The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES

Chapter 794
SEXUAL BATTERY

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CHAPTER 794

SEXUAL BATTERY

794.005 Legislative findings and intent as to basic charge of sexual battery.

794.011 Sexual battery.

794.0115 Dangerous sexual felony offender; mandatory sentencing.

794.02 Common-law presumption relating to age abolished.

794.021 Ignorance or belief as to victim’s age no defense.

794.022 Rules of evidence.

794.023 Sexual battery by multiple perpetrators; reclassification of offenses.

794.0235 Administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) to persons convicted of sexual battery.

794.024 Unlawful to disclose identifying information.

794.026 Civil right of action for communicating the identity of a sexual crime victim.

794.027 Duty to report sexual battery; penalties.

794.03 Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victim.

794.05 Unlawful sexual activity with certain minors.

794.051 Indecent, lewd, or lascivious touching of certain minors.

794.052 Sexual battery; notification of victim’s rights and services.

794.053 Lewd or lascivious written solicitation of certain minors.

794.055 Access to services for victims of sexual battery.

794.056 Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund.

794.075 Sexual predators; erectile dysfunction drugs.

794.08 Female genital mutilation.

794.09 Forfeiture of retirement benefits.

794.005 Legislative findings and intent as to basic charge of sexual battery.—The Legislature finds that the least serious sexual battery offense, which is provided in s. 794.011(5), was intended, and remains intended, to serve as the basic charge of sexual battery and to be necessarily included in the offenses charged under subsections (3) and (4), within the meaning of s. 924.34; and that it was never intended that the sexual battery offense described in s. 794.011(5) require any force or violence beyond the force and violence that is inherent in the accomplishment of “penetration” or “union.”

History.—s. 2, ch. 92-135.

794.011 Sexual battery.—

(1) As used in this chapter:

(a) “Consent” means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and does not include coerced submission. “Consent” shall not be deemed or construed to mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer physical resistance to the offender.

(b) “Female genitals” includes the labia minora, labia majora, clitoris, vulva, hymen, and vagina.

(c) “Mentally defective” means a mental disease or defect which renders a person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct.

(d) “Mentally incapacitated” means temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling a person’s own conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating substance administered without his or her consent or due to any other act committed upon that person without his or her consent.

(e) “Offender” means a person accused of a sexual offense in violation of a provision of this chapter.

(f) “Physically helpless” means unconscious, asleep, or for any other reason physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.

(g) “Physically incapacitated” means bodily impaired or handicapped and substantially limited in ability to resist or flee.

(h) “Retaliation” includes, but is not limited to, threats of future physical punishment, kidnapping, false imprisonment or forcible confinement, or extortion.

(i) “Serious personal injury” means great bodily harm or pain, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.

(j) “Sexual battery” means oral, anal, or female genital penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or female genital penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.

(k) “Victim” means a person who has been the object of a sexual offense.

(2)(a) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon, or in an attempt to commit sexual battery injures the sexual organs of, a person less than 12 years of age commits a capital felony, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082 and 921.1425. In all capital cases under this section, the procedure set forth in s. 921.1425 shall be followed in order to determine a sentence of death or life imprisonment. If the prosecutor intends to seek the death penalty, the prosecutor must give notice to the defendant and file the notice with the court within 45 days after arraignment. The notice must contain a list of the aggravating factors the state intends to prove and has reason to believe it can prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The court may allow the prosecutor to amend the notice upon a showing of good cause.

(b) A person less than 18 years of age who commits sexual battery upon, or in an attempt to commit sexual battery injures the sexual organs of, a person less than 12 years of age commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115.

(3) A person who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older, without that person’s consent, and in the process thereof:

(a) Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon; or

(b) Uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury,

commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115.

(4)(a) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age without that person’s consent, under any of the circumstances listed in paragraph (e), commits a felony of the first degree, punishable by a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115.

(b) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon a person 18 years of age or older without that person’s consent, under any of the circumstances listed in paragraph (e), commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115.

(c) A person younger than 18 years of age who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older without that person’s consent, under any of the circumstances listed in paragraph (e), commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115.

(d) A person commits a felony of the first degree, punishable by a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115 if the person commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older without that person’s consent, under any of the circumstances listed in paragraph (e), and such person was previously convicted of a violation of:

1. Section 787.01(2) or s. 787.02(2) when the violation involved a victim who was a minor and, in the course of committing that violation, the defendant committed against the minor a sexual battery under this chapter or a lewd act under s. 800.04 or s. 847.0135(5);

2. Section 787.01(3)(a)2. or 3.;

3. Section 787.02(3)(a)2. or 3.;

4. Section 800.04;

5. Section 825.1025;

6. Section 847.0135(5); or

7. This chapter, excluding subsection (10) of this section.

(e) The following circumstances apply to paragraphs (a)-(d):

1. The victim is physically helpless to resist.

2. The offender coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence likely to cause serious personal injury on the victim, and the victim reasonably believes that the offender has the present ability to execute the threat.

3. The offender coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate against the victim, or any other person, and the victim reasonably believes that the offender has the ability to execute the threat in the future.

4. The offender, without the prior knowledge or consent of the victim, administers or has knowledge of someone else administering to the victim any narcotic, anesthetic, or other intoxicating substance that mentally or physically incapacitates the victim.

5. The victim is mentally defective, and the offender has reason to believe this or has actual knowledge of this fact.

6. The victim is physically incapacitated.

7. The offender is a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), or (9), who is certified under s. 943.1395 or is an elected official exempt from such certification by virtue of s. 943.253, or any other person in a position of control or authority in a probation, community control, controlled release, detention, custodial, or similar setting, and such officer, official, or person is acting in such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe that the offender is in a position of control or authority as an agent or employee of government.

(5)(a) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age, without that person’s consent, and in the process does not use physical force and violence likely to cause serious personal injury commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115.

(b) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon a person 18 years of age or older, without that person’s consent, and in the process does not use physical force and violence likely to cause serious personal injury commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115.

(c) A person younger than 18 years of age who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older, without that person’s consent, and in the process does not use physical force and violence likely to cause serious personal injury commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115.

