Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...[2] In addition, Hall was sentenced to a concurrent one-year prison term for count VI in case No. 99-762-CF. On appeal, Hall claimed that the trial court erred when it adjudicated him guilty of grand theft and dealing in stolen property after accepting his plea of nolo contendere in violation of section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...[3] The Fourth District *270 Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's adjudication and agreed with the reasoning and holding in Brown v. State, 464 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), approved, 487 So.2d 1073 (Fla.1986): Defendant's third point on appeal is that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983), prohibits his conviction and sentence on the two offenses of theft and dealing in stolen property because the same firearms were the subject of both offenses. We hold that section 812.025 is inapplicable in situations where, as in the present case, the defendant pleads nolo contendere to both offenses pursuant to a plea bargaining arrangement....

...State, 767 So.2d 560, 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quoting Brown, 464 So.2d at 195 (alterations in original)). The district court certified that its decision created conflict with Victory v. State, 422 So.2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), wherein the Second District held that pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981), [4] a defendant convicted of grand theft cannot also be convicted of dealing in stolen property if both counts flow from one scheme or course of conduct, notwithstanding a plea of nolo contendere to both charges. In Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1984), we briefly stated that section 812.025 supplemented the theft statute (section 812.014) and the dealing in stolen property statute (section 812.019) "by providing that a defendant may be charged with both theft and dealing in stolen property, but cannot be found guilty of both crimes." Id. at 233. However, this Court has not specifically addressed section 812.025 as it relates to a plea of nolo contendere....

...d. National Association of Attorneys General, Legislative Responses to Dealing in Stolen Goods 69 (1975). Under the theft statute, the penalties are graded according to the monetary value of the property stolen. See § 812.014(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals property with the intent to appropriate said property to his own use or to the use of a person not entitled to the use of the property or whether the defendant traffics or endeavors to traffic in the stolen property. The linchpin of section 812.025 is the defendant's intended use of the stolen property....

...Just as the trier of fact must make a choice if the defendant goes to trial, so too must the trial judge make a choice if the defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere to both counts. Legislative history leads us to believe that this comports with legislative intent. Thus, we find that section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere....

...Justice, concurs. WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority that the Criminal Punishment Code is constitutional. I dissent to quashing the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision as to the interpretation of section 812.025, Florida Statutes, as it relates to a plea of nolo contendere....

...99-762-CF took place within one scheme or course of conduct. There was no objection below from the defendant on this basis. [2] Hall was further placed on concurrent three-year terms of probation to follow the prison sentences for counts II and IV. [3] Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1999), provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. [4] Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981), is identical to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1999). [5] Sections 812.014, 812.019, and 812.025 are contained within the Florida Anti-Fencing Act of 1977.

...Aversano was charged with one count of grand theft over $20,000, but less than $100,000, and one count of dealing in stolen property. Defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing in part that Aversano could not be convicted of both grand theft and dealing in the same stolen property pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...However, the trial court adjudicated Aversano guilty of grand theft only, and sentenced her to one year in county jail followed by twelve years probation. Aversano argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it could find her guilty of grand theft, or dealing in stolen property, but not both, under section 812.025....

...ion on bailment. Since we are reversing for a new trial, we also address Aversano's argument that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could convict Aversano of either grand theft or dealing in stolen property, but not both. Section 812.025 provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). Both counts charged in the instant case involved the same restaurant equipment. There is no dispute that the alleged offense was "one scheme or course of conduct." In construing section 812.025, the Florida Supreme Court stated: Section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals property with the intent to appropriate said property to his own use . . . or whether the defendant traffics or endeavors to traffic in the stolen property. The linchpin of section 812.025 is the defendant's intended use of the stolen property....

...of his possession of recently stolen property. Accordingly, appellant's conviction and sentence on the burglary charge is affirmed. However, appellant was convicted and sentenced of both grand theft of, and trafficking in, the same stolen property. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979), prohibits a guilty verdict on both counts charging these two statutory offenses as to the same property. While the State was properly not required to elect between these counts, we read Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.505 with section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979), to require that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that guilty verdicts could not be returned as to both counts....

...The defendant appeals basically arguing (1) that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that his conviction for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property arise from a single criminal episode and therefore he cannot be convicted of both under section 812.025, Florida Statutes....

...t offense. [1] The legislature in Florida has expressly provided that convictions for these two offenses are in the alternative and has prohibited convictions for both offenses, when they relate to the same stolen property and the same defendant, in section 812.025, Florida Statutes....

...We address next the conviction for petit theft vis-a-vis the conviction for dealing in stolen property. The information charged Mr. Haugabrook in count II with theft of property consisting of electronic equipment and clothing. The dealing in stolen property count also identified the stolen property as electronic equipment. Section 812.025 provides that, although the State may charge both offenses, the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on only one of the offenses....

...t Palm Beach, for appellee. HAZOURI, J. The issue we address in this case is whether, after an open guilty plea to the court, a defendant may be adjudicated and sentenced for both grand theft and dealing in the property stolen in the theft. Applying section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2001), we hold that there may not be two convictions, and reverse and remand for resentencing....

...Toson argues that he was improperly convicted of the three counts of dealing in stolen property in case number 02-1925 CFA02 because the counts of dealing in stolen property and count of grand theft involved the stealing of the same property during the same scheme or course of conduct. Section 812.025 prohibits the trial court from adjudicating him guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct....

...Toson responds that the dual convictions for grand theft and dealing in stolen property constitute fundamental error. *555 We agree. Under this open plea to the court, the convictions of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property constitute fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal. Section 812.025 expressly prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct....

...The State was unable to prove the theft of the jewelry and the dealing of the same jewelry were distinct and unrelated criminal incidents. Our court stated as follows: While we recognize that additional acts will always be required to dispose of the property in question, the legislative purpose of the section [812.025] is to prevent dual convictions in connection with one scheme or course of conduct. Absent something more to purposefully interrupt the two crimes by an unquestionably disjunctive period of time or series of events, defendant's conviction for one of the offenses must be set aside. Id. at 841. Although section 812.025 does not provide a definition for what constitutes "one scheme or course of conduct," our supreme court discussed the legislative history leading up to the enactment of section 812.025 and the intent of the legislation in Hall....

...n stolen property within the meaning of chapter 812, Florida Statutes, even if the normal use is achieved by some form of transfer, distribution, dispensation, or disposition of the item. Hall, 826 So.2d at 271. The court, thereafter, concluded that section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in *556 connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals p...

...the intent to appropriate such property to his own use or to the use of a person not entitled to the use of the property or whether the defendant traffics or endeavors to traffic in stolen property. Id. Finally, the court concluded: The linchpin of section 812.025 is the defendant's intended use of the stolen property....

...Just as the trier of fact must make a choice if the defendant goes to trial, so too must the trial judge make a choice if the defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere to both counts. Legislative history leads us to believe that this comports with legislative intent. Thus, we find that section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere....

...opinion. See Eugene v. State, 828 So.2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We also order resentencing in cases 01-12121 CFA02 and 01-13048 CFA02 on a scoresheet corrected to reflect the resentencing in 02-1925 CFA02. WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2001), states: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of c...

...ory after the fact. That the legislature has the authority to reclassify and define offenses and offenders does not seem subject to question. 445 So.2d at 660. It is clear that the legislature recognized that it had expanded the definition of theft. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that convictions for theft and dealing in stolen property are in the alternative; the statute prohibits convictions for both offenses, when they relate to the same stolen property and the same defendant....

...d IV, and a one year sentence in Count VI (all to run concurrent with the sentence in case number 99-611). First, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it adjudicated him guilty of both grand theft and dealing in the same stolen property. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: Charging theft and dealing in stolen property.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a *562 guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, or the counts. § 812.025, Fla....

...a defendant pleads nolo contendere. In Victory v. State, 422 So.2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), a defendant was charged with dealing in stolen property and grand theft. He pled nolo contendere and reserved his right to appeal. The second district stated, Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981), forbids convictions for both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct....

...denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 398, 93 L.Ed.2d 352 (1986), the defendant pled nolo contendere, but appealed his conviction and sentence for grand theft and dealing in stolen property. [1] The first district stated, Defendant's third point on appeal is that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983), prohibits his conviction and sentence on the two offenses of theft and dealing in stolen property because the same firearms were the subject of both offenses. We hold that section 812.025 is inapplicable in situations where, as in the present case, the defendant pleads nolo contendere to both offenses pursuant to a plea bargaining arrangement....

...for both offenses, Lennear v. State, 424 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), we affirm on [this issue]. 464 So.2d at 195 (emphasis added); see also Robinson v. State, 549 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). This court has not addressed the interpretation of section 812.025, Florida Statutes, as it relates to a plea of nolo contendere....

...Thus, we would normally reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for the lesser offense. See § 924.34, Fla. Stat. (1991). This, however, brings us to Mr. Burrell's second issue. *630 Mr. Burrell correctly contends that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1989), precludes convictions for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property "in connection with one scheme or course of conduct." Rife v....

...We emphasize that Barfield entered an open, unconditional plea to the court that was not made pursuant to a plea agreement. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Barfield waived any double jeopardy violation. See Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla.1994). Barfield's argument is premised on section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. In Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268 (Fla.2002), the supreme court found that "section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere." Id....

...that is not statutorily authorized may be attacked at any time. The State responds that this is not a double jeopardy claim, asserting that Hall did not find that the dual convictions violated double jeopardy, but rather that they were prohibited by section 812.025....

...The State's argument was rejected in Kilmartin v. State, 848 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), wherein the court analyzed Hall and concluded: Given the holding in Hall, one must conclude that the supreme court had determined that the legislature's intent when it adopted section 812.025 was to prohibit separate punishments for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property when both offenses were parts of the same criminal transaction....

...Pursuant to those pleas, he was adjudicated guilty of both offenses, and sentenced to five years in prison on the former, concurrent with a 12-year habitual felony offender sentence on the latter. He now appeals, contending that the trial court violated section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2001), and thereby committed fundamental error, when it entered judgments and sentences for both offenses because both were parts of "one scheme or course of conduct." The state responds that (1) appellant may not r...

...This legislative intent can be either "explicitly stated in a statute ... or ... discerned through the Blockburger [v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) ] test of statutory construction." M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d at 81. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2001), reads: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of co...

