The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Finally we note that Florida was in the forefront in attempting to address the new problems arising from the advent of widespread computer use. Our legislature, in 1978, was the first to enact a specialized computer crimes statute. Hurewitz Lo, supra, at n. 144. At that time it specifically found that "[c]omputer related crime is a growing problem in government as well as the private sector." § 815.02, Fla. Stat. (1979). The other states' legislatures must have agreed because now all but one have enacted similar provisions. Our review of these statutes disclosed that some states have enacted specific provisions that criminalize behavior arguably not forbidden under Florida's statutory scheme. Missouri, for example, prohibits invasion of privacy by use of a computer. § 569.095(5), Mo. Rev. Stat.Ann. (1991) (computer tampering occurs when a person "[a]cesses a computer, computer system, or a computer network and intentionally examines information about another person"). California has criminalized the knowing introduction of a "computer contaminant" such as a virus or worm into a computer, network or system. § 502, Ca. Penal Code (1992). Because of the explosion in…
. . . Code §§ 42-815 & 42-815.02, to-provide him notice of his right to “foreclosure mediation.” . . .
. . . This is the aggregate net payment after deduction of the administrative fee of $815.02. . . .
. . . Plaintiffs primarily argue that D.C.Code § 1-815.02 gives federal courts “exclusive jurisdiction” over . . .
. . . this Court has exclusive jurisdiction and venue over at least one of these claims under D.C.Code § l-815.02 . . . (Opp. at 11 (citing D.C.Code § 1-815.02).) . . . Code § 1-815.02(a) (providing jurisdiction only for actions arising under Chapter 8). . . . plaintiffs also argue that this Court is "completely precluded” from "claim splitting” based on § l-815.02 . . . claim splitting argument is likely without merit, because the Court rejects the application of § 1-815.02 . . .
. . . The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, as amended, D.C.Code § 1-815.02(a), vests "exclusive jurisdiction” over . . .
. . . Code § 42-815.02(a)(ll)(B)(iv). . . . Code § 42-815.02(a)(ll)(B)(iv). . . .
. . . (A) of this paragraph to the Mayor; and (2) Obtain a mediation certificate in accordance with § 42-815.02 . . .
. . . plaintiffs insist that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this case pursuant to D.C.Code § 1-815.02 . . . See D.C.Code § 1-815.02(a) (providing jurisdiction only for actions arising under Chapter 8). . . . Therefore, D.C.Code § 1-815.02(a) is irrelevant. . . .
. . . D.C.Code § 42-815.02(a)(ll)(B)(iv). . . .
. . . .” § 815.02, Fla.Stat. (1979). . . .
. . . . § 815.02, 815.05. There is no evidence that the proceedings against Gumz had reached this stage. . . .
. . . . § 815.02 (West 1977), and the execution must be “issued from and be sealed with the seal of the court . . .