The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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“[A] defendant is bound by the statements he makes under oath during a plea colloquy.” Rodriguez v. State, 223 So.3d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). See also Scheele v. State, 953 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (“[a] plea conference is not a meaningless charade to be manipulated willy-nilly after the fact; it is a formal ceremony, under oath, memorializing a crossroads in a case.”). Because this claim is conclusively refuted by the record, [the claim] will be denied.While the Commissioner has examined the record and attempted to provide support for the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Karle's opinion, such post-hoc rationalizations do not provide the basis for judicial review of an administrative decision. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). This Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Mitchell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 771 F.3d 782, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).See also Robbins v. Robertson , 782 Fed.Appx. 794, 799 (11th Cir. 2019) (“‘The general rule is that a prisoner's transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief' even when ‘there is no assurance that he will not be returned to the jail.'”) (quoting McKinnon v. Talladega Cty., Ala. , 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984)); Stanley v. Broward Cty. Sheriff, 773 Fed.Appx. 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Where past harm has occurred but ‘the threat of future harm dissipates, the plaintiff 's claims for equitable relief become moot because the plaintiff no longer needs protection from future injury.'”) (quoting Adler v. Duval Cty. SchoolBd. , 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997)).“[A] state court judge, although immune from damages under section 1983, when acting in conspiracy with private defendants, can supply the state action nexus required for a section 1983 suit.” Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)). Because Curtis fails to allege that the defendants and Judge Easton reached an understanding or agreement to deny Curtis's rights, he fails to state a claim under Section 1983. Phillips, 746 F.2d 784, 785 (“[A] naked assertion of a conspiracy between a state judge and private defendants without supporting operative facts provides an insufficient state action nexus for a section 1983 action.”); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The brief suggestion that D'Alessandro colluded with Judge Pack to violate appellant's rights also does not state a claim as appellant failed to plead more than a general conclusory allegation of conspiracy.”).But the general authority to appoint counsel is not the same as the authority to appoint the public defender. See, e.g., Yacucci v. Hershey, 549 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (reversing the appointment of the public defender's office in a dependency proceeding, holding that rule 3.111(b)(2) "however does not give any indication that said counsel can be the public defender's office").In sum, if there are any genuine issues of material fact, the Court must deny summary judgment and proceed to trial. Whelan v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 2013 WL 5583970, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2013) (Ungaro, J.). On the other hand, the Court must grant summary judgment if a party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Lima v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 627 Fed.Appx. 782, 785-86 (11th Cir. 2015) (“If no reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted.” (quoting Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994))).Defendant relies on Robbins, Muhammad, and Midrash. ECF No. [102] at 7-8 (citing Robbins v. Robertson, 782 Fed.Appx. 794, 801 (11th Cir. 2019); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004); Muhammad v. Inch, No. 3:18-CV-212-J-25JBT, 2020 WL 13518236 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2020)).Paragraphs 7.6.2 and 11.2 are not facially in conflict with each other. The problem arises only because the Restatements were not signed in Indiana. When faced with an inconsistency like this, the court must try to reconcile the conflicting provisions or, if reconciliation is not possible, give a “reasonable interpretation.” Kaplan v. Bayer, 782 So.2d 417, 419 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2001). Interpretation is a question of law. Id.In describing what level two requires, Plaintiff purposefully highlighted the fact that it includes "commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions." [ECF No. 20, p. 12 (emphasis in original)]. She states that the "Eleventh Circuit has held that there is an apparent conflict between a limitation to 'simple, routine, tasks' and Reasoning Level 3 jobs." [ECF No. 20, p. 11 (citing Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 782 Fed.Appx. 875, 878 (11th Cir. 2019))].In this case, the alleged legal errors-burden-shifting, misplaced reliance on mitigating circumstances, and division of financial responsibility-first appeared in the Commission's final order. Though OPC filed a motion for reconsideration, it withdrew the motion without giving the Commission a fair opportunity to correct the alleged errors raised in the motion. Thus, OPC failed to preserve these arguments. See Pisano v. Mayo Clinic Florida, 333 So.3d 782, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). This failure constrains our review-that is, we can only reverse if those errors rise to the level of fundamental error. Aills v. Boemi, 29 So.3d 1105, 1109 (Fla. 2010). We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that, even assuming error, that error would not be fundamental.. . . Klindt , 782 P.2d 401, 404 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (overruling Ex parte Nowabbi , 60 Okla. . . . See Klindt , 782 P.2d at 403-404. . . . Klindt , 782 P.2d 401, 404 (Okla. Crim. . . .
. . . Moreno , 413 U.S. 528, 529, 537-538, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973) ; Frontiero v. . . .
. . . International Assn. of Fire Chiefs, Inc. , 782 F.2d 987, 989-990 (CA Fed. 1986). . . .
. . . Holder , 782 F.3d 81, 88 (CA2 2015) ; Pieschacon-Villegas v. Attorney General of U. . . . Holder , 782 F.3d 81, 88-89 (CA2 2015) ; Lovan v. Holder , 574 F.3d 990, 998 (CA8 2009). . . . Gonzales , 410 F.3d 778, 781-782 (CA5 2005). . . .
