Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 810.02 (2025)

Burglary.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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810.02 Burglary.—

(1)(a) For offenses committed on or before July 1, 2001, “burglary” means entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.

(b) For offenses committed after July 1, 2001, “burglary” means:

1. Entering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter; or

2. Notwithstanding a licensed or invited entry, remaining in a dwelling, structure, or conveyance:

a. Surreptitiously, with the intent to commit an offense therein;

b. After permission to remain therein has been withdrawn, with the intent to commit an offense therein; or

c. To commit or attempt to commit a forcible felony, as defined in s. 776.08.

(2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender:

(a) Makes an assault or battery upon any person; or

(b) Is or becomes armed within the dwelling, structure, or conveyance, with explosives or a dangerous weapon; or

1. Uses a motor vehicle as an instrumentality, other than merely as a getaway vehicle, to assist in committing the offense, and thereby damages the dwelling or structure; or

2. Causes damage to the dwelling or structure, or to property within the dwelling or structure in excess of $1,000.

(3) Burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender does not make an assault or battery and is not and does not become armed with a dangerous weapon or explosive, and the offender enters or remains in a:

(a) Dwelling, and there is another person in the dwelling at the time the offender enters or remains;

(b) Dwelling, and there is not another person in the dwelling at the time the offender enters or remains;

(d) Conveyance, and there is another person in the conveyance at the time the offender enters or remains;

(e) Authorized emergency vehicle, as defined in s. 316.003; or

(f) Structure or conveyance when the offense intended to be committed therein is theft of a controlled substance as defined in s. 893.02. Notwithstanding any other law, separate judgments and sentences for burglary with the intent to commit theft of a controlled substance under this paragraph and for any applicable possession of controlled substance offense under s. 893.13 or trafficking in controlled substance offense under s. 893.135 may be imposed when all such offenses involve the same amount or amounts of a controlled substance.

However, if the burglary is committed during a riot or an aggravated riot prohibited under s. 870.01 and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the riot; or within a county that is subject to a state of emergency declared by the Governor under chapter 252 after the declaration of emergency is made and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency, the burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As used in this subsection, the term “conditions arising from the riot” means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel and the term “conditions arising from the emergency” means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, voluntary or mandatory evacuations, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. A person arrested for committing a burglary during a riot or an aggravated riot or within a county that is subject to such a state of emergency may not be released until the person appears before a committing magistrate at a first appearance hearing. For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921, a felony offense that is reclassified under this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 of the offense committed.

(4) Burglary is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender does not make an assault or battery and is not and does not become armed with a dangerous weapon or explosive, and the offender enters or remains in a:

(a) Structure, and there is not another person in the structure at the time the offender enters or remains; or

(b) Conveyance, and there is not another person in the conveyance at the time the offender enters or remains.

However, if the burglary is committed during a riot or an aggravated riot prohibited under s. 870.01 and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the riot; or within a county that is subject to a state of emergency declared by the Governor under chapter 252 after the declaration of emergency is made and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency, the burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As used in this subsection, the terms “conditions arising from the riot” and “conditions arising from the emergency” have the same meanings as provided in subsection (3). A person arrested for committing a burglary during a riot or an aggravated riot or within a county that is subject to such a state of emergency may not be released until the person appears before a committing magistrate at a first appearance hearing. For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921, a felony offense that is reclassified under this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 of the offense committed.

History.—RS 2434; s. 2, ch. 4405, 1895; s. 2, ch. 5411, 1905; GS 3282; RGS 5116; CGL 7217; s. 799, ch. 71-136; s. 31, ch. 74-383; s. 21, ch. 75-298; s. 2, ch. 82-87; s. 1, ch. 83-63; s. 8, ch. 95-184; s. 2, ch. 96-260; s. 2, ch. 2000-233; s. 2, ch. 2001-58; s. 2, ch. 2003-84; s. 1, ch. 2007-115; s. 21, ch. 2011-141; s. 40, ch. 2016-105; s. 28, ch. 2016-145; s. 123, ch. 2019-167; s. 12, ch. 2021-6.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 1,271 cases (59 in the last 5 years), 1947–2026 · leading case: Albert Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prison, 713 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2013).

