The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Mr. Carrin also had a serious medical need. Black v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 578 Fed.Appx. 794, 795 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Hepatitis C is a serious medical need”); see, e.g., Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 862 (7th Cir. 2011); Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1270; Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2019); Woodcock v. Correct Care Sols., 861 Fed.Appx. 654, 659 (6th Cir. 2021). Defendants do not dispute the seriousness of Mr. Carrin's medical need or his right to medical treatment. Rather, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because they did not violate Mr. Carrin's constitutional rights. ECF No. 74 at 6; ECF No. 75 at 6-7; ECF No. 80 at 6-7. Defendants argue that their actions or inactions did not rise “to the level of deliberate indifference.” ECF No. 74 at 9; ECF No. 75 at 910; ECF No. 80 at 9-10. Thus, the issue is whether the complaint sufficiently alleged that Defendants committed a constitutional violation.The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. 505 F.Supp.3d 879, 883 (Minn. 2020). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 26 F. 4th 789, 790 (2022). It held that "[w]here state law recognizes no property interest in surplus proceeds from a tax-foreclosure sale conducted after adequate notice to the owner, there is no unconstitutional taking." Id., at 793. The court also rejected Tyler's claim under the Excessive Fines Clause, adopting the District Court's reasoning that the forfeiture was not a fine because it was intended to remedy the State's tax losses, not to punish delinquent property owners. Id., at 794 (citing 505 F.Supp.3d, at 895-899).The parties will have two (2) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendations within which to file written objections, if any, with the District Judge. Each party may file a response to the other party's objection within two (2) days of the objection. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).See Dees v. Murphy, 794 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[H]abeas corpus is the ‘exclusive initial cause of action' where the claim challenges the constitutionality of the conviction.”).Because normal contract principles apply to a plea agreement, United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2015), a party that has breached the agreement generally cannot enforce it against the other party. See id. ("We agree with our sister circuits that a party's waiver of the right to seek appellate review is not enforceable where the opposing party breaches a plea agreement.") (dicta) (quoting, parenthetically, United States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336, 342 (4th Cir.2001)).And to be clear, the Court finds that the R&R correctly concluded the 50% figure for BVAP in District 5 was arbitrary and not narrowly tailored to VRA compliance. Though Defendant was not required to “determine precisely what percent minority population” is required for VRA compliance, it must have “good reasons” to believe the BVAP figure it selected is sufficient to avoid violating the VRA. Bethune-Hill, 580 U.S. at 194 (emphasis omitted). As the R&R correctly identified, Defendant failed to offer sufficient pre-enactment analysis presented to the Commissioners explaining why it had for selected the 50% BVAP figure. See R&R at 83. Indeed, at various points in the pre-enactment process, both De Grandy and various Commissioners stated their belief that a BVAP figure would be VRA compliant with a figure below 50%. See id. at 84 (citing Tr. Feb. 7 at 8:12-19); (Tr. Mar. 24 at 8:5-9)). And, despite Defendant's assertion that “[n]o published case of which the City is aware has ever found that an election district that needed to be created under the VRA nevertheless had to be created at less than 50%,” Plaintiffs have identified multiple such examples. See Resp. at 5-6 (citing… Under our prior panel precedent rule, a prior panel's holding is binding unless it has been overruled or abrogated by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc. See In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015). Based on Granda, we grant summary affirmance as to the district court's denial of Mr. Brito's § 2255 motion. Mr. Brito's drug-related convictions (Counts 10 and 11) remain valid predicates for his § 924(c) offense. Moreover, his valid and invalid predicates are inextricably linked such that he cannot show a substantial likelihood that the jury actually relied on the invalid predicate.The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with U.S. District Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz, II. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and Recommendation and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).The parties will have 14 days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendations within which to file written objections, if any, with United States District Judge Jose E. Martinez. Each party may file a response to the other party's objection within 14 days of the objection. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).In Parth v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, 630 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2010), for instance, the Ninth Circuit, relying in part on Youngerman-Reynolds, held that an "employer may reduce" its employees' regular rates to accommodate their scheduling desires "so long as the rate reduction was not designed to circumvent the provisions (including overtime) of the [FLSA]." Id. at 797.. . . Burwell , 794 F.3d 1151, 1167 (CA10 2015). . . . Little Sisters , 794 F.3d at 1160. . . .
. . . Perry Local Educators' Assn. , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (content-based . . .