(d) A person commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115 if the person commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older, without that person’s consent, and in the process does not use physical force and violence likely to cause serious personal injury and the person was previously convicted of a violation of:

2. Section 787.01(3)(a)2. or 3.;

3. Section 787.02(3)(a)2. or 3.;

4. Section 800.04;

5. Section 825.1025;

6. Section 847.0135(5); or

7. This chapter, excluding subsection (10) of this section.

(6)(a) The offenses described in paragraphs (5)(a)-(c) are included in any sexual battery offense charged under subsection (3).

(b) The offense described in paragraph (5)(a) is included in an offense charged under paragraph (4)(a).

(d) The offense described in paragraph (5)(c) is included in an offense charged under paragraph (4)(c).

(e) The offense described in paragraph (5)(d) is included in an offense charged under paragraph (4)(d).

(7)(a) A person who is convicted of committing a sexual battery on or after October 1, 1992, is not eligible for basic gain-time under s. 944.275.

(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), for sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after July 1, 2023, a person who is convicted of committing or attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to commit a sexual battery in violation of this section is not eligible for basic gain-time under s. 944.275.

(8) Without regard to the willingness or consent of the victim, which is not a defense to prosecution under this subsection, a person who is in a position of familial or custodial authority to a person less than 18 years of age and who:

(a) Solicits that person to engage in any act which would constitute sexual battery commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) Engages in any act with that person while the person is 12 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age which constitutes sexual battery commits a felony of the first degree, punishable by a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(c) Engages in any act with that person while the person is less than 12 years of age which constitutes sexual battery, or in an attempt to commit sexual battery injures the sexual organs of such person commits a capital or life felony, punishable pursuant to subsection (2).

(9) For prosecution under paragraph (4)(a), paragraph (4)(b), paragraph (4)(c), or paragraph (4)(d) which involves an offense committed under any of the circumstances listed in subparagraph (4)(e)7., acquiescence to a person reasonably believed by the victim to be in a position of authority or control does not constitute consent, and it is not a defense that the perpetrator was not actually in a position of control or authority if the circumstances were such as to lead the victim to reasonably believe that the person was in such a position.

(10) A person who falsely accuses a person listed in subparagraph (4)(e)7. or other person in a position of control or authority as an agent or employee of government of violating paragraph (4)(a), paragraph (4)(b), paragraph (4)(c), or paragraph (4)(d) commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

History.—s. 2, ch. 74-121; s. 17, ch. 75-298; s. 1, ch. 84-86; s. 1, ch. 89-216; s. 3, ch. 92-135; s. 1, ch. 92-310; s. 3, ch. 93-156; s. 2, ch. 95-348; s. 99, ch. 99-3; s. 8, ch. 99-188; s. 1, ch. 2002-211; s. 3, ch. 2014-4; s. 5, ch. 2016-13; s. 5, ch. 2017-1; s. 4, ch. 2022-165; s. 1, ch. 2023-25; s. 1, ch. 2023-146.

794.0115 Dangerous sexual felony offender; mandatory sentencing.—

(1) This section may be cited as the “Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act.”

(2) Any person who is convicted of a violation of s. 787.025(2)(c); s. 794.011(2), (3), (4), (5), or (8); s. 800.04(4) or (5); s. 825.1025(2) or (3); s. 827.071(2), (3), or (4); or s. 847.0145; or of any similar offense under a former designation, which offense the person committed when he or she was 18 years of age or older, and the person:

(a) Caused serious personal injury to the victim as a result of the commission of the offense;

(b) Used or threatened to use a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense;

(d) Committed the offense while under the jurisdiction of a court for a felony offense under the laws of this state, for an offense that is a felony in another jurisdiction, or for an offense that would be a felony if that offense were committed in this state; or

(e) Has previously been convicted of a violation of s. 787.025(2)(c); s. 794.011(2), (3), (4), (5), or (8); s. 800.04(4) or (5); s. 825.1025(2) or (3); s. 827.071(2), (3), or (4); s. 847.0145; of any offense under a former statutory designation which is similar in elements to an offense described in this paragraph; or of any offense that is a felony in another jurisdiction, or would be a felony if that offense were committed in this state, and which is similar in elements to an offense described in this paragraph,

is a dangerous sexual felony offender, who must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, and including, life imprisonment. If the offense described in this subsection was committed on or after October 1, 2014, a person who qualifies as a dangerous sexual felony offender pursuant to this subsection must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 50 years imprisonment up to, and including, life imprisonment.

(3) “Serious personal injury” means great bodily harm or pain, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.

(4) The offense described in subsection (2) which is being charged must have been committed after the date of commission of the last prior conviction for an offense that is a prior conviction described in paragraph (2)(e).

(5) It is irrelevant that a factor listed in subsection (2) is an element of an offense described in that subsection. It is also irrelevant that such an offense was reclassified to a higher felony degree under s. 794.023 or any other law.

(6) Notwithstanding s. 775.082(3), chapter 958, any other law, or any interpretation or construction thereof, a person subject to sentencing under this section must be sentenced to the mandatory term of imprisonment provided under this section. If the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment imposed under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section is less than the sentence that could be imposed under s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or chapter 921, the sentence imposed must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section.

(7) A defendant sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, before serving the minimum sentence.

History.—s. 7, ch. 99-188; s. 1, ch. 2002-211; s. 1, ch. 2003-115; s. 3, ch. 2006-299; s. 4, ch. 2014-4.

794.02 Common-law presumption relating to age abolished.—The common-law rule “that a boy under 14 years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing the crime of rape” shall not be in force in this state.

History.—s. 1, ch. 4964, 1901; GS 3222; RGS 5052; CGL 7154; s. 2, ch. 74-121.

794.021 Ignorance or belief as to victim’s age no defense.—When, in this chapter, the criminality of conduct depends upon the victim’s being below a certain specified age, ignorance of the age is no defense. Neither shall misrepresentation of age by such person nor a bona fide belief that such person is over the specified age be a defense.

History.—s. 2, ch. 74-121.

794.022 Rules of evidence.—

(1) The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution under s. 787.06, s. 794.011, or s. 800.04.