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Albert Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prison, 713 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2013). · cites it 19× “In both instances, the district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Williams’s claim -- which asserted, through the lens of ineffective assistance of counsel, that his Fla. Stat. § 810.02 burglary convictions were not violent felonies in light…”

Dudley Bryant, Jr. v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium, 738 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013). · cites it 6× “Circuit Precedent Did Not Foreclose Williams’s Burglary Claim In Williams, we concluded that Williams could not “show that this Circuit’s law foreclosed him from raising an objection to the treatment of his two Florida burglary convictions [under Fla. Stat. 810.02] as violent…”

State v. Byars, 823 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2002). · cites it 10× “§ 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1999). To resolve the issue certified by the district court below, our review must focus upon the statute's exception for conduct which occurs where "the premises are at the time open to the public.”

Foster v. State, 861 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). · cites it 12× “And three, at the time of entering or remaining in the structure Curtis Foster had a fully formed conscious intent to commit the offense of theft while in that structure.”

United States v. Calvin Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015). · cites it 4× “He argued that his prior felony convictions for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, Fla. Stat. § 810.02 (l)(b), (3)(b), were not “crime[s] of violence.”

Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2003). · cites it 6× “[38] See § 810.02, Fla.State.(1989). [39] The Braggs court subsequently reversed the burglary conviction, determining that it was bound to follow Delgado until this Court explicitly recedes from Delgado.”

State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1995). · cites it 9× “" See § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1941). In 1974, with the enactment of section 810.”

State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001). · cites it 5× “§ 810.02, Fla.Stat. (1997) (emphasis added).”

Gaber v. State, 684 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1996). · cites it 10× “Gaber appealed, claiming that his convictions for both armed burglary under section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1993), [1] and grand theft of a firearm, under section 812.”

State v. Waters, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1983). · cites it 7× “In a prosecution for burglary under section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1979), is it necessary for the state to allege an intent to commit a specific offense? 2.”

State v. Ruiz, 863 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2003). · cites it 10× “" § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] The Legislature also enacted a new definition of burglary for crimes committed after July 1, 2001, that, among other changes, includes a definition of the "remaining in" language.”

Terence Tobias Oliver v. State of Florida, 214 So. 3d 606 (Fla. 2017). · cites it 7× “Section 810.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes, defines burglary as “entering - 24 - or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to…”

Show all 1,271 citing cases →

— 810.02(1) — 223 cases

Foster v. State, 861 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “And three, at the time of entering or remaining in the structure Curtis Foster had a fully formed conscious intent to commit the offense of theft while in that structure.”

State v. Hicks, 421 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1982).

State v. Ruiz, 863 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2003). “" § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] The Legislature also enacted a new definition of burglary for crimes committed after July 1, 2001, that, among other changes, includes a definition of the "remaining in" language.”

Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2003). “[38] See § 810.02, Fla.State.(1989). [39] The Braggs court subsequently reversed the burglary conviction, determining that it was bound to follow Delgado until this Court explicitly recedes from Delgado.”

State v. Byars, 823 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2002). “§ 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1999). To resolve the issue certified by the district court below, our review must focus upon the statute's exception for conduct which occurs where "the premises are at the time open to the public.”

— 810.02(1)(3) — 1 case

Blair v. State, 667 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

— 810.02(1)(a) — 10 cases

Terence Tobias Oliver v. State of Florida, 214 So. 3d 606 (Fla. 2017). “Section 810.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes, defines burglary as “entering - 24 - or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to…”

Delgado v. State, 948 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2006).

Perreault v. State, 831 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

Skellie v. State, 849 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

Young v. State, 979 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

— 810.02(1)(b) — 50 cases

Patrick Albert Evans v. State of Florida, 177 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2015).

Irizarry v. State, 905 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

Diego Tambriz-Ramirez v. State of Florida, 248 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 2018).

Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2009).

— 810.02(1)(b)(1) — 8 cases

Carter v. State, 980 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2008).

Coleman v. State, 956 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Pitts v. State, 989 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Dalton v. City of Largo (M.D. Fla. 2025).

JJD v. State, 973 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

— 810.02(1)(b)(2)(b) — 1 case

Grace v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Polk Cnty.) (M.D. Fla. 2024).

— 810.02(1)(b)(2)(c) — 1 case

Irizarry v. State, 905 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

— 810.02(1)(b)(4)(b) — 1 case

Rivers v. State, 124 So. 3d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

— 810.02(2) — 107 cases

Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Smith v. State, 211 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

Blocker v. State, 968 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1992).

Vileta v. State, 454 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

— 810.02(2)(a) — 148 cases

Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 2012).

Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983).

Savino v. State, 447 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).

Franklin v. State, 887 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2004).

