The 2023 Florida Statutes
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An officer may conduct a traffic stop based on an individual's riding a bicycle without a light after sunset. Florida law requires that “[e]very bicycle in use between sunset and sunrise shall be equipped with a lamp on the front exhibiting a white light visible from a distance of at least 500 feet to the front and a lamp and reflector on the rear each exhibiting a red light visible from a distance of 600 feet to the rear.” § 316.2065(7), Fla. Stat.; see Montanez v. City of Orlando, 678 Fed.Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2017) (stating that a police officer was entitled to stop a bicyclist riding a bicycle without a light after dark because there was probable cause to believe the bicyclist was violating a civil traffic law); Jones v. State, 279 So.3d 342, 345 n.5 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“[A] law enforcement officer may stop a driver when there exists an objective basis that the driver committed a traffic infraction.” (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996))). The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, shows that Sloan was riding a bicycle without a light after dark. Thus, Sloan fails to show that the traffic stop was unlawful.Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).A party's objections are improper, however, if they expand upon and reframe arguments already made and considered by the magistrate judge, or simply disagree with the magistrate judge's conclusions. See Melillo v. United States, No. 17-CV-80489, 2018 WL 4258355, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2018); see also Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (“It is improper for an objecting party to . . . submit [ ] papers to a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the apple' when they file objections to a R & R.”) (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F.Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)). When the objecting party has not properly objected to the magistrate judge's findings, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” See Keaton v. United States, No. 14-21230-CIV, 2015 WL 12780912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2015); see also Lopez v. Berryhill, No… The resolution of the present issue focuses upon a variation of bad faith jurisprudence set forth in a federal court decision applying Florida law: Kropilak v. 21st Century Insurance Co., 806 F.3d 1062 (11th Cir. 2015). And after consideration of the issue presented, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.Under Guidelines § 3B1.2, a minor or minimal participant in the offense is entitled to a “mitigating role” reduction. Amendment 794 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which went into effect in 2015, “added guidance to [U.S.S.G.] § 3B2.1's commentary relating to mitigating-role reductions.” United States v. Palma-Meza, 685 Fed.Appx. 806, 809 (11th Cir. 2017). A minor participant who may be entitled to a role reduction is one “who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as ‘minimal.'” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.5.“‘With a few exceptions, the claimant is allowed to present new evidence at each stage of this administrative process,' including before the Appeals Council.” Washington v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc., Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir.2007)). Under new regulations effective in 2017,the Appeals Council will review a case when it “receives additional evidence that is new, material, and relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision, and there is a reasonable probability that the additional evidence would change the outcome of the decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470(a)(5). New evidence is chronologically relevant if it relates to the period on or before the date of the ALJ's decision. Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1309 (11th Cir. 2018). “Evidence is material if ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would change the administrative outcome.'” Atha, 616 Fed.Appx. at 936. The new regulation added an additional requirement that the Appeals Council “will only consider additional evidence under paragraph (a)(5) of this… We review de novo the Appeals Council's refusal to consider new, material, and chronologically relevant evidence. Washington v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2015). Evidence is "chronologically relevant" when it "relates to the period on or before the date of the [ALJ's] hearing decision." 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5).Truist's final argument requesting the Court strike Plaintiffs' jury demand is misplaced in this motion to dismiss. Truist claims that Plaintiffs' jury demand must be stricken under the agreements. While the Seventh Amendment protects a fundamental right to jury trials, a party may contractually waive its right to a jury. See Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Burns v. Lawther, 53 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1995). Determining whether Plaintiffs waived their jury trial right requires the Court to decide the waiver was made knowingly, intentionally, and voluntary. Aponte v. Brown & Brown of Fla., Inc., 806 Fed.Appx. 824, 827 (11th Cir. 2020). And, as already discussed, Plaintiffs contest the validity of the agreements Truist attaches to its motion to dismiss. The Court will deny Truist's motion to strike within its motion to dismiss without prejudice for Truist to refile the motion to strike separately.“[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). The reasonableness of the stop does not depend on the subjective motivations of the officers if the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for the stop. Id. at 813. Officer Morgan and Officer Marcoux had probable cause to stop Lindsey because they both observed Lindsey fail to come to a complete stop at a stop sign in violation of Florida Statute § 316.123(2)(a). Hr'g Tr. at 11:18-22; 69:16-70:7. The dashcam footage also shows that the left taillight on Lindsey's vehicle was not functioning in violation of §§ 316.217, 316.221. Morgan Fleet Cam. 1 at 0:30-1:15.“The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. When faced with a shotgun pleading, a court should strike the complaint and instruct the plaintiff to file a more definite statement. See Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 984 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly condemned the use of shotgun pleadings for “imped[ing] the administration of the district courts' civil dockets.” PVC Windows, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 806 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010). Shotgun pleadings require the district court to sift through allegations in an attempt to separate the meritorious claims from the unmeritorious, resulting in a “massive waste of judicial and private resources.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has established that a shotgun pleading is an unacceptable form of establishing a claim for relief.. . . Id., at 806. . . .