. . . Nyquist , 413 U.S. 756, 794-796, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973). . . . Locke , 540 U.S. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1307 ; see, e.g. , Nyquist , 413 U.S. at 794-798, 93 S.Ct. 2955 ; . . .
. . . Edwards , 794 F.2d 994 (CA5 1986) ; see also Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt , 579 U. . . .
. . . (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. ), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq. ), or section 794 . . . The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, title IX, section 794, or . . .
. . . No. 19-794. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Crenshaw , 98 Wash.2d 789, 794-795, 659 P.2d 488, 492-493 (1983) ; Ark. . . .
. . . New Mexico , 425 U.S. 794, 797, 96 S.Ct. 1845, 48 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976) (per curiam ) (internal quotation . . .
. . . Wallace & Tiernan Co. , 336 U.S. 793, 794-795, n. 1, 69 S.Ct. 824, 93 L.Ed. 1042 (1949) ; 15A C. . . .
. . . Globe Newspaper Co. , 398 Mass. 731, 734, 500 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1986) ; Caron v. . . .
. . . United States , 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). . . .
. . . In re McLean , 794 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015). . . . In re McLean , 794 F.3d at 1322. . . . to have the "objective effect" of "pressur[ing] the debtor to pay a discharged debt," In re McLean , 794 . . . In re McLean , 794 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Mercer v. . . . In re McLean , 794 F.3d at 1324. . . .
. . . App'x 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001) ; White v. . . . App'x 792, 794 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017). We leave that issue for another day. . . .
. . . See, e.g., 276 So.3d 791, 794 (2019) (case below); Harvey v. . . .
. . . Smith , 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988). II. . . .
. . . Womack , 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Ellis , 622 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 2010) (intentionally directing the actions of a person with physical . . .
. . . Co. , 365 Ark. 1, 223 S.W.3d 789, 794 (2006). . . .
. . . Harris , 794 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. . . .
. . . . § 794(a). The implementing regulations provide additional requirements. . . .
. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) ; O'Connor-Spinner v. . . .
. . . . § 794(a). . . .
. . . No. 29, 794 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting "situations requiring quick action by the State when . . .
. . . Williamson , 118 Idaho 37, 794 P.2d 626, 629 (1990) ; Riverside Dev. Co. v. . . .
. . . City of Minneapolis , 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2009). . . .
. . . United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 794 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2015). . . . See Schaffhauser , 794 F.3d at 903 ("The question is not whether [the employer] made a good decision, . . .
. . . Credit Plan, Inc. , 228 Wis.2d 1, 596 N.W.2d 786, 794 (1999) (observing that the WCA "is intended to . . .
. . . John Nuveen & Co. , 554 F.2d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 1977). . . .
. . . United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). . . .
. . . . § 794(b)(1)(A) (any "department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State . . . 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (state prisons are subject to the ADA). 29 U.S.C. § 794 . . .
. . . . § 794, for "denying [their daughter] equal access" to her elementary school by "refus[ing] to reasonably . . .
. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) ; O'Connor-Spinner v. . . .
. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) ; O'Connor-Spinner v. . . .
. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). . . .
. . . Escobar , No. 7:18-CV-249, 386 F.Supp.3d 794, 799, 2019 WL 1930261, at *1 (S.D.T.X. 2019). . . .
. . . Dep't of Transp. , 171 N.J. 378, 794 A.2d 141, 152 (2002). . . .
. . . But see Mondry , 557 F.3d at 794 (concluding that Gore supports the view that Courts of Appeals "have . . .
. . . J.A. 794 (Finan). In October 2005, the COLTS board approved that contract. . . .
. . . Minn. 1985) (finding a slipper in the shape of a bear's paw copyrightable), aff'd mem. , 794 F.2d 678 . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 794, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) ). * * * For the . . .
. . . McClellan , 794 F.3d 743, 753 (7th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 794 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Soto , 794 F.3d 635, 655 (6th Cir. 2015) ; cf. United States v. . . .
. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2012). . . .
. . . United States , 654 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (explaining that the agency must have "a . . .
. . . Thornton , 514 U.S. 779, 794, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). . . .
. . . Tedeschi Food Shops, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 259, 264 (D. Mass. 2011) (quoting Lee-Crespo v. . . .
. . . United States, 489 U.S. 794, 802, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989) ; and (iv) the "status exception . . .
. . . Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 929 n.6 (8th Cir. 2015) ; see also United States v. . . . Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 928. . . .
