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Florida Statute 810.02 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 810.02 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 810
BURGLARY AND TRESPASS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 810.02
810.02 Burglary.
(1)(a) For offenses committed on or before July 1, 2001, “burglary” means entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.
(b) For offenses committed after July 1, 2001, “burglary” means:
1. Entering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter; or
2. Notwithstanding a licensed or invited entry, remaining in a dwelling, structure, or conveyance:
a. Surreptitiously, with the intent to commit an offense therein;
b. After permission to remain therein has been withdrawn, with the intent to commit an offense therein; or
c. To commit or attempt to commit a forcible felony, as defined in s. 776.08.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender:
(a) Makes an assault or battery upon any person; or
(b) Is or becomes armed within the dwelling, structure, or conveyance, with explosives or a dangerous weapon; or
(c) Enters an occupied or unoccupied dwelling or structure, and:
1. Uses a motor vehicle as an instrumentality, other than merely as a getaway vehicle, to assist in committing the offense, and thereby damages the dwelling or structure; or
2. Causes damage to the dwelling or structure, or to property within the dwelling or structure in excess of $1,000.
(3) Burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender does not make an assault or battery and is not and does not become armed with a dangerous weapon or explosive, and the offender enters or remains in a:
(a) Dwelling, and there is another person in the dwelling at the time the offender enters or remains;
(b) Dwelling, and there is not another person in the dwelling at the time the offender enters or remains;
(c) Structure, and there is another person in the structure at the time the offender enters or remains;
(d) Conveyance, and there is another person in the conveyance at the time the offender enters or remains;
(e) Authorized emergency vehicle, as defined in s. 316.003; or
(f) Structure or conveyance when the offense intended to be committed therein is theft of a controlled substance as defined in s. 893.02. Notwithstanding any other law, separate judgments and sentences for burglary with the intent to commit theft of a controlled substance under this paragraph and for any applicable possession of controlled substance offense under s. 893.13 or trafficking in controlled substance offense under s. 893.135 may be imposed when all such offenses involve the same amount or amounts of a controlled substance.

However, if the burglary is committed during a riot or an aggravated riot prohibited under s. 870.01 and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the riot; or within a county that is subject to a state of emergency declared by the Governor under chapter 252 after the declaration of emergency is made and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency, the burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As used in this subsection, the term “conditions arising from the riot” means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel and the term “conditions arising from the emergency” means civil unrest, power outages, curfews, voluntary or mandatory evacuations, or a reduction in the presence of or response time for first responders or homeland security personnel. A person arrested for committing a burglary during a riot or an aggravated riot or within a county that is subject to such a state of emergency may not be released until the person appears before a committing magistrate at a first appearance hearing. For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921, a felony offense that is reclassified under this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 of the offense committed.

(4) Burglary is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender does not make an assault or battery and is not and does not become armed with a dangerous weapon or explosive, and the offender enters or remains in a:
(a) Structure, and there is not another person in the structure at the time the offender enters or remains; or
(b) Conveyance, and there is not another person in the conveyance at the time the offender enters or remains.

However, if the burglary is committed during a riot or an aggravated riot prohibited under s. 870.01 and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the riot; or within a county that is subject to a state of emergency declared by the Governor under chapter 252 after the declaration of emergency is made and the perpetration of the burglary is facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency, the burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As used in this subsection, the terms “conditions arising from the riot” and “conditions arising from the emergency” have the same meanings as provided in subsection (3). A person arrested for committing a burglary during a riot or an aggravated riot or within a county that is subject to such a state of emergency may not be released until the person appears before a committing magistrate at a first appearance hearing. For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921, a felony offense that is reclassified under this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking under s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 of the offense committed.

History.RS 2434; s. 2, ch. 4405, 1895; s. 2, ch. 5411, 1905; GS 3282; RGS 5116; CGL 7217; s. 799, ch. 71-136; s. 31, ch. 74-383; s. 21, ch. 75-298; s. 2, ch. 82-87; s. 1, ch. 83-63; s. 8, ch. 95-184; s. 2, ch. 96-260; s. 2, ch. 2000-233; s. 2, ch. 2001-58; s. 2, ch. 2003-84; s. 1, ch. 2007-115; s. 21, ch. 2011-141; s. 40, ch. 2016-105; s. 28, ch. 2016-145; s. 123, ch. 2019-167; s. 12, ch. 2021-6.