. . . Shaughnessy , 336 U.S. 806, 69 S.Ct. 921, 93 L.Ed. 1054 (1949) ; United States ex rel. Knauff v. . . . Shaughnessy , 336 U.S. 806, 69 S.Ct. 921, 93 L.Ed. 1054 (1949), we reversed for procedural error because . . .
. . . See McDonald , 561 U.S., at 750, 130 S.Ct. 3020 ; see id. , at 806, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (THOMAS, J., concurring . . .
. . . Gen. , 810 F.3d 792, 806, nn. 3, 12 (CA11 2016) ; Pechenkov v. . . .
. . . See 956 F. 3d, at 806 (opinion of Higginson, J.). . . .
. . . Oil Co. , 188 F.2d 804, 805-806 (CA2 1951) ("the natural meaning of 'safe place' is a place entirely . . .
. . . Lawson , 475 Mass. 806, 811, 62 N. . . . Lawson , 475 Mass. 806, 811, 62 N.E.3d 22, 28 (2016) ; State v. . . .
. . . No. 19-806 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Castaneda , 559 U.S. 799, 806, 130 S.Ct. 1845, 176 L.Ed.2d 703 (2010). . . .
. . . Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 798-99, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991), here there is no reasoned state . . .
. . . United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). . . .
. . . See King , 898 F.3d at 806-07. The testimony's admission was harmless error. C. . . .
. . . Gov't , 806 F.3d 268, 277-78 (5th Cir. 2015) ; cf. Hope v. . . .
. . . Bd. of Regents , 535 U.S. 613, 617, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002). . . . Bd. of Regents , 535 U.S. 613, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002) ], Arizonans , and Will ." . . .
. . . County of Los Angeles , 891 F.3d 776, 806 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit upheld a combined punitive . . . Gutierrez-Rodriguez , 882 F.2d at 581-82 ; see also Rodriguez , 891 F.3d at 806 (upholding a combined . . .
. . . California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), extends to civil commitment proceedings . . .
. . . United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (upholding a "pretextual" stop . . .
. . . Bradford, 806 F.3d 1151, 1155 (8th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Id . at 806. . . . Id. at 806. Harris provides a helpful starting point for evaluating several of Ocwen's statements. . . .
. . . In re I.I.G.T. , 412 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) . . .
. . . Prosecutor's Office , 378 N.J.Super. 539, 876 A.2d 806, 811 (App. Div. 2005). . . .
. . . Dep't of Corr. , 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015). . . . Chavarriaga , 806 F.3d at 229. . . .
. . . Fund, Inc. , 473 U.S. 788, 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) ). . . .
. . . Peters , 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992) ). . . .
. . . App. 3d 563, 307 Ill.Dec. 806, 860 N.E.2d 460 (2006), which holds that "[i]t is the duty to defend that . . . Id. at 570, 307 Ill.Dec. 806, 860 N.E.2d 460 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Home Ins. . . .