(2) Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender may not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 787.06, s. 794.011, or s. 800.04. However, such evidence may be admitted if it is first established to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence may prove that the defendant was not the source of the semen, pregnancy, injury, or disease; or, when consent by the victim is at issue, such evidence may be admitted if it is first established to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent.

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reputation evidence relating to a victim’s prior sexual conduct or evidence presented for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the victim at the time of the offense incited the sexual battery may not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 787.06, s. 794.011, or s. 800.04.

(4) When consent of the victim is a defense to prosecution under s. 787.06, s. 794.011, or s. 800.04, evidence of the victim’s mental incapacity or defect is admissible to prove that the consent was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary; and the court shall instruct the jury accordingly.

(5) An offender’s use of a prophylactic device, or a victim’s request that an offender use a prophylactic device, is not, by itself, relevant to either the issue of whether or not the offense was committed or the issue of whether or not the victim consented.

History.—s. 2, ch. 74-121; s. 237, ch. 77-104; s. 1, ch. 83-258; s. 1, ch. 90-40; s. 5, ch. 90-174; s. 25, ch. 93-156; s. 1, ch. 94-80; s. 5, ch. 2016-199.

794.023 Sexual battery by multiple perpetrators; reclassification of offenses.—

(1) The Legislature finds that an act of sexual battery, when committed by more than one person, presents a great danger to the public and is extremely offensive to civilized society. It is therefore the intent of the Legislature to reclassify offenses for acts of sexual battery committed by more than one person.

(2) A violation of s. 794.011 shall be reclassified as provided in this subsection if it is charged and proven by the prosecution that, during the same criminal transaction or episode, more than one person committed an act of sexual battery on the same victim.

(a) A felony of the second degree is reclassified to a felony of the first degree.

(b) A felony of the first degree is reclassified to a life felony.

This subsection does not apply to life felonies or capital felonies. For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 and determining incentive gain-time eligibility under chapter 944, a felony offense that is reclassified under this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 of the offense committed.

History.—s. 4, ch. 84-86; s. 17, ch. 93-156; s. 24, ch. 95-184; s. 20, ch. 97-194; s. 2, ch. 99-172.

794.0235 Administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) to persons convicted of sexual battery.—

(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court:

(a) May sentence a defendant to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), according to a schedule of administration monitored by the Department of Corrections, if the defendant is convicted of sexual battery as described in s. 794.011.

(b) Shall sentence a defendant to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), according to a schedule of administration monitored by the Department of Corrections, if the defendant is convicted of sexual battery as described in s. 794.011 and the defendant has a prior conviction of sexual battery under s. 794.011.

If the court sentences a defendant to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), the penalty may not be imposed in lieu of, or reduce, any other penalty prescribed under s. 794.011. However, in lieu of treatment with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), the court may order the defendant to undergo physical castration upon written motion by the defendant providing the defendant’s intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent to physical castration as an alternative penalty.

(2)(a) An order of the court sentencing a defendant to medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment under subsection (1), shall be contingent upon a determination by a court appointed medical expert, that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for treatment. Such determination is to be made not later than 60 days from the imposition of sentence. Notwithstanding the statutory maximum periods of incarceration as provided in s. 775.082, an order of the court sentencing a defendant to medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment shall specify the duration of treatment for a specific term of years, or in the discretion of the court, up to the life of the defendant.

(b) In all cases involving defendants sentenced to a period of incarceration, the administration of treatment with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) shall commence not later than one week prior to the defendant’s release from prison or other institution.

(3) The Department of Corrections shall provide the services necessary to administer medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to require the continued administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment when it is not medically appropriate.

(4) As used in this section, the term “prior conviction” means a conviction for which sentence was imposed separately prior to the imposition of the sentence for the current offense and which was sentenced separately from any other conviction that is to be counted as a prior conviction under this section.

(5) If a defendant whom the court has sentenced to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) fails or refuses to:

(a) Appear as required by the Department of Corrections for purposes of administering the medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA); or

(b) Allow the administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA),

the defendant is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

History.—s. 1, ch. 97-184.

794.024 Unlawful to disclose identifying information.—

(1) A public employee or officer who has access to the photograph, name, or address of a person who is alleged to be the victim of an offense described in this chapter, chapter 800, s. 827.03, s. 827.04, or s. 827.071 may not willfully and knowingly disclose it to a person who is not assisting in the investigation or prosecution of the alleged offense or to any person other than the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, a person specified in an order entered by the court having jurisdiction of the alleged offense, or organizations authorized to receive such information made exempt by s. 119.071(2)(h), or to a rape crisis center or sexual assault counselor, as defined in s. 90.5035(1)(b), who will be offering services to the victim.

(2) A violation of subsection (1) constitutes a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

History.—s. 6, ch. 95-207; s. 100, ch. 99-3; s. 2, ch. 2002-246; s. 50, ch. 2004-335; s. 52, ch. 2005-251; s. 5, ch. 2011-83.

794.026 Civil right of action for communicating the identity of a sexual crime victim.—

(1) An entity or individual who communicates to others, prior to open judicial proceedings, the name, address, or other specific identifying information concerning the victim of any sexual offense under this chapter or chapter 800 shall be liable to that victim for all damages reasonably necessary to compensate the victim for any injuries suffered as a result of such communication.

(2) The victim shall not be able to maintain a cause of action unless he or she is able to show that such communication was intentional and was done with reckless disregard for the highly offensive nature of the publication.

History.—s. 7, ch. 95-207.

794.027 Duty to report sexual battery; penalties.—A person who observes the commission of the crime of sexual battery and who:

(1) Has reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has observed the commission of a sexual battery;

(2) Has the present ability to seek assistance for the victim or victims by immediately reporting such offense to a law enforcement officer;

(3) Fails to seek such assistance;

(4) Would not be exposed to any threat of physical violence for seeking such assistance;

(5) Is not the husband, wife, parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, or sister of the offender or victim, by consanguinity or affinity; and

(6) Is not the victim of such sexual battery

is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

History.—s. 3, ch. 84-86; s. 1226, ch. 97-102.