...t may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. Although this language would appear to compel the opposite conclusion, our supreme court has held that the intent of section 812.025 is to preclude separate convictions for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property whenever the two offenses are parts of the same "scheme or course of *1224 conduct"—i.e., it has held that separate convictions are prohibited in such cases regardless of whether a defendant goes to trial or enters pleas. Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla.2002). Given the holding in Hall, one must conclude that the supreme court had determined that the legislature's intent when it adopted section 812.025 was to prohibit separate punishments for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property when both offenses were parts of the same criminal transaction....

...himself or give them to another to use. Rather, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is that appellant stole the stamps intending to sell them. Accordingly, the two offenses were parts of a *1225 single "scheme or course of conduct," and section 812.025 prohibits appellant's conviction for both....

...ntrol fencing operations, the legislative history of that section and the Act as a whole must be examined. The sections of the Act pertinent to this discussion are section 812.014, entitled "Theft;" section 812.019, "Dealing in stolen property;" and section 812.025, "Charging theft and dealing in stolen property." The applicable provisions of 812.014, "Theft," are as follows: (1) A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of anothe...

...(2) Any person who initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property and traffics in such stolen property shall be guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084. Section 812.025, entitled "Charging theft and dealing in stolen property," reads as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property i...

...provision, section 812.019(1). The harshest penalty, a first-degree felony, is imposed under section 819.019(2) on the individual who initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the thefts and traffics in stolen property. Section 812.025 supplements these provisions by providing that a defendant may be charged with both theft and dealing in stolen property, but cannot be found guilty of both crimes....

...timony that offered an innocent explanation of his conduct, entitling him to a judgment of acquittal. Wilson also argues that he was improperly convicted of both crimes in connection with the theft of the same property, contrary to the provisions of section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2002), which provide that a defendant may be found guilty of either theft or dealing in stolen property, but not both, when those charges relate to "one scheme or course of conduct." We conclude that the evidence against Wilson was sufficient to support the dealing in stolen property charge....

...See Law, 559 So.2d at 189 (stating that in circumstantial evidence case where defendant has asserted a hypothesis of innocence State is required "only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events"). III. APPLICATION OF SECTION 812.025 Section 812.025 provides that [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate...

...ut not both, of the counts. The State concedes that this provision precluded Wilson from being convicted of both the dealing in stolen property charge and the grand theft charge. As we noted in Rife v. State, 446 So.2d 1157, 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), section 812.025 precludes dual convictions for theft and dealing in stolen property only when those charges relate to "one scheme or course of conduct" and thus does not entirely foreclose the possibility of prosecution for both offenses in connection with the same stolen property....

...865, 139 L.Ed.2d 763, 66 U.S.L.W. 3473 (1998); Hill v. State, 688 So.2d at 905. We also reverse based on Beaton's conviction for both theft and dealing in the same stolen goods. As the state properly concedes, his conviction on both charges violates double jeopardy under section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The state charged Leslie Kiss with three counts of dealing in stolen property and one count of grand theft of the same property. The charges of grand theft and dealing in stolen property were in connection with one scheme or course of conduct and, pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2007), the state chose to charge Kiss in a single information. Section 812.025 provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate count...

...The case was tried before a jury and the state presented evidence sufficient to convict Kiss of dealing in stolen property or grand theft. The jury returned a verdict finding Kiss guilty on all four counts. Kiss appeals, asserting that the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury—pursuant to section 812.025—that it could return a guilty verdict on one or the other of the charges, but not both....

...n stolen property and discharging him as to the count for grand theft. Rather, he contends that he is entitled to a new trial. We agree, and reverse and remand for a new trial. We are once again faced with the conundrum created by the application of section 812.025....

...charge. The failure to charge the jury on this statute thus puts a defendant at a disadvantage. Id. at 304. As this court noted in Aversano v. State, 966 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA *812 2007), the Florida Supreme Court, in construing the application of section 812.025, stated: "Section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals property with the intent to appropriate said property to his own use... or whether the defendant traffics or endeavors to traffic in the stolen property. The linchpin of section 812.025 is the defendant's intended use of the stolen property....

...efendant guilty of one or the other offense, but not both." Id. at 496 (quoting Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla.2002)) (emphasis added). As we further noted in Aversano, although counsel for the defendant did not request a jury instruction on section 812.025, it was fundamental error not to so instruct the jury. Id. The state asserts there is no error, as the trial court struck the charge of grand theft and sentenced Kiss only on the dealing in stolen property counts. The supreme court's decision in Hall, and the plain meaning of section 812.025, makes it clear that the state is not entitled to have the jury convict Kiss of both dealing in stolen property and grand theft....

...statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So.3d 1078, 1082 (Fla.2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no ambiguity in section 812.025, as that section's statutory language is clear....

...The source of this misconception resides in the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Ridley v. State, 407 So.2d 1000, (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which is the cited authority for this supposed cure. Ridley was charged with trafficking in stolen property and grand theft, arising out of one scheme or transaction pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979). The court in Ridley noted that section 812.025 "prohibits a guilty verdict on both counts charging these two statutory offenses as to the same property." Id. at 1002. It further noted that while the State was not required to elect between these counts, section 812.025 requires that the trial court should have instructed the jury that guilty verdicts could not be returned as to both counts....

...Thus, a conviction for both survives the Blockburger test and does not violate double jeopardy. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). As noted by Judge Klein in Anderson, 2 So.3d at 304, failure to instruct the jury on section 812.025 puts the defendant at a disadvantage....

...Judge Klein completed his concurring opinion in Anderson v. State, 2 So.3d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), with the following recommendation: We need a standard jury instruction to implement the statute, perhaps because, as one writer suggests, "the vast majority of criminal defense attorneys are oblivious" to section 812.025....

...Via's main point is that defense counsel who, in *814 ignorance of the statute, allow clients to plead guilty to both theft and dealing in stolen property, are committing malpractice. I respectfully suggest that our committee on standard jury instructions in criminal cases consider an instruction based on section 812.025. Anderson, 2 So.3d at 304-05 (emphasis added). Since Anderson's issuance, the committee on standard jury instructions in criminal cases has not proposed an instruction based on section 812.025. Nor are we aware of whether the committee has considered such an instruction. I echo Judge Klein's concern that section 812.025 continues to generate appeals and must be addressed to prevent further appeals. However, I respectfully disagree with the form of his recommendation. An instruction based on section 812.025 presumably would tell the jury: "You may return a guilty verdict on either dealing in stolen property or grand theft, but not both." How would a jury choose between the two if the state proves the elements of both crimes? I can foresee juries asking that question time and time again....

...ection 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes. If I were the trial court, I would follow standard jury instruction 14.2 and instruct the jury on dealing in stolen property, with grand theft as the lesser included offense. Such an approach would comply with section 812.025, which states that separate counts for dealing in stolen property and theft in connection with one scheme or course of conduct "may" be consolidated for trial.

...The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Kiss v. State, 42 So.3d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. This case involves section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), which precludes the trier of fact from finding a defendant guilty of both “theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.” We are asked to decide the proper remedy on appeal for dual convictions rendered contrary to section 812.025, but where the defendant had failed to raise section 812.025 at trial....

...evidence to rebut this explanation for his possession of the steel bars. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court did not instruct the jury that it could not return a guilty verdict for both theft and dealing in stolen property pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), and Blackmon did not request such an instruction....

...at 344-45 . On appeal to the First District, Blackmon, citing Kiss v. State, 42 So.3d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), contended that he was entitled to a new trial because he was convicted of both petit theft and dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.025. Id. at 345-46. Section 812.025 provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. § 812.025, Fla....

...court below maintained that he was permitted to challenge the convictions on appeal. Id. The district court below discussed the Fourth District’s decision in Kiss. Id. at 346 . In Kiss , the trial court failed to instruct the jury on section *540 812.025, and the jury ultimately convicted the defendant in violation of said statute. 42 So.3d at 811 . The Fourth District in Kiss held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial, reasoning that the “failure to instruct the jury on section 812.025 puts the defendant at a disadvantage.” Id. at 813 . Although the district court below found the reasoning in Kiss to have “some attraction” because section 812.025 “imposes an obligation on the trier of fact (here, the jury), not the trial court,” it held that vacating the conviction for the lesser offense was the proper remedy....

...ffenses.” Id. at 347 . Further, the district court explained that such remedy was consistent with its previous decisions as well as with our decision in Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268 (Fla.2002): Notably, the supreme court [in Hall] did not construe section 812.025 to preclude a defendant from entering pleas to both theft and dealing with stolen property; rather, the court construed the statute to prohibit the trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both offenses....

...Accordingly, the district court reversed Blackmon’s conviction for petit theft and remanded with directions that the trial court vacate that conviction. Id. at 348 . Moreover the district court certified conflict with Kiss as to the “proper remedy when, contrary to section 812.025, the defendant is convicted of both theft and dealing in stolen property.” Id. 2 II. ANALYSIS The question before this Court involves the interpretation of section 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2009). Blackmon contends that section 812.025 and our decision in Hall required the trial court below to instruct the jury that it could return a guilty verdict on either the petit theft or the dealing in stolen property count, and that because the jury was allowed to return guilty verdicts on both offenses, a new trial is required....

...Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 194 (Fla.2007). We begin our analysis by discussing the history and purpose of the Florida Anti-Fencing Act which was enacted in 1977 and includes section 812.025, and the theft and dealing in stolen property statutes....

...Goddard, 458 So.2d at 233 . The provisions of the Florida Anti-Fencing Act “shall not be construed strictly or liberally, but shall be construed in light of their purposes to achieve their remedial goals.” §§ 812.005, 812.037, Fla. Stat. (1977). 3 Section 812.025, Florida Statutes, titled “Charging theft and dealing in stolen property,” has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1977. Section 812.025 provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. § 812.025, Fla....

....2d at 269 n. 1. Hall was adjudicated guilty of all of the charges. Id. at 269 . 11 On appeal to the Fourth District, Hall asserted that the trial court erred in adjudicating him guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property, contrary to section 812.025. Id. at 269 . The Fourth District discussed Brown v. State, 464 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), approved on other grounds, 487 So.2d 1073 (Fla.1986). Hall, 767 So.2d at 562 . In Brown, the First District held section 812.025 “inapplicable in situations where ......