. . . Holder , 672 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012), as amended (May 3, 2012); see also Howard v. . . . Gaudet , 414 U.S. 573, 593, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974) (quoting Comm'r v. . . . See Oyeniran , 672 F.3d at 804, 806 (explaining that the question of whether petitioner's father was . . . Oyeniran , 672 F.3d at 806. . . . See Oyeniran , 672 F.3d at 806. . . .
. . . James , 415 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2005), and does not apply in the context of his short-lived flight . . .
. . . McCormick, 863 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Castillo , 406 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a completed transaction is not a necessary . . .
. . . Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439. . . .
. . . Co. , 806 F.3d 1062, 1067 (11th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Rushford , 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007) ). . . .
. . . Yates , 846 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation , 806 F.3d 125, 130-34 (3d Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Endeavor Ohio, LLC , 806 F.3d 402, 409 (6th Cir. 2015). B. . . .
. . . Tucker , 806 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex. App. . . .
. . . Gibbs-Inman Co. , 283 Ky. 107, 140 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Ct. . . .
. . . California , 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (requiring a hearing following a . . .
. . . Urban Outfitters, Inc. , 806 F.3d 761, 768 (3d Cir. 2015) ). . . . Hanover , 806 F.3d at 764 ; see Drager v. . . . See Hanover , 806 F.3d at 768 ; Taco Bell Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. . . . See 806 F.3d at 768. . . . Hanover Ins. , 806 F.3d at 768. . . .
. . . See Lee & Mouritsen, supra , at 806-13, 828-32. . . .
. . . Ct. at 806 (quoting United States v. . . . Ct. at 806 (quoting Broce , 488 U.S. at 575, 109 S.Ct. 757 ). . . .
. . . Servs. , 728 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2013) ("The standard for demonstrating a hostile work environment . . .
. . . McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 806, 93 S.Ct. 1817. . . .
. . . Mateen , 806 F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2015) ; Sullivan , 797 F.3d at 640 ; Barker , 723 F.3d at 322-23 . . . Mateen , 806 F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2015) ("[W]hen a sentence enhancement based on a state conviction . . .
. . . Sipnet EU S.R.O. , 806 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 2 We begin with the '501 patent. . . .
. . . State , 917 S.W.2d 799, 806-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc). See id. at 807. Id. (citing Tex. . . .
. . . Sys. of Ga. , 535 U.S. 613, 621, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002). . . .
. . . Thrailkill , 806 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Faragher , 524 U.S. at 806, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1997) ). . . . Faragher , 524 U.S. at 806, 118 S.Ct. 2275. . . .
. . . Learjet, Inc. , 592 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that § 1332(d)(1)(B) "defines class action . . . Cunningham , 592 F.3d at 806 (explaining that subsection (d)(8) at most suggests that a class "may be . . . Learjet, Inc. , 592 F.3d 805, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2010) ; Vega v. . . .
. . . Roldan-Zapata , 916 F.2d 795, 806 (2d Cir. 1990). . . .
. . . Ford Motor Co. , 806 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co. , 174 Cal. . . .
. . . Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (whether the municipality had a policy . . .
. . . United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), which recognized that searches . . . United States , 468 U.S. 796, 806, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). . . .
. . . Heath , 806 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). . . . See Heath , 806 S.W.2d at 537. . . .
. . . Ct. 1421, 1426, 197 L.Ed.2d 806 (2017) (quoting Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 339, 131 S.Ct. 1740 ). . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 801, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Supervisory liability in a § 1983 action depends on a showing of . . .
. . . California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). . . .
. . . Grp., Inc., 78 Mass.App.Ct. 806, 942 N.E.2d 1007, 1015 (2011) (noting that the purpose of the designation . . .
. . . Lynch, 806 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2015). . . . Mejía-Ramaja, 806 F.3d at 21. . . . Mejía-Ramaja, 806 F.3d at 21. . . .
. . . Wis., Inc. , 259 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir. 2001) ). . . .
. . . FBI , 806 F.2d 55, 58-59 (2d Cir.1986) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Supermarkets, Inc. , 806 F.3d 162, 171 (3d Cir. 2015). . . .