F.S. 810.02 on Google Scholar

F.S. 810.02 on Casetext

Amendments to 810.02


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 810.02
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S810.02 2a - BURGL - WITH ASSAULT OR BATTERY - F: F
S810.02 2b - BURGL - DWELLING STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE ARMED - F: F
S810.02 2c1 - BURGL - DWEL OR STRUCT USE VEH AS INSTRUMENT CAUSE DMG - F: F
S810.02 2c2 - BURGL - DWELLING OR STRUCT CAUSE DAMAGE OVER 1000 DOLS - F: F
S810.02 3a - BURGL - OCCUPIED DWELLING UNARMED - F: S
S810.02 3a - BURGL - OCCUPIED DWELLING STATE OF EMERGENCY OR RIOT - F: F
S810.02 3b - BURGL - UNOCCUPIED DWELLING UNARMED - F: S
S810.02 3b - BURGL - UNOCCUPIED DWELLING STATE OF EMERGENCY/RIOT - F: F
S810.02 3c - BURGL - OCCUPIED STRUCTURE UNARMED - F: S
S810.02 3c - BURGL - OCCUPIED STRUCTURE STATE OF EMERGENCY OR RIOT - F: F
S810.02 3d - BURGL - OCCUPIED CONVEYANCE UNARMED - F: S
S810.02 3d - BURGL - OCCUPIED CONVEYANCE STATE OF EMERGENCY/RIOT - F: F
S810.02 3e - BURGL - AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLE UNARMED - F: S
S810.02 3e - BURGL - EMERGENCY VEHICLE STATE OF EMERGENCY OR RIOT - F: F
S810.02 3f - BURGL - STRUCTURE CONVEYANCE THEFT CONTROLLED SUBST - F: S
S810.02 3f - BURGL - STRUCT CONVEY THEFT CON SUB STATE OF EMERGENCY - F: F
S810.02 4 - BURGL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 6266 AND REC # 6267 - F: T
S810.02 4a - BURGL - UNOCCUPIED STRUCTURE UNARMED - F: T
S810.02 4a - BURGL - UNOCCUPIED STRUCTURE STATE OF EMERGENCY/RIOT - F: S
S810.02 4b - BURGL - UNOCCUPIED CONVEYANCE UNARMED - F: T
S810.02 4b - BURGL - UNOCCUPIED CONVEYANCE STATE OF EMERGENCY/RIOT - F: S



