BROWN,, 545 So. 2d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

    . . . Section 777.201, Florida Statute (1987) states: Entrapment.— (1) A law enforcement officer, a person . . .

    GONZALEZ, v. STATE, 525 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

    . . . We note that the Cruz objective test of entrapment has been abolished by Section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

    BAUER, v. STATE, 528 So. 2d 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

    . . . We are not called upon in this case to interpret or otherwise consider section 777.201, Florida Statutes . . .

    STATE v. LOPEZ,, 522 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

    . . . We note that the Cruz objective test has been abolished by the Florida Legislature in section 777.201 . . .