. . . Rptr. 3d 806, 822 (2016) (emphases added). . . .
. . . United States, 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1993) )); see also Pls.' Reply in Supp. of Pls.' . . .
. . . Beardslee , 53 Cal. 3d 68, 92, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311 (1991) (explaining that if there are . . .
. . . Ashcroft , 366 F.3d 799, 806-07 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing INS v. . . .
. . . Yates , 846 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . United States v King , 898 F.3d 797, 806 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). . . .
. . . No. 1D19-806 District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. . . .
. . . Gov't , 806 F.3d 268, 277-78 (5th Cir. 2015) (" Mason I"). . . . Contrary to the views expressed by Judge Higginbotham's dissent in Mason I , 806 F.3d at 286-88, and . . .
. . . Rosenberg , 806 F.2d 1169, 1179 (3d Cir. 1986). . . .
. . . Boston, 806 F.3d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. . . .
. . . Dep't of Natural Resources , 600 F.3d 798, 806 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[B]ecause Ms. . . .
. . . See Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. at 806, 104 S.Ct. 2118 ("[T]he city was entitled to protect unwilling . . .
. . . California , 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) )). . . . Williamson ("John Williamson "), 806 F.2d 216, 219-20 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Courts indulge every presumption . . . John Williamson , 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann , 776 F.3d at 763 ("We reflect on the totality of the circumstances . . . John Williamson , 806 F.2d at 219 (noting that "[e]ach case must be reviewed individually, with the objective . . . Constitution' " (quoting Von Moltke , 332 U.S. at 723, 68 S.Ct. 316 )); see also John Williamson , 806 . . .
. . . INTRODUCTION ...806 II. BACKGROUND ...806 III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS ...807 IV. . . .
. . . Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), judgment aff'd , 400 U.S. 806, 91 S.Ct. 65, 27 L.Ed.2d 38 (1970). . . .
. . . United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ; see also Wayte v. . . .
. . . Effjohn Oy Ab , 806 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (collecting cases). . . .
. . . Ct. 799, 801, 806 N.E.2d 933, 936 (2004). . . .
. . . McVeigh , 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997). . . .
. . . Id. at 806. The above-captioned cases were stayed pending the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hicks . . . .
. . . App'x 806 (11th Cir. 2015), which observed that "[i]n this circuit, there is no clearly established right . . . App'x 806 (11th Cir. 2015). 503 F. App'x 672 (11th Cir. 2012). Compare Dodd v. . . .
. . . NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. , 473 U.S. 788, 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985 . . . discrimination prohibited in traditional, designated, and limited public forums); Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 806 . . .
. . . Republic of Argentina , 806 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2015) ). . . .
. . . United States , 517 U.S. 806, 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ). . . .
. . . Ayres, 725 F.2d 806 (1st Cir. 1984) ; United States v. Young, 105 F.3d at 6 (same). . . . Brake, 666 F.3d 800, 806 (1st Cir. 2011) United States v. . . .
. . . Learjet, Inc. , 592 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that § 1332(d)(1)(B) "defines class action . . . Cunningham , 592 F.3d at 806 (explaining that subsection (d)(8) at most suggests that a class "may be . . . Learjet, Inc. , 592 F.3d 805, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2010) ; Vega v. . . .
. . . California , 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). . . .
. . . Lynch , 834 F.3d 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2016), where the evidence consisted of "random incidents of violence . . .
. . . Rodriguez-Valencia , 753 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). . . .
. . . Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cty. , 806 F.3d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted . . .
. . . Jirak, 728 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 583 N.E.2d 806, 820 (1991) ; Druker v. Roland Wm. . . .
. . . Ct. 1421, 197 L.Ed.2d 806 (2017). . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 798, 806 (E.D.Va. 2005) (consent given thirty minutes after officers arrived; finding of voluntariness . . .
. . . FBI, 572 F.3d 794, 806 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). . . .
. . . Schimel , 806 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 2015) ), petition for cert. filed (Feb. 4, 2019). . . .