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All
  1. Adkins contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of “simple burglary.” (Doc. 10 at 5.) Adkins was charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling, a second-degree felony. (Doc. 132, Ex. 2, at 1; see also Fla. Stat. § 810.02( 1)(b)(3)(a).) The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of that offense. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. 3, at 200-02.) The court also informed the jury that, if it did not find the charge to be “proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” it must consider whether Adkins was guilty of the lesser-included offense of trespass. (Id. at 203.) The court did not, however, instruct the jury that it could find Adkins guilty of the lesser-included offense of simple burglary, a third-degree felony that occurs if the offender (1) enters an unoccupied “structure” or “conveyance” rather than a “dwelling,” and (2) intends “to commit an offense therein.” Fla. Stat. § 810.02( 1)(b)(4). Likewise, the verdict form required the jury to decide whether Adkins committed burglary of an occupied dwelling or trespass; it did not include an option for simple burglary. (Doc. 13-2, Ex. 5.) As noted above…
  2. The State gave notice of intent to classify Key as a Prison Releasee Reoffender, a Habitual Felony Offender, and a Violent Career Criminal ("VCC"). The offense in count 1 is a first-degree felony punishable by a sentence up to and including life imprisonment. § 810.02(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2010). As such, when as in this case, the defendant qualifies as a VCC, the required sentence for count 1 is life imprisonment. § 775.084(4)(d)1., Fla. Stat.
    PAGE 2
  3. Affirmed. See Morris v. State, 727 So.2d 975, 977 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("An acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the judge from determining that a parole or probation violation has occurred based on the same conduct."); Eustache v. State, 248 So.3d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 2018) ("Florida courts have consistently treated conduct involving a new criminal offense, such as [appellant's] illegal drug possession, as a substantive violation."); Flagg v. State, 179 So.3d 394, 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("Where there has been a substantive violation, such as a new law offense, a previously designated youthful offender may be sentenced above the six-year cap up to the statutory maximum for the underlying offenses."); see also § 810.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2010).
  4. a violation of subsection (a). ... [T]he judgment should not reflect a violation of section 810.02(2)(a), and this Court should remand for the trial court to correct the written judgment so it [indicates] a violation of ... section 810.02(2)(b) to reflect the language in the information and the jury's findings. [ See] Sweeney v. State, 138 So.3d 1095, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (remanding for trial court to correct statute number on appellant's written judgment and sentencing documents); [ cf.] Moseley v. State, 688 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ("Because the information recited the appropriate factual description of a violation of section 810.02(2)(a), we treat the citation to the incorrect statute as a scrivener's error and remand this case for correction of the judgment to indicate a conviction under section 810.02(2)(a).").
    PAGE 2
  5. On August 13, 1999, at the conclusion of a trial in Leon County Circuit Court case 1998-CF-2824, the jury found Petitioner Dwayne Martin guilty of (1) burglary with assault, a first degree felony punishable by life in prison, in violation of section 810.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes; (2) trespass of an occupied structure, a first degree felony punishable by life in prison, in violation of section 810.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes; (3) armed burglary of a dwelling, a first degree felony punishable by life in prison, in violation of section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes; and (4) resisting arrest without violence, a first degree misdemeanor, in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes. Ex. B (verdict).The offenses occurred July 12, 1998. Ex. A. On December 1, 1999, Judge George S. Reynolds sentenced Martin to life in prison as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) on Counts 1 and 3, and to 365 days' time served on Counts 2 and 4, with all sentences concurrent. See Exs. C at 28-29 (sentencing transcript); D (judgment and sentence).
    PAGE 2
  6. To prove the predicate crime of burglary, the State was required to prove that Appellant entered "a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein." § 810.02(1)(b), Fla. Stat. From this evidence, a reasonable inference can be drawn that Appellant and two others, at the very least, set up the victim for a robbery. Again, the victim's house was ransacked. Appellant's JOA argument essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence in his favor, which is not appropriate. And so, we see no problem with the trial court's ruling on the JOA motion.
    PAGE 3
  7. Wooden v. The Town of Eatonville

    premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter." Id. § 810.02(1)(b). As relevant here, Florida law defines the crime of threats, in relevant part, as "[w]hoever

  8. On March 25, 2015, the State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Highlands County, Florida charged Petitioner with (1) burglary of a dwelling while armed with a firearm in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 810.02 and 775.087, and (2) grand theft in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.014 (DE 9-1 at 9-11, Ex. B). The case proceeded to trial on June 13, 2016 (DE 10-3, DE 10-4).
  9. To address Appellant's claim of truly inconsistent verdicts, I must consider the broader context of Florida's burglary statute set forth in section 810.02, Florida Statutes (2019). Generally, in Florida, burglary of an unoccupied structure is a third-degree felony, punishable by five years in prison. See § 810.02(4)(a), Fla. Stat. If the structure burglarized is a dwelling, that burglary is classified as a second-degree felony, punishable by fifteen years in prison. See § 810.02(3)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. Further, under Florida law pertinent to this case, burglary is a first-degree felony punishable by life in prison if during the burglary of a dwelling, structure, or conveyance, one assaults or batters another person, is or becomes armed within the dwelling, structure or conveyance, or causes damage to the dwelling or structure in excess of $1,000. See § 810.02(2), Fla. Stat.
    PAGE 6
  10. Tobitt contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to a misleading and confusing jury instruction. As addressed, the State's theory of burglary was that Tobitt entered the property without permission and with the intent to commit an offense therein. But a burglary can also occur when a person, “[n]otwithstanding a licensed or invited entry, remains in a dwelling, structure, or conveyance” under certain circumstances. § 810.02(1)(b)2., Fla. Stat.
    PAGE 12