Mosely v. State, 688 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

— 810.02(2)(a)(b) — 1 case

Anderson v. State, 758 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

— 810.02(2)(b) — 94 cases

Bunkley v. State, 882 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2004).

Hardee v. State, 534 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1988).

Gaber v. State, 684 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1996). “Gaber appealed, claiming that his convictions for both armed burglary under section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1993), [1] and grand theft of a firearm, under section 812.”

Yegge v. State, 186 So. 3d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

— 810.02(2)(c) — 9 cases

I.M. v. State, 917 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Horne v. State, 997 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Odell Brown v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

IM v. State, 917 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Demetrius Elliot v. State of Florida, 243 So. 3d 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

— 810.02(2)(c)(2) — 1 case

Horne v. State, 997 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

— 810.02(3) — 165 cases

Nurse v. State, 658 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

Walker v. State, 896 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2005).

Rozier v. State, 402 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

State v. Burnette, 881 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1995). “" See § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1941). In 1974, with the enactment of section 810.”

— 810.02(3)(6) — 1 case

State v. Meyers, 708 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

— 810.02(3)(a) — 22 cases

State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Weems v. State, 795 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

State v. Eldredge, 801 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

Gordon v. State, 745 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

C.R.C. v. Portesy, 731 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

— 810.02(3)(b) — 18 cases

McKIVER v. State, 55 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

Williams v. State, 66 So. 3d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Henig v. State, 820 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Vantine v. State, 66 So. 3d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

State v. Burnette, 881 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

— 810.02(3)(c) — 9 cases

Fuston v. State, 764 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

Jackson v. State, 902 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Hoppert v. State, 68 So. 3d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Reidy v. State, 965 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Jarmal N. Brown v. State (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).

— 810.02(3)(d) — 7 cases

State v. Huggins, 744 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Jackson v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2013).

Roosevelt Smith v. the State of Florida (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).

Williams v. State, 165 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

Jarmal N. Brown v. State (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).

— 810.02(3)(f) — 2 cases

In re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report No. 2012-01, 109 So. 3d 721 (Fla. 2013).

Dream Defenders v. Desantis (N.D. Fla. 2021).

— 810.02(4) — 16 cases

Henry v. State, 707 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

Rosen v. State, 272 So. 3d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).

Kinney v. State, 808 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

R.L.B. v. State, 703 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

United States v. Sanchez-Loredo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 873 (S.D. Tex. 2003).

— 810.02(4)(B) — 1 case

State v. M.J., 929 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

— 810.02(4)(a) — 19 cases

Munoz v. State, 937 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Castillo v. State, 929 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Kelly v. State, 816 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

Freudenberger v. State, 940 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

D.E.R. v. State, 744 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

— 810.02(4)(b) — 8 cases

Aponte v. State, 896 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

A.D. v. State, 106 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

G.C. v. State, 944 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Keith London v. State of Florida, 240 So. 3d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

Odell Brown v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

— 810.02(b) — 4 cases

Franke v. State, 997 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Stabile v. State, 790 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

A.M.W. v. State, 934 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

AMW v. State, 934 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

— 810.02(b)(1) — 2 cases

Victorino v. State, 127 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 2013).

Jean-Marie v. State, 947 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

— 810.02(b)(l) — 1 case

Harris v. State, 48 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

— 810.02(c) — 1 case

State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001). “§ 810.02, Fla.Stat. (1997) (emphasis added).”

— 810.02(l) — 1 case

Burgan v. State, 675 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

— 810.02(l)(3)(b) — 1 case

Robinson v. State, 766 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

— 810.02(l)(a) — 8 cases

Tuttle v. State, 137 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

Delgado v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 659 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2011).

Wojcieszak v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

J.W. v. State, 849 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

United States v. Bargeron, 435 F. App'x 892 (11th Cir. 2011).

— 810.02(l)(b) — 34 cases

Harris v. State, 48 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2009).

Robert Pernell McCloud v. State of Florida, 208 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 2016).

Tai a. Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485 (Fla. 2011).

State v. Herron, 70 So. 3d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

— 810.02(l)(b)(4)(b) — 1 case

Rivers v. State, 124 So. 3d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

— 810.02(l)(b)(i) — 1 case

Knott v. State, 198 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

— 810.02(l)(b)(l) — 7 cases

B.M. v. State, 212 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).

L.A.H. v. State, 197 So. 3d 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Faulk v. State, 222 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

A.D. v. State, 106 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

J.J.D. v. State, 973 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

— 810.02(l)(c) — 1 case

Murray v. State, 801 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

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