. . . No. 19-782. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . United States , 577 U.S. 1098, 136 S.Ct. 892, 193 L.Ed.2d 782 (2016) ; McLane Co. v. . . .
. . . EPA , 843 F.2d 782, 791 (C.A.4 1988) ("[T]he control of non[-]point source pollution was so dependent . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Community , 572 U.S. 782, 798, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). . . .
. . . United States , 415 U.S. 814, 831, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 39 L.Ed.2d 782 (1974). . . .
. . . Bangor Publishing Co. , 470 A.2d 782, 784 (Me. 1984). In this case, it appears that the D. C. . . .
. . . . ----, 139 S.Ct. 782, 202 L.Ed.2d 510 (2018). . . .
. . . Admin. , 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) ; Phillips , 357 F.3d at 1237 (ALJ has a duty to consider . . .
. . . ARCO Alaska, Inc. , 782 F.2d 800, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) ; see also United States v. Sec'y, Fla. . . .
. . . Beentjes , 397 F.3d at 782 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Belanger v. . . .
. . . Thompson (CHMP ), 323 F.3d 782, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) ; GCI Health Ctrs., Inc. v. . . .
. . . United States , 782 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Ayers , 782 F.3d 425, 460 n.62 (9th Cir. 2015) )). Even if the weaknesses in Moore's and Dr. . . .
. . . Wilson , 107 F.3d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1997). . . .
. . . Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), the Court addressed "whether Ohio's . . .
. . . Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997) ; Schloesser v. . . .
. . . Hayden , 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) ; see also id. at 633, 6 S.Ct. 524 (stating . . .
. . . Williamson , 782 F.3d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . letter dated August, 2015, that petitioner was ineligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 782 . . .
. . . Anderson , 755 F.3d 782, 791 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[W]e defer to the district court's credibility determination . . .
. . . Kappes , 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court has wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges . . .
. . . Albury , 782 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Albury , 782 F.3d at 1295. . . .
. . . App'x 778, 782 (4th Cir. 2008) ; see Mann v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 185 F. . . . App'x at 782 (finding that plaintiff's belief that African-American candidates were being discriminated . . .
. . . Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 782, which revised the Guidelines' drug quantity table by reducing . . . C amend. 782 (Nov. 1, 2014); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). . . . Amendment 782 was later made retroactive for defendants, including those in this consolidated proceeding . . . Invoking Amendment 782, each defendant filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence. . . .
. . . Heico Cos., L.L.C. , 782 F.3d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Reed , 701 F.3d at 441 ). . . .
. . . Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 820 F.2d 777, 782 (6th Cir. 1987). . . .
. . . Under Amendment 782, Sainz's Guidelines range had been reduced from 188-235 months in prison to 151-188 . . . ground that "[the district court] expressly considered the potential effect of then-expected Amendment 782 . . . is consistent with its approach throughout litigation of sentence reduction motions under Amendment 782 . . .
. . . Booksellers Ass'n , 484 U.S. 383, 393, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988). . . .
. . . Moreno , 413 U.S. 528, 538, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973). . . . Moreno , 413 U.S. 528, 538, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973). . . .
. . . United States , 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999) ). . . .
. . . Servs. , 709 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Ayers , 782 F.3d 425, 462 (9th Cir. 2015) ; see also Williams , 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (discussing . . .
. . . Id. at 782-83. . . . Id. at 782-83. . . .
. . . Fossil, Inc. , 817 F.3d 782, 789-90 (Fed. . . .
. . . See In re Copper Antitrust Litig. , 436 F.3d 782, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997) ; Schloesser v. . . .
. . . Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997) ; Schloesser v. . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 788, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014), "as far as the federal . . .
. . . Wilson , 197 F.3d 782, 786 (6th Cir. 1999). . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty ., 572 U.S. 782, 788, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (first quoting Oklahoma . . .
. . . Hayden , 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). . . .
. . . White , 782 F.3d 1118, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015) ("[W]e conclude Congress intended courts to apply a categorical . . .
. . . United States , 782 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ); accord Allustiarte v. . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 794, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) ). * * * For the . . .
. . . others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place." 458 U.S. 782 . . .
. . . State , 113 Wash.2d 612, 618, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989). Id. . . . State , 113 Wash.2d 612, 618, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989) ). . . .
. . . C, Amend. 782 (2014); USSG § 1B1.10(a)(1), (d), (e)(1) (2014). . . .
. . . Sessions , 885 F.3d 782, 789 (4th Cir. 2018) ("[W]hen, absent federal direction or authorization, a state . . .
. . . Lockett , 782 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Whether a prior conviction is a qualifying predicate under . . .
. . . Anderson , 782 F.2d 908, 913 (11th Cir. 1986). . . .
. . . Kappes , 782 F.3d 828, 853 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Lambert, 782 F.2d 1299, 1302 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that an alien who was Inside an aircraft against . . .
. . . Roy , 782 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015) ("[A] serious medical need does not require that an inmate receive . . . Perry , 782 F.3d at 79 ; see also Estelle , 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. 285. . . . Perry , 782 F.3d at 79 (quotation marks and citation omitted). . . .