    Cases from cite.case.law:

    WARD, DOC v. STATE, 273 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . See § 810.02(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

    ROSEN, v. STATE, 272 So. 3d 875 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . The judgment and order of revocation cites to section 810.02(4), Florida Statutes (2018). . . . directions that this scrivener's error be corrected so that the judgment accurately reflects section 810.02 . . .

    NEWBY, v. STATE, 272 So. 3d 862 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . Newby was charged in a one-count information with burglary with a battery under section 810.02(2)(a), . . .

    WADE, v. STATE, 274 So. 3d 479 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . See § 810.02(4), Fla. . . .

    CURRY, v. UNITED STATES, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

    . . . . § 810.02 (1985 & 1989). . . .

    GALLO, v. STATE, 272 So. 3d 418 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . ." § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .

    T. BREWER, LPN, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING,, 268 So. 3d 871 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . Section 435.04(2)(z) lists burglary in section 810.02, Florida Statutes, as a qualifying offense. . . .

    AGENOR, DOC v. STATE, 268 So. 3d 868 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . of burglary of a conveyance with "an air pistol or BB gun, a dangerous weapon or explosive," see § 810.02 . . . Stat. (2015) ; and one count of attempted burglary of a conveyance "with a deadly weapon," see §§ 810.02 . . . See generally § 810.02. . . .

    C. OGDEN, v. STATE, 273 So. 3d 162 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . . § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. He qualified for sentencing as a PRR and a habitual felony offender. . . . second-degree felony), which would carry a fifteen-year sentence as a PRR, in exchange for a guilty plea. §§ 810.02 . . .

    JAMES, v. STATE, 264 So. 3d 982 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . James was charged with burglary of a dwelling in violation of subsections 810.02(1) and (3), Florida . . .

    VON YOUNG, v. STATE, 266 So. 3d 1225 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . ." § 810.02(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

    SHADE, v. STATE, 263 So. 3d 91 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . one charge of burglary because the two counts constituted the same statutory offense under section 810.02 . . .

    BARBER, v. STATE, 263 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

    . . . Torna , 742 So.2d at 367 (suggesting that "in future cases involving charges of a violation of section 810.02 . . . See § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. . . .

    IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 260 So. 3d 941 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . Burglary of a dwelling 810.02(3) 13.1 Robbery 812.13(2)(c) 15.1 Burglary of a Structure 810.02 13.1 Petit . . .

    UNITED STATES, v. J. STITT, II. v., 139 S. Ct. 399 (U.S. 2018)

    . . . . §§ 810.011(2), 810.02 (1976) ; Ga. . . .

    IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 257 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . 1981 and was amended in 1992 [603 So.2d 1175], and 2014 [146 So.3d 1110], and 2018. 13.1 BURGLARY § 810.02 . . . Burglary 810.02(4) 13.1 Aggravated battery 784.045 8.4 Persons Engaged in 790.07(2) 10.3 Criminal Offense . . . in 790.07(1) 10.3 Criminal Offense Having Weapon Assault 784.011 8.1 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Burglary 810.02 . . . OF STRUCTURE OR CONVEYANCE WITH HUMAN BEING INSIDE; BURGLARY OF AN AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLE* - 810.02 . . . BURGLARY - 810.02(4) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. . . .

    HUCKABA, v. STATE, 260 So. 3d 377 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . and the information alleged that the defendant's actions were "contrary to the provisions of section 810.02 . . .

    WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 257 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . was changed to "ARMED BURGLARY OF DWELLING WITH PERSON ASSAULTED" and included a citation to section 810.02 . . . acknowledged receiving the amended information and its completed burglary charge, which referenced section 810.02 . . . In addition to citing the burglary statute, section 810.02(2), by alleging that Mr. . . .