794.03 Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victim.—No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed, published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense within this chapter, except as provided in s. 119.071(2)(h) or unless the court determines that such information is no longer confidential and exempt pursuant to s. 92.56. An offense under this section shall constitute a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

History.—s. 1, ch. 6226, 1911; RGS 5053; CGL 7155; s. 2, ch. 74-121; s. 16, ch. 75-298; s. 180, ch. 91-224; s. 1, ch. 94-88; s. 430, ch. 96-406; s. 6, ch. 2008-234.

794.05 Unlawful sexual activity with certain minors.—

(1) A person 24 years of age or older who engages in sexual activity with a person 16 or 17 years of age commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Female genitals” includes the labia minora, labia majora, clitoris, vulva, hymen, and vagina.

(b) “Sexual activity” means oral, anal, or female genital penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or female genital penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual activity does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.

(3) The provisions of this section do not apply to a person 16 or 17 years of age who has had the disabilities of nonage removed under chapter 743.

(4) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section.

(5) If an offense under this section directly results in the victim giving birth to a child, paternity of that child shall be established as described in chapter 742. If it is determined that the offender is the father of the child, the offender must pay child support pursuant to the child support guidelines described in chapter 61.

History.—RS 2598; s. 1, ch. 4965, 1901; GS 3521; s. 1, ch. 6974, 1915; s. 1, ch. 7732, 1918; RGS 5409; s. 1, ch. 8596, 1921; CGL 7552; s. 1, ch. 61-109; s. 759, ch. 71-136; s. 1, ch. 96-409; s. 5, ch. 2014-4; s. 5, ch. 2022-165.

794.051 Indecent, lewd, or lascivious touching of certain minors.—

(1) A person 24 years of age or older who intentionally touches in a lewd or lascivious manner the breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of a person 16 or 17 years of age, or forces or entices a person 16 or 17 years of age to so touch the perpetrator, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) This section does not apply to a person 16 or 17 years of age who has had the disability of nonage removed under chapter 743.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2022-164.

794.052 Sexual battery; notification of victim’s rights and services.—

(1) A law enforcement officer who investigates an alleged sexual battery shall:

(a) Assist the victim in obtaining medical treatment, if medical treatment is necessary as a result of the alleged incident, a forensic examination, and advocacy and crisis-intervention services from a certified rape crisis center and provide or arrange for transportation to the appropriate facility.

(b) Advise the victim that he or she may contact a certified rape crisis center from which the victim may receive services.

(c) Prior to submitting a final report, permit the victim to review the final report and provide a statement as to the accuracy of the final report.

(2) The law enforcement officer shall give the victim immediate notice of the legal rights and remedies available to a victim on a standard form developed and distributed by the Florida Council Against Sexual Violence in conjunction with the Department of Law Enforcement. The notice must include the resource listing, including telephone number, for the area certified rape crisis center as designated by the Florida Council Against Sexual Violence.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2009-184; s. 7, ch. 2011-220.

794.053 Lewd or lascivious written solicitation of certain minors.—A person 24 years of age or older who solicits a person who is 16 or 17 years of age in writing to commit a lewd or lascivious act commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2023-123.

794.055 Access to services for victims of sexual battery.—

(1) This section may be cited by the popular name, the “Sexual Battery Victims’ Access to Services Act.”

(2) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Crisis-intervention services” means advice, counseling, or consultation provided by a sexual battery counselor or trained volunteer to a victim aimed at reducing the level of emotional trauma experienced by the victim.

(b) “Department” means the Department of Health.

(c) “Medical intervention” means services necessary for the forensic examination of a victim or medical treatment for injuries of a victim of sexual battery.

(d) “Rape crisis center” means any public or private agency that provides sexual battery recovery services to victims of sexual battery and their families and is certified by the statewide nonprofit association.

(e) “Sexual battery” has the same meaning as that term has in the offenses provided in s. 794.011.

(f) “Sexual battery counselor” means any employee of a rape crisis center whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling, or assistance to victims of sexual battery.

(g) “Sexual battery recovery services” include the following services:

1. For victims who have reported the offense to law enforcement:

a. A telephone hotline that is operated 24 hours a day and answered by a sexual battery counselor or trained volunteer, as defined in s. 90.5035.

b. Information and referral services.

c. Crisis-intervention services.

d. Advocacy and support services.

e. Therapy services.

f. Service coordination.

g. Programs to promote community awareness of available services.

h. Medical intervention.

2. For victims who have not reported the offense to law enforcement:

a. A telephone hotline that is operated 24 hours a day and answered by a sexual battery counselor or trained volunteer, as defined in s. 90.5035.

b. Information and referral services.

c. Crisis-intervention services.

d. Advocacy and support services.

e. Therapy services.

f. Service coordination.

g. Programs to promote community awareness of available services.

(h) “Statewide nonprofit association” means the federally recognized sexual assault coalition whose primary purpose is to represent and provide technical assistance to rape crisis centers.

(i) “Trained volunteer” means a person who volunteers at a rape crisis center, has completed 30 hours of training in assisting victims of sexual violence and related topics provided by the rape crisis center, is supervised by members of the staff of the rape crisis center, and is included on a list of volunteers which is maintained by the rape crisis center.

(j) “Victim” means a person who consults a sexual battery counselor or a trained volunteer for the purpose of securing advice, counseling, or assistance concerning a mental, physical, or emotional condition caused by a sexual battery.

(3)(a) The department shall contract with the statewide nonprofit association. The statewide nonprofit association shall receive 95 percent of the moneys appropriated from the Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund.

(b) Funds received under s. 938.085 shall be used to provide sexual battery recovery services to victims and their families. Funds shall be distributed to rape crisis centers based on an allocation formula that takes into account the population and rural characteristics of each county. No more than 15 percent of the funds shall be used by the statewide nonprofit association for statewide initiatives. No more than 5 percent of the funds may be used by the department for administrative costs.

(c) The department shall ensure that funds allocated under this section are expended in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of this section. The department may require an annual audit of the expenditures and shall provide a report to the Legislature by February 1 of each year.

