The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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“Recovery under DOHSA is expressly limited to pecuniary losses.” Sexton v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-20990-CIV, 2021 WL 2400274, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 11, 2021), amended on reconsideration on other grounds, No. 20-20990-CIV, 2021 WL 3006916 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2021) (Scola, J.) (citing Sanchez v. Loffland Bros. Co., 626 F.2d 1228, 1230 (5th Cir. 1980) (“DOHSA specifically limits recoverable damages to those pecuniary in nature.”)). “The measure of recovery under DOHSA is the actual pecuniary benefits that the decedent's beneficiaries could reasonably have expected to receive from the continued life of the decedent.” Id. (cleaned up; citing Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 786 (5th Cir.1976)). “Pecuniary losses include loss of support, loss of services, and loss of nurture and guidance.” Tello v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 946 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Lenard, J.)). Pecuniary losses under DOHSA are “not so narrow as to exclude damages for the loss of services of a husband, wife, or child,” but damages for a decedent's “pain and suffering” or for loss of society are barred under DOHSA. Kennedy v. Carnival Corp., 385 F.Supp.3d 1302, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2019… We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not properly certify its order, which did not resolve all claims and counterclaims in the adversary proceedings, for immediate review under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7054(a). See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7054(a) (providing that Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) applies in adversary bankruptcy proceedings); Dzibowski v. Boomer's Sports &Recreation Ctr., Inc. (In re Boca Arena, Inc.), 184 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that a bankruptcy court order disposing of fewer than all claims in an adversary proceeding is not immediately appealable absent Rule 7054 certification). Specifically, the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in determining that there was "no just reason for delay." See Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that to certify a case under Rule 54(b), a court must determine, inter alia, that there is "no just reason for delay" in permitting an immediate appeal).E. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), the Plaintiff may be entitled to recover, as an equitable remedy, the illegal profits gained through the Defendants' distribution and sales of goods bearing counterfeits and infringements of the CreeLED Marks. See Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Fuller Brush Prods. Co. v. Fuller Brush Co., 299 F.2d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1962) (“An accounting of profits under § 1117(a) is not synonymous with an award of monetary damages: ‘[a]n accounting for profits . . . is an equitable remedy subject to the principles of equity.'”)).Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on a final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, are extremely limited. A prisoner is only entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that: (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) exceeded its jurisdiction; (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, relief under § 2255 “is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)). If a court finds a claim under § 2255 valid, the court “shall vacate and set the judgment aside shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The § 2255 movant “bears the burden to prove the claims in his § 2255 motion.… "A denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of fact and law," so we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and review questions of law and the district court's application of the law to facts de novo. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 870 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). We review a decision to admit expert opinion testimony for abuse of discretion and will not reverse "in the absence of manifest error." United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2015).“Prior to a court exercising any leveling mechanism due to spoliation of evidence, the court must answer three threshold questions: 1) whether the evidence existed at one time, 2) whether the spoliator had a duty to preserve the evidence, and 3) whether the evidence was critical to an opposing party being able to prove its prima facie case or a defense.” Golden Yachts, Inc. v. Hall, 920 So.2d 777, 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Defendant had a duty to take pictures of the scene before it was cleaned. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to an adverse inference instruction. Therefore, there is no dispute of material fact regarding notice and summary judgment must be granted in Defendant's favor.Petitioner, the § 2255 movant, “bears the burden to prove the claims in his § 2255 motion.” Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 917 (2015); see also Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1168 (2019). Moreover, a § 2255 movant is not entitled to a hearing, much less relief, “when his claims are merely conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics or contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 (1992).One, the procedural history of our case (including the two prior dismissals) is a matter of public record, and “a district court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Klopfenstein v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 592 Fed.Appx. 812, 816 (11th Cir. 2014). Normally, on a motion to dismiss, a court should constrain its analysis to the four corners of the complaint. Here, though, Judge Christensen properly took judicial notice of the two dismissals in Great Lakes's other federal cases. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) provides for taking judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999); see also SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010) (“In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.” (citing… We review a district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007). Although Ortiz seeks reversal of the order denying reconsideration, she makes no arguments in her briefing that pertain to the order denying reconsideration nor the correct standard of review. As such, we consider any argument as to that order abandoned. Tanner Advert. Grp., L.L.C. v. Fayette County, 451 F.3d 777, 785 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that issues not clearly designated in the initial brief are considered abandoned).Importantly, the Court must “view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.” Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Carter v. City of Melbourne, Fla., 731 F.3d 1161, 1166 (11th Cir. 2013)). At the same time, “[a] mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Brooks v. Cnty. Comm'n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990)). Ultimately, summary judgment should only be granted “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).. . . Walsh, supra , at 777. . . .
. . . . ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 767, 777, 200 L.Ed.2d 15 (2018) (quoting Loughrin v. . . .
. . . No. 19-777. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 777, p. 248 (1833). See, e.g., J. . . . Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 777, p. 248 (1833); 6 N. . . .
. . . not made the new rule announced in Hall retroactive to cases on collateral review"); see In re Hill, 777 . . .
. . . In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284, 301 (11th Cir. 2013) ; see In re Hill, 777 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015) . . .
. . . Holt , 777 F.3d 1234, 1261 (11th Cir. 2015). . . . Holt , 777 F.3d at 1261. . . . See, e.g. , Holt , 777 F.3d at 1265 (" 'The operations of narcotics dealers are a proper subject for . . . Holt , 777 F.3d at 1259 (quoting United States v. Maxwell , 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) ). . . .
. . . Ct. at 1778 ; Plumhoff , 572 U.S. at 777, 134 S. Ct at 2022 ). . . . sent a state trooper to a jury "in defiance" of "the concept and precedents of qualified immunity." 777 . . .
. . . Fayette Cty. , 451 F.3d 777, 786 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("A request for damages that is barred as . . .
. . . Gomez-Leon , 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008) that an intentional use of force was required for a crime of . . .
. . . (R. 777). The ALJ is correct, of course, but common sense does have to enter into the calculus. . . .
. . . Rptr. 770, 777 (1979) ("The state with the 'predominant' interest in controlling conduct normally is . . .
. . . Shuler , 777 F.2d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Where, as here, a plaintiff predicates liability under . . .
. . . 'relies on' a new rule only when the rule is 'sufficient to justify a grant of relief.' " Supra at 777 . . .
. . . Baines , 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). . . . Thompson , 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and United States v. . . .
. . . Id. at 777. . . . "[R]elief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in 'extraordinary circumstances.' " Id. at 777 (quoting . . . See Id. at 777-780 (finding that Martinez / Trevino was one significant element but relying in significant . . . Ct. at 777. . . .
. . . Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. , 370 U.S. 690, 698-99, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962) (quoting United . . . Dental Ass'n , 526 U.S. at 777, 119 S.Ct. 1604. . . . FTC , 526 U.S. 756, 777, 119 S.Ct. 1604, 143 L.Ed.2d 935 (1999) ). . . . Id. at 777. . . .
. . . Lo , 839 F.3d 777, 792-94 (9th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Ct. 759, 777-78, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017) (quoting Gonzalez v. . . .
. . . Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 820 F.2d 777, 782 (6th Cir. 1987). . . .
. . . Frito Lay, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. . . . Cerutti, 777 F. . . .
. . . Ryan , 752 F.3d 768, 777 (9th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Ct. 759, 777, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017). . . .
. . . certain credit card information, including the card's expiration date, on printed receipts. 883 F.3d 776, 777 . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009) ); see also Perez v. . . .
. . . Butler , 777 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). . . . Thompson , 777 F.3d 368, 378 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Some conditions of supervised release are administrative . . .
. . . Vandenberg , 796 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . United States v Jones , 188 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 1999). . . .
. . . Dunn , 777 F.3d 1171, 1181 (10th Cir. 2015) (vacating restitution order that held a single defendant . . .
. . . Bd. of Educ. , 462 F.3d 762, 777 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Id. at 777-78. The Dogans urge us to adopt the Fourth Circuit's approach. . . . the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Yousuf (post-remand from the Supreme Court). 699 F.3d at 777 . . . Id. at 777. . . . Yousuf , 699 F.3d at 777. . . .
. . . Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). . . .
. . . Williams , 777 F.3d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . App'x 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (explaining that "[p]rison inmates do not have a constitutionally . . .
. . . Simmons , 964 F.2d 763, 777 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Issues not raised on appeal are waived under Rule 4 of . . .
. . . Holder , 777 F.3d 199, 212-13 (4th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Comm., 777 F.2d 776 (1st Cir. 1985), however, Johnson's receipt of a copy of those records from the provider . . .
. . . Lyon , 567 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 1977) (explaining that "ambiguity does not in every case constitute . . .
. . . Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . appellate court confronted a similar situation and found the discovery rule inapplicable. 843 S.W.2d 777 . . .
. . . Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2010). . . .
. . . individual who had already fired his weapon causing police to fear for their lives); Boyd , 374 F.3d at 777 . . .
. . . Bogen , 913 F.3d 777, 780-81 (8th Cir. 2019) (italics removed, alteration in original) (quoting Laase . . .
. . . Martin , 777 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Kelley , 747 F.2d 777, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984). . . .
. . . Rentz , 777 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2015). . . . "authorizes multiple charges when everyone admits there's only a single use, carry, or possession." 777 . . . See Rentz , 777 F.3d at 1117. . . .
. . . Co., 264 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Even though the railroad's system of scheduling appears quite . . .
. . . Butler , 777 F.3d 382, 386-87 (7th Cir. 2015). . . . See Butler , 777 F.3d at 387. . . .
. . . App'x 777 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ; Voter Verified, Inc. v. . . .
. . . Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. , 370 U.S. 690, 699, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962) ); see also Phila . . .
. . . Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc. , 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1986) ); see also Manley v. . . .
. . . Rhone , 647 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2011), where an appeal continued after the appellant was released from . . .
. . . Youkhana , 277 Ill.App.3d 101, 213 Ill.Dec. 777, 660 N.E.2d 34, 39-42 (1995), aff'd sub nom. . . .
. . . Dillard's, Inc. , 450 F.3d 775, 777 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). . . . Dillard's Inc. , 450 F.3d 775, 777 (8th Cir. 2006). This is not, however, what happened here. . . .
. . . See Hilton , 481 U.S. at 777-78, 107 S.Ct. 2113 (explaining that stronger showings on some factors can . . .
. . . United States , 777 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. . . .
. . . Corsini , 777 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2015). The Commonwealth does not contest that Mr. . . .
. . . Arpaio , 770 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). . . . Rptr. 2d 777, 785 (1999) ; see also Nat'l Am. Ins. . . .
. . . J.A. 777. . . .
. . . Londondio , 420 F.3d 777, 786 (8th Cir. 2005), citing United States v. . . .
. . . 2011), and reh'g denied 565 U.S. 1101, 132 S.Ct. 869, 181 L.Ed.2d 566 (2011), dismissed on remand , 777 . . .
. . . Cramer , 777 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 2015) ; United States v. . . . McMillian , 777 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. . . .
. . . State, 87 So. 3d 774, 777 (Fla. 2012). . . .
. . . State, 404 So. 2d 776, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). . . . items were found in a duplex where he lived and inside a shed located outside the duplex. 404 So. 2d at 777 . . . Walton, 404 So. 2d at 777-78. . . .
. . . Wilson , 343 U.S. 495, 503, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952) ). . . .
. . . Danbury Hospital , 278 Conn. 163, 896 A.2d 777 (2006), forecloses this claim because, as alleged, it . . . See Sherwood , 278 Conn. at 196, 896 A.2d 777 ("Although the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant . . . Id. at 196-97, 896 A.2d 777. . . .
. . . EPA , 777 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2014). V. . . .
. . . that federal appellate courts, on average, invalidated patents at a rate of 77% between 1941-1945), 777 . . .
. . . Stephens], supra , [777 F.3d 250] at 266 [ (2015) ] ("The denial of funding will be upheld ... when the . . .
. . . Carter , 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001). . . .
. . . Butler , 777 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). . . . To start, because we liberally construe waiver in favor of defendants, see Butler , 777 F.3d at 387, . . . Thompson , 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015). See, e.g., United States v. . . .