    STATE v. I. J. a, 258 So. 3d 473 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . structure or conveyance, with explosives or a dangerous weapon.' " (alteration in original) (quoting § 810.02 . . .

    WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 252 So. 3d 859 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 810.02(2)(a)&(b), Fla. Stat. . . . See §§ 812.13(2)(a) & 810.02(2)(a)&(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

    UNITED STATES v. URBINA- FUENTES,, 900 F.3d 687 (5th Cir. 2018)

    . . . . § 810.02(1)(b) & (3)(a) (West 2008). . . . Stat. § 810.02(1)(b)(1),] indisputably does not implicate the elements clause [of the 'crime of violence . . .

    E. M. v. STATE, 251 So. 3d 990 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See § 810.02(1)(b), Fla. . . .

    TAMBRIZ- RAMIREZ, v. STATE, 248 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 2018)

    . . . ." § 810.02(1) - (2), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 810.02(2), Fla. . . . To commit or attempt to commit a forcible felony, as defined in s. 776.08. § 810.02(1)(b), Fla. . . . in the course of committing the offense, the offender makes an assault or battery upon any person. § 810.02 . . .

    LUCAS, v. STATE, 247 So. 3d 23 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . corrected to reflect that appellant was charged with burglary of an unoccupied dwelling under section 810.02 . . .

    PARISH, v. STATE, 249 So. 3d 734 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . was required to "plead and prove not only the essential elements of burglary as defined in section 810.02 . . .

    WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 244 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See §§ 810.02(3), 812.019(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984). . . .

    ELLIOT, v. STATE, 243 So. 3d 418 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . As to the October burglary, the state alleged a violation of section 810.02(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes . . . residential burglary causing "damage to the dwelling or property within the dwelling in excess of $1,000." § 810.02 . . .

    WALLACH, v. STATE, 242 So. 3d 442 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . . § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

    ROBERTS, v. STATE, 240 So. 3d 883 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . Pursuant to section 810.02(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2014), it is burglary to enter a dwelling without . . .

    HUMPHREY, v. STATE, 239 So. 3d 718 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . Humphrey was charged with and convicted of burglary with a battery under section 810.02(2)(a), Florida . . .

    LONDON, v. STATE, 240 So. 3d 746 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . See §§ 777.011, 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . . § 810.02(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

    I. L. a v. STATE, 240 So. 3d 81 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

    . . . Count One of the petition alleged that I.L. committed burglary of a structure in violation of section 810.02 . . . necessarily lesser-included offense of burglary of a structure as charged in the petition under section 810.02 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. HERROLD,, 883 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2018)

    . . . . § 810.02 (1983) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1 (1984); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-810 (1985); Ill. Rev. . . . Ann. § 810.02 ; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1 ; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 708-810 ; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. . . .

    HOPE, v. STATE, 239 So. 3d 737 (Fla. App. Ct. 2017)

    . . . a dwelling with an assault or battery and a firearm when the correct statutory citation is section 810.02 . . . (2)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), and erroneously cites to section 810.02(2)(a) for the crime of aggravated . . .

    UNITED STATES v. OSCAR, a. k. a. ZB, a. k. a. a. k. a., 877 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . convictions for violent felonies, with one being his conviction for Florida burglary under Florida Statute § 810.02 . . . Subsequently, this Court held that a Florida burglary conviction under Florida Statute §§ 810.02(l)(b . . . specifically, in Esprit, this Court held that a Florida burglary conviction under Florida Statute §§ 810.02 . . .

    PINKNEY, v. SECRETARY, DOC,, 876 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . burglary with assault or battery while armed with a deadly weapon, in violation of Florida Statutes §§ 810.02 . . .

    J. DAVIS, DOC v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Davis of burglary with an assault or battery, in violation of section 810.02, Florida, Statutes (2013 . . .

    MORGAN, v. STATE, 228 So. 3d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . (1)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2014), and one count of burglary of a dwelling in violation of section 810.02 . . .

    N. BROWN, v. STATE, 226 So. 3d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . defendant pled no contest to two offenses, including burglary- of an occupied structure under section 810.02 . . . (2016),, but his judgment reflects a conviction for burglary of an occupied structure under section 810.02 . . .