History.—s. 2, ch. 2003-114; s. 24, ch. 2006-79; s. 7, ch. 2008-19; s. 11, ch. 2011-220.

794.056 Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund.—

(1) The Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund is created within the Department of Health for the purpose of providing funds for rape crisis centers in this state. Trust fund moneys shall be used exclusively for the purpose of providing services for victims of sexual assault. Funds credited to the trust fund consist of those funds collected as an additional court assessment in each case in which a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, an offense provided in s. 775.21(6) and (10)(a), (b), and (g); s. 784.011; s. 784.021; s. 784.03; s. 784.041; s. 784.045; s. 784.048; s. 784.07; s. 784.08; s. 784.081; s. 784.082; s. 784.083; s. 784.085; s. 787.01(3); s. 787.02(3); s. 787.025; s. 787.06; s. 787.07; s. 794.011; s. 794.05; s. 794.08; former s. 796.03; former s. 796.035; s. 796.04; s. 796.05; s. 796.06; s. 796.07(2)(a)-(d) and (i); s. 800.03; s. 800.04; s. 810.14; s. 810.145; s. 812.135; s. 817.025; s. 825.102; s. 825.1025; s. 827.071; s. 836.10; s. 847.0133; s. 847.0135(2); s. 847.0137; s. 847.0145; s. 943.0435(4)(c), (7), (8), (9)(a), (13), and (14)(c); or s. 985.701(1). Funds credited to the trust fund also shall include revenues provided by law, moneys appropriated by the Legislature, and grants from public or private entities.

(2) The Department of Health shall establish by rule criteria consistent with the provisions of s. 794.055(3)(b) for distributing moneys from the trust fund to rape crisis centers.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2003-140; s. 2, ch. 2004-225; s. 25, ch. 2006-79; s. 151, ch. 2007-5; s. 8, ch. 2011-220; s. 84, ch. 2012-5; s. 16, ch. 2012-97; s. 21, ch. 2014-160; s. 18, ch. 2016-104; s. 12, ch. 2017-170; s. 34, ch. 2018-3; s. 3, ch. 2018-128; s. 87, ch. 2019-167.

794.075 Sexual predators; erectile dysfunction drugs.—

(1) A person may not possess a prescription drug, as defined in s. 499.003(40), for the purpose of treating erectile dysfunction if the person is designated as a sexual predator under s. 775.21.

(2) A person who violates a provision of this section for the first time commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. A person who violates a provision of this section a second or subsequent time commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2006-150; s. 41, ch. 2008-207; s. 44, ch. 2010-161; s. 46, ch. 2016-24; s. 20, ch. 2016-212.

794.08 Female genital mutilation.—

(1) As used in this section, the term “female genital mutilation” means the circumcising, excising, or infibulating, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of a female person.

(2) A person who knowingly commits, or attempts to commit, female genital mutilation upon a female person younger than 18 years of age commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) A person who knowingly removes, or causes or permits the removal of, a female person younger than 18 years of age from this state for purposes of committing female genital mutilation commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) A person who is a parent, a guardian, or in a position of familial or custodial authority to a female person younger than 18 years of age and who knowingly consents to or permits the female genital mutilation of that female person commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(5) This section does not apply to procedures performed by or under the direction of a physician licensed under chapter 458, an osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459, a registered nurse licensed under part I of chapter 464, a practical nurse licensed under part I of chapter 464, an advanced practice registered nurse licensed under part I of chapter 464, a midwife licensed under chapter 467, or a physician assistant licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 when necessary to preserve the physical health of a female person. This section also does not apply to any autopsy or limited dissection conducted pursuant to chapter 406.

(6) Consent of a female person younger than 18 years of age or the consent of a parent, guardian, or person who is in a position of familial or custodial authority to the female person younger than 18 years of age is not a defense to the offense of female genital mutilation.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2007-245; s. 82, ch. 2018-106.

794.09 Forfeiture of retirement benefits.—The retirement benefits of a person convicted of a felony committed on or after October 1, 2008, under this chapter are subject to forfeiture in accordance with s. 112.3173 or s. 121.091 if the person is a public officer or employee when the offense occurs; the person commits the offense through the use or attempted use of power, rights, privileges, duties, or position of the person’s public office or employment position; and the victim is younger than 18 years of age when the offense occurs.

History.—s. 5, ch. 2008-108.

F.S. 794 on Google Scholar

F.S. 794 on Casetext

Amendments to 794

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 794

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S794.011 2a - SEX ASSLT - BY 18 YOA OLDER SEX BATTERY VICT UNDER 12 YOA - F: C

S794.011 2b - SEX ASSLT - BY UNDER 18 YOA SEX BATTERY VICTIM UND 12 YOA - F: L

S794.011 3 - SEX ASSLT - W WEAPON OR FORCE SEX BATT VICTIM 12 YOA OLDER - F: L

S794.011 4 - SEX ASSLT - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7682 - F: F

S794.011 4a - SEX ASSLT - SEX BAT 12 YR LES 18 YR BY PRSN 18 YR OR OLD - F: F

S794.011 4b - SEX ASSLT - SEX BAT 18 YR OR OLDER BY PRSN 18 YR OR OLD - F: F

S794.011 4c - SEX ASSLT - SEX BAT ON 12 YR OR OLDER BY PRSN LESS 18 YR - F: F

S794.011 4d - SEX ASSLT - SEX BATT ON 12 YR OR OLDER BY PRSN SUBSEQ OFF - F: F

S794.011 5 - SEX ASSLT - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7686 - F: S