...f both grand theft and dealing in stolen property. Id. The Fourth District also certified conflict with the Second District’s decision in Vic *544 tory v. State, 422 So.2d 67, 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Hall, 767 So.2d at 562 . In Victory, pursuant to section 812.025, the Second District reversed a defendant’s conviction for dealing in stolen property based on a plea of nolo contendere after he was previously convicted of grand theft. 422 So.2d at 68 . In deciding whether section 812.025 applied to no contest pleas, we noted the legislative history of the Florida Anti-Fencing Act....

...n stolen property within the meaning of chapter 812, Florida Statutes, even if the normal use is achieved by some form of transfer, distribution, dispensation, or disposition of the item. Id. (quoting Camp, 596 So.2d at 1057 ). Importantly, we said: Section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals property with the intent to appropriate said property to his own use or to the use of a person not entitled to the use of the property or whether the defendant traffics or endeavors to traffic in the stolen property. The linchpin of section 812.025 is the defendant’s intended use of the stolen property....

...Just as the trier of fact must make a choice if the defendant goes to trial, so too must the trial judge make a choice if the defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere to both counts. Legislative history leads us to believe that this comports with legislative intent. Thus, we find that section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere....

...defendant be resentenced on the remaining count.” Id. at 272. 12 *545 District Courts Each of our district courts of appeal has been confronted with the issue of dual convictions — dealing in stolen property and theft — which were contrary to section 812.025....

...rdict on one or the other but not both, meaningless. Id. at 497. In Anderson v. State, 2 So.3d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), the defendant was convicted by a jury of grand theft and dealing in stolen property. Id. at 303 . On appeal, the defendant raised section 812.025 for the first time....

...charge. The failure to charge the jury on this statute thus puts a defendant at a disadvantage. We need a standard jury instruction to implement the statute, perhaps because ... “the vast majority of criminal defense attorneys are oblivious” to section 812.025.... I respectfully suggest that our committee on standard jury instructions in criminal cases consider an instruction based on section 812.025....

...ealing in stolen property conviction. Allwine v. State, 42 So.3d 291, 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed, explaining that even though “a trial court commits fundamental error by failing to instruct a jury, pursuant to section 812.025 ......

...Thereafter, the trial court adjudicated the defendant guilty on the dealing in stolen property counts and discharged the defendant on the grand theft count. Id. On appeal to the Fourth District, the defendant argued that “by failing to instruct the jury — pursuant to section 812.025 — that it could return a guilty verdict on one or the other of the charges, but not both,” the trial court committed fundamental error warranting a new trial. Id. The Fourth District stated that based on the plain meaning of section 812.025 and our decision in Hall, it was “clear that the state is not entitled to have the jury convict Kiss of both dealing in stolen property and grand theft.......

...eturn a verdict for both dealing in stolen property and grand theft is to strike the lesser of the two offenses,” do not contain any analysis to support this remedy. Id. Furthermore, the Fourth District said that “failure to instruct the jury on section 812.025 puts the defendant at a disadvantage,” because the jury could have found the defendant guilty of grand theft only. Id. at 813 (citing Anderson, 2 So.3d at 304 (Klein, J., concurring specially)). The Fourth District held that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on section 812.025 amounted to fundamental error, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, and certified conflict with Ridley and its progeny. Id. at 811, 813. Fifth District In reversing the lesser offense, the Fifth District in Ridley v. State, 407 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), stated: [W]e read Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.505 14 with section 812.025, *547 Florida Statutes (1979), to require that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that guilty verdicts could not be returned as to both counts....

...based on Ridley, and certifying conflict with Kiss). First District As demonstrated by the decision below, the First District holds that the vacating of the lesser offense conviction is the proper remedy when faced with dual convictions contrary to section 812.025....

...of grand theft, a third-degree felony, and dealing in stolen property, a second-degree felony, among other counts, after the trial court refused to allow the defendant’s proposed jury instruction which essentially tracked the language provided in section 812.025....

...arranted. Id. at 365 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Second District affirmed, and express *548 ly recognized conflict with Kiss. Id. at 361, 365. 15 Third District When confronted with theft and dealing in stolen property convictions contrary to section 812.025, the Third District Court of Appeal reverses the lesser conviction....

...3d DCA 2012) (“As the record reflects that both charges for dealing in stolen property and grand theft relate to one scheme or course of conduct, we reverse the judgment and sentence for grand theft.”); Corvo v. State, 916 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Jones v. State, 453 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). This Case Section 812.025 and Hall clearly provide that a jury may not return guilty verdicts on both dealing in stolen property and theft when both offenses were committed “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.” See § 812.025, Fla....

...So.2d at 271 (“[I]t is upon this evidence that the trier of fact may find the defendant guilty of one or the other offense, but not both.”). Here, the jury convicted Black-mon of both dealing in stolen property and petit theft 16 in violation of section 812.025. 17 Blackmon did not request a jury instruction under section 812.025, nor did the trial court instruct the jury that it could not return dual guilty verdicts where both offenses were “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.” Because both dealing in stolen property and petit theft were submitted to the jury, we find that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the rendering of dual convictions contrary to section 812.025....

...Furthermore, Blackmon failed to argue at trial the impropriety of the trial court in adjudicating him guilty in accordance with the jury verdict. The trial court further erred in adjudicating Blackmon guilty of both dealing in stolen property and theft. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2009). If a statute precludes a jury from rendering certain dual convictions, clearly the trial court commits error in adjudicating a defendant guilty in conformance with such an impermissible jury verdict. Because Blackmon did not bring section 812.025 to the attention of the trial court, Blackmon must demonstrate fundamental error....

...ing its verdicts from the inconsistent counts.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.505. .The Second District also certified the following questions of great public importance: (1) Must the trial court instruct the jury to perform the selection process described in section 812.025 of the Florida Statutes?; (2) If so, must the appellate court order a new trial on both offenses if the trial court fails to give the instruction?; and (3) If the appellate court is not required to mandate a new trial, must it require...

...Because Blackmon took the steel bars from the side of the road and then sold the same stolen bars approximately two hours later, we find that both offenses were committed “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.” . The district court's decision in applying section 812.025 and Hall was consistent with the remedy in double jeopardy contexts....

...at 255 (Pearson, J., specially concurring). As his second issue on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not setting aside the conviction for grand theft when there was also a conviction for dealing in stolen property. Appellant urges that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981) [2] precludes convictions and sentences for both offenses....

...The defendant does not need to be present when sentence is corrected. NOTES [1] The Court went on to say, however, that prosecutorial misconduct would not be condoned. It stated that the appropriate punishment for such misconduct would be to refer the matter to the local Bar Disciplinary Committee. [2] Section 812.025 states: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts...

...lacks, thus satisfying the Blockburger test. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Where the charges of theft and dealing in stolen property are included in one information and involve the same property, section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1993), has been interpreted to preclude convictions for both charges in connection with one scheme or course of conduct....

...idence seized at the time of arrest; (2) that the court erred in failing to direct a judgment of acquittal based upon the theory that a co-owner of property cannot be guilty of larceny of property which he jointly owns with his partner; and (3) that Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979), bars a conviction of both theft of property and dealing in the same stolen property....

...(2) Any person who initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property and traffics in such stolen property shall be guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084. * * * * * * 812.025 Charging theft and dealing in stolen property....

...other, but not both, of the counts. Defendant asserts he may not be convicted and sentenced for both larceny and dealing in the same stolen property. Section 812.019, Florida Statutes (1979), was enacted in 1977, simultaneously with the enactment of Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...r obtaining control of the property with the intent to sell, transfer or distribute it. These additional elements, furthermore, are separate and distinct from the essential elements of the crime of theft. Thus, absent the prohibition of the statute, Section 812.025, we can envision no reason why a person might not be the thief and also be guilty of dealing in the same stolen property. We agree with the First District and, absent the prohibition of Section 812.025, we also can envision no reason why a person might not be the thief and also be guilty of dealing in the same stolen property. Apparently, the Legislature felt otherwise. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979), ends with the very specific words that a guilty verdict may be returned "on one or the other, [theft or dealing] but not both, of the Counts." Based upon the statute alone, we conclude that defendant here could not be properly convicted of both theft and of dealing in the same stolen property. It appears that the theft and the exchange of gems for real estate were all part of the same scheme or course of conduct by defendant herein. Section 812.025 as cited above prohibits a conviction of both crimes if charged in the same information and we can see no reason for indulging a different interpretation merely because defendant was here charged in separate informations....

...NOTES [1] We are also perplexed by other aspects of the Anti-Fencing Act. Does mere receipt of stolen property constitute the crime of "Dealing" under Section 812.019 absent the intent to sell, transfer or dispose of the property? Are Sections 812.019(2) and 812.025 inconsistent? How could a defendant be proved guilty of both theft and dealing under Section 812.019(2) if he could not be convicted of both under Section 812.025?

...lear title to the trailers. The defendant's motion to dismiss the charges in Manatee County was denied. The defendant then pled nolo contendere reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981), forbids convictions for both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct....

...This point on appeal is rendered moot, however, by the disposition of the last point considered hereinafter. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in accepting verdicts, and sentencing him, on both the charge of grand theft and the charge of dealing in stolen property. See § 812.025, Fla....

...Gen., Tampa, for appellee. OTT, Chief Judge. The trial court adjudicated Michael Anthony Rife guilty of and sentenced him for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property. We reverse and set aside the grand theft conviction and sentence as violative of section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981). Section 812.025 prohibits a defendant from being found guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property where the two offenses arose from one scheme or course of conduct....

...e or set of circumstances, defendant's conviction of and sentence for grand theft must be set aside. See Victory v. State, 422 So.2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Williams v. State, 404 So.2d 1165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We do not mean to infer and do not read section 812.025 to prohibit convictions of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property in all situations where the same property is involved....

scheme or course of conduct, since Fla. Stat. § 812.025"expressly prohibits a trial court from adjudicating

...2d DCA 2011), which certified to this Court three questions of great public importance. Id. at 361 . 1 We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the certified questions as follows: 1. MUST A TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY PURSUANT TO SECTION 812.025, FLORIDA STATUTES (2008), WHEN BOTH THEFT *526 AND DEALING IN STOLEN PROPERTY OFFENSES ARE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY? 2. IF A TRIAL COURT DENIES A DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION UNDER SECTION 812.025, MUST THE DEFENDANT BE GIVEN A NEW TRIAL IF THE JURY CONVICTS THE DEFENDANT OF BOTH THEFT AND DEALING IN STOLEN PROPERTY CONTRARY TO SAID STATUTE? We answer both rephrased questions in the affirmative....