    B. R. W. v. STATE, 226 So. 3d 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . See § 810.02(l)(b)(l), (4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

    RAWLS, v. STATE, 225 So. 3d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . (reorganizing this. burglary statute into three subsections and moving it to section 810.02). . . .

    FAULK, v. STATE, 222 So. 3d 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Burglary, as defined by section 810.02(l)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (2015), means “[e]ntering a dwelling . . .

    UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ- MARTINEZ,, 689 F. App'x 330 (5th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 810.02. . . .

    UNITED STATES v. DIAZ,, 684 F. App'x 887 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 810.02(1)(b), (3)(b), was a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of section 4B1.2(a)(2). . . .

    OLIVER, v. STATE, 214 So. 3d 606 (Fla. 2017)

    . . . Statutes (2009); one count of armed burglary of a dwelling while inflicting death, in violation of section 810.02 . . . Section 810.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes, defines burglary as “entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure . . .

    RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE, 223 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . ’s error and remand this case for correction of the judgment to indicate a conviction under section 810.02 . . .

    B. M. v. STATE, 212 So. 3d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . See § 810.02(l)(b)(l), (l)(b)(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . See § 810.02(l)(b)(l), (l)(b)(4)(a); cf. A.D. v. . . .

    BIENAIME, v. STATE, 213 So. 3d 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . terms are defined in section 790.001, Florida Statutes contrary to Florida Statutes 775.087(2)(a)l, 810.02 . . .

    TAMBRIZ- RAMIREZ, v. STATE, 213 So. 3d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . Burglary, which is proscribed in section 810.02, Florida Statutes (2009), is a separate offense from . . . to the dwelling or structure, or to property within the dwelling or structure in excess of $1,000. § 810.02 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. GERMAN, a. k. a., 680 F. App'x 841 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . . § 810.02(1)(a). . . .

    J. PILAFJIAN, v. STATE, 210 So. 3d 738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . See § 810.02(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . See § 810.02(l)(b), Fla. . . .

    IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 217 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 2017)

    . . . This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 and 2017. 13.1 BURGLARY § 810.02, Fla. . . .

    MORLAS, v. STATE, 211 So. 3d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

    . . . “[e]nter[ed] a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein 810.02 . . . ejntering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.” § 810.02 . . .

    KING, v. UNITED STATES, 233 F. Supp. 3d 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . . § 810.02 (1995); see also Williams v. Singletary, 78 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996). . . .

    LEONE, v. UNITED STATES, 233 F. Supp. 3d 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

    . . . . § 810.02 (1989). . . .

    UNITED STATES v. GARCIA- MARTINEZ,, 845 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 2017)

    . . . illegally, was convicted in Florida of second degree burglary of a dwelling under Florida Statute § 810.02 . . . Stat. § 810.02(1)(b). . . . Id. § 810.02(3)(a)-(b). . . . Stat. § 810.02(3), the decisive question is whether it counts under § 2L1.2’s enumerated offenses clause . . .

    SMITH, v. STATE, 211 So. 3d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . A burglary offense under s. 810.02. 6. . . . preserved and available for testing by the accused.” § 775.15(15)(a). - For burglary offenses (section 810.02 . . . commission of the offense, said defendant possessed a firearm or destructive device, in violation of s. 810.02 . . . Section 810.02(2), Florida Statutes (1990), the statute under which Smith was charged, provides in pertinent . . . The State could have alleged, pursuant to section 810.02(2)(a), rather than (2)(b)), that Smith committed . . .

    UNITED STATES v. BERNEL- AVEJA, B., 844 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02(l)(b)(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2016) Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1 (2011 & Supp. 2016) 720 III. . . . Ann. § 810.02; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1; Haw. Rev. Stat, § 708-810; 720 III. Comp. Stat. . . . Ann. § 810.02; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:18-2). . See Model Penal Code § 221.1 (Am. . . .

    ORR, v. STATE, 206 So.3d 120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . on drug offender probation where he was convicted of third-degree felony of burglary under section 810.02 . . .