S794.011 5a - SEX ASSLT - BY 18Y OLDR VIC 12Y UND 18Y NO PHY FORC VIOL - F: F

S794.011 5b - SEX ASSLT - BY 18Y OLDR VIC 18Y OLDR NO PHY FORC VIOL - F: S

S794.011 5c - SEX ASSLT - BY 18Y UNDR VIC 12Y OLDR NO PHY FORC VIOL - F: S

S794.011 5d - SEX ASSLT - SEX BAT VIC 12Y OLDR NO PHY FOR VIOL SUB OFF - F: F

S794.011 8a - SEX ASSLT - SOL SEX BATT ACT BY CUSTODIAN VICT UND 18 YOA - F: T

S794.011 8b - SEX ASSLT - BY CUSTODIAN SEX BATT VICT 12 YOA UNDER 18 YOA - F: F

S794.011 8c - SEX ASSLT - BY 18 YOA OLDR CUSTOD SEX BATT VICT UND 12 YOA - F: C

S794.011 8c - SEX ASSLT - UND 18 YOA CUSTODIAN SEX BATT VICT UND 12 YOA - F: L

S794.011 10 - MAKING FALSE REPORT - ACCUSE LEO OR GOVERNMENT AGENT SEXUAL BATTERY - F: T

S794.023 2 - SEX ASSLT - MT 1 PERSON COMMIT 2ND DEG FEL SEX BATT 1 VIC - F: F

S794.023 2 - SEX ASSLT - MT 1 PERSON COMMIT 1ST DEG FEL SEX BATT 1 VIC - F: L

S794.023 2a - SEX ASSLT - REMOVED - F: F

S794.023 2b - SEX ASSLT - REMOVED - F: L

S794.0235 5a - FAILURE TO APPEAR - FAIL TO APPEAR FOR MPA (CASTRATION TREATMENT) - F: S

S794.0235 5b - CONTEMPT OF COURT - FAIL TO ALLOW MPA (CASTRATION TREATMENT) - F: S

S794.024 - INVADE PRIVACY - DISCLOSE ID INFORMATION SEXUAL BATTERY VICTIM - M: S

S794.027 - FAILURE REPORT CRIME - OBSERVE SEXUAL BATTERY - M: F

S794.03 - INVADE PRIVACY - PUBLISH BROADCAST INFO ID SEXUAL OFFENSE VICT - M: S

S794.041 2a - SEX OFFENSE - REPLD 1993 SOL ENGAGE SEX ACT W 11 TO 18 YOA - F: T

S794.041 2b - SEX ASSLT - REPEALED 1993 ENGAGE IN SEX ACT W 11 TO 18 YOA - F: F

S794.041 2b - SEX OFFENSE - REPEALED 1993 ENGAGE IN SEX ACT W 11 TO 18 YOA - F: F

S794.05 - SEX ASSLT - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 2711 - F: S

S794.05 1 - SEX ASSLT - BY 24 YOA OLDER SEX BATT VICTIM 16 OR 17 YOA - F: S

S794.051 1 - LEWD LASCV BEHAVIOR - 24 YO OLDER L&L TOUCHING VICTIM 16 OR 17 YOA - F: T

S794.065 - SEX OFFENDER VIOLATION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC #7073 - F: T

S794.065 - SEX OFFENDER VIOLATION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC #7074 - M: F

S794.075 - SEX PRED VIOLATION - SEX PREDATOR POSSESS ED DRUG - M: S

S794.075 - SEX PRED VIOLATION - SEX PREDATOR POSSESS ED DRUG 2ND SUBSQ VIOL - M: F

S794.08 2 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION YOUNGER THAN 18 - F: F

S794.08 3 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - REMOVE FROM STATE FOR GENITAL MUTILATION - F: S

S794.08 4 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - PARENT GUARDIAN CONSENT TO GENITAL MUTILATION - F: T

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOME, v. PENNSYLVANIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 2367 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Burwell , 794 F.3d 1151, 1167 (CA10 2015). . . . Little Sisters , 794 F.3d at 1160. . . .

P. BARR, v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Perry Local Educators' Assn. , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (content-based . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Nyquist , 413 U.S. 756, 794-796, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973). . . . Locke , 540 U.S. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1307 ; see, e.g. , Nyquist , 413 U.S. at 794-798, 93 S.Ct. 2955 ; . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Edwards , 794 F.2d 994 (CA5 1986) ; see also Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt , 579 U. . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. ), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq. ), or section 794 . . . The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, title IX, section 794, or . . .

MACIAS, v. NICHOLS,, 140 S. Ct. 2669 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-794. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

K. KAHLER, v. KANSAS, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Crenshaw , 98 Wash.2d 789, 794-795, 659 P.2d 488, 492-493 (1983) ; Ark. . . .

ARIZONA v. CALIFORNIA, 140 S. Ct. 684 (U.S. 2020)

. . . New Mexico , 425 U.S. 794, 797, 96 S.Ct. 1845, 48 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976) (per curiam ) (internal quotation . . .

RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Wallace & Tiernan Co. , 336 U.S. 793, 794-795, n. 1, 69 S.Ct. 824, 93 L.Ed. 1042 (1949) ; 15A C. . . .

NATIONAL REVIEW, INC. v. E. MANN v. E., 140 S. Ct. 344 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Globe Newspaper Co. , 398 Mass. 731, 734, 500 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1986) ; Caron v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLOCK, 935 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). . . .

IN RE ROTH, v. LLC,, 935 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . In re McLean , 794 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015). . . . In re McLean , 794 F.3d at 1322. . . . to have the "objective effect" of "pressur[ing] the debtor to pay a discharged debt," In re McLean , 794 . . . In re McLean , 794 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Mercer v. . . . In re McLean , 794 F.3d at 1324. . . .

EDMO, v. CORIZON, INC. Al v. Al, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . App'x 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001) ; White v. . . . App'x 792, 794 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017). We leave that issue for another day. . . .

BOWLES v. FLORIDA,, 140 S. Ct. 2589 (U.S. 2019)

. . . See, e.g., 276 So.3d 791, 794 (2019) (case below); Harvey v. . . .

J. GENZER, v. JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY,, 934 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Smith , 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988). II. . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. HOPPER,, 934 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Womack , 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007). . . .

UNITED STATES v. V. GILLIAM,, 934 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ellis , 622 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 2010) (intentionally directing the actions of a person with physical . . .

SINGLETON, v. ARKANSAS HOUSING AUTHORITIES PROPERTY CASUALTY SELF- INSURED FUND, INC. BRK, 934 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 365 Ark. 1, 223 S.W.3d 789, 794 (2006). . . .

UNITED STATES v. E. JONES,, 934 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Harris , 794 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. . . .