...ted the burglary, evidence that he knowingly possessed the items, evidence that he falsified information on the pawnbroker form, and sufficient evidence of value. The trial court denied Williams’ motion. Williams did not put on a defense. Based on section 812.025, Florida Statutes, Williams requested that the jury be given the following instruction: CHARGING THEFT AND DEALING IN STOLEN PROPERTY An information may charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but you may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. Williams’ request apprised the trial judge of pertinent language from our decision in Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268 (Fla.2002): Section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals proper...

...As to this proposed jury instruction, the following exchange took place: DEFENSE COUNSEL: ... The issue is that Dealing [in] stolen property or Grand Theft should be decided by the trier of fact. THE COURT: They will be, both of them will be. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right. But the jury, based upon Florida Statute *527 812.025 which reads that a person can be only convicted of one or the other, then the next step is for the jury to determine one or the other and that [is] decided by the jury, not later on by the Court once a conviction is made....

...THE COURT: I note for the record that our Supreme Court, despite having raised this issue in 2002 in the Hall case has not yet seen fit to encourage our Florida Bar committee on criminal jury instructions to properly write an instruction as it relates to section 812.025 of the Florida Statutes....

...y if we’re not going— THE COURT: No. You’re being precluded from that given the Court’s ruling. (Emphasis added.) The trial court instructed the jury on the standard jury instructions — which were relied on by the State and do not refer to section 812.025 or otherwise instruct a jury that it is precluded from finding a defendant guilty of both dealing in stolen property and theft “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.” § 812.025, Fla....

...y to the fifteen-year sentences. On appeal to the Second District, relying on Kiss v. State, 42 So.3d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), Williams argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court denied his requested instruction modeled after section 812.025. 3 Williams v. State, 66 So.3d 360, 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The Second District observed that “trial courts have been attempting to fulfill the apparent substantive intent of [section 812.025] by obtaining factual determinations from the jury on both [dealing in stolen property and theft] and then entering a judgment of conviction and a sentence on the greater charge.” Id....

...Consequently, the district court held that the trial court below “did not err in following established precedent.” Id. at 368 . The district court maintained that the trial court was not obligated to give the requested instruction because the language contained in section 812.025 was “not an adequate jury instruction” and “doubt[ed] that there [was] any adequate method to instruct on this statute.” Id....

...The courts have been following the policies of double jeopardy as to this issue. Even if we concluded that we must select the offense with the lesser degree or the lesser penalty, a new trial would not be warranted. Id. at 365 (footnote omitted). The Second District concluded as follows: [T]he procedural requirements in section 812.025 are unenforceable to the extent that the statute (1) attempts to establish a procedure by which a jury does not return a factual finding announcing a verdict of guilty on each of the two separately charged offenses despite its determi...

...nized conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Kiss , and certified three questions of great public importance to this Court. Id. at 361, 365. 4 II. ANALYSIS The question before us is whether a jury must be instructed, in accordance with section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008), that it cannot find a defendant guilty of both dealing in stolen property and theft “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct” when both offenses are submitted to the jury. We further decide whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial on dealing in stolen property and theft, having been convicted of both offenses after the trial court denied the defendant’s request for a jury instruction modeled after section 812.025. This Court’s interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and subject to a de novo standard of review. Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So.3d 1216, 1220 (Fla.2010). *530 Section 812.025, Florida Statutes, provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2008). In Blackmon v. State, 121 So.3d 535 , 2013 WL 4555655 (Fla.2013), we rejected the defendant’s contention that he was entitled to a new trial after being convicted of both petit theft and dealing in stolen property contrary to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009). Id., at 541 . 5 Notably, the defendant in Blackmon “did not request a jury instruction under section 812.025.” Id. at 548 . We determined that the First District Court of Appeal properly reversed that defendant’s petit theft conviction while upholding his dealing in stolen property conviction. Id. at 541 . Whether Trial Courts Must Instruct under Section 812.025? Williams asks this Court to find that trial courts must instruct juries on section 812.025....

...The plain and ordinary meaning of the words of a statute must control. Marrero v. State, 71 So.3d 881, 887 (Fla.2011). In Blackmon , we expressly found that the trial court erred “in failing to instruct the jury on the rendering of dual convictions contrary to section 812.025.” Blackmon , at 548. The Florida Legislature’s intent as to section 812.025 is clear: the trier of fact is precluded from returning guilty verdicts on both “theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct,” notwithstanding that the State has proven both offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2008). Under section 812.025, “the trier of fact must make a choice” as to whether the defendant is a common thief who steals property with the intent to appropriate said property to his own use or to the use of a person not entitled to the use of the propert...

...It is important to note that with three exceptions, the State is “to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity ... to determine legislative intent.” § 775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). 6 As section 812.025 conflicts with *531 such intent, it is paramount that our trial courts assist in giving the proper effect to section 812.025. Thus, in light of the plain language expressed in the statute, we conclude that trial courts have an obligation to instruct the jury on section 812.025 when both theft and dealing in stolen property counts are submitted to the jury. See Ridley v. State, 407 So.2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (“[W]e read Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.505 7 with section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979), to require that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that guilty verdicts could not be returned as to both counts.”). We note that the Legislature has failed to give any guidance pertaining to how a jury should proceed in convicting a defendant of either dealing in stolen property or theft pursuant to section 812.025, when both offenses were proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt and were “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.” 8 In Hall , we explained that section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals proper...

...person not entitled to the use of the property or whether the defendant traf-fies or endeavors to traffic in the stolen property. 826 So.2d at 271 (emphasis added). The language we utilized in Hall was a hybrid of the relevant language contained in section 812.025, and the theft and dealing in stolen property statutes: Section 812.025 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. § 812.025, Fla....

...property.” § 812.012(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). As we explained in Hall, the trier of fact must determine the defendant’s intent when deciding to convict a defendant of either theft or dealing in stolen property: The linchpin of section 812.025 is the defendant’s intended use of the stolen property....

...Just as the trier of fact must make a choice if the defendant goes to trial, so too must the trial judge make a choice if the defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere to both counts. Legislative history leads us to believe that this comports with legislative intent. Thus, we find that section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere....

...eo two days later were all a portion of the same scheme or course of conduct”). Having determined that these offenses were “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct,” we conclude that the dual convictions in the instant case violated section 812.025. See Blackmon, at 548 & n. 17 (finding that the dealing in stolen property and petit theft convictions, which were committed “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct,” violated section 812.025). “[T]rial courts have an obligation to instruct the jury on section 812.025 when both theft and dealing in stolen property counts are submitted to the jury.” See supra, at 531....

...ity that the error contributed to the conviction.’ ” Ibar v. State, 938 So.2d 451, 466 (Fla.2006) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)). Here, it is significant that Williams specifically requested a jury instruction under section 812.025—unlike the defendant in Blackmon—which would have prevented the jury from returning the improper dual convictions....

...ns given them.”). Had the trial court granted Williams’ request, the jury could have acquitted him of dealing in stolen property while convicting him of grand theft. As the Fourth District in Kiss stated, “[The] failure to instruct the jury on section 812.025 puts the defendant at a disadvantage.” Kiss, 42 So.3d at 813 (citing Anderson v....

...4th DCA 2008) (Klein, J., concurring specially)). We find that the State has failed to meet its burden of showing that the errors were harmless. It cannot be said that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have come to the same decision if instructed under section 812.025....

...is case. It is so ordered. POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion. .The Second District asked: 1. MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY TO PERFORM THE SELECTION PROCESS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 812.025 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES? 2....

...at 365 . . The State also argued that not all of the items taken from the victim’s home were sold to the pawn shop by Williams. . Williams was tried before the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued its decision in Kiss . . See supra, footnote 1. . Section 812.025 has not been amended since its enactment in 1977....

...3.390(a) ("Except in capital cases, the judge shall not instruct the jury on the sentence that may be imposed for the offense for which the accused is on trial.”). . We acknowledge that "common thief” is not expressed in the theft statute. . We note that section 812.025 does not impose a requirement of "the same property." ....

...We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wolcott's motion for mistrial. The convictions and sentences are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. As to case number 99-10253, we reverse the conviction for theft because, as the state properly recognizes, section 812.025 Florida Statutes (1997) precludes a conviction for dealing in stolen property and a conviction for theft of the same property....

...The only issue that Mr. Williams raises in this appeal is his claim that the trial court should have instructed the jury that it could return a verdict on the offense of grand theft or the offense of dealing in stolen property, but not on both offenses, as explained in section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...1st DCA 2011) (disagreeing with Kiss and concluding that when a jury returns verdicts for dealing in stolen property and grand theft, the trial court may vacate the conviction for the lesser offense). We conclude that the procedural requirements in section 812.025 are unenforceable to the extent that the statute (1) attempts to establish a procedure by which a jury does not return a factual finding announcing a verdict of guilty on each of the two separately charged offenses despite its determi...

...Williams with four offenses: (1) burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, [1] (2) third-degree grand theft, [2] (3) dealing in stolen property, [3] and (4) providing false information to a pawnbroker. [4] During the jury trial, Mr. Williams asked the court to instruct the *362 jury under section 812.025....

...Williams argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he did not receive the requested instruction. II. This Court's Case Law Did Not Require the Trial Court to Provide the Requested Instruction. The procedure the trial court utilized to fulfill the intent of section 812.025 is the same procedure that most, if not all, circuit courts have used in this district for many years....

...is vacating the conviction which carries the lesser sentence." Anderson v. State, 2 So.3d 303, 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). [6] *363 Thus, in this case, the trial court did not err in following established precedent. III. The Trial Court Did Not Need to Give the Proposed Instruction on Section 812.025, and We Doubt that Any Instruction is Appropriate in this Context. Despite the established case law, Mr. Williams preserved this issue in the trial court and now forcefully argues that he was entitled to an instruction that tracks the statute. We disagree because the language of section 812.025 is not an adequate jury instruction and we doubt that there is any adequate method to instruct on this statute for several reasons....