    S. A. W. v. STATE, 206 So.3d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . S.A.W., a juvenile, pleaded guilty to burglary, in violation of section 810.02, Florida Statutes (2014 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. ESPRIT,, 841 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02(l)(b)(l). . . . Stat. § 810.02(l)(b)(l). . . . Stat. § 810.02(l)(b)(l) ]. The former requires an unlawful entry [into a building or structure]. . . .

    McCLOUD, v. STATE, 208 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 2016)

    . . . reasonable doubt that the defendant actually “[e]nter[ed] a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance,” see § 810.02 . . .

    MATHIS, v. STATE, 204 So.3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . A burglary' offense under s. 810.02. 6. . . .

    POSTASKI, v. STATE, 203 So. 3d 967 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See §§ 810.02(2)(b); 784.045(l)(a), (2); 775.087(l)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . (1) because the use of a weapon or firearm was an essential element of armed burglary under section 810.02 . . .

    D. McCLOUD, v. STATE, 202 So. 3d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See § 810.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1991); Johnson v. State, 60 So.3d 1045 (Fla.2011); Betancourt v. . . .

    UNITED STATES v. D. THORNE,, 837 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02(3) (1995), second degree burglary of a dwelling. . . . Stat. § 810.02 does not qualify as a violent felony. . . .

    M. W. a v. STATE, 201 So. 3d 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

    CAPPELLO, v. STATE, 199 So. 3d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . In relevant part, section 810.02(l)(b)l., Florida Statutes (2015), defines burglary as “[e]ntering a . . . Section 810.02(1) specifically exempts from its purview premises that are open to the public at the time . . .

    LEOPOLD, v. STATE, 199 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See §§ 810.02(3)(a), 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

    FERNANDEZ, v. STATE, 199 So. 3d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See §§ 810.02(2)(a), 921.0022(3)(h), 921.0024(l)(a), Fla. Stat (2009). . . .

    R. ARNOLD ROGERS, v. CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA, a M., 660 F. App'x 819 (11th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02(l)(b)(l), A motor vehicle is a conveyance. Id. § 820.011(3). . . . .

    R. BANNER, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 659 F. App'x 1005 (11th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02(1), (3); aggravated fleeing or eluding, id, § 316.1935(3)(a); grand theft, id, § 812,014(1 . . .

    MEDRANO, v. STATE, 199 So. 3d 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . burglary of a dwelling, possession of burglary tools, and grand theft of a motor vehicle under sections 810.02 . . . ejntering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein _” § 810.02 . . . To constitute burglary, the place entered must be "a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance.” § 810.02 . . .

    REDDING, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See §§ 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q), 775.084(4)(a)(2), 810.02(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008); State v. . . .

    L. A. H. v. STATE, 197 So. 3d 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . .” § 810.02(l)(b)(l), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . juvenile’s intent to commit an offense at the time he enters the dwelling, structure, or conveyance. § 810.02 . . .

    BARRIERA, v. STATE, 196 So. 3d 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1994). . . .

    IN RE LEONARD,, 655 F. App'x 765 (11th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02. . . .

    WOJCIESZAK, v. UNITED STATES, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

    . . . Stat.aNN, § 810.02(l)(a) (West 2011). . . . Section 810.011 defines the term “structure” used in § 810.02 as “a building of any kind, either temporary . . . Section 810.011 defines- the term “dwelling” used in § 810.02 as a building or conveyance of any kind . . . 713 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir.2013) (stating that it is impossible for Florida’s burglary statute, § 810.02 . . .

    IN RE ADAMS,, 825 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02. . . .

    LUCAS, v. STATE, 192 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See §§ 316.063(1), 316.1935(1), 810.02(1)(b)(4), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

    UNITED STATES v. GHANY,, 652 F. App'x 748 (11th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02(3)(b), was not a crime of violence under the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). . . . Stat. § 810.02(3)(b) qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. . . . Stat. § 810.02(3)(b) involved a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and thus it was . . .