. . . Keystone Oilfield Supply Co. , 777 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (wholesaler); Burch v. . . . Garber , 380 F.Supp.3d at 777, 2019 WL 1437877, at *7 ("The [plaintiffs] have not presented any evidence . . .
. . . Topcon Medical Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 217, 238 (D. Mass. 2011). . . . See 18 § 1839(5)(B) ; Optos, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d at 238. . . .
. . . Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015). A. . . . Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015). . . . Sosa, 777 F.3d at 1294. . . .
. . . Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 999 (5th Cir. 1985) ). . . .
. . . defendants' Seventh Amendment and due process rights.' " Id. at 52 (quoting In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 . . .
. . . (EPIC) , 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Milner v. . . . EPIC , 777 F.3d at 522. . . .
. . . Univ. of Hous. , 860 F.3d 767, 777-78 (5th Cir. 2017) (resolving the case by reference to the Yusuf framework . . .
. . . State , 264 Ga. 777, 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994) ). . . .
. . . PCD-2009-777 (Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 2, 2010) (Pavatt III ). . . . PCD-2009-777 at 6 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1089(D)(8) ). . . . PCD-2009-777 at 2-3. . . . PCD-2009-777 at 4). . . . PCD-2009-777 at 7. . . .
. . . Dunn , 777 F.3d 1171, 1181-82 (10th Cir. 2015) (same). See, e.g. , United States v. . . .
. . . Library of Congress , 777 F.2d 1573, 1574 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ). . . .
. . . that would produce a congressional delegation of ten Republicans and three Democrats. 318 F.Supp.3d 777 . . . On remand, the District Court again struck down the 2016 Plan. 318 F.Supp.3d 777. . . . Rucho , 318 F.Supp.3d 777, 805-806 (M.D.N.C. 2018). • Lewis then presented for the redistricting committee's . . .
. . . Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985). . . .
. . . Ticonic Nat'l Bank , 307 U.S. 161, 168, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939). . . .
. . . InterVarsity Christian Fellowship , 777 F.3d 829, 834-35 (6th Cir. 2015) ). . . . Catholic school was a minister, emphasizing "function" was "the most important consideration"); Conlon , 777 . . .
. . . Int'l, Inc. , 920 F.3d 777, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2019). . . .
. . . Corsini , 777 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2015) ("[P]rocedurally defaulted claims cannot be resurrected by . . .
. . . Amphenol Printed Circuits, Inc. , 777 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir. 2015) ("To demonstrated that he was fired . . .
. . . App'x 777, 786 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and footnote call number omitted). . . . G & E Tires & Serv., Inc. , 777 So. 2d 1034, 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ; Jim Black & Assocs., Inc. v. . . . Co. , 777 So. 2d at 1039 ; Jim Black & Assocs., Inc. , 932 So. 2d at 518. . . .
. . . Id. at 777. A. . . . Holmstrom , 615 F.3d at 777. Almost as problematic as Dr. Stock's and Dr. . . .
. . . Id. at 777. . . .
. . . Southpeak Interactive Corp., 777 F.3d 658, 672 (4th Cir. 2015) ("Every federal circuit court to have . . .
. . . Alfonso , 143 F.3d 772, 777 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Comm'rs of Bernalillo Cty. , 781 F.2d 777, 782 (C.A.10 1985) (county seal depicting Latin cross) ("[T . . .
. . . State, 777 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ; Edwards v. . . .
. . . State, 777 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ; Wright v. . . .
. . . Id. at 777. Id. at 770. Id. Jones v. Texas , 542 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 2836, 159 L.Ed.2d 270 (2004). . . . Jones , 119 S.W.3d at 777-83. . . .
. . . Wright , 777 F.3d 769, 773 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. . . . See Wright , 777 F.3d at 776 (holding that a suspect was not in custody under Miranda in part because . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 447, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (relying on Hilton , 481 U.S. at 777, 107 S.Ct. 2113 ). . . . See Hilton , 481 U.S. at 777, 107 S.Ct. 2113 (noting that the government's interest in "continuing custody . . .