...rimes. The trial court then instructs the jury on the elements of both crimes. But having found that the State has proven both crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury "may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts." § 812.025....

...As Justice Canady explained when he was a member of this court: The State concedes that this provision precluded Wilson from being convicted of both the dealing in stolen property charge and the grand theft charge. As we noted in Rife v. State, 446 So.2d 1157, 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), section 812.025 precludes dual convictions for theft and dealing in stolen property only when those charges relate to "one scheme or course of conduct" and thus does not entirely foreclose the possibility of prosecution for both offenses in connection with the same stolen property....

...See id. at 1158; Gray v. State, 611 So.2d 100, 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); T.S.R. v. State, 596 So.2d 766, 767 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). *365 Wilson v. State, 884 So.2d 74, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). In this case, the trial court gave Mr. Williams the benefit of section 812.025, but it is not entirely clear from the evidence that he was entitled to its benefit....

..., and in light of the significant number of cases that are tried involving both of these offenses, we certify the following questions of great public importance: 1. MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY TO PERFORM THE SELECTION PROCESS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 812.025 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES? 2....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. ORFINGER, Chief Judge. Appellant correctly contends that he could not be convicted of both grand theft (second degree) and dealing in stolen property, because section 812.025, [1] Florida Statutes *152 (1981), prohibits both convictions....

...The State argues that two crimes were committed, not one, and thus multiple convictions and sentences are permissible under section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1981). From a double jeopardy standpoint, the State's position seems to be correct, and without section 812.025, both convictions and sentences would appear to be proper. [2] But, the legislature has the right to define crimes and provide for their punishment. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1436, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), and section 812.025 limits the punishment and so must control, especially in view of the clear intention that it apply "Notwithstanding any other provision of law......

...e set aside, and the conviction and sentence for trafficking in stolen property are affirmed. See Ridley v. State, 407 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.025, Fla....

...Further, the reasonableness of a defendant's explanation of how he came into possession of recently stolen property is a question of fact for the jury to be considered in connection with all other facts and circumstances. T.S.R.; Ridley. *634 A long line of cases from this court, [2] establish that section 812.025 prohibits convictions and sentences for dealing in stolen property and grand theft of the same items, when the crimes arise out of one scheme or course of conduct....

...her three crimes. Subsequently, the appellant's conviction for grand theft was vacated, as it is statutorily prohibited to convict on both theft and dealing in stolen property when the two charges arise from the same scheme or course of conduct. See § 812.025, Fla....

...parole; (2) Whether the court erred in departing from the guidelines sentence without stating clear and convincing reasons; (3) Whether the court, in convicting and sentencing Brown of both theft and trafficking of the same stolen property, violated section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983); and (4) Whether the imposition of consecutive minimum mandatory sentences for aggravated assault and aggravated battery *194 was improper when the parties had agreed that the circumstances of the two offenses constituted a single transaction....

...State, 455 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Dorman v. State, 457 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We affirm the trial court's departure from the guidelines since the court set forth clear and convincing reasons for such departure. Defendant's third point on appeal is that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983), prohibits his conviction and sentence on the two offenses of theft and dealing in stolen property because the same firearms were the subject of both offenses. We hold that section 812.025 is inapplicable in situations where, as in the present case, the defendant pleads nolo contendere to both offenses pursuant to a plea bargaining arrangement....

...State, 417 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), pet. for rev. den., 426 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1983); Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230, 234 (Fla. 1984). We do agree with appellant's claim that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that it was precluded by Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983) [1] from convicting him of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property where, as here, appellant's actions arose out of a common scheme or course of conduct....

...at constitutes "trafficking" under Section 812.019(1), Florida Statutes (1983). See Blake v. State, supra, at 1055; Lancaster v. State, supra, at 688. Accordingly, appellee's motion for rehearing is DENIED. MILLS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 812.025 Charging theft and dealing in stolen property Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course...

...Because the theft arose out of the same course of conduct or scheme as the fencing crime, we reverse and set aside the conviction and sentence for the lesser crime of petit theft. W.J. v. State, 485 So.2d 22 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Ridley v. State, 407 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); § 812.025, Fla....

...Opportunity to be heard is provided at the sentencing hearing. On the authority of Beasley, then, we affirm the order imposing costs. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. HARRIS, J., concurs. W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion. W. SHARP, Judge dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1989) prohibits conviction for both theft and dealing in stolen property "in connection with one scheme or course of conduct." See Ridley v....

...Duncan v. State, 503 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Here, the dealing count charged appellant with selling a stolen camera, and the petit theft count involved a suitcase and clothing as well as the camera. Since the two crimes involved different properties, section 812.025 does not apply, in my view....

...Appellant, Andrew Gray, challenges his convictions and sentences for dealing in stolen property and grand theft. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, by convicting and sentencing him for both crimes, contrary to Section 812.025, Florida Statutes, and by including a juvenile adjudication that was more than three years old when computing his guideline sentence....

...First, our review of the record discloses that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case as to both offenses. The trial court therefore properly denied appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and we affirm as to this issue. Second, while Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1989), allows the state to charge in a single indictment or information both grand theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated...

...ions of guilt upon appellant for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property. See Daniels v. State, 422 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Kelly v. State, 397 So.2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Accord Hudson v. State, 408 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (section 812.025 prohibited convictions for both grand theft, charged under the 1977 statutes, and dealing in stolen property, charged under the 1979 statutes)....

...and his conviction and sentence for dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.019(1) Florida Statutes (1985). We affirm his conviction and sentence for dealing in stolen property and reverse his conviction and sentence for petit theft. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. Section 812.025 prohibits conviction for both petit theft and dealing in stolen property where both charges appear in the same information, involve the same property and involve only one scheme or course of conduct....

...Duncan was charged with petit theft in violation of section 812.014(2)(b) and with dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.019(1). While both charges properly appeared in the same information, the trial court improperly permitted the jury to return guilty verdicts on both offenses. § 812.025, Fla....

...Walter Barber, in his petition filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c), alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that, in circuit court cases 01-01128 and 01-08189, the trial court was prohibited by section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2001), [1] from adjudicating him guilty of grand theft and dealing in stolen property where, in each case, the offenses were part of one scheme or course of conduct....

...ourse of conduct. Trial counsel did not raise any objection to the adjudications. Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268 (Fla.2002), was published prior to the filing of the initial brief in the direct appeal in this case. In Hall, the supreme court held that section 812.025 applied where a defendant entered pleas to the charges of grand theft and dealing in stolen property....

...The court in Kilmartin held that the imposition of separate convictions on an unconditional guilty plea to grand theft and dealing in stolen property constituted fundamental error where the offenses arose out of the same course of conduct and there was no indication that the defendant intended to waive his rights under section 812.025....

...by a clearly disjunctive interval of time or set of circumstances. See Wilson v. State, 884 So.2d 74, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). In the present case, there is nothing in the plea transcript to establish that Barber intended to forego the application of section 812.025....

...ose out of the same course of conduct *1015 and that there was no meaningful disruption of the defendant's conduct by a clearly disjunctive interval of time or set of circumstances. See Toson v. State, 864 So.2d 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that section 812.025 prohibited dual convictions for grand theft and dealing in stolen property where the information, the probable cause affidavit, and the factual basis established that the property that was the subject of the dealing in stolen property...

...The trial court record may contain other items that conclusively establish this to be the case. However, we conclude that appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising the issue that, in case numbers 01-01128 and 01-08189, Barber's convictions for both theft and dealing in stolen property were prohibited by section 812.025....

...his filing a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and we certify conflict with the holding of the Fourth District in Johnson, 744 So.2d 1042. Petition granted; conflict certified. NORTHCUTT and DAVIS, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2001), states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of...

...lie. Dual convictions for the two offenses therefore are not improper. Hale finally argues that he cannot be convicted of both trafficking in stolen property and petit theft, if the two offenses involve the same property. This issue is controlled by section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1999), which states: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or cours...

...Public Defender, Apalachicola, for appellants. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Richard A. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Defendants appeal their judgments and sentences for dealing in stolen property. They contend that § 812.025, Fla....

...They had been previously charged and convicted in Gulf County for grand theft involving the same television set which they sold in Franklin County. The state does not contest the fact that the offenses arose out of the same scheme and course of conduct. Defendants contend that pursuant to § 812.025 they cannot be convicted of both dealing in stolen property and of grand theft of the same property. Section 812.025 provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. (emphasis added). Section 812.025 clearly prohibits a conviction of both crimes if charged in the same information and there is no reason for a different interpretation merely because the defendants here were charged in separate informations in separate counties. Hudson v. State, 408 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). There is no reason why a person cannot be convicted of theft of property and also be guilty of dealing in the same stolen property in the absence of the prohibition in *1025 § 812.025....

...owing the admission of the challenged similar fact evidence. Appellant's second issue assails the validity of his convictions for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property. We agree that appellant could not be legally convicted of both crimes. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1985), provides: *1299 Charging theft and dealing in stolen property....

...ng in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. The above language of section 812.025 clearly forbids convictions for both dealing in stolen property and grand theft of the same property in regard to the same scheme or course of conduct....

...Palmer, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant argues that his separate convictions on one count of grand theft of various household items and two counts of dealing in stolen property, based on the same items being pawned, violates section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2005), which provides: Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or co...

...another date. We rejected this same argument in Toson v. State, 864 So.2d 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), in which the exact date that various items of property were taken was unknown, and two of the items were pawned on different dates. We concluded that section 812.025 precluded convictions for both theft and dealing in stolen property under those facts. In this case appellant did not raise section 812.025 in the trial court; however, his adjudication of guilt and sentences can be raised for the first time on appeal as fundamental error....

...The failure to charge the jury on this statute thus puts a defendant at a disadvantage. We need a standard jury instruction to implement the statute, perhaps because, as one writer suggests, "the vast majority of criminal defense attorneys are oblivious" to section 812.025....

...Via's main point is that defense counsel who, in ignorance of the statute, allow clients to plead guilty to both theft and dealing in stolen property, are committing malpractice. I respectfully suggest that our committee on standard jury instructions *305 in criminal cases consider an instruction based on section 812.025.