BIONDO, v. KALEDIA HEALTH, d b a, 935 F.3d 68 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 794(a). The implementing regulations provide additional requirements. . . .

SAM K. v. SAUL,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) ; O'Connor-Spinner v. . . .

J. YOCHIM, v. S. CARSON, Sr. U. S., 935 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 794(a). . . .

DOLLAR LOAN CENTER OF SOUTH DAKOTA, LLC, v. AFDAHL, LLC, v., 933 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 29, 794 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting "situations requiring quick action by the State when . . .

PIZZUTO, Jr. v. BLADES,, 933 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Williamson , 118 Idaho 37, 794 P.2d 626, 629 (1990) ; Riverside Dev. Co. v. . . .

ESTATE OF ROMAIN, v. CITY OF GROSSE POINTE FARMS A. J., 935 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Minneapolis , 558 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2009). . . .

G. BEASLEY v. WARREN UNILUBE, INC., 933 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 794 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2015). . . . See Schaffhauser , 794 F.3d at 903 ("The question is not whether [the employer] made a good decision, . . .

H. BURTON, v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S. C., 934 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Credit Plan, Inc. , 228 Wis.2d 1, 596 N.W.2d 786, 794 (1999) (observing that the WCA "is intended to . . .

LAVALLEE, v. MED- SOLUTIONS, LLC,, 932 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . John Nuveen & Co. , 554 F.2d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 1977). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GAMMELL, v., 932 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). . . .

FURGESS, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 933 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 794(b)(1)(A) (any "department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State . . . 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (state prisons are subject to the ADA). 29 U.S.C. § 794 . . .

PARENT PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY LEAGUE M. W. a F. D. S. S. a S. Y. v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS J., 934 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 794, for "denying [their daughter] equal access" to her elementary school by "refus[ing] to reasonably . . .

CONSTANCE S. v. SAUL,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 583 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) ; O'Connor-Spinner v. . . .

BRENDA L. v. SAUL,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 858 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) ; O'Connor-Spinner v. . . .

A. LAVITE, v. J. DUNSTAN,, 932 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). . . .

MALDONADO L. Jr. v. RODRIGUEZ, Jr., 932 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Escobar , No. 7:18-CV-249, 386 F.Supp.3d 794, 799, 2019 WL 1930261, at *1 (S.D.T.X. 2019). . . .

ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION, v. SOUTH JERSEY RESOURCES GROUP, LLC,, 933 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Transp. , 171 N.J. 378, 794 A.2d 141, 152 (2002). . . .

BERGAMATTO, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE NYSA ILA PENSION FUND, 933 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . But see Mondry , 557 F.3d at 794 (concluding that Gore supports the view that Courts of Appeals "have . . .

C. CORDARO, v. UNITED STATES, 933 F.3d 232 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . J.A. 794 (Finan). In October 2005, the COLTS board approved that contract. . . .

SILVERTOP ASSOCIATES INC. v. KANGAROO MANUFACTURING INC., 931 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Minn. 1985) (finding a slipper in the shape of a bear's paw copyrightable), aff'd mem. , 794 F.2d 678 . . .

CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL PENSION FUND,, 932 F.3d 91 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 794, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) ). * * * For the . . .

UNITED STATES v. THOMAS, v., 933 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . McClellan , 794 F.3d 743, 753 (7th Cir. 2015). . . .

J. MAHLER, v. FIRST DAKOTA TITLE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a LLC, a LLC C. A. Jr., 931 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 794 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .

UNITED STATES v. MATHIS, a k a a k a a k a D- v. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a v. a k a a k a K. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a a k a, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Soto , 794 F.3d 635, 655 (6th Cir. 2015) ; cf. United States v. . . .

L. CRUMP, v. M. SAUL,, 932 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015). . . .

LACEY, Ry v. NORAC, INC., 932 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2012). . . .

CHRONIS, v. UNITED STATES, 932 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 654 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (explaining that the agency must have "a . . .

DAVIS, v. GUAM M. C. F. P. F. I. M., 932 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Thornton , 514 U.S. 779, 794, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). . . .

POSADA, v. ACP FACILITY SERVICES, INC., 389 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Tedeschi Food Shops, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 259, 264 (D. Mass. 2011) (quoting Lee-Crespo v. . . .

AL- BALUCHI a k a v. T. ESPER,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . United States, 489 U.S. 794, 802, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989) ; and (iv) the "status exception . . .

UNITED STATES v. SHELDON TREE TOP,, 931 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 929 n.6 (8th Cir. 2015) ; see also United States v. . . . Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 928. . . .

CALZONE, v. T. OLSON,, 931 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mendoza-Gonzalez , 363 F.3d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 2004), and that Missouri's regulatory scheme for the inspection . . .

COBA v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 932 F.3d 114 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Transp. , 171 N.J. 378, 794 A.2d 141, 152 (2002). . . . SRH-16266 By & Through Goodman , 43 F.3d 794, 809 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between knowledge . . .

TRACIE H. v. SAUL,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 990 (N.D. Ill. 2019)

. . . Colvin , 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015) ; O'Connor-Spinner v. . . .

P. J. BY THROUGH MR. MRS. W. J. L. G. MR. MRS. L. G. M. L. MR. MRS. J. L. Mr. v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 931 F.3d 156 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 794 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988." J.A. 767 (2010 Attorneys' Fees Motion). . . .

MEJIA- CASTANON, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 931 F.3d 224 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Dec. 793, 794 (B.I.A. 2005) (citations omitted). . . . Dec. at 794. . . . Id. at 794. . . . Dec. at 794 ; see supra note 10. But we cannot read the statute in isolation. . . . Dec. at 794. . . .

IN RE ZOFRAN ONDANSETRON PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, 392 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Owens-Illinois Glass Co. , 107 F.R.D. 793, 794-95 (D. Mass. 1985). B. Rule 26(b)(4)(D) Fed. R. Civ. . . .

KOALA, v. KHOSLA,, 931 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) ) (observing . . .

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT, v. BARR,, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

. . . Coeur d'Alene Tribe , 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015) ); accord Pennsylvania v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. JENNINGS, Sr., 930 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Vick, 421 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). . . .