. . . Mendoza-Gonzalez , 363 F.3d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 2004), and that Missouri's regulatory scheme for the inspection . . .
. . . Dep't of Transp. , 171 N.J. 378, 794 A.2d 141, 152 (2002). . . . SRH-16266 By & Through Goodman , 43 F.3d 794, 809 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between knowledge . . .
. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) ; O'Connor-Spinner v. . . .
. . . . § 794 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988." J.A. 767 (2010 Attorneys' Fees Motion). . . .
. . . Dec. 793, 794 (B.I.A. 2005) (citations omitted). . . . Dec. at 794. . . . Id. at 794. . . . Dec. at 794 ; see supra note 10. But we cannot read the statute in isolation. . . . Dec. at 794. . . .
. . . Owens-Illinois Glass Co. , 107 F.R.D. 793, 794-95 (D. Mass. 1985). B. Rule 26(b)(4)(D) Fed. R. Civ. . . .
. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) ) (observing . . .
. . . Coeur d'Alene Tribe , 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015) ); accord Pennsylvania v. . . .
. . . Vick, 421 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Pryor Cashman LLP (In re Licking River Mining, LLC) , 565 B.R. 794, 798 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2017). . . .
. . . Clark Atlanta Univ., Inc., 339 Ga.App. 814, 794 S.E.2d 422, 432-34 (2016) (considering treatise on university . . .
. . . Chicago , 260 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 2001), we drew an inference from insurance pricing clues and concluded . . . Rogers Cartage Co. , 794 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Smith v. . . .
. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 794, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (citation omitted . . .
. . . Kennedy , 794 F.2d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing Parratt dismissal where plaintiffs alleged Monell . . .
. . . Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). . . .
. . . Charles , 794 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[Deep offense] is not by itself a fact that distinguishes . . .
. . . App'x 794, 796 (9th Cir. 2010) ("This single incident is insufficient to prove a de facto debarment." . . .
. . . Curran , 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 881 N.E.2d 792, 794 n. 4 (2008). . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 794, 797 (W.D. . . .
. . . Id. at 794. . . . Id. at 794-95. . . . Id. at 794. . . .
. . . United States , 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). . . .
. . . See Anderson , 460 U.S. at 794, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Alcorn , . . .
. . . Gonzalez , 747 F.3d at 794 (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ); see also Deorle v. . . .
. . . Kingcade , 562 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted)). . . .
. . . Sec. , 909 F.3d 786, 794 (6th Cir. 2018). . . . Conn's law office.' " Id. at 794-95. . . .
. . . Díaz-Colón, 794 F. . . . Díaz-Colón, 794 F. . . . Díaz-Colón, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (citing Mabry v. . . . See Díaz-Colón, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 355. IV. . . . But see Díaz-Colón, 794 F. . . .
. . . No. 1D19-794 District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. July 10, 2019 Antuan R. . . .
. . . Co. , 794 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). . . .
. . . United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that . . .
. . . Co. , 794 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Hicks , 909 F.3d at 794. "This tag has statutory significance." Id. . . .
. . . Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 2015) ("Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive . . .
. . . Id. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . . Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14, 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . . Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. Galloway would later rely on this same language. . . . Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . . Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . .
. . . Dep't of Transp. , 171 N.J. 378, 794 A.2d 141, 152 (2002). . . . SRH-16266 By & Through Goodman , 43 F.3d 794, 809 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between knowledge . . .
. . . App'x 790, 794 (3d Cir. 2009). . . .
. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). . . .
. . . Ct. 2720, 2724, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013) (internal quotation omitted). . . .
. . . Khan , 794 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015). . . . Khan , 794 F.3d at 1309. . . . Khan , 794 F.3d at 1310-11 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Mukasey , 539 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (persecution also includes behavior that threatens death, . . .
. . . Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) ). . . .
. . . Gracey , 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. . . .
. . . Bowen, 794 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1986). . . .
. . . . § 794(a) ). . . . to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 . . .
. . . Cellco P'ship , 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015), it is inappropriate for a court to dismiss an action after . . .
. . . Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that the possibility of removal by immigration . . .
. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 49, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) ). . . .
. . . Lynch, 794 F.3d 119, 121 (1st Cir. 2015) (ruling that a court may take notice of agency decisions to . . .
. . . Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 374-75 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). . . .
. . . FBI, 572 F.3d 794, 806 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). . . .