...m of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property where these offenses are in connection with one scheme or course of conduct. *400 We find no merit in the first issue raised by the appellant. As to the second issue, the appellant is correct. See § 812.025, Fla....

...ling in stolen property because both charges arose from the same course of conduct. If it is true that both charges involved the same scheme or course of conduct, then defendant is correct that he can be convicted of only one of the two charges. See § 812.025, Fla....

...Second, we agree with the Defendant that his conviction for grand theft should be reversed. Convictions for both dealing in stolen property and grand theft violate double jeopardy when the convictions arise "in connection with one scheme or course of conduct...." § 812.025, Fla....

...Accordingly, we affirm that issue without further discussion. With respect to the sentence on remand, the briefs of both parties anticipate re-sentence will be for the dealing in stolen property conviction. We note, however, that neither brief cites Hall. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1999), provides that where a defendant is charged in connection with one scheme or course of conduct including both offenses, "the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both." In Hal...

...ellant. No appearance for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm appellant's judgment and sentence for dealing in stolen property, but we direct the trial court to enter an order vacating appellant's judgment of conviction and sentence for grand theft. See § 812.025, Fla....

...The evidence that Melendez participated in the burglary is circumstan *461 tial and not compelling without the code-fendants’ statements. Melendez also argues on appeal that his conviction and sentence for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property violates double jeopardy. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2012), provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme o...

...nduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. As the Florida Supreme Court explained in Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla. 2002), section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, “but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals property with the intent to appropriate said property to his own use ......

...y of both crimes.” Blackmon v. State, 121 So.3d 535, 541 (Fla.2013) (quoting Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230, 233 (Fla.1984)). The State contends that Melendez’s dual conviction for grand theft and dealing in stolen property is not prohibited by section 812.025 because Melendez could have been convicted of grand theft with respect to the stolen items that were never recovered (and thus not a basis for the charge of dealing in stolen property)....

...The State points out that the information charged him with grand theft of the iPad, Nikon camera, “or other personal property.” However, a similar argument was rejected by the Third District in Jones v. State, 453 So.2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). In Jones , the court agreed with the defendant that section 812.025 precluded his dual conviction for grand theft and dealing in stolen property, “notwithstanding the state’s attempt to circumvent the statute’s prohibition by limiting the grand theft count to the stolen car and limiting the dealing in stolen property to the stereo component system.” Id....

...later were all a portion of the same scheme or course of conduct ... the convictions and sentences for both ... cannot stand.” Id. Recently, the Florida Supreme Court held that the proper remedy on appeal for dual convictions rendered contrary to section 812.025, but where the defendant had failed to raise section 812.025 at trial, is to vacate the conviction and sentence of the lesser offense....

...$150.00. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts, i.e., grand theft and trafficking in stolen property. *857 At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel again urged that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury pursuant to Section 812.025, Florida Statutes, and moved for a new trial....

...812.014 and 812.019(1), but may not be charged with `organizing' under Section 812.019(2)." Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230, 234 (Fla. 1984). Appellant maintains, too, that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury pursuant to the provisions of Section 812.025, Florida Statutes, [1] and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.505 [2] cannot be cured by vacating the theft conviction....

...Rather, appellant urges the error can only be corrected by award of a new trial. The State, on the other hand, contends the proper remedy is that followed by the Fifth District in Ridley v. State, 407 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We agree with the State's view. In Ridley the court construed Section 812.025 with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.505: to require that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that guilty verdicts could not be returned as to both counts....

...Therefore, we reverse appellant's conviction and sentence imposed pursuant to Section 812.019(2), and remand for entry of adjudication of guilt and resentencing pursuant to Section 812.019(1), and Goddard v. State . ERVIN, C.J., and SHIVERS, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.025, Fla....

...Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee/cross-appellant. PER CURIAM. We have for review the appeal of Kennis Lee Schummer (Schummer), and the cross-appeal of the State. The jury found Schummer guilty of both dealing in stolen property and petit theft, despite that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1991), permits a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both....

...evidence to rebut this explanation for his possession of the steel bars. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court did not instruct the jury that it could not return a guilty verdict for both theft and dealing in stolen property pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), and Blackmon did not request such an instruction....

...Blackmon is not precluded from challenging his dual convictions for petit theft and dealing in stolen property on appeal even though he did not raise an objection below. See Rhames v. State, 473 So.2d 724, 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that defendant not precluded from raising section 812.025 issue on appeal even though no objection was made below because, based on the prohibition in the statute, conviction of both theft and dealing in stolen property would be analogous to being convicted of nonexistent crime); see also Aversano v. State, 966 So.2d 493, 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (stating that it was fundamental error for the trial court not to instruct the jury on its obligation under section 812.025). Our review of this issue is de novo. See Croom v. State, 36 So.3d 707, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (stating that de novo standard of review applies to claims of fundamental error); Beckham v. State, 884 So.2d 969, 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (same). Section 812.025, Florida Statutes, provides that: a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. In construing this statute, the Florida Supreme Court explained: The linchpin of section 812.025 is the defendant’s intended use of the stolen property....

...In that case, a jury found the defendant guilty of three counts of dealing in stolen property and one count of grand theft of the same property and in the same course of conduct. Id. at 811 . On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court fundamentally erred by failing to instruct the jury that, pursuant to section 812.025, it could not return a guilty verdict on both grand theft and dealing in stolen property....

...him guilty of only the dealing in stolen property count and, therefore, he was entitled to a new trial. Id. The Fourth District agreed and remanded for a new trial. Id. The court reasoned that the failure to instruct the jury on its obligation under section 812.025 prejudiced the defendant because, if properly instructed, the jury could have found the defendant guilty of only theft, the lesser offense....

...4th DCA 2008) (Klein, J., specially concurring) (“If the jury had followed the statute, and was required to choose, it might well have returned a verdict only on the theft charge.”)). Accord Aversano, 966 So.2d at 497 (stating in dicta that “Hall and a plain reading of [section 812.025] make it clear that the state was not entitled to have a jury convict [the defendant] of both [grand theft and dealing in stolen property] counts and then have the trial court adjudicate her guilty of grant theft”)....

...properly instruct the jury, “this court, rather than the jury, must now relieve appellant of one of the two convictions.... ” Id. (quoting Ridley, 407 So.2d at 1002 ). There is some attraction to the Fourth District’s reasoning in Kiss because section 812.025, by its terms, imposes an obligation on the trier of fact (here, the jury), not the trial court. Nevertheless, we dis *347 agree with Kiss that the proper remedy for the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on section 812.025 is a new trial....

...The defendant pled nolo contendere to those charges. Id. The trial court accepted the plea and adjudicated the defendant guilty of both offenses. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred when it adjudicated him guilty of both offenses in violation of section 812.025....

...The Fourth District affirmed, concluding that the statute did not apply when the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere. Id. at 270 . On review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision. Id. at 272 . The court reasoned that: Section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief who steals proper...

...ndeavors to traffic in the stolen property.... Just as the trier of fact must make a choice if the defendant goes to trial, so too must the trial judge make a choice if the defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere to both counts-Thus, we find that section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct pursuant to a plea of nolo con-tendere. Id. at 271 . Notably, the supreme court did not construe section 812.025 to preclude a defendant from entering pleas to both theft and dealing with stolen property; rather, the court construed the statute to prohibit the trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both offenses....

...Anderson, 905 So.2d 111, 115-16 (Fla.2005) (holding that score-sheet error requires resentencing unless record conclusively shows that same sentence would have been imposed using correct scoresheet). We also certify conflict with Kiss regarding the proper remedy when, contrary to section 812.025, the defendant is convicted of both theft and dealing in stolen property....

...Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from an order of adjudication of delinquency and order of commitment in which appellant was found guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property. Appellant raises two points on appeal. First, that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983), prevents the imposition of an adjudication of delinquency for both offenses where he is charged with both in the same information and both charges involve the same property....

...challenges the imposition of certain unannounced fees and costs in all six cases. With respect to the dual adjudications for dealing in stolen property and theft in case numbers 1D16-3189 and 1D16-3190, the State properly concedes error. Pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes, a court is precluded from allowing a defendant to plead guilty to both offenses if they are based on a single course of conduct....

...atter of both offenses being the same property, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both charges. Appellant maintains that it was error for the trial judge to instruct the jury that a guilty verdict could be returned on both charges, citing Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1977), which permits trial for theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct, but provides that the jury may return a guilty verdict for only one of the offenses....

...r obtaining control of the property with the intent to sell, transfer or distribute it. These additional elements, furthermore, are separate and distinct from the essential elements of the crime of theft. Thus, absent the prohibition of the statute, Section 812.025, we can envision no reason why a person might not be the thief and also be guilty of dealing in the same stolen property....

...t for time served. On the grand theft conviction, the court adjudicated the defendant but did not impose any sentence. The defendant appealed, correctly asserting that he could not be convicted of both dealing in stolen property and grand theft. See § 812.025, Fla....

...3.800(b)(2)(B) & 3.800(b)(1)(B) *293 (2008). The defendant also challenges that denial in this appeal. We affirm the denial of the defendant's request for a new trial. We recognize that a trial court commits fundamental error by failing to instruct a jury, pursuant to section 812.025, that it may return a guilty verdict on either dealing in stolen property or grand theft, but not both....

accordance with section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008). Id. at 12-13. Section 812.025, “Charging theft

...Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Joshua Allen Poole was charged with burglary, dealing in stolen property, and grand theft. At trial, the court did not instruct the jury that it could not find Poole guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property under section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), and Poole did not request such an instruction....

...quitted him of *432 burglary. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the theft charge and sentenced Poole only for dealing in stolen property. On appeal, Poole argues that the trial court fundamentally erred by failing to instruct the jury that under section 812.025, it could not return a guilty verdict for both theft and dealing in stolen property and that he is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Kiss v. State, 42 So.3d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). In Williams v. State, 66 So.3d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), this court held that the court's failure to instruct the jury on section 812.025 does not constitute fundamental error warranting a new trial....

...Accordingly, we affirm Poole's judgment and sentence and as in Williams, we certify conflict with Kiss and certify the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court: I. MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY TO PERFORM THE SELECTION PROCESS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 812.025 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES? II....