IN RE LICKING RIVER MINING, LLC, v. LLC,, 603 B.R. 336 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2019)

. . . Pryor Cashman LLP (In re Licking River Mining, LLC) , 565 B.R. 794, 798 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2017). . . .

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. WATTLES COMPANY, a, 930 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Clark Atlanta Univ., Inc., 339 Ga.App. 814, 794 S.E.2d 422, 432-34 (2016) (considering treatise on university . . .

PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY, THE BABY FOLD,, 930 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Chicago , 260 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 2001), we drew an inference from insurance pricing clues and concluded . . . Rogers Cartage Co. , 794 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Smith v. . . .

L. KEEN, v. C. HELSON, LLC, N. A. N. A. J. P. N. A., 930 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bay Mills Indian Cmty. , 572 U.S. 782, 794, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (citation omitted . . .

R. BRADLEY, v. VILLAGE OF UNIVERSITY PARK, ILLINOIS,, 929 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Kennedy , 794 F.2d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing Parratt dismissal where plaintiffs alleged Monell . . .

MANNING v. CALDWELL, s FOR CITY OF ROANOKE s, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). . . .

CARELLO, v. AURORA POLICEMEN CREDIT UNION,, 930 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Charles , 794 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[Deep offense] is not by itself a fact that distinguishes . . .

PHILLIPS, v. V. SPENCER,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 136 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . App'x 794, 796 (9th Cir. 2010) ("This single incident is insufficient to prove a de facto debarment." . . .

GREEN, v. KENNEWAY,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 275 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Curran , 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 881 N.E.2d 792, 794 n. 4 (2008). . . .

RIOS, v. JENKINS,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 714 (W.D. Va. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 794, 797 (W.D. . . .

UNITED STATES v. STRUBBERG,, 929 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 794. . . . Id. at 794-95. . . . Id. at 794. . . .

ACUITY, A v. REX, LLC LLC EVAC EMS,, 929 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). . . .

FUSARO, v. R. COGAN, C. J. A. J. Jr., 930 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Anderson , 460 U.S. at 794, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Alcorn , . . .

S. R. NEHAD K. R. v. N. BROWDER, 929 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gonzalez , 747 F.3d at 794 (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ); see also Deorle v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. DESOTELL,, 929 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Kingcade , 562 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted)). . . .

IN RE VARIOUS SOCIAL SECURITY CASES AFFECTED BY SIXTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN HICKS V. BERRYHILL, NO., 392 F. Supp. 3d 784 (E.D. Ky. 2019)

. . . Sec. , 909 F.3d 786, 794 (6th Cir. 2018). . . . Conn's law office.' " Id. at 794-95. . . .

UNITED STATES v. MALENO- P REZ, 388 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Díaz-Colón, 794 F. . . . Díaz-Colón, 794 F. . . . Díaz-Colón, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (citing Mabry v. . . . See Díaz-Colón, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 355. IV. . . . But see Díaz-Colón, 794 F. . . .

R. GOLDEN, v. STATE, 275 So. 3d 262 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . No. 1D19-794 District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. July 10, 2019 Antuan R. . . .

OIL GAS TRANSFER L. L. C. v. KARR,, 928 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 794 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .

KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, Gu, v. J. TRUMP,, 928 F.3d 226 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). . . .

UNITED STATES v. PARKER,, 929 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that . . .

OIL GAS TRANSFER L. L. C. v. KARR, 929 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Co. , 794 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .

KIRK, v. A. BERRYHILL,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 652 (D.S.C. 2019)

. . . Hicks , 909 F.3d at 794. "This tag has statutory significance." Id. . . .

MUNICIPALITY OF CABO ROJO, v. POWERSECURE, INC. v., 390 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 2015) ("Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive . . .

WILLIAMSON, v. BREVARD COUNTY,, 928 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . . Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14, 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . . Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. Galloway would later rely on this same language. . . . Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . . Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794, 103 S.Ct. 3330. . . .

COBA v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 930 F.3d 174 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Transp. , 171 N.J. 378, 794 A.2d 141, 152 (2002). . . . SRH-16266 By & Through Goodman , 43 F.3d 794, 809 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between knowledge . . .

WHITSERVE LLC, v. DONUTS INC. LLC, v. LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 571 (D. Del. 2019)

. . . App'x 790, 794 (3d Cir. 2009). . . .

EVANS, v. SANDY CITY, a R. P. C. C. J. E. I- XX,, 928 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). . . .

UNITED STATES v. FLUTE,, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 2720, 2724, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013) (internal quotation omitted). . . .

KHAN, v. UNITED STATES, 928 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Khan , 794 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015). . . . Khan , 794 F.3d at 1309. . . . Khan , 794 F.3d at 1310-11 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

ARRAZABAL, v. P. BARR,, 929 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Mukasey , 539 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008) (persecution also includes behavior that threatens death, . . .

EDGE, v. CITY OF EVERETT, a, 929 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) ). . . .

SIERRA CLUB v. J. TRUMP, T. K., 929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gracey , 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. . . .

DIAZ, Jr. v. BERRYHILL,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 382 (M.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Bowen, 794 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1986). . . .

M. MOTE, M. J. N. a v. CITY OF CHELSEA, v., 391 F. Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . . § 794(a) ). . . . to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 . . .

ABDULLAYEVA, v. ATTENDING HOMECARE SERVICES LLC,, 928 F.3d 218 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Cellco P'ship , 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015), it is inappropriate for a court to dismiss an action after . . .

UNITED STATES v. SORIANO NUNEZ,, 928 F.3d 240 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that the possibility of removal by immigration . . .

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL v. SPOKANE TRANSIT AUTHORITY,, 929 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 49, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) ). . . .

SISSE, v. MONIZ,, 388 F. Supp. 3d 63 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Lynch, 794 F.3d 119, 121 (1st Cir. 2015) (ruling that a court may take notice of agency decisions to . . .

BAKER v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L. L. C. EQR- LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 246 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 374-75 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). . . .

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, v. CENTURA HEALTH,, 933 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . FBI, 572 F.3d 794, 806 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). . . .