    L. JACKSON, v. STATE, 192 So. 3d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . his conviction and sentence for attempted burglary of an occupied dwelling in violation of sections 810.02 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. MAIDA,, 650 F. App'x 682 (11th Cir. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02, which the court concluded qualified as violent felonies for ACCA purposes. . . . Stat. § 810.02, failed to meet the requirements for “burglary” as enumerated in section 924(e)(2)(B)( . . . Stat. § 810.02 does not qualify as a generic burglary as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).” . . . Stat. § 810.02 qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA’s residual clause. Id. at 4-9. . . .

    BUSBEE, v. STATE, 187 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . The first sentence imposed was for unarmed burglary of an occupied dwelling, contrary to sections 810.02 . . . in that case was for one count of unarmed burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, contrary to sections 810.02 . . . The first was for unarmed burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, contrary to sections 810.02(l)(b) and . . . The first two counts were for burglary of an unoccupied structure, contrary to sections 810.02(l)(b) . . . The third sentence in this case was for burglary of an unoccupied structure, contrary to sections 810.02 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. CASTRO- VAZQUEZ,, 176 F. Supp. 3d 13 (D.P.R. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02[1]). . . .

    L. LONG Jr. v. STATE, 188 So. 3d 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . burglary as “the intent to commit an offense therein [within a dwelling, structure, or conveyance] —” § 810.02 . . . See, § 810.02, Fla.Stat. (1983).... . . .

    MORGAN, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See §§ 806.13(l)(a), (b)(2), 810.02(l)(b), (3), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . See § 810.02(l)(a). Evaluating whether Mr. . . . See §§ 810.02(3), 775.082(3)(d). Mr. . . .

    M. M. a v. STATE, 187 So. 3d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See § 810.02, Fla. . . . federal district court, which correctly determined that by reading the word “structure” in section 810.02 . . .

    ORANGE COUNTY, v. STATE, 187 So. 3d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . . § 810.02(2)(a)? Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

    KNOTT, v. STATE, 198 So. 3d 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . See § 810.02(l)(b)(i), (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). ’ . See § 787-.01(l)(a)(4). . . . .

    WOODBERRY, v. STATE, 193 So. 3d 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

    . . . . §§ 787.01(2), 810.02(2), 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1990). Woodberry was convicted as a principal. . . .

    UNITED STATES v. GERMAN, a. k. a., 627 F. App'x 908 (11th Cir. 2015)

    . . . . § 810.02, qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA. . . .

    BROOKS, v. STATE, 186 So. 3d 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

    . . . See §§ 812.13(2)(a); 810.02(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

    UNITED STATES v. DIXON, a. k. a., 622 F. App'x 892 (11th Cir. 2015)

    . . . . § 810.02(3)(b) was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) and thus . . . Stat. § 810.02(3)(b) falls within the scope of the clause. Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1195-97. . . .

    UNITED STATES v. WALKER, a. k. a., 631 F. App'x 753 (11th Cir. 2015)

    . . . the district court in applying § 2K2.1— second-degree burglary of a dwelling under Florida Statute § 810.02 . . . Stat. § 810.02(l)(b), (3), qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), Matchett likewise controls . . . addressed whether a prior conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling under Florida Statute § 810.02 . . .

    A. FORTSON, v. STATE, 179 So. 3d 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

    . . . See § 810.02(1)(b)2.a., Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

    EVANS, v. STATE, 177 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2015)

    . . . . § 810.02(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

    UNITED STATES v. CHISOLM, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

    . . . .” § 810.02, Fla: Stat. (1986). . . . entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.” § 810.02 . . .

    In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 176 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 2015)

    . . . Offenses Comment This instruction was adopted in 2013 [131 So.3d 720] and amended in 2015. 13.1 BURGLARY § 810.02 . . .

    UNITED STATES v. MATCHETT,, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015)

    . . . . § 810.02(l)(b), (3)(b), were not “crime[s] of violence.” . . . Stat. § 810.02(l)(b), (3)(b), were “crime[s] of violence” because they “involve[d] conduct that presents . . . Stat. § 810.02(l)(b), (3)(b), does not fall under that definition. . . . Stat. § 810.02(l)(b), (3)(b), we must decide only whether that crime “categorically pose[s] a serious . . .