...III (grand theft) and count IV (dealing in stolen property) of the information filed against appellant. Count III charged appellant with grand theft of Kathleen Gianferrara's jewelry. Count IV charged him with dealing in the stolen jewelry. Although section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981), permits a single information, under proper circumstances, to charge in separate counts both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct, the statute only allows the...

...The court accepted the plea, adjudicated the defendant guilty, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to 180 days in jail. On appeal, the defendant now argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating him guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property charges in connection with one scheme or course of conduct. § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2006). Section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct. Toson v. State, 864 So.2d 552, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); § 812.025, Fla....

...eft charge. [2] The State argues that the defendant waived his right to appeal from the underlying charges because adjudication was initially withheld. See Kilmartin v. State, 848 So.2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). This argument is without merit. Section 812.025 precludes a court from "allowing" a defendant to plead guilty or no contest to both theft and dealing in stolen goods....

...He argues that the court erred in adjudicating and sentencing him for both petit theft and dealing in stolen property. The State properly conceded error on this issue. While a defendant may be charged with both theft and dealing in stolen property when relating to the same property, he cannot be convicted of both crimes. § 812.025, Fla....

of theft and dealing in stolen property. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2010). This statute has allowed the

...Samuel Arthur Bishop appeals judgments and sentences for grand theft in the first degree, a first-degree felony, and dealing in stolen property, a second-degree felony. It is undisputed that both offenses arose out of one scheme or course of conduct. We affirm the judgment and sentence for grand theft. Pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1995), we strike the judgment and sentence for the less serious offense of dealing in stolen property....

...dealing in stolen property because each offense requires an element that the other does not. Blair v. State, 667 So.2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (discussing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)). Nevertheless, section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2006) prohibits convictions for both crimes where a single charging document charges "theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct." Toson v. State, 864 So.2d 552, 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). In that circumstance, the "trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts." § 812.025, Fla....

...When analyzing the issue, the trial court focused its attention on the fact that multiple guns were taken from the residence instead of analyzing whether the theft counts and dealing in stolen property count were distinct and unrelated criminal incidents. When the proper analysis is applied, it is clear that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2006) prohibits the adjudication on the three grand theft charges and the dealing in stolen property charge in this case....

...The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court violated a Florida statute by adjudicating Gordon guilty of both dealing in stolen property and grand theft. The state concedes error. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate one of the charges and resentence Gordon. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2006), provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. Thus, section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property where the two charges arise from the same course of conduct....

...el. Kablitz v. State, 13 So.3d 155, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). We granted his petition, concluding appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising as fundamental error that convictions for both theft and dealing in stolen property were prohibited by section 812.025, Florida Statutes....

...ase and are, except in exceptional circumstances, no longer open for discussion or consideration in subsequent proceedings in the case.”). Not previously raised, Kablitz asserts that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury — pursuant to section 812.025 — that he could be convicted of dealing in stolen property or theft, but not both, constitutes fundamental error....

...Crosby argues that the trial court reversibly erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss his trial counsel without first holding a Nelson 1 hearing, in failing to renew the offer of assistance of counsel before permitting Mr. Crosby to represent *824 himself at trial, and in failing to properly instruct the jury under section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...1st DCA 1988). Accordingly, Mr. Crosby has not established reversible error based upon the trial court’s failure to renéw the offer of counsel before voir dire or the evidentiary portion of the trial. FAILURE TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY UNDER SECTION 812.025 In an amended information filed on November 22, 2010, the State charged Mr....

...Crosby with grand theft, dealing in stolen property, and providing false information to a pawn broker. Mr. Crosby allegedly committed all of the offenses on September 15, 2009, and all of the offenses involved the same property, a Dell D630 laptop computer. During the jury charge conference, Mr. Crosby argued that under section 812.025 the trial court was required to instruct the jury that it could convict Mr....

...Crosby *827 guilty of dealing in stolen property and false verification of ownership to a pawn shop in accord with the jury’s verdict. Mr. Crosby filed a motion for new trial in which he argued that he was entitled to a new trial as a result of the trial court’s failure to comply with section 812.025....

...not both offenses. Further, he asserts that the trial court’s attempt to correct the error by permitting the State to dismiss the grand theft charge after the verdict was an insufficient cure and that he is entitled to a new trial. 4 We disagree. Section 812.025 provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in sep...

...lty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. This court recently observed in Williams v. State, 66 So.3d 360, 362 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review granted, 70 So.3d 588 (Fla.2011), that when a trial court has not instructed the jury under section 812.025 and has permitted the jury to consider and convict a defendant of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property, “this court has consistently reversed only the lesser offense and, if necessary, remanded the case for resentencing w...

...And we concluded that the trial court did not reversibly err when it permitted the jury to consider and convict Mr. Williams of both offenses, after which the trial court dismissed the lesser of the two offenses. Id. at 362-65 . We questioned whether an adequate jury instruction under section 812.025 could ever be fashioned, noting, in part, that the statute provides no guidance or criteria for a jury to use in selecting the appropriate offense if it finds that the evidence establishes that a defendant is guilty of both. Id. at 363-64 . Thus we certified three questions of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court as follows: 1. MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY TO PERFORM THE- SELECTION PROCESS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 812.025 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES? 2....

...ole v. State, 67 So.3d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (same). Based upon this court’s decision in Williams , we reject Mr. Crosby’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on its failure to instruct the jury under section 812.025....

...In addition, we certify conflict with Kiss , and we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the three questions certified in Williams . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm Mr. Crosby’s convictions and sentences. With respect to Mr. Crosby’s argument concerning the requested jury instruction under section 812.025, we certify conflict with Kiss and repeat our certification of the three questions certified in Williams ....

...te counsel was indubitably constitutionally ineffective. See Barber v. State, 918 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising issue that convictions for both theft and dealing in stolen property were prohibited by § 812.025). Petition granted. FARMER, STEVENSON and LEVINE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 812.025, Fla....

...unt I. He filed a motion on April 30, 1996, to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. The trial court ruled Dasher could not be sentenced for both petit theft and trafficking in stolen property pursuant to section 812.025, Fla.Stat....

...both, of the counts. Accordingly, the trial court struck the sentence Dasher had been given, for the trafficking count—fifteen years probation. The state concedes that Dasher was improperly convicted of both petit theft and trafficking pursuant to section 812.025....

...The defendant's convictions for both dealing in stolen property (§ 812.019, Fla.Stat.) and grand theft (§ 812.014, Fla.Stat.) in connection with one scheme or course of conduct was improper. See, Hernandez v. State, 636 So.2d 605 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (citing, § 812.025, Fla....

...State, 24 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), L.O.J. v. State, 974 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and Pomaski v. State, 989 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), a defendant may properly be charged with both theft and dealing in stolen property. However, when the offenses are committed “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct . . . the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts.” § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2009). The question raised in this case relates to the proper remedy on appeal where a defendant has been adjudicated guilty of theft and dealing in stolen property in violation of section 812.025, following an open plea of guilty or no contest....

...cient mental capacity to enter the plea and that there was a factual basis for the plea, the trial court adjudicated Anucinski guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property. Anucinski did not contend at the plea hearing that, based on section 812.025, the court could not adjudicate her guilty of both offenses....

...roperty count and four years of probation on the grand theft count, which were ordered to run concurrently with each other. Anucinski appealed her dual adjudications of guilt, claiming that the trial court committed fundamental error—per section 812.025—by accepting her plea and adjudicating her guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property. The Second District reversed, holding that, based on section 812.025, the trial court erred in adjudicating Anucinski guilty of both offenses....

...Id. at 882 (citation omitted). The district court reasoned that there was “no factual determination left to be made by the trial court” and that its decision fosters judicial economy. Id. ANALYSIS Section 812.025, provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. -4- § 812.025, Fla. Stat. Adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in accordance with a plea of guilty or no contest violates section 812.025, if the offenses were “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.” The question raised is whether the proper remedy on appeal for such violation is to remand the case back to the trial court to decide which count to v...

...s argued by the State. Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2007). Hall, Blackmon,3 and Williams4 In Hall, we held that “section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere.” 826 So. 2d at 271. We explained that Section 812.025 allows the State to charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts, but the trier of fact must then determine whether the defendant is a common thief...

...e intent to appropriate said property to [his or her] own use or to the use of a person not entitled to the use of the property or whether the defendant traffics or endeavors to traffic in the stolen property. The linchpin of section 812.025 is the defendant’s intended use of the stolen property. The legislative scheme allows this element to be developed at trial and it is upon this evidence that the trier of fact may find the defendant 3....

...and for him to be resentenced on the remaining count. Id. at 272. Recently, this Court decided Blackmon and Williams, which both involved jury trials. In Blackmon, we held that the defendant’s convictions of petit theft and dealing in stolen property violated section 812.025, and that the trial court erred in (1) failing to instruct the jury on section 812.025, and (2) adjudicating the defendant guilty of both offenses....

...Finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate fundamental error, this Court approved the district court’s reversal of the petit theft conviction. Id. at 549, 551. Unlike the defendant in Blackmon, the defendant in Williams requested for the trial judge to instruct the jury under section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008). 121 So. 3d at 526. We concluded that the defendant’s convictions of grand theft and dealing in stolen property violated section 812.025, and that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the statute, and in precluding the defendant -6- from arguing to the jury that it could find him guilty of either offense....

...at 534. Finding the errors not to be harmless, we determined that the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id. We held in Williams that when both theft and dealing in stolen property counts are submitted to a jury, the trial court must provide an instruction on section 812.025....

...grand thefts, which had resulted from a plea of no contest). This Case As a threshold matter, we find that Anucinski is not precluded from raising her claim that her dual adjudications of guilt violate section 812.025 even though the argument was not raised in the trial court. We conclude that Anucinski’s grand theft and dealing in stolen property offenses, which involved the theft of a ring and the pawning thereof the same day, were “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct” under section 812.025....

...steel bars and approximately two hours later sold them to a scrap yard). Therefore, the trial court erred in adjudicating Anucinski guilty of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property, following her open plea of guilty or no contest, contrary to section 812.025. See Hall, 826 So. 2d at 271 (“[W]e find that section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere.”); Blackmon, 121 So....