. . . Checora , 175 F.3d 782, 790 (10th Cir. 1999). . . .
. . . Lyon , 567 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 1977) (explaining that "ambiguity does not in every case constitute . . .
. . . Beyle , 782 F.3d 159, 171 (4th Cir. 2015) (announcing no standard for reviewing the overarching compulsory . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 790, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). . . .
. . . Armstrong, 782 F.3d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 2015). . . . See Armstrong, 782 F.3d at 1036-37 (holding that two convictions counted as predicate controlled substance . . .
. . . outlined why Monell's logic, developed for municipalities, may not apply to private corporations. 746 F.3d 782 . . .
. . . Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997). . . .
. . . Co., No. 18 Civ. 782, 2019 WL 1059973, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2019) (quoting ZKZ Assoc. v. . . .
. . . In October 2015, the Probation Office prepared an Amendment 782 Memorandum to determine whether Mr. . . . Defender, then notified the Court it would not file a motion for sentence reduction under Amendment 782 . . .
. . . Litig ., 585 F.3d 774, 782-783 (3d Cir. 2009) ; In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. . . .
. . . White , 782 F.3d 1118, 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2015). . . . to be "an instruction to courts to consider the specific circumstance of a victim's age"); White , 782 . . . Young , 872 F.3d 742, 745-47 (5th Cir. 2017) ; White , 782 F.3d at 1137. . . .
. . . Watson , 881 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2018) ; see also Hammond , 354 F. Supp. 3d at 49 ; Chance v. . . .
. . . Cotton , 782 F.3d 392, 395 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Alburay , 415 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Holder , 782 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) ; id. at 92 n.1 (Lohier, J., concurring). . . .
. . . Herman , 221 F.3d 782, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (burns); E. Tex. Motor Freight , 671 F.2d at 849 (toes). . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 794, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (citation omitted . . .
. . . Meléndez-Rivera, 782 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . . 218, 819 N.E.2d 714 (2004) ; In re Andrea F. , 208 Ill. 2d 148, 165, 280 Ill.Dec. 531, 802 N.E.2d 782 . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 729, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("the averments in the Complaint indicate that Defendants' conduct . . .
. . . we read Edwards as extending beyond covenants not to compete between employers and their employees. 782 . . . See Golden , 782 F.3d at 1086 ; see also Steven M. Perry & Sean F. . . .
. . . Vill. of Hinsdale , 326 Ill.App.3d 372, 260 Ill.Dec. 599, 761 N.E.2d 782, 789 (2001) (holding that a . . .
. . . Sessions, 885 F.3d 782, 789 (4th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . . ----, 782 S.E.2d 736 (2016), as did the United States Supreme Court, see Richardson v. . . .
. . . Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 350, 782 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (2003). . . .
. . . Hampton Affiliates, Inc. , 66 N.Y.2d 782, 497 N.Y.S.2d 898, 488 N.E.2d 828 (1985) ). . . .
. . . Dep't of Justice , 653 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). . . .
. . . Brathwaite , 782 F.2d 399, 406-07 (3d Cir. 1986) (describing the Blockburger test). . . . Express, Inc. , 486 Mich. 50, 782 N.W. 2d 475 (2010). . . .
. . . T&H Lemont, Inc. , 845 F.3d 772, 782 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Entergy Corp. , 782 So. 2d 606, 611 (La. 2001) (a negligence claim requires "proof of actual damages" . . .
. . . See DePiero, 180 F.3d at 782 ("The Supreme Court's test does not call for proof of actual temptation. . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 789, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (holding that tribal . . .
. . . Kappes , 782 F.3d 828, 842-43 (7th Cir. 2015). . . . Kappes , 782 F.3d at 843. . . . See, e.g., Kappes , 782 F.3d at 844 ; United States v. . . .
. . . Colvin, 861 F.3d 779, 782 n.3 (8th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . O'Lone , 782 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 1986) ). . . . Id . at 350, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (quoting Shabazz , 782 F.2d at 420 )). . . .
. . . Smith , 782 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2015) ; Belbachir v. . . .
. . . Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) ). . . .
. . . Thomas, 417 Mass. 782, 633 N.E.2d 390, 395 (1994). Compare Jablonski v. . . .
. . . Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, 91 Mass.App.Ct. 835, 81 N.E.3d 782, 789 (2017) (to prevail . . .
. . . Mellon , 782 F.3d 504, 508-10 (9th Cir. 2015) ; Appert , 673 F.3d at 620-21 (7th Cir.). . . . See Eminence , 782 F.3d at 510 (quoting BlackRock , 673 F.3d at 179 ). c. . . . Mellon , 782 F.3d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Edwards , 782 F.3d 554, 561 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that a constructive amendment occurs when the evidence . . .
. . . Woodel, 145 So. 3d 782, 803 (Fla. 2014) ("Furthermore, because we do not find multiple errors in this . . .
. . . Vasey , 834 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1987) (endorsing contrary reasoning and declining to apply the Leon . . .