Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 810.015 (2025)

Legislative findings and intent; burglary.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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810.015 Legislative findings and intent; burglary.—

(1) The Legislature finds that the case of Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), was decided contrary to legislative intent and the case law of this state relating to burglary prior to Delgado v. State. The Legislature finds that in order for a burglary to occur, it is not necessary for the licensed or invited person to remain in the dwelling, structure, or conveyance surreptitiously.

(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that the holding in Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000) be nullified. It is further the intent of the Legislature that s. 810.02(1)(a) be construed in conformity with Raleigh v. State, 705 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1997); Jimenez v. State, 703 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1997); Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1997); Routly v. State, 440 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1983); and Ray v. State, 522 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 3rd DCA, 1988). This subsection shall operate retroactively to February 1, 2000.

(3) It is further the intent of the Legislature that consent remain an affirmative defense to burglary and that the lack of consent may be proven by circumstantial evidence.

(4) The Legislature finds that the cases of Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2002); Fitzpatrick v. State, 859 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003); and State v. Ruiz/State v. Braggs, Slip Opinion Nos. SC02-389/SC02-524 were decided contrary to the Legislative intent expressed in this section. The Legislature finds that these cases were decided in such a manner as to give subsection (1) no effect. The February 1, 2000, date reflected in subsection (2) does not refer to an arbitrary date relating to the date offenses were committed, but to a date before which the law relating to burglary was untainted by Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000).

(5) The Legislature provides the following special rules of construction to apply to this section:

(a) All subsections in this section shall be construed to give effect to subsection (1);

(b) Notwithstanding s. 775.021(1), this section shall be construed to give the interpretation of the burglary statute announced in Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), and its progeny, no effect; and

(c) If language in this section is susceptible to differing constructions, it shall be construed in such manner as to approximate the law relating to burglary as if Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000) was never issued.

(6) This section shall apply retroactively.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2001-58; s. 1, ch. 2004-93.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 39 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2001–2026 · leading case: Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2003).

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Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2003). · cites it 18× “" However, the Legislature also stated that subsection (2) of § 810.015 would "operate retroactively to February 1, 2000.”

State v. Ruiz, 863 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2003). · cites it 17× “Specifically, section 1 of chapter 2001-58, which is the subject of the certified question, created section 810.015, Florida Statutes (2002): 810.”

Foster v. State, 861 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). · cites it 16× “2000)), the Florida Legislature enacted section 810.015, Florida Statutes (2001), which includes the legislative finding that the supreme court in Delgado had interpreted the burglary statute, section 810.”

Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2009). · cites it 8× “See § 810.015(3), Fla. Stat. (2004) ("[L]ack of consent may be proven by circumstantial evidence.”

Patrick Albert Evans v. State of Florida, 177 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2015). · cites it 4× “2009) (quoting § 810.015(3), Fla. Stat. (2004)). In circumstantial evidence cases, the trial court must grant a judgment of acquittal if the State has failed to present evidence from which a jury could exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.”

Delgado v. State, 948 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2006). · cites it 4× “[3] Delgado maintained a theory of innocence *685 and presented no evidence or testimony.”

Fl. Dept. of Env't Prot. v. Contractpoint Florida Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2008). · cites it 2× “[10] An example of the Legislature's clearly expressed intention to override a prior judicial construction is seen in section 810.015, Florida Statutes (2004), in which the Legislature expressly stated: (1) The Legislature finds that the case of Delgado v.”

Fitzpatrick v. State, 859 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003). · cites it 4× “§ 810.015, Fla. Stat. (2001); see also ch.”

Skellie v. State, 849 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). · cites it 6× “Stat. (2002). The question in this case is whether Skellie had permission from the owner to enter and remain in the building where the grand theft occurred.”

Carter v. State, 980 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2008). · cites it 2× “[4] Moreover, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's and the jury's conclusion that the murders of Pafford and Reed were committed in the course of a burglary. Carter either entered Reed's home uninvited with the intent to commit murder therein, or,…”

Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 2010). “(creating § 810.015(1), Florida Statutes (2002)). 19 .”

Jose Jimenez v. Florida Dept. of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2007). “Fla. Stat. § 810.015 . This statute was effective retroactively to February 1, 2000.”

Show all 39 citing cases →

— 810.015(1) — 3 cases

Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 2010). “(creating § 810.015(1), Florida Statutes (2002)). 19 .”

Delgado v. State, 948 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2006). “[3] Delgado maintained a theory of innocence *685 and presented no evidence or testimony.”

Skellie v. State, 849 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). “Stat. (2002). The question in this case is whether Skellie had permission from the owner to enter and remain in the building where the grand theft occurred.”

— 810.015(1)(2) — 1 case

Carter v. State, 980 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2008). “[4] Moreover, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's and the jury's conclusion that the murders of Pafford and Reed were committed in the course of a burglary. Carter either entered Reed's home uninvited with the intent to commit murder therein, or,…”

— 810.015(2) — 6 cases

Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2003). “" However, the Legislature also stated that subsection (2) of § 810.015 would "operate retroactively to February 1, 2000.”

State v. Ruiz, 863 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2003). “Specifically, section 1 of chapter 2001-58, which is the subject of the certified question, created section 810.015, Florida Statutes (2002): 810.”

Foster v. State, 861 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “2000)), the Florida Legislature enacted section 810.015, Florida Statutes (2001), which includes the legislative finding that the supreme court in Delgado had interpreted the burglary statute, section 810.”

Smith v. Crosby, 872 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

— 810.015(3) — 8 cases

Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2009). “See § 810.015(3), Fla. Stat. (2004) ("[L]ack of consent may be proven by circumstantial evidence.”

Patrick Albert Evans v. State of Florida, 177 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2015). “2009) (quoting § 810.015(3), Fla. Stat. (2004)). In circumstantial evidence cases, the trial court must grant a judgment of acquittal if the State has failed to present evidence from which a jury could exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.”

MacKey v. State, 83 So. 3d 942 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

Robinson v. State, 989 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

— 810.015(l) — 1 case

Ducas v. State, 84 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

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