...In this case we consider the proper remedy on appeal when a defendant— who has entered an unbargained-for, open plea to the court—is improperly convicted of both theft and dealing in stolen property “in connection with one scheme or course of conduct,” contrary to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), but the defendant failed to preserve the error in the trial court....

...the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.” Id. When one of these exceptions comes into play, dual convictions are understood to be double jeopardy violations. An additional exception to the general rule of separate sentences for each offense exists in section 812.025—the statute at issue here— which provides that a defendant may be convicted of either theft or dealing in stolen property, but not both, where those charges relate to “one scheme or course of conduct.” When dual conv...

...1988) (stating that when “one of two convictions must fall, we hold that the conviction of the lesser crime should be set aside”). As I have previously explained, “[t]here is no more harm [when the lesser conviction is vacated due to a violation of section 812.025] than there is under section 775.021(4) when impermissible dual convictions have been returned and the conviction for the lesser offense has been set aside.” Williams v....

...Therefore, when impermissible dual convictions for theft and dealing in stolen property are imposed, the remedy - 12 - should also be to vacate the lesser conviction. The majority has never provided a cogent explanation for why impermissible dual convictions under section 812.025 should be treated differently than impermissible dual convictions under section 775.021(4)(b)....

...such an instruction. Id. at 539. The jury found Blackmon guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property. Id. The trial court thereafter adjudicated Blackmon guilty of both offenses and sentenced him for each offense. Id. Blackmon did not bring section 812.025 to the trial court’s attention, and he did not object to the dual convictions or sentences....

...1969) (“[W]e think that the plea of guilty in this situation is correctly accorded the effect of a jury verdict . . . .”). Like Blackmon, Anucinski did not object to the dual convictions - 14 - and sentences, and she did not bring section 812.025 to the attention of the trial court. The trial courts in each of these cases erred in entering convictions for both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct....

...Appellant was originally charged with dealing in stolen property and grand theft of certain fishing equipment belonging to Jesse Moore. At the close of the evidence, the trial judge reduced the grand theft charge to petit theft. The jury found appellant guilty on both counts but, pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes, the trial judge vacated the petit theft conviction....

...r the first time on appeal. While appellant relies on Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla.2002), for the proposition that conviction of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property violates double jeopardy, Hall is based upon a construction of section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1999), which precludes conviction for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property if they flow from one scheme....

...Wilkins argues that the trial court's remedy was erroneous. He asserts that he is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Kiss v. State, 42 So.3d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), arguing that the trial court fundamentally erred by failing to instruct the jury that under section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2006), it could not return a guilty verdict for both grand theft and dealing in stolen property....

...ansaction is also included within the theft. At trial, the court did not instruct the jury that it could find Mr. Wilkins guilty of either grand theft or dealing in stolen property, but not both, and Mr. Wilkins did not request this instruction. See § 812.025 (providing that under proper circumstances a defendant may be charged with and tried for both "theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct ..., but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts")....

...ling in stolen property, as a second-degree felony, but not for grand theft, as a third-degree felony in this case. This is the same procedure "that most, if not all, circuit courts have used in this district for many years" to satisfy the intent of section 812.025. Williams, 66 So.3d at 362. In Williams, which was decided after Kiss, this court held that a new trial was not warranted on the basis of the trial court's failure to give an instruction on section 812.025, even when the defendant requested the instruction and preserved the issue for review....

...State, 134 So.3d- 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), which was quashed by the Florida Supreme Court following its decision in Blackmon v. State, 121 So.3d 535, 548-49 (Fla.2013) (holding that a trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury pursuant to section 812.025 was “not fundamental error such that we would require a new trial.”)....

...It is well-settled that, while the State may charge both, only one conviction may stand. Hall v. State, 826 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla.2002); Hale v. State, 838 So.2d 1185, 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); T.S.R. v. State, 596 So.2d 766, 767-68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); § 812.025, Fla....

...This remains the case even where only some of the property alleged stolen is dealt. See Corvo v. State, 916 So.2d 44, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (rejecting the argument the State *570 makes here and reversing sentence of grand theft); Toson v. State, 864 So.2d 552, 554-55 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (vacating convictions under section 812.025 though several items stolen were not alleged to be dealt)....

...He raises three issues, asserting two errors in the jury instructions and an error in the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. As to the issue regarding the failure to give a jury instruction on dealing in stolen property and grand theft pursu *522 ant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2011), we affirm and certify conflict with Kiss v....

...The State charged Culpepper with burglary of a dwelling, dealing in stolen property, grand theft, and false verification of ownership to pawnbroker, and the jury found Culpepper guilty as charged. Because the grand theft and dealing in stolen property charges arose from “one scheme or course of conduct,” see § 812.025, the trial court dismissed the grand theft count....

...The court then adjudicated Culpepper guilty of the z'emaining charges. Culpepper contends that the trial court should have given his requested instruction to the jury that it could return a verdict for dealing in stolen property or grand theft, but not both, pursuant to Kiss, 42 So.3d 810 , and section 812.025. Culpepper acknowledges this court’s precedent to the contrary in Williams v. State, 66 So.3d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, 70 So.3d 588 (Fla.2011), in which this court determined that the jury instruction regarding section 812.025 is not warranted and failure to give the instruction does not require a new trial....

...2d DCA 2011); Williams, 66 So.3d at 365 . We again certify conflict with Kiss and certify the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court that this court certified in Williams : 1.MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY TO PERFORM THE SELECTION PROCESS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 812.025 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES? 2....

...ER CURIAM. Appellant raises a number of issues, all of which we affirm except as to the claim that his dual convictions for dealing in stolen property and grand theft (of $300 or more but less .than $5,000) violate principles of double jeopardy. See § 812.025, Fla....

...and Kurt T. Koehler, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. April 2, 2026 PER CURIAM. Appellant correctly claims that his dual convictions for grand theft and dealing in stolen property violated section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2023), where his theft and sale of an RV trailer on the same morning were in conjunction with one scheme or course of conduct....

LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2010), precludes such a

property and grand theft violate the mandates of section 812.025, Florida Statutes. According to that section

jury must be instructed in accordance with section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008). Id. at

The issue presented by this case is whether section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983), prohibits dual convictions

adjudicate him guilty of petit theft. We agree. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1989), reads as follows:

committed during a single, ongoing scheme. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2015). The State concedes this error

arise from the same scheme or' course of conduct. § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2013). The evidence adduced at trial

scheme or course of conduct were prohibited by section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2010). See Hall v. State

to instruct petitioner’s jury, pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2004).1 We held this case

ground. Appellant’s second point argues that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981), prevents the state

v. State, 408 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (1981). We conclude that the present

arising out of one course of conduct, *484as in section 812.025, which provides that in cases of theft and

from the same scheme or course of conduct. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2011). This is so even when a defendant

He asserts that the trial court violated section 812.025, Florida Statutes, when it adjudicated him

single scheme or course of conduct contrary to section 812.025. Appellant’s third point was that his dual

connection with one scheme or course of conduct....’ § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2005).” Id. at 46; see also Hall

the dual sentences cannot stand pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2001). The statute provides:

State, 397 So.2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm the convictions

degree felony of dealing in stolen property. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1995) prohibits convictions

scheme or course of conduct. In such instances, section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2011), prohibits convictions

following special jury instruction based on section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009): Defendant is charged

under the circumstances of this case, under section 812.025, Florida Statutes, he cannot be convicted of

vehicle with an altered manufacturer’s number. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1981), prohibits adjudicating

Consequently, under this court’s holding in Jones and section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1987),1 the defendant’s

concedes, that Appellant’s convictions violate section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2015), which prohibits dual

v. State, 446 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (1991). After remand the trial court

contending that the dual convictions violate section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2015), as they arose from

one scheme or course of conduct was improper. § 812.025, Fla.Stat. T.S.R. v. State, 596 So.2d 766 (Fla

dealing in stolen property in the instant case. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), provides: Notwithstanding

violation of sections 812.014(1) and (2)(c). Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1995) prohibits convictions

So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 2002) (finding that section 812.025, Florida Statutes, prohibits a trial court

PER CURIAM. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1979) permits a finding of guilt of either theft or dealing

dealing in stolen property in this ease. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2010) (stating that only one of these

2002), the Florida Supreme Court held that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2000), prohibits a trial

denied. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B). Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2002), expressly prohibits

trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2011), does not constitute

Appellant raises two points on appeal. First, that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983), prevents the imposition

theft and dealing in stolen property because section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), bars dual convictions

State, 596 So.2d 766, 767-68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2003). This remains the case even

theft and dealing in stolen property violate section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2014), which provides:

equal protection principles because under Section 812.025, Florida Statutes, defendants who elect to

grand theft and dealing in stolen property. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2006), prohibits convictions

conviction of grand theft was contrary to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1999), which prohibits an

stolen property in connection with one scheme. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1999), prohibits an individual

180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)). Nevertheless, section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2006) prohibits convictions

failing to instruct the jury that pursuant to section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2011), he could not be convicted

So.2d 1379, 1380 (Fla.1991) (holding that section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1983), does not prohibit

based upon the one course of conduct alleged. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (1999). ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and CASANUEVA

theft arising out of the same episode. Ridley; § 812.025, Fla.Stat. (1983). The conviction for dealing

connection with one scheme or course of conduct. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2010) (providing that a defendant

grand theft and dealing in stolen property. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1995), prohibits a defendant

grand theft and dealing in stolen property. Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1995), prohibits a defendant

committed during a single, ongoing scheme. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2015). The State concedes this error

000) violate principles of double jeopardy. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (2014); Blackmon v. State, 121 So

other grounds, 698 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1997). Section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1997), entitled “Charging

vacate the inadvertently entered judgment. See § 812.025, Fla. Stat. (1999). Affirmed in part; reversed

therefore he cannot be convicted of both under section 812.025, Florida Statutes. Although there is no direct

in stolen property and grand theft violated section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008); that the trial court

in stolen property and grand theft violated section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2008); that the trial court

fundamental error in failing to instruct the jury on section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2009), because the theft

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1989). DAUKSCH, GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ

v. State, 397 So.2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); § 812.025, Fla.Stat. (1981). Given our reversal of the grand